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LINCOLN  ROOM 

UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS 
LIBRARY 


MEMORIAL 

the  Class  of  1901 

founded  by 

HARLAN  HOYT  HORNER 

and 

HENRIETTA  CALHOUN  HORNER 


LIFE  AND  PUBLIC 
SERVICES  OF 

EDWIN  M.  STANTON 

.   BY 

GEORGE  C.  GORHAM 

WITH  PORTRAITS,  MAPS,  AND  FACSIMILES 
OF  IMPORTANT  LETTERS 

IN  TWO  VOLUMES 
VOLUIME  I. 


BOSTON  AND  NEW  YORK 
HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN  AND  COMPANY 

1899 


COPYKIGHT,  1899,  BY  LEWIS  H.  STANTON 
ALL  RIGHTS  RESERVED 


PREFACE 

Although  this  book  contains  a  sketch  of  Mr.  Stan- 
ton's early  life,  his  professional  career,  and  his  general 
characteristics,  its  main  purpose  is  to  present  the  record 
of  his  relation  to  the  civil  war,  and  to  mark  the  place 
in  history  to  which  his  services  to  the  country  entitle 
him.  His  public  life  embraced  the  secession  winter  of 
1860-61,  three  years  of  the  civil  war,  — 1862-65,  — 
and  three  years  of  the  reconstruction  struggle  which 
followed  it.  He  died  in  1869,  while  yet  the  passions 
of  those  times  were  at  the  highest.  The  story,  there- 
fore, of  his  public  career  is  as  stormy  as  the  period  in 
which  he  wrought ;  and  his  claims  upon  the  respect  and 
gratitude  of  his  countrymen  rest  chiefly  upon  the  part 
he  took  in  the  preservation  of  the  Union. 

It  is  thirty  years  since  this  great  American  ended 
his  work ;  and  the  country,  then  torn  by  faction,  and 
divided  into  two  warring  sections,  is  now  thoroughly 
reunited.  Time  and  a  revival  of  national  pride  and 
patriotic  feeling  have  extinguished  the  violent  animosi- 
ties of  that  period,  and  the  wounds  thus  healed  are  in 


iv  PREFACE 

no  danger  of  being  reopened  by  such  recitals  as  are 

necessary  to  illustrate  Stanton's  work  and  his  motives. 

On  the  contrary,  the  author  beHeves  that  the  time  has 

come  when  the  judgment  of  all  Americans — North  and 

South  —  who  rejoice  in   the  possession  of  a  reunited 

country  may  confidently  be  invoked  upon  the  patriotic 

services  of  the  great  War  Minister  to  whom  so  much  is 

due  for  the  grand  result. 

G.  C.  G. 
Washington,  D.  C,  January  2, 1899. 


CONTENTS 


PAET  I 

EARLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 


CHAPTER  I 

Prefatory.  —  Ancestry.  —  School-Days.  —  Death  of  his  Father. 

—  Clerk  in  a  Store  at  Thirteen.  —  Preparations  for  College. 

—  Characteristics  as  a  Boy.  —  His  Struggle  for  an  Educa- 
tion. —  His  College  Course  unfinished  for  Want  of  Means     .       1 

CHAPTER  II 

A  Miniature  Disunion  Struggle  at  Kenyon  College,  in  which 
Stanton  "  goes  over  to  Jackson."  —  Admitted  to  the  Bar.  — 
Married 11 

CHAPTER  III 

His  Choice  between  the  Political  Parties  in  1836.  —  A  Politi- 
cal Review.  —  Jackson  and  the  United  States  Bank.  —  For- 
mation of  the  Whig  Party.  —  Its  Elements.  —  Calhoun  a 
Whig  Leader.  —  Van  Buren's  Election.  —  Toleration  on  the 
Slavery  Question 19 

CHAPTER   IV 

Resumes  his  Residence  in  Steubenville.  —  Relations  with  Sen- 
ator Tappan.  —  His  Part  in  the  Campaign  of  1840      ...     25 

CHAPTER  V 

His  Great  Success  as  a  Lawyer.  —  "  The  Divine  Alchemy  of 
Work."  —  His  First  Case  in  Washington.  —  Removal  to 
Pittsburg.  —  His  Career  there.  —  Second  Marriage     ...     31 


vi  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  VI 
Argument  of  IVIr.  Stanton  in  the  "Wheeling  Bridge  Case  in  the 
United  States  Supreme  Court.  —  His  Methods  in  preparing 
for  an  Argument 38 

CHAPTER  VII 
Removal  to  Washington.  —  Employed  by  the  Government  as 
Special  Counsel  in  California  Land  Cases.  —  The  Limantour 
Fraud 46 

CHAPTER  Vni 

Mr.  Stanton  in  California.  —  His  Work  there.  —  Collection  and 
Arrangement  of  the  Mexican  Archives 51 

CHAPTER  IX 

The  Limantour  Case.  —  The  Claim  rejected.  —  Zeal,  Ability, 
and  Ingenuity  of  Stanton  in  conducting  the  Case     ....     57 

CHAPTER  X 

Overthrow  of  the  Forged  Claim  to  the  New  Almaden  Quick- 
silver Mine. — Stanton's  Work  in  California.  —  Land  Cases 
in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 67 

CHAPTER  XI 

Mr.  Stanton's  Political  Views,  Antecedents,  and  Antagonisms. 
—  A  Freesoiler  in  1848.  —  The  "  Union-Saving  "  Era  from 
1850  to  1860.  —  Pro-Slavery  Whigs  adopt  the  Anti-Slavery 
Shibboleth.  —  Stanton's  Aversion  to  the  Whigs.  —  His  Posi- 
tion in  1856-60. —  The  Support  he  gave  Buchanan     ...     71 

PAKT  II 

THE  SECESSION  WINTER.  —  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S 

CABINET 


CHAPTER  Xn 

Appointed  Attorney-General,   December  20,  1860.  —  Review 
of   the  Political  Situation.  —  The  Presidential  Election. — 


CONTENTS  vii 

The  Disunion  Conspiracy.  —  Movements  in  South  Caro- 
lina. —  Her  Agents  in  Washington.  —  Floyd's  Treason.  — 
Buchanan's  Message  revised  by  Jefferson  Davis       ....     81 

CHAPTER   XIII 
Mr.  Buchanan  asks  Attorney-General  Black's  Opinion.  —  The 
Opinion,  November  20,  1860.  —  The  Same   analyzed   and 
reviewed.  —  The  Anti-Coercion  Doctrine 94 

CHAPTER   XIV 
President  Buchanan's  Last  Annual  Message.  —  Censure  of  the 
North  and  Apology  for  the  South.  —  Unconstitutional  to  use 
Force  to  preserve  the  Union 106 

CHAPTER  XV 

The  Southern  Forts.  —  Resignation  of  Cass,  Secretary  of  State. 
—  Secession  Pronunciamento  at  Washington.  —  Secession  of 
South  Carolina.  —  Demand  for  Surrender  of  Fort  Sumter     .  Ill 

CHAPTER   XVI 

Stanton  accepts  Appointment.  —  Judge  Black's  Influence  in 
the  Matter.  —  Why  exercised.  —  His  New  Attitude.  — 
Perils  of  the  Administration 121 

CHAPTER  XVII 

The  South  Carolina  Commissioners.  —  Anderson's  Movement 
at  Charleston.  —  Jefferson  Davis  urges  the  President  to  sur- 
render Fort  Sumter.  —  Submission  of  the  Question  to  the 
Cabinet 127 

CHAPTER  XVIII 

The  Cabinet  Crisis.  —  Anderson's  Instructions.  —  Buchanan's 
Pledge  to  South  Carolina.  —  Floyd's  Demand.  —  The  Presi- 
dent's Irresolution 131 

CHAPTER  XIX 

The  President  confers  with  the  Commissioners.  —  The  Strug- 
gle in  the  Cabinet.  —  Stanton's  Attitude.  —  Resignation  of 
Floyd.  —  The  President's  Letter  to  the  South  Carolina  Com- 
missioners. —  His  Final  Break  with  the  Secessionists  .     .     .  142 


viii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  XX 
Stanton's  Account  of  the  Cabinet  Crisis.  —  Judge  Holt  on  the 
Same 149 

CHAPTER  XXI 

New  Departure  of  the  Administration.  —  Anderson's  Act  ap- 
proved. —  Attempt  to  reinforce  Sumter.  —  Rebel  Attack  on 
the  Star  of  the  West.  —  Treason  of  Jacob  Thompson.  — 
His  Resignation.  —  Anderson's  Truce.  —  The  Confederacy 
erected.  —  Attempts  at  Compromise.  —  War  not  then  seri- 
ously thought  of.  —  No  War  Party.  —  The  Government  and 
the  Secessionists  equally  disinclined  to  open  Hostilities     .     .  160 

CHAPTER  XXII 

Mr.  Stanton's  Work  during  the  Remainder  of  his  Term  as  At- 
torney-General. —  Freedom  from  Disguises.  —  He  affiliates 
with  Union  Men  of  all  Parties,  and  antagonizes  all  Others. 
Fidelity  to  the  President.  —  The  Plot  to  seize  the  National 
Capital.  —  Stanton's  Interview  with  Sumner.  —  Alarm  of 
Black.  —  The  Real  Peril.  —  How  it  was  averted  by  the  Pre- 
sence of  Troops.  —  Importance  of  Stanton's  Services  at  that 
Time 165 

CHAPTER  XXIII 

Mr.  Stanton's  Democracy  and  his  Patriotism.  —  His  Attitude 
towards  Slavery.  —  The  Pro-Slavery  Constitution.  —  His 
Views  on  Compromise  Propositions,  compared  with  those  of 
Mr.  Lincoln.  —  Patriotic  Motives  of  Both.  —  Necessity  of 
making  Union  and  not  Anti-Slavery  the  Test.  —  The  Outlook 
for  Emancipation  at  that  Time.  —  The  Northern  Disunion- 
ists 176 

CHAPTER  XXIV 
Expiration  of  Buchanan's  Administration.  —  Summary  of  his 
Course  towards  the  South.  —  Stanton's  Great  Influence  upon 
him 187 


CONTENTS 


PART  III 

STANTON'S  DISCONTENT.  —  OPENING  OF  THE  REBEL- 
LION 


CHAPTER  XXV 

1861.  —  The  Accession  of  Mr.  Lincoln.  —  The  Situation.  — 
Jealousy  and  Distrust  among  the  Unionists 191 

CHAPTER  XXVI 

Surrender  of  Fort  Sumter  favored  by  the  Lincoln  Cabinet.  — 
Effect  of  Supposed  Non-Resistant  Policy  of  Mr.  Lincoln  on 
Union  Democrats.  —  Mr.  Stanton  as  a  Representative  Man 
of  this  Class.  —  His  Letter  to  a  Friend  in  1861  on  the  Union 
Question.  —  His  Aid  or  Advice  not  sought  by  the  Republican 
Administration.  —  Did  not  meet  Lincoln  while  President 
until  he  was  appointed  Secretary  of  War.  —  The  Hostility 
between  Republicans  and  Union  Democrats  explained.  — 
Bombardment  of  Fort  Sumter 197 

CHAPTER  XXVII 

The  Attack  on  Sumter.  —  Stanton  on  the  Outlook.  —  His  "Want 
of  Confidence  in  Mr.  Lincoln.  —  The  Reasons  for  it.  —  Mr. 
Buchanan  declares  his  Allegiance  to  the  Union  Cause       .     .  208 

CHAPTER  XXVIII 

The  Two  Uprisings.  —  One  for  the  Union,  and  the  Other  for 
Slavery.  —  Radicals  and  Conservatives.  —  Discontent  among 
Union  Men.  —  Mr.  Stanton's  Trenchant  Criticisms  of  the 
Administration  in  Private  Letters 212 

CHAPTER  XXIX 

The  Battle  of  Bull  Run.  —  Stanton's  Views  at  the  Time.  — 
McClellan  called  to  the  Command  in  Virginia 219 

CHAPTER  XXX 

McClellan  in  Command  of  the  Division  of  the  Potomac.  —  Or- 
ganization of  the  Army.  —  Fortifying  the  Capital.  —  Confi- 


CONTENTS 

dence  reposed  in  him.  —  His  Private  Letters  from  August  to 
November.  —  General  Scott  retired  and  McClellan  placed 
in  Command  of  all  the  Armies.  —  Stanton's  Relations  with 
him  at  that  Time.  —  Public  Impatience  for  Military  Opera- 
tions. —  Joint  Committee  of  Congress  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War,  to  investigate  the  Causes  of  the  Inactivity  of  the  Army. 
—  Testimony  of  the  Division  Generals  and  Others.  —  Mc- 
Clellan's  Delay  in  appearing  before  the  Committee      .     .     .  226 


PART  IV 
STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 


CHAPTER  XXXI 

Stanton's  Appointment  as  Secretary  of  War.  —  Without  Pre- 
vious Consultation  with  him.  —  Stanton  consults  McClellan 
before  accepting.  —  Reasons  for  the  Appointment.  —  Com- 
ments on  the  Appointment  by  Men  of  Distinction.  —  Stan- 
ton's Conception  of  the  Duties  of  his  Office 238 

CHAPTER  XXXII 

Mr.  Stanton  at  Work.  —  Some  of  his  Duties  and  Some  of  his 
Annoyances 246 

CHAPTER  XXXIII 
His  First  Official  Order.  —  Care  for  Union  Prisoners.  —  Con- 
ference with  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War.  — 
The  Military  Situation  made  known  to  him  through  the  Tes- 
timony of  McClellan's  Generals.  —  His  First  War  Bulletin. 
—  In  this  the  President's  INIilitary  Supremacy  asserted    .     .  250 

CHAPTER  XXXIV 

Important  War  Measures  enacted  by  Congress  on  Mr.  Stan- 
ton's Recommendation.  —  Work  in  the  Department.  —  Con- 
gress calls  for  Information 255 


CONTENTS  xi 

CHAPTER  XXXV 
Army  Contracts  dealt  with.  —  An  Order  made  to  investigate 
them  and  terminate  Fraudulent  Ones.  —  Order  taking  Pos- 
session of  all  Railroads  for  Military  Purposes 258 

CHAPTER  XXXVI 

Order  concerning  Political  Prisoners  and  Military  Arrests.  — 
Release  of  Prisoners.  —  Further  Extraordinary  Arrests  to 
be  made  by  the  Military  Authorities  only.  —  Mr.  Stanton 
defends  Arrests  otherwise  made  up  to  that  Time     ....  262 

CHAPTER  XXXVn 

Colonel  Thomas  A.  Scott's  Mission  to  the  "West.  —  Halleck 
and  Buell.  —  Grant  escapes  from  Halleck  and  takes  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson.  —  Halleck  demands  his  Reward  for 
it.  —  Nashville  evacuated 268 

CHAPTER  XXXVni 

Correspondence  between  Secretary  Stanton  and  Assistant  Sec- 
retary Scott.  —  Stanton's  Ideas  of  what  War  should  be.  — 
His  Intentions  towards  Halleck  and  Buell.  —  Comments  on 
this  and  Reference  to  Critics.  —  Grant  promoted  to  Major- 
Generalship  on  Recommendation  made  by  Stanton  on  the 
Morning  following  the  Capture  of  Fort  Donelson    ....  277 

CHAPTER  XXXIX 

Horace  Greeley  on  Stanton.  — The  Latter  disclaims  Credit  not 
his  Due  in  a  Letter  to  the  "  Tribune."  —  Comments  on  this 
Letter  by  Lewis  Cass 283 

CHAPTER  XL 

A  Fleet  of  Steam  Rams  for  Operations  on  the  IVIississippi 
River.  —  Constructed  under  Stanton's  Orders  by  Charles 
EUet,  Jr 288 

CHAPTER  XLI 
The  Capture  of  Memphis 297 


xii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  XLII 

Halleck  in  the  West.  —  His  Importunity  for  an  Enlarged  Com- 
mand. —  His  Ludicrous  Pretensions.  —  His  Injustice  to 
Grant  undone  by  an  Inquiry  from  the  War  Department.  — 
He  is  given  Supreme  Command  in  the  West.  —  He  then 
restores  Grant  to  his  Command.  —  The  Battle  of  Shiloh 
fought  while  Halleck  is  still  at  St.  Louis.  —  He  then  takes 
the  Field  and  resumes  Persecution  of  Grant.  —  Halleck's 
Advance  on  Corinth  by  Parallels.  —  Finds  it  evacuated   .     .  300 

CHAPTER  XLIII 
General  Butler's   New  Orleans  Expedition.  —  Cooperation  of 
Naval    Fleet    under    Admiral    Farragut.  —  Grand    Naval 
Exploit  and  Capture  of  the  City.  —  Occupation  and  Military 
Government  by  General  Butler 313 

CHAPTER  XLIV 
Operations  on  the  Mississippi  River.  —  First  Movements  on 
Vicksburg  by  Farragut  and  Butler 321 

PART  V 

McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN  AND  HIS  PRE- 
LIMINARY MOVEMENTS 


CHAPTER  XLV 

Lincoln  and  McClellan.  —  The  Relations  between  them.  — 
Reluctance  of  the  President  to  force  an  Issue  with  his  Gen- 
eral-in-Chief. —  Stanton's  Hopes  of  McClellan.  —  Elation  of 
the  Latter  attributable  to  Exaggerated  Importance  given 
to  his  Operations  in  West  Virginia.  —  Brief  Review  of  that 
Campaign.  —  Stanton's  Influence  made  Manifest.  —  Lincoln 
asserts  his  Authority  as  Commander-in-Chief.  —  He  orders  a 
Movement  of  the  Land  and  Naval  Forces 326 

CHAPTER  XLVI 

McClellan  proposes  a  Peninsular  Campaign.  —  Mr.  Lincoln 
opposes  it  and  orders  a  Different  Movement.  —  The  Ques- 


CONTENTS  xiii 

tion  left  unsettled  until  Obstructions  are  removed  from  the 
Lower  Potomac  and  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Raih-oad.  — 
Blunders  at  Harper's  Ferry  compel  an  Abandonment  of  an 
Important  Movement.  —  An  Order  to  attack  Rebel  Batter- 
ies on  the  Potomac  revoked,  because  of  an  Opinion  of  the 
Chief  Engineer  of  the  Army,  Five  Months  before  the  Order 
was  made.  —  General  Lander's  Brilliant  and  Successful  Ex- 
ploit. —  Rasliness  on  his  Part  feared  by  the  General-in-Chief. 

—  Stanton's  Contrary  Opinion 336 

CHAPTER  XLVII 
A  Council  of  War.  —  McCIellan's  Plan  submitted  and  adopted. 

—  The  Council  summoned  to  the  White  House.  —  The  Plan 
laid  before  the  President.  —  The  Council  questioned  by  Sec- 
retary Stanton.  —  The  President  accepts  the  Plan  with  Cer- 
tain Modifications 345 

CHAPTER   XLVIII 
The  Peninsular  Campaign,  —  Conditions  imposed  by  the  Pre- 
sident. —  Evacuation  of  Manassas.  —  The  Rebels  in  a  Panic 
when  deemed  most  Formidable  by  McClellan.  —  Advance  of 
the  Army  on  the  Deserted  Field 350 

CHAPTER  XLIX 

McClellan  relieved  of  General  Command,  and  assigned  to  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  only.  —  His  Plan  demanded  by  Stan- 
ton. —  Vague  Response.  —  Ordered  to  move  by  Some  Route 
at  once.  —  The  Transportation  of  the  Army  and  its  Supplies 
to  Fortress  Monroe 360 

CHAPTER   L 

Stanton's  New  Duties.  —  Daily  Meetings  of  his  Bureau  Ofl&- 
cers  as  a  Board  of  Administration.  —  Its  First  Meeting.  — 
How  to  neutralize  the  Merrimac 366 

CHAPTER  LI 

The  Peninsular  Campaign.  —  McCIellan's  Disregard  of  Orders. 

—  His  Attempt  to  leave  Washington  unprotected.  —  How  this 
was  prevented.  —  McDowell's  Corps  retained.  —  McCIellan's 


xiv  CONTENTS 

Misrepresentations.  —  He  treated  the  Enforcement  of  Con- 
ditions originally  placed  upon  his  Campaign  as  an  Interfer- 
ence   376 

CHAPTER  LII 

On  the   Peninsula.  —  Stanton  to   McClellan.  —  The    Siege  of 

Yorktown.  —  Manassas    repeated.  —  Preparations    and    nft 

Attack   for   Thirty    Days.  —  Yorktown   then    evacuated.  — 

Loud  Demand  for  Troops  which  were  sent  and  never  used. 

—  McClellan's  Daily  Promises  to  Stanton  daily  broken.  — 
Said  he  would  have  attacked  on  the  6th  of  May  if  the  Enemy 
had  not  retreated  on  the  4th 381 

CHAPTER   LIII 

The  Battle  of  Williamsburg,  —  McClellan  says  Battle  was  an 
Accident  due  to  Rapidity  of  Pursuit  of  the  Enemy  ordered 
by  him,  —  How  he  saved  the  Day  by  Two  Orders,  neither  of 
which  he  says  was  executed 391 

CHAPTER  LIV 
The  Fall  of  Norfolk  and  the  Destruction  of  the  Merrimac.  — 
The  James  River  then  opened  to  McClellan 398 

CHAPTER  LV 

McClellan's  Snail  Pace  on  the  Peninsula.  — His  Failure  to  take 
the  Line  of  the  James  River  on  two  Favorable  Occasions.  — 
Then  attributes  Failure  of  his  Campaign  to  not  having  taken 
it.  —  His  Correspondence,  exposing  Glaring  Inconsistency, 
and  refuting  many  Statements  in  his  Book 403 

CHAPTER  LVI 

Slanders  of  Stanton  by  the  McClellan  and  Copperhead  Press. 

—  Directly  based  on  Private  Letters  of  McClellan.  —  The 
Latter  boasts  of  having  insulted  President  Lincoln  ....  414 

CHAPTER  LVII 

Stanton's  Silence  under  Persecution,  lest  Harm  come  to  the 
Country,  —  His  Reply  in  a  Private  Letter,  never  published 
until  Seventeen  Years  after  his  Death.  —  A  Voice  from  the 
Grave 425 


CONTENTS  XV 

CHAPTER  LVIII 
The  Battle  of  Fair  Oaks.  —  McClellan  divides  his  Army  by  a 
River  rapidly  being  rendered  impassable  by  a  Flood.  —  Two 
Corps  are  saved  by  Sumner's  Energetic  Movement  in  Ad- 
vance of  McClellan 's  Order.  —  A  Costly  Victory  thrown 
away.  —  Army  ordered  back  when  within  Four  Miles  of 
Richmond 433 

CHAPTER  LIX 

McClellan  lies  down  on  the  Banks  of  the  Chickahominy  and 
awaits  an  Attack  which  he  says  will  destroy  his  Army     .     .  440 

CHAPTER  LX 
The  Seven  Days'  Batties 447 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 

Page 

Edwin  M.  Stanton.  From  a  daguerreotype  taken  when  he  was 
about  forty-two Frontispiece 

Birthplace  of  Mr.  Stanton,  Steubenville,  Ohio ;  from  a  photo- 
graph taken  in  1898 facing      8 

Mrs.  Stanton  (Ellen  M.  Hutchison),  from  a  daguerreo- 
type   facing    34 

Facsimile  extracts  from  letter  of  J.  S.  Black  to  Mr.  Stanton, 
April  27,  1858 facing    54 

Mr.  Stanton's  Washington  home,  1861-1869     .     .     .    facing  188 

The  "War  Department  under  Secretary  Stanton  .     .     .    facing  238 

Facsimile  of  part  of  letter  from  James  Buchanan  to  Mr.  Stan- 
ton, February  25, 1862 facing  284 

Facsimile  of  letter  from  President  Lincoln  to  General  McClel- 

lan,  February  3,  1862 facing  338 

Map  to  illustrate  McClellan's  Peninsular  Campaign    .    facing  380 

Facsimile  of  Mr.  Stanton's  copy  of  his  letter  to  General  Mc- 
CleUan,  May  6,  1862 facing  398 

Facsimile  of  part  of  Mr.  Stanton's  letter  to  the  Rev.  Heman 
Dyer,  May  18,  1862 facing  426 


LIFE  OF  EDWIN  M.  STANTON 


PART  I 

EARLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 


CHAPTER  I 

Prefatory.  —  Ancestry.  —  School-Days.  —  Death  of  his  Father. — 
Clerk  in  a  Store  at  Thirteen.  —  Preparations  for  College. —  Char- 
acteristics as  a  Boy.  —  His  Struggle  for  an  Education.  —  His 
College  Course  unfinished  for  Want  of  Means. 

From  the  incipiency  of  the  Southern  rebellion  In 
1860  to  the  end,  in  1868,  of  the  unsuccessful  struggle 
of  the  Southern  leaders  to  dictate  the  terms  of  peace, 
perhaps  no  man  exercised  more  influence  over  the  des- 
tinies of  the  nation  than  did  Edwin  M.  Stanton.  He 
has  been  the  object  of  as  much  admiration  and  as  much 
hatred  as  ever  fell  to  the  lot  of  a  pubHc  man.  His 
public  services  as  our  great  War  Minister  were  rendered 
in  fierce  revolutionary  times,  and  in  proportion  to  the 
fidehty  and  force  he  brought  to  the  cause  of  the  gov- 
ernment he  was  praised  by  its  friends  and  denounced 
by  its  foes.  In  the  administration  of  his  office  he  came 
in  direct  conflict  with  the  class  of  plunderers  who  al- 
ways seek  to  enrich  themselves  out  of  the  necessities  of 


2   EARLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

a  government  engaged  in  war.  These  he  counted  as 
public  foes  equally  with  the  enemy  in  the  field.  From 
various  sources  have  naturally  come  many  unjust 
assaults  upon  his  memory.  On  the  other  hand,  he  has 
sometimes  been  credited  with  a  perfection  of  character 
and  a  consistency  of  antecedents  which  are  equally 
exaggerated.  To  give  some  account  of  his  life  and  ser- 
vices, and  to  speak  of  him  as  he  was,  concealing  no 
weakness  and  exalting  unduly  no  virtue,  would  be  a 
desirable  contribution  to  biographical  literature.  Per- 
haps such  a  task  is  impossible  to  either  a  friend  or  an 
enemy  of  the  cause  he  upheld.  These  pages  are  writ- 
ten from  the  standpoint  of  the  Union  cause  of  1861, 
and  no  pretense  is  made  to  impartiality  between  the 
Unionists  of  that  period  and  their  antagonists.  Jus- 
tice can  be  done  to  the  subject  of  this  biography,  when 
dealing  with  his  public  career,  only  by  assuming  the 
right  of  this  nation  to  preserve  its  life  by  all  necessary 
measures,  and  by  refusing  to  admit  to  the  field  of  con- 
troversy any  claims  in  any  manner  tending  to  justify 
the  rebellion.  This  will  not,  however,  excuse  any  false 
claims  in  his  behalf,  nor  a  failure  to  meet  in  a  spirit 
of  fair  discussion  any  allegation  calling  in  question  his 
public  acts  and  motives.  As  to  his  private  life  and 
conduct,  and  his  political  opinions  and  affiliations,  from 
the  beginning  to  the  end,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  biogra- 
pher to  make  them  as  an  open  book,  presenting  the 
truth  tininfluenced  by  any  consideration  of  his  public 
services.  The  real  Stanton  is  the  one  on  whom  the 
considerate  judgment  of  mankind  will  be  invoked,  — 
the  man  of  great  mental  endowments,  a  warm,  emotional 


PREFATORY  3 

nature,  varying  moods,  and,  like  all  other  men,  pos- 
sessed of  qualities  which  often  warred  one  with  another. 

Politically,  he  commenced  life  as  a  Jackson  Demo- 
crat ;  became  a  "  Freesoiler "  when  he  thought  Mr. 
Van  Buren  had  been  unfairly  defeated  by  the  South  in 
the  convention  of  1844 ;  remained,  nevertheless,  in  the 
Democratic  party,  and  adhered  to  the  extreme  pro- 
slavery  wing  of  the  party  when  the  Dred  Scott  decision 
marked  a  new  departure  in  the  discussion  of  the  slavery 
question. 

In  the  cabinet  of  Mr.  Buchanan,  during  the  secession 
winter  of  1860-61,  he  was  faithful  to  his  country  and 
to  his  chief,  and  never  served  the  latter  better  than 
when,  with  the  aid  of  his  colleagues,  Black  and  Holt, 
he  saved  the  President  from  the  ruin  in  which  treason 
at  the  council  board  sought  to  engulf  him.  His  patri- 
otic zeal  at  that  time  led  to  his  subsequent  appointment 
as  Secretary  of  War.  He  was  slow  to  overcome  his 
antipathy  to  the  "  Black  Republicans,"  as  he,  in  com- 
mon with  other  Democrats,  called  them  as  late  as  the 
summer  of  1861 ;  and  so  intense  was  his  dislike  for 
President  Lincoln  that  we  have  his  own  authority  for 
saying  that  when  he  called  on  him  to  receive  his  com- 
mission as  Secretary  of  War,  on  the  15th  of  January, 
1862,  it  was  the  first  time  he  had  seen  him  since  his 
inauguration,  more  than  ten  months  before. 

It  was  in  the  War  Department  that  Mr.  Stanton 
developed  his  greatest  qualities.  These  were  intellec- 
tual power,  self-reliance,  an  iron  will,  unbending  integ- 
rity, devoted  patriotism,  immense  capacity  for  long-sus- 
tained work,  adaptability  to  new  duties,  and  an  intense 


4   EARLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

entliusiasni  for  whatever  cause  lie  espoused.  His  faults 
were  chiefly  those  of  temperament.  Rapidity  of  discus- 
sion and  action,  made  necessary  by  the  vastness  of  the 
work  before  him,  sometimes  led  him  to  injustice,  which 
was  the  harder  to  bear  because  of  the  abruptness  of 
manner  with  which  it  was  often  accompanied.  He  was 
too  busy  to  be  ceremonious  when  many  would  have 
construed  it  into  an  invitation  to  occupy  the  time  which 
he  could  not  give  them.  He  was  the  man  who  said 
"  no  "  for  the  government  when  it  had  to  be  said,  no 
matter  how  distasteful  or  offensive  it  might  be  to  those 
to  whom  it  was  addressed. 

The  materials  for  a  just  and  full  narrative  of  Mr. 
Stanton's  public  life  do  not  exist.  In  the  very  nature 
of  the  case,  his  most  important  daily  work  during  the 
war  left  no  record  behind.  Mr.  Stanton  kept  no  diary, 
nor  did  he  in  any  manner  concern  himself  with  what 
should  be  said  of  him  either  by  his  contemporaries  or 
by  posterity.  The  great  mass  of  papers  left  by  him 
contain  no  suggestion  of  any  contribution  by  him  to 
his  biography.  The  daily  conferences  between  him  and 
President  Lincoln  at  the  War  Department,  where  the 
latter  spent  much  of  his  time,  and  the  share  which  he 
contributed  to  the  conclusions  at  which  they  arrived 
cannot  be  known  or  estimated.  They  worked  together 
as  one  man,  each  supplying  something  that  might  be 
wanting  in  the  other  .^ 

^  In  a  letter  to  Mr.  Stanton,  dated  at  Paris,  July  26,  1865,  Mr.  John 
Hay  made  this  reference  to  the  relations  between  Mr.  Stanton  and  Mr. 
Lincoln,  as  he  had  observed  them  while  near  the  President  :  — 

"  Not  every  one  knows  as  I  do  how  close  you  stood  to  our  lost  leader. 
How  he  loved  you  and  trusted  you,  and  how  vain  were  all  the  efforts  to 


PREFATORY  5 

He  was  potent  in  the  councils  of  congressional  com- 
mittees, where  pubHc  measures  are  framed.  He  kept 
himself  well  informed  as  to  the  thoroughness  with 
which  the  several  bureaus  of  his  department  were  per- 
forming their  great  work  of  raising  and  equipping 
troops,  and  providing  transportation  and  supplies  for 
them  in  the  field.  His  long  arm  reached  into  the 
States  and  aided  their  authorities  in  raising  volunteers. 
His  words  of  encouragement  and  cheer  went  out  to  the 
country  through  the  press  in  frequent  of&cial  announce- 
ments of  events  in  the  field,  always  giving  the  bright 
side  in  times  of  doubt  and  discouragement. 

His  antagonism  to  President  Johnson's  reconstruc- 
tion policy,  and  his  refusal  to  resign  from  the  Cabinet 
when  called  upon  by  him  to  do  so,  will  be  praised  or  cen- 
sured according  as  the  motives  of  the  President  and  the 
Secretary  respectively  are  estimated.  It  was  a  part  of 
a  great  controversy  involving  the  fruits  of  the  war  and 
the  terms  of  peace.  In  that  controversy  he  upheld 
what  he  believed  to  be  the  national  cause,  and  resisted 
a  "  plan  "  which  he  regarded  as  reactionary,  and  one 
that  could  be  enforced  only  by  executive  usurpation  of 
legislative  powers. 

When  the  cause  he  wrought  for  had  fully  prevailed, 
he  resigned.  His  work  was  done,  and,  worn  out  by  it, 
he  died  within  the  following  year. 

Mr.  Stanton's  origin  and  early  surroundings,  his 
school-days  and  youthful  impressions,  his  twenty-five 
years  of  hard  work  as  a  lawyer,  and  his  political  affiHa- 

shake  that  trust  aud  confidence,  not  lightly  given  and  never  v?ithdrawn. 
All  this  will  be  known  some  time,  of  course,  to  his  honor  and  yours." 


6   EARLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

tions  before  he  entered  public  life  afford  material  for 
some  interesting  chapters. 

Stantons  and  Macys  —  Quakers  —  had  emigrated 
from  Massachusetts  to  North  Carolina  before  the  war 
of  the  Revolution.  There  Benjamin  Stanton  and  Abi- 
gail Macy  were  married  in  1774. 

Following  the  example  of  members  of  the  Society  of 
Friends  residing  in  Northern  States,  Benjamin  Stanton, 
in  1787,  desired  to  manumit  the  slaves  he  had  inherited ; 
but  as  this  was  at  the  time  forbidden  by  a  statute  of 
the  State,  he  made  his  will,  in  which  he  provided  that 
"  all  the  poor  black  people  that  ever  belonged  to  me  be 
entirely  free  whenever  the  law  of  the  land  will  allow, 
until  which  time,  my  executor  I  leave  as  guardian  to 
protect  them  and  see  that  they  be  not  deprived  of  their 
rights,  or  in  any  way  misused." 

He  died ;  and  in  the  year  1800  his  widow,  taking  six 
of  her  children,  the  eldest  of  them  but  sixteen,  and 
accompanied  by  a  married  daughter  and  son-in-law, 
emigrated  to  the  free  Northwestern  territory  because 
slavery  had  been  there  forever  prohibited.  Two  years 
later  her  three  remaining  daughters — all  married  — 
followed  her  thither.  She  purchased  land  of  the  gov- 
ernment at  the  present  site  of  Mount  Pleasant,  Ohio, 
and  was  one  of  the  pioneers  of  that  region. 

Her  son  David  was  bred  a  physician  at  Steubenville, 
and  he  was  reputed  a  skillful  practitioner,  a  curious 
scholar,  a  worthy  and  public  spirited  citizen,  and  a  man 
of  sincere  convictions. 

Lucy  Norman,  the  daughter  of  a  Virginia  planter, 
had  of  her  own  choice  left  her  father's  home,  with  his 


ANCESTRY  7 

consent,  to  emigrate  with  friends  of  her  deceased 
mother  to  the  Northwest.  Young  David  Stanton  mar- 
ried her,  and  to  them  was  born,  at  Steubenville,  Ohio, 
on  the  19th  of  December,  1814,  the  subject  of  these 
memoirs,  Edwin  McMasters  Stanton.^ 

Dr.  Stanton  separated  from  the  Quakers  upon  their 
demand  for  an  apology  for  having  married  outside  of 
his  sect.  His  wife  was  a  woman  of  deep  rehgious  faith, 
strong  character,  and  amiable  qualities.  Their  home 
was  the  favorite  resort  of  traveling  preachers  and 
philanthropists.  Every  week,  during  the  year  1821, 
Benjamin  Lundy  —  Quaker  Abolitionist  —  came  there 
to  bring,  for  distribution  therefrom,  his  edition  of  "  The 
Universal  Genius  of  Emancipation,"  an  anti-slavery 
journal  published  by  him  at  Mount  Pleasant,  where  he 
also  made  saddles  for  a  livelihood,  and  to  eke  out  the 
cost  of  printing  his  paper. 

The  following  extracts  from  a  letter  addressed,  in 
1865,  to  Stanton  by  a  venerable  old  lady  friend,^  give 
the  earliest  glimpse  we  have  of  his  life,  and  other  inter- 
esting references  to  himself  and  his  family  :  — 

I  have  a  vivid  recollection  of  you  and  your  brother  when 
you  were  schoolmates  of  my  sons,  Thomas  and  Peter,  and  of 
your  little  sisters  when  you  were  all  children,  and  your  father, 
kind,  good  Dr.  Stanton,  who,  you  may  recollect,  was  our 
family  physician  for  many  years.  ...  I  still  recollect  of  once 
going  into  poor  Miss  Randle's  school,  and  you  and  my  Thomas 

1  The  daughter  of  the  friends  with  whom  Lucy  Norman  had  left 
Virginia  married  David  McMasters  ;  hence  that  portion  of  Stanton's 
name. 

2  Mrs.  Frances  B.  Wilson,  of  Steubenville,  then  seventy-six  years  of 
age. 


8        EARLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

were  seated  in  your  little  chairs,  one  on  each  side  of  her,  with 
your  heads  lying  in  her  lap,  both  fast  asleep.  She  said  to 
me :  "  You  see  my  two  little  pets."  The  fact  is,  you  were 
quite  too  young  to  be  sent  to  school ;  but  she  was  so  gentle 
and  affectionate  that  we  always  felt  you  were  safe.  .  .  . 

Some  years  ago  I  received  a  letter  from  my  youngest  son, 
Samuel  M.  Wilson,  of  San  Francisco,^  saying  that  you  were 
there  attending  to  some  business  for  the  government,  and 
that  you  were  gaining  golden  opinions  by  the  way  you  were 
managing  it.  .  .  . 

Dr.  Stanton's  practice  was  good,  but  in  those  days, 
in  a  place  like  Steubenville,  this  meant  only  a  living, 
even  to  the  most  thrifty.  When  he  died,  therefore,  in 
1827,  he  left  his  widow  in  straitened  circumstances, 
with  four  children  to  care  for.  Young  Edwin,  then 
thirteen  years  of  age,  was  the  eldest,  and  him  she 
placed,  with  his  ready  assent,  in  the  bookstore  of  Mr. 
Turnbull.  His  salary  there  was  meagre  enough,  — 
being  but  four  dollars  a  month,  —  but  to  her  this  was 
then  a  helpful  simi,  which,  in  her  circumstances,  she 
could  not  afford  to  forego. 

This  situation  took  him  from  school,  but  he  devoted 
his  evenings,  under  his  latest  teacher,  the  Rev.  Mr. 
Buchanan,  to  such  preparatory  studies  as  would  be 
necessary  for  his  entrance  at  Kenyon  College.  At  the 
store  he  read  much,  and  sometimes,  as  his  employer 
complained,  to  the  neglect  of  customers,  failing  to  see 
them  when  they  first  came  in. 

Mr.  Gallagher,  a  venerable  and  highly  respected 
citizen  of  Steubenville,  better  known  there  as  "  Squire  " 

^  A  leading  member  of  the  bar  of  that  city,  since  deceased. 


BIRTHPLACE   OF    MR.   STANTON,  STELTSENVILLE,  OHIO 


SCHOOI^DAYS  9 

Gallagher,  attended  seliool  with  Stanton,  and  says  of 
him  that  he  was  "  a  good  boy;  amiable  and  courteous." 
He  tells  of  his  enterprise  in  starting  a  circulating 
library ;  also  of  prayer-meetings  held  by  some  boys 
under  his  leadership.  His  only  adverse  criticism  upon 
him  was  when  he  referred,  with  a  tinge  of  bitterness,  to 
his  having  "  gone  over  to  Jackson." 

John  Harper,  afterwards  and  for  many  years  the 
president  of  the  Bank  of  Pittsburg,  went  to  Steuben- 
ville  a  boy  in  1826,  and  remained  until  1831.  He 
knew  young  Stanton  intunately  during  those  years,  and 
testifies  to  his  greed  for  books.  He  was  especially  fond 
of  poetry.  He  was  of  a  rehgious  tendency,  and  in 
their  Sunday  strolls  in  the  country  "  generally  gave  the 
conversation  a  moral  and  religious  turn."  He  had  no 
taste  for  the  streets,  nor  for  association  with  boys  of 
coarse  manners  or  language.  Mr.  Harper  bears  willing 
testimony  to  the  general  amiability  and  kindness  of  Mr. 
Stanton's  disposition  when  a  boy,  as  well  as  to  his  ele- 
vated moral  tone.  They  continued  to  be  friends  up 
to  the  time  of  the  latter' s  death. 

His  old  playmate,  Louis  A.  Walker,  testifies  to  his 
masterfulness  as  a  boy.  He  says  :  "  Stanton  was  always 
positive,  and  in  the  latitude  given  or  taken  in  boys' 
plays  and  games  was  somewhat  imperious ;  never  com- 
bative or  abusive.  I  question  whether  he  ever  in  his 
lifetime  once  thought  of  personal  force  to  defend  him- 
self or  punish  an  enemy.  Self-reliance,  however,  placed 
him  in  advance  of  others  with  whom  he  played,  acted, 
and  lived,  and  his  invincible  energy  kept  him  there 
to    the    very    end."      "Imperious/'     "self -rehant," 


10      EARLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

"positive,"  and  of  "invincible  energy,"  —  so  testifies 
a  companion  of  Stanton's  boyhood.  He  needs  no  cor- 
roboration.    The  boy  was,  indeed,  father  to  the  man. 

He  struggled  at  a  great  disadvantage  for  the  limited 
education  he  received.  In  1831,  when  in  his  seven- 
teenth year,  after  four  years  of  work  in  the  bookstore, 
he  entered  Kenyon  College  (Gambler,  Ohio).  He  was 
unable  to  continue  the  course  there  for  want  of  means, 
and  left  during  his  junior  year  in  1833.  In  a  letter 
written  that  year  he  complains  bitterly  of  a  disappoint- 
ment which  rendered  it  impossible  for  him  to  realize 
the  hope  he  had  entertained  of  being  able  to  remain  at 
least  one  year  longer  in  college. 


CHAPTER  II 

A  Miniature  Disunion  Struggle  at  Kenyon  College,  in  which  Stan- 
ton "  goes  over  to  Jackson."  —  Admitted  to  the  Bar.  —  Married. 

It  was  at  Kenyon  that  Stanton  "  went  over  to  Jack- 
son." The  old  Whig  squire  of  his  native  town,  who 
thus  reproached  him,  related  at  the  same  time  how  firm 
an  adherent  of  Clay  and  Adams,  as  against  Jackson, 
Stanton's  father  was  in  1825.  This  fact  seemed  to  him 
to  carry  with  it  an  inherited  obligation  on  the  part  of 
the  son  to  oppose  Jackson  at  aU  times  and  under  all 
circumstances. 

It  is  worth  while  here  to  consider  the  reasons  that  led 
young  Stanton,  while  at  Kenyon,  to  espouse  the  cause 
of  Jackson,  —  a  step  which  had  so  large  an  influence 
upon  his  life. 

Dr.  Stanton  died  in  1827,  two  years  before  Jackson 
became  President,  five  years  before  the  first  national 
Democratic  convention  was  held,  and  seven  years  before 
the  Whig  party  came  into  existence.  The  last  presi- 
dential struggle- that  took  place  during  his  lifetime  was 
that  of  1824.  Monroe  had  been  chosen  to  a  second 
term  in  1820,  with  but  one  dissenting  electoral  vote,  that 
one  being  of  his  own  party.  After  this  the  Federalist 
party  made  no  sign,  and  the  Republican  party  was  left 
without  an  antagonist. 

In  1824  the  Republican  representatives  in  Congress 


12      EAELY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

refused  to  meet  in  the  usual  party  caucus  for  the  selec- 
tion of  a  presidential  candidate.^  A  minority  of  them 
met,  however  {66  out  of  216),  and  nominated  William 
H.  Crawford,  of  Georgia.  This  being  without  binding 
force,  three  other  members  of  the  "  Republican  "  party 
—  Jackson,  Adams,  and  Clay — were  presented  by  their 
friends  as  candidates.  No  others  entered  the  field. 
Whoever  voted  that  year,  therefore,  voted  for  a  Repub- 
lican. Jackson  received  the  highest  number  of  electoral 
votes,  but  not  a  majority.  Adams  received  the  next 
highest  number,  Crawford  the  next,  and  Clay  the  low- 
est. The  failure  of  the  people  to  elect  threw  the  elec- 
tion into  the  House  of  Representatives,  where,  by  the 
terms  of  the  Constitution,  a  choice  had  to  be  made 
from  the  three  persons  having  the  highest  number  of 
votes.  Clay's  friends,  under  his  directions,  gave  the 
votes  necessary  to  make  Adams  President.  This  greatly 
embittered  the  Jackson  men,  the  more  so  from  the  fact 
that  the  legislature  of  Kentucky — Clay's  own  State  — 
had,  by  a  vote  of  73  to  11  in  the  House  of  Represent- 
atives, and  18  to  12  in  the  Senate,  requested  its  members 
to  vote  for  Jackson,  since  Clay  could  not  himself  be 
constitutionally  voted  for. 

This  coalition  between  Adams  and  Clay  was  followed 
by  the  appointment  of  the  latter  as  Secretary  of  State, 
and  it  was  charged  that  the  appointment  was  the  result 
of  a  pledge  or  "  bargain "  extorted  from  Adams  by 
Clay  or  his  friends  as  the  price  of  their  votes.  The 
fiercest  passions  were  aroused  by  these  events,  and  upon 
the  relative  merits  of  the  parties  to  the  controversy 

1  National  conventions  were  then  unknown. 


HE  GOES  OVER  TO  JACKSON  18 

hinged  our  national  politics  for  the  ensuing  twenty 
years.  The  truth  or  falsity  of  this  charge  of  a  "  bar- 
gain "  between  Clay  and  Adams  was  hardly  to  be 
ranked  as  a  political  principle,  adherence  to  which  was 
essential  to  political  consistency,  regardless  of  the  poli- 
cies subsequently  upheld  by  the  opposing  chiefs. 

The  supporters  of  the  Adams  Administration  called 
themselves  "  National  Republicans."  General  Jackson 
continued  to  claim  for  his  adherents  the  name  of  "  Re- 
publicans." 

The  national  judgment  was  with  Jackson,  and  twice 
made  him  President.  Adams  and  Clay,  whose  coalition 
had  defeated  him  in  1824,  were  successively  rejected 
by  the  people  in  his  favor,  the  one  in  1828,  and  the 
other  in  1832. 

There  never  has  been  a  period  during  the  political 
history  of  the  country  when  men  were  more  intolerant 
toward  their  political  opponents  than  in  the  time  we  are 
considering.  No  enemy  of  either  chief  could  see  any 
good  in  him.  No  admirer  of  either  could  discover  in 
him  any  imperfection.  The  fierce  hostihty  of  the  two 
men  towards  each  other  was  reflected  in  their  respective 
followers,  and  the  evil  of  each  became  the  good  of  the 
other. 

Stanton  probably  went  with  the  political  party  of  his 
father  in  1828,  when  Jackson  defeated  Adams.  He 
■was  then  not  quite  fourteen.  But  the  strong  influences 
necessary  to  change  his  boyish  predilections  were  near 
at  hand.  John  C.  Calhoun,  of  South  Carolina,  had  at 
first  some  pretensions  to  the  presidency,  in  1824,  but 
finally  became  a  candidate  for  the  vice-presidency,  and 


14      EARLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

was  elected.  Although  he  served  as  Vice-President 
under  Adams  from  1825  to  1829,  he  became  the  Jack- 
son candidate  for  the  same  office  in  1828,  and  was 
elected.  While  serving  his  second  term  as  Vice-Presi- 
dent, it  became  apparent  that  Martin  Van  Buren  was 
becoming  an  important  factor  in  poHtics.  To  check 
his  rise,  and  to  rebuke  Jackson  for  showing  a  prefer- 
ence for  him,  Calhoun  defeated  the  confirmation  of  Van 
Buren  for  the  English  mission  by  his  casting  vote  as 
president  of  the  Senate.  Thus  invited  to  activity.  Van 
Buren  influences  brought  together  the  first  national 
Democratic  convention  in  May,  1832,  not  for  the  nom- 
ination of  a  candidate  for  the  presidency,  —  Jack- 
son's candidacy  being  a  foregone  conclusion,  —  but  for 
the  purpose  of  nominating  a  candidate  with  him  for 
the  vice-presidency.  The  convention  nominated  Van 
Buren  by  a  vote  of  208  out  of  283  votes,  and  indorsed 
the  several  nominations  of  Jackson  for  the  presidency 
which  had  been  made  in  the  States.  They  were  both 
elected  by  219  out  of  the  286  electoral  votes  of  the 
Union.  South  Carolina,  dominated  by  Calhoun,  was 
represented  in  the  convention,  and  cast  her  eleven 
votes  for  the  nomination  of  Philip  P.  Barbour  for  the 
vice-presidency.  Neither  Jackson  (by  birth  a  South 
Carolinian)  nor  Van  Buren  received  a  single  one  of  her 
electoral  votes,  which  were  all  cast  for  John  Floyd,  of 
Virginia,  for  President,  and  Henry  Lee,  of  Massachu- 
setts, for  Vice-President. 

The  South  Carolina  leader  had  not  rested  quietly 
during  the  preparations  for  these  events  so  damaging 
to  his  own  poHtical  future.     As  early  as  1830  he  had 


HE  GOES  OVER  TO  JACKSON  IB 

commenced  making  the  tariff  law  of  1828  the  pretext 
for  breeding  a  revolt  against  the  national  authority,  to 
take  the  form  of  state  action  declarino"  that  law  unau- 
thorized  by  the  Constitution,  and  null  and  void  within 
the  borders  of  South  Carolina.  Being  in  the  chair  of 
the  Senate,  he  spoke  to  the  people  only  through  his 
Edgefield  letters,  and  by  the  mouth  of  his  spokesman 
in  the  Senate,  Robert  Y.  Hayne.  The  latter,  in  Janu- 
ary, 1830,  announced  in  that  body,  in  an  elaborate 
speech,  the  Calhoun  doctrine  of  nuUification,  and  was 
replied  to  by  Daniel  Webster  in  an  exposition  of  the 
relations  between  the  federal  and  state  governments, 
which  at  once  became,  as  it  has  evefr  since  remained, 
the  received  and  settled  authority  with  all  who  believe 
that  the  Constitution  established  a  nation.  It  thrilled 
every  patriot  heart  as  a  renewal  of  the  covenant  of 
union  of  1789,  and  revived  the  fires  of  patriotism 
which  had  been  slumbering  in  the  breasts  of  the  people 
in  the  absence  of  any  apparent  danger  to  the  country. 

The  agitation  in  South  Carolina  continued  to  rage 
under  the  revolutionary  leadership  which  had  set  it  in 
motion,  until  in  November,  1832,  immediately  after  the 
reelection  of  Jackson,  it  reached  white  heat,  and  gave 
vent  to  itself  in  the  adoption  of  the  long-threatened 
state  ordinance,  declaring  null  and  void  within  the 
State  the  existing  tariff  laws  of  the  United  States,  as 
being  an  exercise  of  power  unauthorized  by  the  Consti- 
tution. On  the  10th  of  December  President  Jackson 
issued  his  immortal  proclamation  against  the  Nullifiers, 
in  which  he  declared  the  national  authority  to  be 
supreme  on  all  subjects  intrusted  by  the  Constitution 


16      EAELY   LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

to  federal  control,  and  asserted  it  to  be  his  inflexible 
purpose  to  execute  the  tariff  and  all  other  laws  of  the 
United  States  with  whatever  force  resistance  might 
render  necessary. 

Stanton,  as  we  have  seen,  entered  Kenyon  College  in 
1831,  and  remained  until  some  time  in  1833.  His  fel- 
low-student, S.  A.  Bronson,  in  a  letter  to  Stanton's  sis- 
ter, Mrs.  Wolcott,  dated  June  25,  1886,  says :  "  We 
had  been  throug-h  a  miniature  division  of  the  Union  in 
our  literary  society  in  Kenyon  College.  We  had  come 
to  a  point  where  the  South  would  not  admit  a  member 
from  the  North,  nor  the  North  a  Southern  member ;  so 
we  split  and  made  two  societies.  When  I  met  Stanton 
at  Columbus  (some  years  afterwards)  there  was  a  South- 
ern gentleman  in  the  ofi&ce.  Stanton  took  me  to  him, 
introduced  me  as  a  student  from  Kenyon,  saying: 
*  Here  is  "  Father  Bronson "  (my  sobriquet).  We 
fought  the  South  together  at  Kenyon,  and  whipped.'  " 
In  a  subsequent  letter,  dated  August  17,  1887,  Mr. 
Bronson  says :  "  The  cause  of  the  strife  was  the  grow- 
ing hostility  between  the  North  and  the  South."  This 
hostility  was  based  upon  the  attitude  at  that  time 
(1832-33)  of  South  Carolina  and  her  adherents  under 
Calhoun's  lead.  It  was  upon  the  question  of  nullifi- 
cation that  Stanton  and  his  fellows  had  "  fou2"ht  the 
South  at  Kenyon,  and  whipped."  When,  therefore, 
the  proclamation  of  "  the  Old  Hero  "  came  thundering 
over  the  land,  if  any  one  of  them  could  have  hesitated 
for  a  moment  about  "  going  over  to  Jackson  "  from 
whatever  attitude  previous  circumstances,  traditions, 
predilections,  or  family  ties  might  have  placed  him  in. 


DISUNION  STRUGGLE  AT  KENYON  17 

that  one  would  not  have  been  Edwin  M.  Stanton. 
Burning  with  patriotic  enthusiasm,  he  turned  his  back 
upon  the  stale  and  personal  pohtics  o£  1824,  to  be  for- 
ever enhsted  in  the  cause  of  the  Union  and  the  mainte- 
nance of  its  rightful  authority.  He  learned  no  better 
lesson  at  Kenyon  than  this.  It  was  good  training  for 
the  boy  who,  in  his  manhood,  was  to  raise  and  equip 
the  armies  by  which  the  heresies  of  nullification  and 
secession  should  be  forever  silenced  in  the  land.  Had 
his  father  lived,  he  would  have  had  reason  to  rejoice 
that  he  had  a  son  who  at  eighteen  possessed  individu- 
ahty  enough  to  break  away  from  the  dry  rot  of  old 
political  traditions  and  rise  to  the  stature  of  a  patriotic 
citizen  in  time  of  public  danger. 

In  1833  Stanton  again  entered  the  employ  of  Mr. 
Turnbull,  —  this  time  in  a  store  at  Columbus,  Ohio,  — 
in  the  hope  of  earning  enough  to  enable  him  to  pay 
his  way  another  year  in  college ;  but  the  amount  of 
the  portion  of  his  compensation  which  had  been  made 
contingent  disappointed  his  expectations,  and  he  wrote 
to  his  guardian  making  known  his  dissatisfaction.  The 
result  was  the  termination  of  his  engagement  with  Mr. 
Turnbull,  and  an  abandonment  of  all  hope  of  reentering 
college. 

He  then  entered,  with  energy,  upon  the  study  of  the 
law,  —  the  profession  in  which,  as  he  matured  in  years 
and  character,  his  whole  ambition  was  centred,  and  in 
which  he  obtained  a  place  among  the  few  in  the  very 
front  rank,  with  all  the  honors  it  could  bestow,  includ- 
ing commissions  as  Attorney-General  and  Justice  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States.     During  this  his 


18       EARLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

eighteenth  year  he  became  engaged  to  Miss  Mary  Ann 
Lamson,  the  daughter  of  WiUiam  Lamson,  of  Columbus, 
Ohio.  They  were  not  to  be  married,  however,  until  he 
had  completed  his  law  studies.  These  he  pursued  at 
Steubenville  with  unremitting  industry,  literally  obey- 
ing the  scriptural  injunction :  "  Whatsoever  thy  hand 
findeth  to  do,  do  it  with  thy  might."  Three  years  of 
well-directed  and  vigorous  work  at  his  books  brought 
the  reward.  His  examination  found  him  well  equipped, 
and  in  1836  he  was  admitted  to  the  bar,  and  commenced 
practice  at  Cadiz,  the  county-seat  of  Harrison  County, 
adjoining  the  county  in  which  he  was  born.  Having 
thus  made  his  start  in  life,  he  was  married  on  the  31st 
of  December  of  that  year.  From  this  marriage  were 
born  a  son  and  daughter.  The  latter  died  September 
17,  1841.     The  son  survived  him  a  few  years. 

After  a  brief  sojourn  in  Steubenville  at  the  house  of 
Judge  Tappan,  the  young  couple  took  up  their  residence 
at  a  hotel  in  Cadiz.  In  the  spring  following  they  went 
to  housekeeping  in  a  very  modest  way,  in  a  house  but 
partially  finished  at  the  edge  of  that  town,  bringing  the 
furniture  therefor  from  Stanton's  home  at  Steubenville. 
This  removal  did  not  take  place,  however,  until  after 
the  young  husband,  leaving  his  wife  at  Judge  Tappan's, 
had  made  a  journey  over  the  mountains  of  Virginia  for 
the  dutiful  purpose  of  escorting  home  his  mother,  who 
had  been  spending  the  winter  there  with  her  family. 
In  all  periods  of  his  life,  and  under  all  circumstances, 
his  devotion  to  his  mother  was  a  marked  trait  in  his 
character. 


CHAPTER  m 

His  Choice  between  the  Political  Parties  in  1836.  —  A  Political  Re- 
view. —  Jackson  and  the  United  States  Bank.  —  Formation  of 
the  Whig  Party.  —  Its  Elements.  —  Calhoun  a  Whig  Leader.  — 
Van  Buren's  Election.  —  Toleration  on  the  Slavery  Question. 

The  young  lawyer  must  have  made  a  good  impression 
in  the  county  in  which  he  commenced  business,  for, 
during  the  first  year  of  his  practice,  viz.,  in  August, 
1837,  he  received  his  commission  as  prosecuting  attor- 
ney, to  which  office  he  had  been  chosen  by  the  people 
as  a  Democrat  at  the  preceding  election.  Why  he  chose 
to  act  with  the  Democratic  party  will  appear  by  refer- 
ence to  the  questions  upon  which  parties  were  then 
divided,  and  the  elements  that  composed  them. 

General  Jackson  had,  during  his  first  term  (1829-33), 
called  in  question  the  constitutionality  and  expediency 
of  the  United  States  Bank,  a  federal  corporation  deriv- 
ing much  profit  and  importance  from  the  handling  of 
the  government  funds  of  which  it  was  the  depository. 
In  1832,  before  the  presidential  election  of  that  year, 
he  vetoed  a  bill  to  recharter  the  bank,  the  existing 
charter  of  which  was  not  to  expire  until  1836.  This 
gave  that  institution  an  opportunity  for  an  appeal  to 
the  people,  which  it  confidently  made.  The  result  was 
the  reelection  of  Jackson  by  219  electoral  votes  against 
49  for  Clay,  11  for  Floyd,  and  7  for  Wirt. 


20      EARLY  LIFE  AND   PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

A  new  question  came  now,  however,  to  supplant  the 
hank  agitation,  and  gave  its  supporters  time  to  rally 
from  their  discomfiture.  As  already  stated,  this  second 
election  of  Jackson  had  been  almost  immediately  fol- 
lowed by  the  South  Carolina  convention,  and  the  adop- 
tion, on  the  24th  of  November,  1832,  of  the  Nullifica- 
cation  Ordinance  against  the  tariff  law  of  1828.  The 
people  who,  during  the  presidential  canvass  then  just 
ended,  had  been  divided  between  the  friends  and  oppo- 
nents of  the  United  States  Bank  must  now  divide  for 
and  against  nullification.  Jackson's  proclamation  was 
a  fiery  appeal  to  the  national  patriotism.  It  pleaded 
with  the  rebellious  people  in  his  own  native  State  to 
obey  the  laws,  but  at  the  same  time  made  it  unmistak- 
ably clear  that  if  they  could  not  be  thus  conciliated, 
they  would  be  met  with  "  all  means  to  crush."  The 
struggle  terminated  in  a  surrender  on  the  part  of  Con- 
gress, under  the  leadership  of  Henry  Clay.  The  law  of 
the  United  States  which  South  Carolina  had  ordained 
should  be  null  and  void  within  her  boundaries  became 
null  and  void  accordingly.  It  was  meekly  taken  out 
of  her  way,  and  another  substituted  for  it,  with  which 
she  and  her  chieftain  professed  to  be  satisfied,  and  for 
which  he  voted.^  Notwithstanding  this  stultifying 
vote  of  the  great  Nullifier  in  favor  of  diluted  "  pro- 
tection," the  fact  remained  that,  instead  of  the  prestige 
of  vindicated  authority  remaining  with  the  federal 
government,  it  went  with  the  revolted  State.  Clay 
gained  great  credit  at  the  time  as  "  a  Union-saver,"  by 

^  Mr.  Calhoxin  had  resigned  the  vice-presidency  and  taken  a  seat  in 
the  Senate  in  December,  1832. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  BANK  21 

this  compromise,  but  most  dangerously  did  he  prevail. 
The  federal  government  was  saved  from  the  necessity  of 
enforcing  its  authority  only  by  abdicating  that  author- 
ity, and  faction  was  taught  how  to  rule  by  making 
national  submission  to  its  most  unreasonable  demands 
the  price  at  which  the  Union  might  continue  to  exist 
without  the  use  of  force. 

Peace  having  thus  been  secured  on  terms  agreeable 
to  the  Nullifiers,  the  United  States  Bank  was  again  left 
to  the  undisputed  leadership  of  "  the  field  "  in  oppo- 
sition to  Jackson.  That  corporation,  nothing  daunted 
by  the  verdict  of  the  people  at  the  polls,  and  des- 
perately fighting  for  existence,  rallied  its  forces  for  the 
control  of  the  next  congressional  elections.  In  view  of 
this,  the  President,  in  the  summer  of  1833,  ordered  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  remove  the  government 
deposits  from  the  vaults  of  the  bank  for  the  alleged 
double  purpose  of  protecting  the  country  from  loss  and 
the  people  from  the  political  power  which  the  bank 
could  otherwise  wield  against  them  with  their  own 
money.  No  executive  act,  not  even  the  Emancipation 
Proclamation  of  Lincoln  thirty  years  later,  ever  brought 
upon  its  author  such  an  avalanche  of  denunciation  or 
more  of  concentrated  hate. 

For  this  act  the  Senate  at  its  next  session  (in  April, 
1834),  under  the  leadership  of  Clay,  adopted  a  resolu- 
tion of  censure  of  the  President.^ 

At  the  same  time  the  Whig  party  was  formed,  made 

*  This  resolution  is  principally  known  in  history  as  the  one  which, 
some  years  afterwards,  the  Senate  caused  to  be  expunged  from  its 
Journal. 


22      EARLY  LIFE  AND   PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

up  of  Clay  and  his  followers,  Calhoun  and  the  NuUifiers, 
the  Anti-Masons,  and  all  other  opponents  of  Jackson's 
administration.  This  statement  is  made  upon  the 
authority  of  Horace  Greeley,  the  ablest  and  most  zeal- 
ous champion  of  the  Whig  party,  as  he  had  been  one 
of  the  most  conspicuous  of  its  founders.^ 

1  The  statement  made  at  page  3,  in  The  Whig  Almanac  and  Politi- 
cian's Register  for  1838,  published  by  Horace  Greeley,  is  in  the  following 
words  :  — 

"The  American  Whig  Party  was  formed  in  the  spring  of  1834  by  a 
union,  so  far  as  their  common  objects  and  views  seemed  to  dictate,  of  all 
those  who  condemned  the  most  arbitrary  and  unconstitutional  removal  of 
the  deposits  of  the  public  treasure  by  General  Jackson,  from  the  one 
safe,  advantageous,  and  proper  depositary  designated  by  law,  into  forty 
or  fifty  State  banks.  That  reckless  and  most  indefensible  measure  — 
which  lies  at  the  foundation  of  all  our  subsequent  commercial,  financial, 
and  general  calamities  —  necessarily  gave  rise  to  an  intense  political 
excitement,  and  to  a  new  organization  of  parties,  in  which  was  partially 
merged  all  former  distinctions. 

"  The  Whig  Party  comprised  — 

"  1.  Most  of  those  who,  under  the  name  of  National  Republicans,  had 
previously  been  known  as  supporters  of  Adams  and  Clay,  and  advocates 
of  the  American  system. 

"  2,  Most  of  those  who,  acting  in  defense  of  what  they  deemed  the 
assailed  or  threatened  rights  of  the  States,  had  been  stigmatized  as 
Nullijiers,  or  the  less  virulent  State-Rights  men,  who  were  tlirown  into  a 
position  of  armed  neutrality  towards  the  administration  by  the  doctrines 
of  the  proclamation  of  1832,  against  South  Carolina. 

"  3.  A  majority  of  those  before  known  as  Anti-Masons. 

"  4.  Many  who,  up  to  that  time,  had  been  known  as  Jackson  men,  but 
who  united  in  condemning  the  high-handed  conduct  of  the  executive,  the 
immolation  of  Duane,  and  the  subserviency  of  Taney. 

"  5.  Numbers  who  had  not  before  taken  any  part  in  politics,  but  who 
were  now  awakened  from  their  apathy  by  the  palpable  usurpations  of  the 
executive  and  the  imminent  peril  of  our  whole  fabric  of  constitutional 
liberty  and  national  prosperity. 

"  Such  was  the  origin  of  the  Whig  Party." 

Duane,  for  refusing  to  obey  Jackson's  order  for  the  removal  of  these 


FORMATION  OF  THE   WHIG   PARTY  23 

The  Whig  party,  thus  made  up,  was  led  by  Clay  and 
Calhoun,  and  seemed  indeed  formidable  ;  but  in  vain 
did  it  contend  with  Jackson  for  popular  favor.  Martin 
Van  Buren,  his  choice  for  the  succession,  was  unani- 
mously nominated  by  the  national  Democratic  conven- 
tion in  1835,  and  triumphantly  elected  in  183G  by  the 
170  electoral  votes  of  four  of  the  New  England  States, 
with  New  York,  Pennsylvania,  Virginia,  North  Caro- 
lina, Alabama,  Mississippi,  and  Louisiana,  against  71 
for  William  Henry  Harrison,  and  51  scattering. 

Van  Buren  was  pledged  to  "  follow  in  the  footsteps 
of  his  illustrious  predecessor."  Harrison  was  under  no 
pledge ;  he  was  simply  the  candidate  of  the  opposition. 
Neither  party  had,  at  that  time,  made  any  declaration 
whatever  on  the  question  of  slavery.  The  prevailing 
sentiment  in  the  North,  and,  indeed,  throughout  the 
country,  was  that  slavery  was  an  evil  which  would  in 
time  be  removed  by  the  States  in  which  it  existed,  and 
which  alone  had  the  lawful  right  to  deal  with  it.  Anti- 
slavery  men  on  principle  were  not  only  tolerated  in  both 

deposits,  had  been  removed  from  the  secretaryship  of  the  Treasury,  and 
Taney  had  been  appointed  to  succeed  him. 

At  page  24  of  the  same  Almanac  Mr.  Greeley  bears  the  following  testi- 
mony to  the  zeal  with  which  the  NuUifiers  supported  the  Whig  cause  in 
1836.     Under  the  head  of  "  South  Carolina  "  he  says  :  — 

"  In  tlie  election  of  1836  this  State  voted  for  Willie  P.  Mangum  of 
North  Carolina  for  President  and  John  Tyler  of  Virginia  for  Vice-Presi- 
dent. There  was  no  Van  Buren  party  here.  Not  a  single  vote  was  given 
for  Van  Buren  in  the  legislature.  Not  a  voice  was  raised  for  him  in  the 
public  journals.  The  clear  Whig  majority  in  that  State  is  probably  not 
less  than  36,000." 

Presidential  electors  were  then  chosen  in  South  Carolina  by  the  legis- 
lature. 


24     EAELY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

parties,  but  to  question  their  opinions  on  the  subject 
was  no  more  thought  of  than  it  is  to  question  the  right 
of  individual  opinion  in  the  parties  of  to-day  upon  the 
subject  of  rehgious  beHef.  To  enlist,  therefore,  in 
either  the  one  party  or  the  other  at  the  time  was  not  to 
take  any  position  whatever  upon  the  subject  of  slavery. 

If  any  faction  was  secretly  endeavoring  to  control 
politics  in  the  interest  of  slavery  in  1836,  it  was  the 
NuUifiers,  and  they,  as  Mr.  Greeley  testifies,  were  in  the 
Whig  party. 

Such  were  the  party  divisions  and  such  the  party 
candidates  when  young  Stanton,  having  reached  his 
majority,  was  called  upon  to  cast  his  vote  at  the  presi- 
dential election  of  1836.  The  Whig  party,  which, 
according  to  the  authority  of  Horace  Greeley,  embraced 
"  most  of  those  who  had  been  stigmatized  as  NuUifi- 
ers," and  "  State-Rights  men,  thrown  into  a  position 
of  armed  neutrality  towards  the  administration  by  the 
doctrines  of  the  proclamation  of  1832  against  South 
Carolina,"  was  not  the  party  for  Edwin  M.  Stanton. 

1836  was  for  him  a  most  eventful  year.  It  had  seen 
him  admitted  to  the  practice  of  the  law,  married,  and 
enlisted  in  a  political  cause  which  to  him  represented 
the  patriotism  that  flamed  in  his  enthusiastic  nature. 


CHAPTER  IV 

Resumes  his  Residence  in  Steubenville.  —  Relations  with  Senator 
Tappan.  —  His  Part  in  the  Campaign  of  1840. 

Stanton  was  most  diligent  in  his  profession ;  careful 
in  the  preparation,  and  confident  in  the  presentation  of 
his  cases.  Within  the  space  of  two  years  he  had  built 
up  a  lucrative  practice,  extending  through  the  circuit. 
He  was  then  but  twenty-three  years  of  age. 

At  the  end  of  his  term  as  prosecuting  attorney 
of  Harrison  County,  in  the  fall  of  1839,  he  resumed 
his  residence  in  Steubenville,  where  he  became  the  law 
partner  of  Judge  Tappan,  who  had  just  been  elected  to 
the  United  States  Senate.  He  had  found  time  to  inter- 
est himself  to  some  extent  in  political  affairs,  and  had 
been  consulted  by  Judge  Tappan  during  his  political 
contest.  He  preserved  many  letters  from  that  gentle- 
man, whose  confidence  in  him  seemed  to  be  unbounded. 
In  one  of  these  letters  (January  9,  1840)  the  Senator 
refers  to  a  letter  written  by  Stanton,  in  the  "  Ohio 
Statesman,"  to  one  of  the  supreme  judges  of  the  State 
opposing  the  latter' s  reelection.     He  writes  :  — 

"  We  all  think  here  you  must  have  killed  him.  Our 
mess  consists  of  Allen  and  Tappan  of  the  Senate, 
Medill,  Weller,  and  Duane  of  the  House  —  a  genuine 
loco-foco  set  as  you  will  find  in  this  city.     We  read 


26      EAELY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

your   letter   to    Wood   and   all   agreed   in    the   above 
opinion."     Wood  was  defeated. 

It  appears  that  Stanton  was  named  for  judicial  hon- 
ors, for  Senator  Tappan  wrote  him  March  3,  1840,  as 
follows :  — 

I  am  very  clearly  of  the  opinion  that  you  should  refuse  the 
office  of  President  Judge,  if  offered  to  you.  I  was  elected 
under  similar  circumstances  with  yours  as  to  business,  and  I 
lost  by  it  in  every  point  of  view.  If  you  are  ambitious  (and 
who  is  not  ?)  look  this  way. 

Stanton  was  ambitious,  but  not  for  office.  He  looked 
neither  towards  Congress  nor  the  bench,  but  kept  right 
on  in  his  practice  of  the  law. 

Although  in  full  accord  with  the  party  in  power,  and 
on  terms  of  intimacy  with  a  Senator  from  his  State,  who 
endeavored  to  spur  him  to  political  activity,  he  could 
not  be  induced  to  leave  his  law  business  to  seek  political 
preferment.  He  was  a  warm  partisan  of  Van  Buren, 
who  was  the  upholder  of  the  dynasty  established  by 
Jackson,  and  in  1840  wrote  and  spoke  in  favor  of  his 
reelection.  The  issues  which  were  then  uppermost  in 
the  public  mind  were  those  which  related  to  banking 
and  currency.  The  following  editorial  written  by  him 
that  year  will  give  the  reader  an  idea  of  the  Democratic 
doctrine  of  that  day,  and  of  Mr.  Stanton's  method  of 
discussing  it :  — 

Every  one  looks  upon  the  election  of  this  fall  as  a  solemn 
declaration  by  the  people  of  the  State  against  the  present  un- 
equal and  fraudulent  system  of  banking.  "  But  what  system 
are  you  going  to  give  us  in  the  place  of  it  ?"  is  asked  by  those 
who  think  the  whole  affairs  of  the  world  are  dependent  upon 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1840  27 

banks  and  corporations.  For  there  are  many  who  so  disre- 
gard their  own  senses  and  hang  their  faith  implicitly  upon  the 
humbuggery  of  banks,  as  to  think  those  institutions  equally 
essential  to  life,  as  the  sun  is  to  animal  existence. 

"  What  plan  will  the  governor  recommend  or  the  legisla- 
ture adopt  ? "  such  persons  ask  ;  and  they  are  greatly  aston- 
ished when  told  that  no  plan  is  necessary,  and  that  none  will 
be  recommended  or  adopted,  except  to  rej)eal  the  existing 
restrictions  on  banking,  and  to  enforce  the  prohibition  against 
issuing  and  circulating  small  notes. 

"  But  how  will  exchange  be  regulated  ?  "  It  will  regulate 
itself,  is  answered,  if  left  free,  just  as  the  price  of  wheat  or 
pork,  or  any  other  article  of  trade  is  regulated,  and  without 
the  aid  of  special,  partial,  or  fraudulent  legislation. 

It  is  now  clear  that  the  people  of  this  country  and  espe- 
cially of  this  State  have  discovered  that  all  the  evils  under 
which,  through  the  medium  of  a  corrupt  banking  system,  they 
have  been  suffering,  may  be  traced  to  one  simple  cause  — 
partial  legislation.  By  this  partial  legislation  it  is  now  seen 
that  one  set  of  men  have,  under  various  pretenses,  been 
granted  exclusive  pri%"ileges,  and  allowed  to  exercise  powers 
denied  to  the  rest  of  the  community.  That  thus  monopolies 
have  been  created ;  competition  put  down.  Irresponsible 
associations  have  been  formed  with  power  to  regidate  the 
quantity  and  value  of  the  circulating  medium,  and  thereby 
regulate  the  price  of  everything  else.  And  acting  upon  this 
principle,  they  have  managed,  for  a  long  while,  not  only  to 
compel  the  mass  of  the  people  to  pay  them  heavy  tribute,  but 
have  also  tried,  in  various  ways,  to  bring  the  whole  business 
of  the  country  within  their  grasp.  The  people  have  felt  such 
a  state  of  things  to  be  an  evil  of  great  magnitude,  and,  having 
traced  that  evil  to  partial  and  unequal  legislation,  they  have 
also  made  another  discovery,  the  truth  of  which  is  every  day 
becoming  more  apparent  and  better  understood,  viz.,  that  all 
the  schemes  of  State  banks  and  other  corporations  for  banking 


28      EARLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

purposes,  by  whatever  name  called,  which  are  now  so  busily 
suggested  or  set  afloat,  are  but  contrivances  to  accomplish  the 
same  end  for  which  the  present  system  was  created.  They 
are  all  based  on  partial  or  exclusive  legislation.  Build  them, 
construct  them,  regulate  and  christen  them  as  you  may,  the 
people  see  that  they  are  but  machines  to  promote  the  interest 
of  the  few  at  the  expense  of  the  many.  And  the  public  mind 
is  therefore  fast  and  firmly  resolving  to  have  no  legislation 
upon  the  subject,  except  what  may  be  necessary  to  check  and 
prevent  the  abuses  of  the  present  system. 

The  Democratic  party  will  leave  currency  tinkering  and 
doctoring  to  their  opponents,  the  Whigs  and  the  Conservatives, 
considering  charters  and  acts  of  incorporation  no  more  essen- 
tial to  the  purposes  of  trade  and  commerce  than  they  are  for 
raising  wheat  or  making  salt.  The  injustice  and  impolicy  of 
granting  to  a  few  persons  the  exclusive  privilege  of  raising 
wheat  or  making  salt  is  easily  seen,  and  the  people,  though  for 
a  long  time  deceived,  have  now  found  it  to  be  equally  unwise 
and  unjust  to  grant  to  a  few  persons  powers  and  privileges  by 
which  the  circulating  medium  is  regulated  and  controlled, 
and  thereby  wheat,  salt,  and  other  commodities  of  life  monopo- 
lized, and  their  prices  controlled. 

When  a  human  body  is  diseased  a  skillful  practitioner  seeks 
first  to  discover  the  source  or  cause  of  disease,  and  remove 
that  cause.  The  rest  he  will  leave  to  nature,  or  use  such  rem- 
edies only  as  may  aid  her  operations.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
quack  will  fall  to  dosing  and  doctoring,  counteracting  all  the 
while  the  operations  of  nature,  and  perhaps  increasing  the 
violence  of  the  disease. 

The  present  diseased  state  of  currency  and  of  business  has 
been,  as  is  now  admitted,  caused  by  the  partial  legislation 
that  created  the  banks,  and  restricted  that  peculiar  branch  of 
business  to  a  few  persons  only,  who  were  at  the  same  time 
endowed  with  vast  powers  and  exclusive  privileges.  The 
quack  nostrums   of   State   banks  and   all  similar  remedies, 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1840  29 

instead  of  removing  the  cause  of  disease,  only  aggravate  tlie 
symptoms,  and  may  render  the  evil  incurable.  But  by  put- 
ting an  end  to  partial  legislation  and  exclusive  privileges,  by 
removing  the  present  legislative  restrictions  upon  banking,  so 
far  as  may  be  sufficient  to  prevent  monopoly  and  secure  com- 
petition, the  cause  of  the  present  evils  will  be  removed,  and 
the  operations  of  business  once  more  become  equal,  healthy, 
and  uniform. 

Such  appears  now  to  be  the  current  of  public  opinion,  and 
there  is  little  doubt  but  the  next  legislature  will  set  a  wise 
and  wholesome  example  by  abstaining  from  all  partial  legisla- 
tion, strictly  confining  itself  to  such  action  as  shall  have  in 
view  the  interests  of  the  people  at  large,  and  will,  in  granting 
no  exclusive  privileges,  create  no  corporations,  and  build  up 
no  monopolies,  under  any  name  or  for  any  purpose.. 

An  invitation  for  him  to  speak  at  Bloomfield  was 
made  very  urgent  by  the  club  committee,  on  the  ground 
that  the  "Tippecanoe  Club  "  had  sent  as  a  speaker  Mr. 
Bingham,  in  the  hope  of  drawing  their  audience. 

Among  his  papers  he  preserved  the  points  of  some 
speeches  made  by  him  that  year,  which  bristled  with 
arguments  in  favor  of  the  independent  treasury  system, 
and  against  the  banks. 

The  Democratic  leaders  looked  for  a  continued  adher- 
ence by  the  people  to  the  Jacksonian  dynasty ;  but  the 
country  had  not  recovered  from  the  effects  of  the  panic 
and  bank  suspensions  in  1837.  The  administration 
of  Van  Buren  had  been  one  of  "  hard  times "  throuo-h- 

o 

out,  and  the  magic  power  of  Jackson  could  not  sway 
the  people  from  the  "  Hermitage  "  as  it  had  when  at  the 
helm  of  State  he  spoke  with  authority  and  "  took  the 
responsibility."    The  voters  listened,  therefore,  with  less 


30      EARLY  LIFE  AND   PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

interest  to  the  usual  appeals  against  the  banks,  than 
they  did  to  the  promise  of  better  times  if  a  change 
should  be  made.  With  songs  of  "  Tippecanoe  and 
Tyler  too,"  and  tales  of  "  hard  cider  "  dealt  out  with 
generous  hospitality  at  the  "  log-cabin "  of  General 
Harrison,  the  "  latch-string  "  of  whose  door  was  picto- 
rially  represented  as  being  "  always  out "  to'  all  who 
chanced  to  fare  his  way,  they  marched  over  the  pros- 
trate cause  of  Democracy  in  1840,  and  seated  the  Whig 
candidate  —  William  Henry  Harrison  —  in  the  White 
House  by  an  electoral  vote  of  234  against  60  for  Van 
Buren. 

With  this  campaign  terminated  Stanton's  interest  in 
party  affairs.  He  became  more  and  more  devoted  to 
his  profession.  The  energy  and  fidelity  with  which  he 
attended  to  his  business,  and  the  ability  which  he  dis- 
played in  the  conduct  of  his  cases,  brought  to  him  well- 
earned  success  and  amply  gratified  his  sole  ambition. 


CHAPTER   V 

His  Great  Success  as  a  Lawyer.  —  "  The  Divine  Alchemy  of  Work." 
—  His  First  Case  in  Washington.  —  Removal  to  Pittsburg.  —  His 
Career  there.  —  Second  Marriage. 

The  professional  career  of  Mr.  Stanton  Tvas,  through- 
out, a  brilliant  success.  From  the  very  start  he  meant 
to  succeed,  and  never  doubted  his  power  to  do  so.  For 
this  he  worked  eagerly  and  unremittingly,  not  as  an 
irksome  necessity,  but  with  a  stimulating  resolve  to 
win.  Light  of  heart,  healthy  of  body,  abounding  in 
energy,  he  deemed  nothing  very  difficult,  much  less 
impossible.  His  reputation  and  business  steadily  in- 
creased together  after  his  return  from  Cadiz  to  Steu- 
benville,  in  1839,  and  the  tide  of  his  prosperity  knew 
no  returning  ebb. 

The  irresistible  force  and  momentum  which  he  car- 
ried into  his  work  are  well  illustrated  by  his  conduct 
of  a  case  into  which  he  was  brought,  in  1845,  after  it 
had  been  virtually  abandoned  by  the  lawyers  originally 
employed.  Caleb  J.  McNulty,  Clerk  of  the  United 
States  House  of  Representatives,  had  been  indicted  as  a 
defaulter.  He  was  an  Ohio  man,  and  in  his  extremity 
sought  the  aid  and  advice  of  Senator  Tappan.  He 
was  confined  in  the  District  of  Columbia  jail  in  default 
of  bail,  and  the  resident  lawyers  in  charge  of  his  case 
regarded  it  as  hopeless. 


32      EARLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

Tappan  advised  him  to  secure  the  services  of  Stan- 
ton, who  was  promptly  sent  for.  Arriving  in  Wash- 
ington at  midnight,  he  went  directly  to  the  jail  and 
conferred  with  his  client.  He  found  that  no  time  was 
to  be  lost.  The  case  was  set  for  trial  on  the  following 
morning.  Without  thinking  of  rest,  he  at  once  com- 
menced an  examination  of  the  statutes,  rules  of  the 
House  of  Representatives,  and  all  records  that  would 
shed  Hght  on  the  duties  and  responsibilities  of  the 
of&ce  held  by  McNulty.  By  four  o'clock  in  the  morn- 
ing he  had  satisfied  himself  that  the  indictment  was 
not  good  in  law,  and  he  then  took  two  hours  of  sleep. 
After  an  early  breakfast  he  called  upon  the  attorneys 
in  the  case.  It  was  much  too  early  in  the  day  to  find 
them,  and  he  employed  the  intervening  time  up  to 
ten  o'clock  in  further  examination  of  the  law.  Upon 
consulting  with  them,  he  found  them  decidedly  of  the 
opinion  that  the  facts  and  the  law  were  against  the 
accused.  They  readily  assented,  however,  to  an  effort 
by  him  to  quash  the  indictment,  and  he  at  once  pro- 
ceeded to  draw  up  the  motion  for  that  purpose.  Ap- 
pearing in  the  court  a  perfect  stranger,  he  was  at  a 
great  disadvantage  in  thus  attacking  an  indictment, 
the  validity  of  which  had  been  virtually  acquiesced  in 
by  older  and  well-known  counsel  for  the  defense.  The 
court  was  disposed  to  regard  it  as  a  dilatory  motion, 
without  merit,  and  to  decline  to  entertain  it  at  that  late 
stage  in  the  proceedings.  Seeing  that  he  must  act 
with  energy,  and  even  with  audacity,  if  he  would  be 
heard  at  all,  he  arose,  and,  not  waiting  for  the  court  to 
say  whether  or  not  his  motion  should  have  a  hearing. 


GREAT  SUCCESS  AS  A  LAWYER  35 

made  an  appeal  so  vehement  and  earnest  —  giving 
briefly  the  story  of  his  sudden  entrance  into  the  case, 
and  what  he  had  been  doing  during  the  preceding 
night,  and  asking  only  one  day  in  which  to  prepare  for 
the  argument  —  that  the  district  attorney  made  no 
objection,  and  the  court  granted  his  request.  At  the 
same  time  it  was  ordered  that  if  the  motion  should  be 
overruled,  the  prisoner  must  be  ready  for  trial  at  once. 
A  two  hours'  argument  the  next  day  resulted  in  the 
quashing  of  the  indictment  and  the  discharge  of  the 
prisoner. 

In  1844  he  met  with  a  severe  affliction  in  the  death 
of  his  wife.  His  removal  to  Pittsburg  occurred  in 
1847.  He  had  long  been  contemplating  a  wider  field 
of  operations  than  was  presented  at  Steubenville.  Co- 
lumbus was  considered  by  him,  but  Pittsburg  was 
finally  chosen,  partly  through  the  encouragement  of 
the  Hon.  William  Wilkins  of  that  city,  and  partly  be- 
cause he  could,  by  steamboat  from  there,  more  easily 
visit  his  mother  at  Steubenville  on  Sundays  than  from 
the  other  place.  He  continued  to  be  a  citizen  of  Ohio, 
retaining  the  home  at  Steubenville  for  his  mother's 
use,  and  also  retaining  his  place  in  the  law  firm  of 
Stanton  &  McCook. 

On  the  25th  of  June,  1856,  while  Mr.  Stanton  was 
still  residing  in  Pittsburg,  he  married  Miss  Ellen 
M.  Hutchison,  the  daughter  of  James  Hutchison,  a 
wealthy  merchant  of  Pittsburg.  From  this  marriage 
were  born  four  children,  —  two  sons  and  two  daugh- 
ters. Of  these,  one  of  the  sons,  born  October  17, 
1861,  died  July  10,  1862. 


34      EARLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

He  remained  at  Pittsburg  from  1847  to  1856.  His 
professional  life  there  was  one  of  great  activity  and 
brilliant  success,  as  was  well  attested  by  the  leading 
members  of  the  Pittsburg  bar  at  the  meeting  of  their 
association,  called  after  his  death,  in  1869.  On  that 
occasion  Thomas  M.  Marshall,  Esq.,  said  :  — 

With  invincible  will  and  resolute  purpose  he  performed 
his  work,  whether  in  the  schoolroom  at  the  student's  desk,  in 
the  office,  in  the  forum,  or  as  the  greatest  war  minister  of  the 
age.  He  approached  the  object  of  labor  with  the  purpose  to 
overcome  it.  He  labored  with  the  diligence  of  the  student 
and  the  courage  of  the  soldier.  Herein  lay  the  secret  of  his 
great  success.  He  believed  in  the  divine  "  alchemy "  of 
work.  When  he  was  admitted  to  the  bar  in  our  sister 
State,  Ohio,  he  worked  for  bread  for  his  widowed  mother. 
He  attained  the  front  rank  of  his  profession  there  before  he 
reached  the  age  of  thirty  years.  When  he  moved  to  Pitts- 
burg he  at  once  took  his  place  with  the  ablest  of  our  bar. 
It  is  no  small  compliment  to  his  memory  to  say  that  he  added 
fresh  honors  to  the  bar  that  could  point  to  its  illustrious  dead 
and  pronounce  the  names  of  Woods,  Ross,  Baldwin,  Semple, 
Biddle,  Fetterman,  and  Burke,  and,  among  the  then  great 
living  minds,  to  Wilkins,  Fernand,  Shaler,  Loomis,  Metcalf, 
and  their  associates.  After  ten  years  of  full  practice  here, 
the  rare  ability,  learning,  and  success  of  which  may  be  traced 
in  contemporary  reports,  he  removed  to  Washington,  soon  to 
enter  upon  that  public  career  which  made  his  name  famous 
wherever  civilization  had  a  foothold,  and  patriotism,  loyalty, 
and  courage  had  admirers.  Before  saying  a  single  word 
further  of  Mr.  Stanton,  I  may  say  that  if  by  any  human  pos- 
sibilities his  valuable  public  services  to  this  nation  could  be 
expunged  from  its  history ;  if  he  had  contributed  nothing 
more  than  the  results  of  his  individual  labor  as  an  example 


(2>/li?my  -  >x^^i^::^^i^;<;>?2y'  Cola^iy^ 


/.-^^ny 


CAREER  AT   PITTSBURG  35 

to  his  countrymen,  as  an  example  to  the  young  men  of  the 
country,  still  his  fame  would  have  been  ample  and  secure. 

Of  Mr.  Stanton's  great  capacity  for  work  Mr.  Mar- 
shall said :  — 

I  have  known  men  more  richly  endowed  with  natural  gifts  ; 
I  have  known  more  learned  men,  more  eloquent  men,  more 
persuasive  men  ;  but  I  have  never  met  another  man  who  was 
capable  of  such  prodigious,  continuous,  and  incessant  mental 
labor.  I  may  be  pardoned  in  referring  to  an  instance  of 
this  power.  I  think  it  was  in  the  winter  of  1854.  I  had 
occasion  to  meet  him  in  regard  to  a  case  which  had  been  fixed 
on  a  Saturday  for  trial  on  the  succeeding  Monday  two  weeks. 
The  cause  involved  questions  of  church  polity,  rules  of  church 
discipline,  and  considerable  real  estate  was  dependent  upon 
the  result  of  the  issue.  It  was  a  quarrel,  a  trouble  among 
the  saints.  It  was  a  novel  and  rare  case  in  the  law,  intricate 
and  complex  in  its  facts.  Mr.  Stanton  had  no  previous 
knowledge  of  the  case ;  had  never  known  anything  of  the 
denominational  or  church  quarrel.  Yet  within  two  weeks 
he  mastered  the  case  in  all  its  details  of  the  law,  facts,  and 
church  history.  To  do  so  he  was  compelled  to  peruse  and 
study  over  one  thousand  pages  of  ecclesiastical  history,  and 
examine  critically  the  yearly  proceedings  of  church  courts, 
synods,  and  assemblies  for  over  fifty  years.  He  had  to 
unravel  and  dissect  the  dry  and  unchristian  details  of  a 
denominational  schism,  and  prepare  the  law  for  the  trial 
of  the  case.  In  these  two  weeks  he  became  familiar  with 
the  history  of  the  Covenanter  Church  from  the  days  of 
the  "  solemne  league  and  covenant "  to  the  day  of  trial.  He 
delivered  the  opening  address  on  behalf  of  the  defendants, 
and  occupied  one  hour  and  a  half  in  an  exhaustive  statement 
of  the  case.  The  court-room  was  crowded  with  the  brethren, 
—  doctors  of  divinity,  gray  with  time's  years,  and  full  of  the 


36      EARLY  LIFE  AND   PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

wisdom  of  their  school.  When  he  sat  down,  one  of  these 
doctors  inquired  if  Mr.  Stanton  had  not  been  educated  in  the 
church,  tutored  in  her  principles  and  history.  He  was 
answered :  "  Two  weeks  since  he  knew  nothing  of  your  his- 
tory or  principles,  and  scarcely  knew  of  your  existence."  The 
doctor's  wonder  was  excited,  to  be  merged  afterwards  in 
admiration  of  the  perfections  of  a  lawyer's  work.  This  case 
was  tried  by  men  eminent  in  the  profession,  —  Mr.  Williams 
with  Mr.  Jones,  and  my  dead  friend,  the  eloquent,  brave 
hero,  Samuel  W.  Black,  were  counsel  for  the  plaintiffs.  Mr. 
Stanton  prepared  and  tried  that  case  as  if  it  had  been  his 
life's  work.  When  it  was  won,  he  turned  to  fresh  work  with 
the  appetite  and  inspiration  of  youth. 

John  H.  Hampton,  Esq.,  said :  — 

He  rose  in  his  profession  rapidly,  not  because  wealth  or 
influential  family  connections  opened  the  way,  but  because  his 
ambition  and  ceaseless  effort  drew  attention  to  his  early 
efforts  and  excited  him  to  renewed  exertion.  He  possessed 
an  indomitable  will,  and  trusted  not  to  displays  of  winning 
declamation  to  gain  a  cause,  but  to  severe  and  continuous 
study,  which  marks  the  careful  and  successful  lawyer.  When 
at  our  bar,  he  was  noted  for  the  exact  knowledge  he  had  of 
the  law  and  facts  in  his  case,  and  for  the  constant  labor  he 
practiced  in  getting  ready  for  the  conflicts  he  entered.  Day 
and  night  he  toiled,  and  exhibited  in  a  large  degree  that  stub- 
born pertinacity  of  purpose  which  distinguished  him  in  the 
great  duties  he  afterwards  performed  as  Secretary  of  War. 
No  man  ever  saw  one  of  his  briefs  that  was  not  struck  with 
its  completeness  and  with  the  array  of  authority  it  presented. 
But  he  added  to  his  labor  that  high  degree  of  method  which 
few  men  possess.  Order  was  the  controlling  element  of  his 
mind.  He  possessed  a  power  of  arranging  his  facts  and  the 
decisions  applicable  to  them  that  made  him  almost  irresistible 


CAREER  AT  PITTSBURG  37 

when  put  before  a  court  or  a  jury.  He  planted  himself  for 
success  upon  one  or  two  points  in  his  case,  and  fought  his 
battle  manfully  to  the  end  upon  them.  His  mind  was  strong, 
his  judgment  clear,  his  logic  direct  and  convincing.  No  false 
ornaments  marred  the  line  of  his  arguments ;  no  attempt 
made  to  triumph  by  pathetic  appeals.  He  moved  steadily  on 
to  the  end  by  clear  reasoning,  and  carried  his  case  by  the 
power  and  force  which  he  infused  into  it. 

A.  W.  Loomis,  Esq.,  a  leading  lawyer  of  the  Pitts- 
burg bar,  said  when  Mr.  Stanton  took  up  his  residence 
in  that  city  :  — 

I  shall  now  have  to  work.  Stanton  will  study  my  side  of 
cases  as  thoroughly  as  he  does  his  own,  and  will  know  as 
much  as  I  do  of  it,  and  perhaps  more. 


CHAPTER  VI 

Argument  of  |klr.  Stanton  in  the  Wheeling  Bridge   Case  in   the 
United  States  Supreme  Court.  —  His  Methods  in  preparing  for 
I    an  Argument. 

Early  in  his  Pittsburg  career  Mr.  Stanton  acquired 
a  considerable  national  reputation  as  counsel  for  the 
State  of  Pennsylvania  in  a  suit  brought  by  that  com- 
monwealth, under  his  advice,  against  the  Wheeling 
Bridge  Company,  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States.  It  was  an  original  suit,  brought  under  that 
clause  of  the  Federal  Constitution  which  provides  that 
in  all  cases  in  which  a  State  is  a  party,  the  Supreme 
Court  shall  have  original  jurisdiction,  and  was  for  an 
injunction  against  the  construction  of  a  bridge  across 
the  Ohio  River  at  Wheehng,  then  in  progress,  under  a 
charter  granted  by  the  State  of  Virginia. 

The  legislatures  of  Ohio  and  Virginia  had,  as  early 
as  1816,  passed  acts  authorizing  the  construction  of  a 
bridge  at  that  point,  providing  that  it  should  not 
obstruct  navigation.  The  work  not  being  done.  Con- 
gress was,  in  1836  and  1838,  petitioned  to  perform  it, 
but  without  favorable  results.  In  1843  the  Ohio  legis- 
lature memorialized  Congress  to  construct  the  bridge. 
This  was  met  by  Pennsylvania  with  resolutions  of 
remonstrance,  setting  forth  the  injury  to  her  commerce 
which  would  be  caused  thereby.  The  scheme  was  again 
defeated. 


THE  WHEELING  BRIDGE  CASE  39 

In  1847  Virginia  revived  her  former  charter,  and 
authorized  the  reorganization  of  the  corporation  for  the 
construction  of  the  bridge.  The  people  of  Pittsburg 
and  of  "western  Pennsylvania  saw  with  dismay  the 
work  progressing,  which  was,  as  Mr.  Stanton  said  in  his 
argument,  to  make  Wheeling,  Va.,  to  all  intents  and 
purposes,  the  head  of  navigation  on  the  Ohio  River. 
The  two  States  embracing  the  shores  on  either  side  of 
the  river  had  consented,  and  were  indeed  equally  desir- 
ous of  seeinof'  the  work  advanced.  Where  could  the 
authority  be  found  to  interfere  ?  It  was  not  then  the 
fashion  for  the  federal  government  to  be  appealed 
to,  to  stay  the  action  of  the  States,  even  when  its 
powers  were  invaded ;  and  the  Virginia  legislature  had 
avoided  the  appearance  of  any  conflict  with  the  power 
of  Congress  to  regulate  commerce  between  the  States 
by  declaring  that  if  the  bridge  should  be  so  erected  as 
to  obstruct  the  navigation  of  the  river,  then,  unless  the 
obstruction  was  at  once  removed,  the  bridge  might  be 
treated  as  a  public  nuisance  and  abated  accordingly. 

But  although  the  bridge,  as  it  was  being  constructed, 
would  thus  obstruct  the  navigation  of  the  river,  little 
was  to  be  hoped  for  from  the  courts  of  Virginia  in  the 
way  of  enforcing  the  conditions  of  her  charter  thus 
violated.  To  seek  reHef  in  the  United  States  Circuit 
Court  for  either  of  the  districts  in  which  the  bridge  was 
situated  would  likely  be  fruitless,  and  an  appeal  could 
be  heard  only  after  long  and  injurious  delay.  How, 
then,  could  it  be  made  to  appear  that  the  State  of  Penn- 
sylvania was  an  injured  party,  in  the  sense  which  would 
bring  her  within  the  right  to  institute  an  original  suit 


40     EARLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

against  the  Bridge  Company  in  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States  ? 

This  problem  Mr.  Stanton  solved.  He  commenced 
suit  in  July,  1849,  by  fiUng  in  the  office  of  the  clerk 
of  that  court  the  bill  of  complaint  of  the  State  of  Penn- 
sylvania against  the  Wheeling  Bridge  Company  and 
others.  On  the  16th  of  the  following  month  he  ap- 
peared before  Justice  Grier,  sitting  at  chambers  in  Phil- 
adelphia, and  moved  for  an  injunction  against  the 
Bridge  Company  on  behalf  of  the  State  of  Pennsylvania 
at  the  instance  of  her  attorney-general.  After  consid- 
ering the  bill  and  answer,  and  the  affidavits  of  the 
respective  parties  in  support  of  the  same,  the  judge 
refused  the  injunction,  but  ordered  that  the  papers  be 
filed  in  the  office  of  the  clerk  of  the  court,  and  that  the 
complainant  have  leave  to  move  for  an  injunction,  as 
prayed  for,  on  the  first  day  of  the  next  term  of  the 
court,  which  would  be  in  the  following  December.  He 
declined  to  take  the  responsibility  of  exercising  the 
power  of  the  court  in  the  premises,  mainly  because  the 
question  of  the  plaintiff's  right  was  new  and  involved 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  court. 

Mr.  Stanton's  position  as  to  the  right  of  the  State  of 
Pennsylvania  to  bring  the  suit,  and  the  reasons  urged 
by  him  to  show  that  her  interest  was  sufficient  for  that 
purpose,  were  deemed  "  far  fetched  "  by  leading  mem- 
bers of  the  Pennsylvania  bar,  while  Virginia  lawyers 
treated  the  suit  with  derision.  Unmoved  by  these  dis- 
couragements, he  appeared  in  the  Supreme  Court  at  the 
next  term  (December,  1849),  and  moved  for  the  injunc- 
tion.   His  argument  in  support  of  the  motion  exhausted 


THE  WHEELING  BRIDGE  CASE  41 

the  history  and  law  of  the  subject.  He  demonstrated 
the  federal  jurisdiction  over  the  subject-matter,  and  the 
original  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  case. 
His  argument  was  conceded  to  be  one  of  great  power, 
and  placed  him  at  once  in  the  front  rank  of  his  profes- 
sion in  the  nation. 

Mr.  Stanton's  argument  in  this  celebrated  case  ap- 
pears in  the  13th  volume  of  Howard's  U.  S.  Reports, 
page  532.  In  its  conclusion  he  grandly  asserted  the 
rights  of  the  State,  while  confidently  submitting  their 
protection  to  the  highest  tribunal  of  the  nation.  The 
sentiments  he  uttered  evinced  his  fidelity  to  the  majesty 
of  the  law,  and  his  devotion  to  the  rightful  authority 
of  both  the  nation  and  the  State.     He  said :  — 

Having  thus  presented  my  proposition  in  its  various 
branches,  I  feel  that  it  is  not  needful  for  me  to  urge  upon 
this  court  the  important  considerations  which  necessarily  arise 
from  the  case,  considerations  not  only  affecting  life  and  pro- 
perty to  an  immeasurable  extent,  but  vast  commerce,  essential 
state  rights,  and  the  peace  of  the  confederacy.  They  will 
present  themselves  to  the  court  with  more  force  than  I  could 
urge  them.  I  know  not,  sir,  that  it  becomes  me  to  say  more 
in  this  behalf.     This  only  I  will  add :  — 

In  1765  a  distinguished  son  of  Pennsylvania,  Dr.  Ritten- 
house,  first  conceived  the  idea  of  her  great  works  connecting 
the  waters  of  the  lakes  and  the  Atlantic  with  the  Ohio  River. 
Seventy  years  elapsed  before  the  resources  of  the  State  were 
equal  to  such  an  undertaking.  But,  once  commenced,  it  was 
accomplished.  While  all  other  works  tending  to  the  same 
object  halted  east  of  the  Alleghanies,  Pennsylvania  forced  her 
way  through,  thus  opening  a  cheap,  easy,  and  secure  water 
transportation  from  the  Gulf  and  the  Rocky  Mountains  to  the 
Atlantic  seaboard. 


42      EARLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

But  no  sooner  had  this  mighty  work  been  completed  and 
its  revenues  commenced  to  replenish  the  exhausted  treasury 
of  the  State,  and  a  prosperous  commerce  to  reimburse  her 
citizens  for  their  heavy  taxation,  than  the  flagitious  scheme 
is  undertaken  to  cut  her  off  from  the  Ohio  by  a  bridge  at 
Wheeling,  within  fifty  miles  of  her  borders. 

When  to  prevent  so  great  a  wrong  she  appeals  to  the  Su- 
preme Court,  the  work  is  hurried  on ;  and,  pending  her  appli- 
cation for  an  injunction,  iron  cables  are  stretched  across  the 
channel  of  a  navigable  river,  interrupting  vessels  arriving  and 
departing  from  the  ports  of  Pennsylvania,  and  before  she  can 
be  heard  in  this  tribunal  her  vessels  are  stopped  on  a  public 
highway,  their  cargo  and  passengers  discharged  at  Wheeling, 
and  Pennsylvania  ports  shut  up. 

For  less  injuries  than  these  States  have  been  heretofore 
prompt  to  redress  their  wrongs,  and  have  rushed  swiftly  to 
war.  Even  imder  our  government,  in  defense  of  commercial 
rights,  supposed  to  be  invaded  by  congressional  enactment, 
the  banner  of  disunion  has  been  unfurled  in  the  South.  In 
the  North  and  East  bordering  States,  asserting  navigation 
privileges,  have  resorted  to  acts  of  confiscation  and  retortion, 
until  at  length  civil  war  was  ready  to  burst  forth  along  their 
borders  and  range  along  their  coasts.  At  a  later  day,  the 
Western  States  of  Ohio  and  Michigan,  on  a  mere  boundary 
question,  arrayed  their  military  forces  against  each  other 
under  command  of  their  respective  governors.  And  now  on 
a  mere  abstract  question.  State  is  seen  arrayed  against  State 
with  threats  and  warlike  aspect. 

To  these  what  a  contrast  and  example  does  Pennsylvania 
this  day  present.  Threatened  in  her  dearest  rights,  she 
makes  no  appeal  to  force. 

When  the  foundations  of  the  government  were  laid,  and 
this  tribunal  established  as  its  corner-stone,  Pennsylvania 
was  there.  She  knew  that  the  chief  object  of  the  Constitu- 
tion was  to  substitute  the  law  of  reason  for  the  law  of  force, 


THE  WHEELING  BRIDGE  CASE  43 

and  her  abiding  confidence  in  its  efficacy  for  every  exigency 
has  never  been  shaken.  Her  commerce  obstructed  on  a  pub- 
lic river,  she  comes  this  day  at  the  head  of  no  armed  squad- 
rons, with  no  blustering  enactments  of  state  sovereignty,  with 
no  threatenings  of  disimion  upon  her  lips.  As  becomes  the 
keystone  of  the  federal  arch,  she  seeks  first  a  peaceful  rem- 
edy. She  appears  as  an  humble  suitor  before  civil  judges 
upon  their  judgment  seat,  surrounded  by  no  armed  janiza- 
ries, by  no  imperial  guards ;  but  in  the  exercise  of  their  con- 
stitutional functions  clothed  with  an  authority  more  potent,  in 
her  estimation,  than  an  army  with  banners.  She  asks  them  to 
protect  a  right  deemed  the  most  inestimable  among  all  nations, 
guaranteed  by  the  Constitution  and  the  laws  of  Congress,  for 
the  improvement  of  which  millions  of  her  treasure  have  been 
lavished,  and  upon  which  the  welfare  of  her  people  depends. 
She  asks  them  by  simple  injunction  to  prevent  a  local  corpo- 
ration from  violating,  imder  color  of  state  authority,  a  right 
that  a  world  in  arms  could  not  wrest  from  her. 

The  court  sustained  Mr.  Stanton  on  the  question  of 
jurisdiction,  and  ordered  a  reference  to  a  special  com- 
missioner to  take  testimony  as  to  whether  the  bridge 
really  was  an  obstruction  to  the  free  navigation  of  the 
river,  and  if  so,  what  alterations  could  be  made,  if  any, 
which  would  remove  the  obstruction  and  yet  allow  of 
the  continuance  of  the  bridge.  The  commissioner  re- 
ported at  the  next  term  that  the  bridge  was  an  obstruc- 
tion to  the  free  navigation  of  the  Ohio  River  by  steam- 
boats, and  recommended  certain  alterations,  which  if 
made  would  render  such  navigation  entirely  free. 

The  court  decided  that  the  interest  of  Pennsylvania, 
as  an  owner  of  the  public  works  which  would  be  injui'i- 
ously  affected  by  any  obstruction  to  the  free  navigation 


44      EARLY   LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

of  the  Ohio  River,  was  such  as  to  entitle  her  to  bring 
the  suit,  and  that,  therefore,  it  was  properly  brought  in 
this  court,  as  a  court  of  original  jurisdiction  in  cases 
where  a  State  was  a  party ;  that  the  Ohio  River  is  sub- 
ject to  the  commercial  power  of  Congress,  and  that  its 
navigation  cannot  be  obstructed  by  the  authority  of 
any  State ;  that  the  Wheeling  bridge  as  constructed 
was  a  nuisance,  being  an  obstruction  to  navigation ; 
that  the  remedy  applied  for  in  this  case  was  a  23roper 
one ;  and  that  the  bridge  must  be  altered  within  a  fixed 
time  or  removed. 

The  triumph  of  Mr.  Stanton  was  complete.  In  the 
face  of  a  powerful  army  of  antagonists,  he  had  estab- 
lished the  right  of  Pennsylvania  to  bring  the  suit  at 
once  in  the  highest  court.  He  had  been  sustained  by 
the  court  on  the  constitutional  power  of  Congress  to 
maintain  the  free  navigation  of  the  Ohio  against  any 
impediment  under  state  authority.  He  had  prevailed 
on  the  disputed  question  of  fact  as  to  whether  the 
bridge  really  was  an  obstruction.  And,  finally,  he  was 
held  to  have  sought  the  remedy  appropriate  to  the 
case. 

In  1856,  and  until  the  final  determination  of  the 
case  in  1858,  Mr.  Stanton  was  counsel  with  that  emi- 
nent patent  lawyer,  George  Harding,  Esq.,  of  Phila- 
delphia, in  the  celebrated  case  of  McCormick  v. 
Manny,  in  a  suit  brought  for  an  alleged  infringement 
of  the  patent  for  McCormick's  reaping-machine. 

Mr.  Harding  says  of  this  case  :  — 

Mr.  Stanton  argued  the  patent  case  of  McCormick  v. 
Manny  before  Judges  McLean  and  Drummond  at  Cincinnati. 


METHODS  IN  PREPARING  ARGUMENTS         45 

Mr.  Lincoln  and  I  were  associated  with  him  for  the  defense, 
and  Messrs.  Dickerson  and  Reverdy  Johnson  represented  the 
plaintiff.  He  devoted  himself  to  the  legal  question  which 
arose  in  the  case,  and  enforced  the  defendant's  position  on  the 
facts  as  brought  out.     Mr.  Lincoln  did  not  argue  the  case. 

Of  Mr.  Stanton's  eloquence  Mr.  Harding  says :  — 

He  was  a  very  eloquent  speaker.  I  never  heard  a  more 
eloquent  lawyer.  He  had  a  style  of  vehement  speaking  well 
adapted  for  a  jury,  and  an  entirely  different  style  when 
before  the  Supreme  Court  at  Washington.  In  the  latter  case 
he  was  calm,  deliberate,  and  impressive,  carefully  repressing 
all  feeling  and  all  exuberance  of  expression.  The  greatest 
legal  work  of  Mr.  Stanton's  life  was,  in  my  judgment,  his 
conduct  of  the  suit  of  the  State  of  Pennsylvania  against  the 
Wlieeling  and  Belmont  Bridge  Company,  commonly  known 
as  the  Wheeling  Bridge  case.  .  .  . 

Mr.  Stanton's  manner  of  preparing  his  arguments  in  the 
Supreme  Court  was  to  arrange  his  matter  in  advance,  and  then 
formidate  his  sentences,  and  correct  them  mentally  without 
using  any  notes  or  reducing  anything  to  writing,  so  that  his 
great  speeches  were  usually  precomj)osed  and  committed  to 
memory,  although  he  never  wrote  out  a  single  sentence  of 
them.  This  is  the  most  difficult  mode  of  preparing  a  speech, 
but  it  was  very  effective.  His  speaking  had  all  the  vigor  of  an 
extemporaneous  production,  and  at  the  same  time  possessed 
the  accuracy  and  completeness  of  a  written  speech. 


CHAPTER  VII 

Kemoval  to  "Washington.  —  Employed  by  the  Government  as  Spe- 
cial Counsel  in  California  Land  Cases.  —  The  Limantour  Fraud. 

In  the  latter  part  of  1856,  Mr.  Stanton  removed 
to  Washington,  where  he  could  devote  himself  more 
especially  to  cases  in  which  he  was  already  engaged  in 
the  Supreme  Court,  and  be  the  better  prepared  for  an 
increase  of  practice  in  that  tribunal.  In  December  of 
that  year  he  made  his  final  argument  in  the  Wheeling 
Brido-e  case.  At  the  next  term  of  the  court  he  made 
his  final  argument  in  the  McCormick  Reaper  case ;  and 
two  days  afterwards,  February  18,  1858,  he  was  on  his 
way  to  California  as  special  counsel  for  the  United 
States  in  some  of  the  most  important  litigation  to 
which  the  federal  government  has  ever  been  a  party. 

By  the  treaty  of  1848  with  Mexico,  under  which 
California,  with  other  territory,  was  ceded  to  the  United 
States,  it  was  provided  that  the  "  grants  of  land  made 
by  Mexico  in  the  ceded  territories  "  should  "  preserve 
the  legal  value  which  they  may  possess,  and  the  gran- 
tees may  cause  their  legitimate  titles  to  be  acknow- 
ledged before  the  American  tribunals." 

In  order  to  secure  to  the  owners  of  valid  grants, 
under  Mexican  law,  the  treaty  rights  thus  pledged, 
Congress,  by  the  act  of  1851,  created  a  Board  of  Land 
Commissioners,  before  which  their  claims  were  to  be 


CALIFORNIA  LAND  CASES  47 

presented  within  two  years  from  the  passage  of  the  act. 
Lands  not  claimed  within  that  time  were  to  be  consid- 
ered as  a  part  of  the  public  domain.  This  board  was 
to  have  three  years  within  which  to  decide  upon  the 
claims  presented.  The  term  of  its  existence  was  ex- 
tended by  subsequent  enactments  to  five  years.  It 
adjourned  sine  die  on  the  1st  of  March,  1856,  after 
having  acted  upon  all  the  claims  brought  before  it  for 
consideration,  —  803  in  number.  The  law  provided  for 
an  appeal  to  the  United  States  District  Court  from  the 
decision  of  the  Land  Commission,  and  from  the  District 
to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States. 

The  amount  of  land  covered  by  the  claims  presented 
to  the  Board  of  Land  Commissioners  under  alleged 
grants  from  Mexico  was  19,148  square  miles,  —  more 
than  twelve  millions  of  acres,  —  including  the  sites  of 
San  Francisco,  Sacramento,  Marysville,  and  other  cities 
and  towns. 

The  most  enterprising  of  all  the  claimants  was  J.  Y. 
Limantour,  a  Frenchman,  and  formerly  a  merchant 
at  Monterey.  He  filed  eight  claims,  embracing  958 
square  miles.  One  of  these  claims  was  for  eighty 
leagues. 

Six  of  his  claims,  covering  924  square  miles,  were 
rejected  by  the  board,  while  the  other  two  were  con- 
firmed. He  modestly  or  magnanimously  waived  his 
right  to  appeal  from  the  adverse  decisions,  and  from 
the  two  which  were  favorable  to  him  an  appeal  was 
taken  by  the  United  States. 

Of  the  two  pretended  grants  confirmed  to  him  by 
the  commission,  one  was  for  four  square  leagues  of 


48      EAELY  LIFE  AlsB  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

land  within  the  city  and  county  of  San  Francisco,  and 
the  other  was  for  the  Farallone  Islands,  just  outside 
the  Golden  Gate,  and  the  islands  of  Alcatraz  and 
Yerba  Buena  (Goat  Island),  and  one  square  league  at 
Point  Tiburon,  opposite  Angel  Island,  —  all  in  the  bay 
of  San  Francisco.  On  these  the  fortifications  and 
lighthouses  of  the  government  were  being  erected. 
The  market  value  of  the  lands  thus  claimed  by  him  at 
San  Francisco  was,  at  that  time,  estimated  at  from  ten 
to  twelve  millions  of  dollars,  while  the  sites  for  military 
and  lighthouse  purposes  were  of  a  value  that  could 
hardly  be  estimated. 

Judge  Black  became  Attorney-General,  March  6, 
1857.  The  Land  Commission  in  California  had  ex- 
pired by  limitation  of  law,  a  year  before.  Its  decisions 
and  the  evidence  upon  which  they  had  been  based  were 
a  part  of  the  records  of  his  department.  Most  of  the 
cases  not  abandoned  by  the  claimants  were  pending  in 
the  District  Court  of  California  on  appeal.  During 
the  session  of  Congress  preceding  his  appointment,  the 
Judiciary  Committee  of  the  House  of  Representatives 
had  reported  a  bill  confirming  all  grants  not  abeady 
rejected  by  the  Land  Commission,  and  its  passage  had 
been  vehemently  urged  as  an  act  of  justice  to  the  poor 
injured  claimants  under  treaty  rights.  Such  a  clamor 
was  raised  against  the  Limantour  claims  that  the  com- 
mittee, hoping  to  save  the  bill  thereby,  so  amended  it 
as  to  exclude  them  from  its  operation.  The  scheme 
was  nevertheless  defeated. 

Within  three  months  after  Judge  Black  came  into 
of&ce,  he  was  visited  by  one  Augustus  Jouan,  then 


THE  LIMANTOUR  FRAUD  49 

residing  in  Cincinnati,  -who  related  to  him,  from  per- 
sonal knowledge,  what  was  afterwards  shown  to  be  a 
true  story  of  the  crimes  upon  which  the  Limantour 
claims  were  founded. 

Jouan  seems  to  have  drifted  away  from  California, 
and  to  have  been  located  at  Cincinnati.  The  clamor 
against  Limantour  in  Congress  and  in  the  newspapers 
doubtless  originated  with  him.  He  felt  sure  the  gov- 
ernment would  need  him,  if  he  would  reveal  the  know- 
ledge he  possessed.  He  went  to  Washington  in  May, 
1857,  opened  his  budget,  secured  employment,  and 
started  to  California  June  5,  to  aid  in  the  preparation 
of  the  case  against  Limantour. 

At  San  Francisco  he  reported  to  the  United  States 
District  Attorney  June  30,  1857.  Himself  an  agent, 
and  to  some  extent  an  accomplice  of  Limantour,  his 
statements  standing  alone  would  have  carried  with 
them  little  or  no  weight ;  but  on  the  hearing  of  the 
case  he  was  fully  corroborated  in  every  particular. 

To  resist  these  monstrous  claims  of  Limantour  to  the 
land  embracing  the  city  of  San  Francisco,  and  all  the 
eligible  sites  for  military  approaches  to  it,  Mr.  Stanton 
was  employed  as  special  counsel  for  the  United  States. 
His  mission,  however,  was  made  to  embrace  the  whole 
subject  of  Mexican  grants  in  California.  The  value  of 
the  lauds  covered  by  fabricated  grants  was  estimated  by 
Attorney-General  Black,  in  1860,  in  an  official  report, 
at  $150,000,000. 

Mr.  Stanton's  instructions,  dated  February  18,  1858, 
directed  him  to  proceed  to  San  Francisco,  confer  with 
the  United  States  Attorney  in  relation  to  land  claims 


50      EARLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

pending  in  the  United  States  District  Court,  -wherein 
the  United  States  was  a  party,  and  "  render  such  pro- 
fessional services  therein,  as  in  your  opinion  may  be 
required  for  the  interests  of  the  United  States."  He 
was  instructed  to  especially  direct  his  attention  to  the 
case  of  the  United  States  v.  J.  Y.  Limantour,  and 
with  the  District  Attorney  to  "  take  such  measures  in 
the  investigation  and  defenses  of  said  claim  of  J.  Y. 
Limantour,  as  in  your  judgment  may  be  proper  to 
resist  the  claim."  He  was  to  remain  in  San  Francisco 
as  long  as  might  be  necessary  for  resistance  and  de- 
fense against  the  claim,  and  his  investigations  were  to 
be  extended  into  Mexico  and  wherever  else  occasion 
might  require.  Said  the  Attorney-General  in  conclu- 
sion :  "  You  will  generally  do  and  perform  all  such 
matters  and  things  in  relation  to  the  aforesaid  cases  as 
may  be  right  and  proper  to  be  done  by  counsel  learned 
in  the  law,  in  behalf  of  the  United  States  as  your 
client." 


CHAPTER  VIII 

Mr.  Stanton  in  California.  —  His   Work  there.  —  Collection   and 
Arrangement  of  the  Mexican  Archives. 

Mr.  Stanton's  diary  shows  that  on  the  21st  of  Feb- 
ruary, 1858,  he  sailed  from  New  York  to  Aspinwall 
on  the  steamer  Star  of  the  West,  —  the  steamer  at 
which,  less  than  three  years  after,  while  he  was  serving 
as  Attorney-General  in  Mr.  Buchanan's  Cabinet,  rebel- 
lion fired  its  first  shot.  He  arrived  in  San  Francisco 
at  ten  o'clock  p.  m.,  on  Friday,  March  19,  and  after 
a  single  day  spent  in  introductions,  he  entered  upon  his 
work. 

His  plan  was  to  collect  all  the  archives  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  California  under  Mexican  rule,  and  to  ascertain 
from  them  what  grants  of  land  had  been  made ;  then 
to  resist  as  fabricated  and  spurious  all  that  were  not 
found  among  them,  no  matter  how  strongly  they  might 
be  supported  by  documents  purporting  to  be  official  but 
unknown  to  those  records.  These  archives,  if  all  col- 
lected together  and  properly  arranged,  might  be  sup- 
posed to  exhibit  the  record  evidence  of  every  act  of  the 
former  government  whereby  lands  had  been  granted  to 
individuals. 

This  was  a  work  that  had  never  been  attempted.  In- 
deed, its  necessity  did  not  appear  to  have  occurred  to 
any  one.     Mr.  Stanton  found  a  portion  only  of  these 


52      EAELY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

arcliives,  and  they  were  kept  in  loose  boxes  in  the  office 
of  the  United  States  Surveyor-General  at  San  Francisco, 
where  but  little  attention  had  been  paid  to  them.  The 
Board  of  Land  Commissioners,  created  in  1851  for  the 
express  purpose  of  investigating  and  deciding  the  valid- 
ity of  alleged  Mexican  grants  in  California,  had  totally 
ignored  them  during  the  five  years  of  its  labors.  They 
embraced  only  a  portion  of  what  had  been  taken  by  the 
United  States  forces  at  the  time  of  the  conquest  of 
California  in  184l6,  —  many  having  gone  into  private 
hands,  and  many  more  having  remained  stored  away 
and  forgotten  in  various  parts  of  the  State.  Besides 
this,  our  government  never  had  been  in  possession  of 
all  the  Mexican  records.  Civil  commotion  in  the  De- 
partment of  California  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  be- 
tween Mexico  and  the  United  States,  and  the  final  chaos 
of  conquest,  had  thrown  the  archives  into  seemingly 
inextricable  confusion,  and  many  records  were  missing. 
To  the  documents  he  found  at  San  Francisco,  Mr.  Stan- 
ton therefore  had  to  add  all  others  that  could  be  found, 
and  if  any  were  in  the  possession  of  private  individuals, 
they  must  be  traced  and  wrested  from  them  by  legal 
process,  under  a  statute  yet  to  be  enacted.  The  records 
when  so  collected  must  be  methodically  arranged,  and 
bound  in  convenient  volumes,  so  that  they  might  be 
safely  preserved  and  ready  for  reference.  This  task, 
which  to  most  men  would  have  seemed  impossible,  Mr. 
Stanton  undertook  and  accomplished. 

From  the  date  of  his  arrival  in  California  until 
July  16  was  one  hundred  and  twenty  days,  of  which 
eighty-nine,  as  his  diary  shows,  were  spent  by  him  in 


WORK  IN  CALIFORNIA  53 

examining  these  records.  In  this  he  had  the  valuable 
assistance  of  Mr.  R.  C.  Hopkins,  afterwards,  for  thirty 
years,  the  keeper  of  the  archives.  That  gentleman  has 
furnished  an  interesting  statement  in  this  connection, 
in  which  he  says  that  the  books  and  papers  were  taken 
from  the  "  loose  boxes  "  in  which  they  were  packed,  and 
arranged  in  order  in  several  rooms.  An  adequate  cleri- 
cal force  was  engaged,  the  work  of  which  was  directed 
by  Mr.  Stanton,  who,  according  to  Mr.  Hopkins's  tes- 
timony, "labored  with  unremitting  industry,  doing  as 
much  or  more  work  than  any  of  his  clerks."  "  When 
he  commenced  the  work,"  says  Mr.  Hopkins,  "  he  was 
unacquainted  with  the  Spanish  language,  but  very  soon 
he  was  able  to  substantially  translate  any  ordinary 
Spanish  document." 

Mr.  Stanton  framed  and  sent  to  Attorney-General 
Black  two  bills  for  the  consideration  of  Congress,  one 
of  which  provided  for  the  compulsory  production,  wher- 
ever they  might  be  found,  of  Mexican  official  papers 
belonging  to  the  archives,  and  the  other  for  the  punish- 
ment of  any  who  should  present  false  claims,  or  add  to 
or  take  away  anything  from  these  archives.  These  bills 
were  successfully  urged  upon  Congress  by  Judge  Black, 
and  became  laws  on  the  18th  of  May,  within  two  months 
from  the  day  of  Mr.  Stanton's  arrival  in  California. 
They  will  be  found  in  the  U.  S.  Revised  Statutes, 
Sections  2229,  2471,  2472,  2473,  5411,  and  5412. 
Under  this  new  authority  Stanton  made  rapid  work  of 
gathering  the  scattered  records  so  valuable  to  the  gov- 
ernment. He  sent  his  subordinates  in  various  directions 
upon  successful  missions.     He  went  himself  to  Benicia 


54      EARLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

and  San  Jose,  and  was  well  rewarded  for  his  labors. 
At  the  former  place  he  found  four  boxes  of  documents, 
including  some  valuable  ones  which  proved  fatal  to  the 
pretensions  of  Limantour. 

The  archives  of  the  Mexican  government,  thus  labo- 
riously collected,  were  arranged  by  him  in  their  proper 
order,  and  bound  in  four  hundred  large  volumes.  As 
they  unfolded  to  Stanton  the  system  of  Mexican  land 
laws,  the  methods  of  Mexican  administration,  the  changes 
of  governments  by  revolution  or  otherwise,  the  succes- 
sion of  high  and  lesser  officials,  and  tlie  history  of  the 
departmental  government  in  all  its  details,  he  was  put 
upon  inquiry  as  to  what  was  missing,  and  aided  in 
detecting  what  had  been  interpolated. 

The  records  of  land  grants  were  found  to  have  been 
admirably  kept  and  indexed,  and  one  of  the  most  valu- 
able discoveries  made  was  that  of  the  "  Jimeno  index," 
the  leaves  of  which,  separated  and  worn,  were  restored  to 
their  places.  This  was  an  index  of  all  Mexican  grants 
in  California  up  to  December,  1844,  kept  by  Jimeno, 
the  Secretary  of  State  for  many  years,  whose  high  char- 
acter stood  the  test  of  all  the  investigations.  Another 
index  was  found  of  all  grants  from  December,  1844,  to 
the  conquest  in  1846. 

Of  the  value  of  this  immense  labor,  Attorney-General 
Black  said,  in  a  letter  to  the  President :  — 

When  the  historical  facts  ascertained  from  the  archives, 
and  the  laws,  customs,  and  usages  of  the  Mexican  government, 
of  which  a  knowledge  was  derived  from  the  same  source,  came 
to  be  presented  before  the  Supreme  Court,  that  tribunal  con- 
curred on  every  occasion  with  the  views  taken  by  this  depart- 
ment. 


IP 


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MEXICAN  AECHIVES  55 

The  correspondence  between  Mr.  Stanton  and  At- 
torney-General Black  during  the  former's  stay  in  Cali- 
fornia is  voluminous  and  interesting.  It  shows  the 
close  relations  and  mutual  confidence  that  existed  be- 
tween them,  and  gives  an  inside  view  of  a  campaign 
against  fraud,  in  which  they  both  performed  patriotic 
and  successful  services  calling  for  the  highest  courage 
and  unbending  integrity. 

On  the  27th  of  April  Black  wrote  that  he  had  read 
letters  from  Stanton  with  "  intense  delight."  "  The 
progress  you  make,"  he  said,  "  in  the  Limantour  case 
is  just  what  I  expected  of  your  energy  and  talents. 
You  are  doing  justice  to  your  reputation  and  to  your 
great  client,  the  United  States  of  America."  He  had 
shown  Stanton's  letter  to  the  President,  "who  is  de- 
lighted with  his  own  sagacity  in  selecting  so  able  and 
faithful  a  man  for  this  important  business."  He  had 
called  on  the  chairman  of  the  Judiciary  Committee  of 
the  Senate  with  drafts  of  the  bills  which  Stanton  had 
sent  him,  to  aid  in  collecting  scattered  documents  be- 
longing to  the  archives  and  for  punishing  fraud  upon 
them,  and  that  gentleman  had  enhsted  himself  earnestly 
in  their  behalf. 

"  There  is,"  Black  wrote,  "a  rumor  which  annoys  me 
sometimes,  about  your  coming  home  suddenly,  or  rather 
about  your  intention  to  come  home.  This  is  a  thing 
that  won't  do  to  think  of  as  long  aS  there  remains  any- 
thing in  the  world  you  can  do  for  this  great  cause  you 
are  enofasred  in.  .  .  .  There  is  no  other  man  hvinof  on 
this  round  earth  for  whom  I  would  have  assumed  the 
responsibility  which  I  have  taken  with  you.     You  must 


56      EARLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

succeed,  or  be  able  to  prove  that  success  was  utterly 
impossible.  I  am  sure  you  will.  It  is  true  I  can't  float 
unless  I  ride  on  the  wave  of  your  reputation,  and  I  want 
it  to  roll  high.  Your  interest  in  success  is  like  my  own 
exactly.  I  mean  exactly  equal  to  my  own  in  magnitude. 
.  .  .  When  you  make  up  your  mind  to  come  home,  you 
must  give  me  due  and  timely  notice  of  it.  All  this  I 
have  said  in  consequence  of  the  opinion  which  divers 
persons  have  expressed  with  great  confidence,  that  you 
would  return  in  May." 

On  the  15th  of  May  Judge  Black  writes  again  in 
highest  praise  of  Stanton's  progress,  and  says  :  — 

"  The  President  expressed  great  pleasure  at  learning 
what  an  immense  amount  of  work  you  were  doing  and 
had  done.  When  I  came  to  the  part  of  it  in  which  you 
mentioned  the  number  of  volumes  you  had  collected,^  he 
broke  out :  '  God  bless  me,  what  a  task.'  " 

^  Four  hundred. 


CHAPTER  IX 

The  Limantour  Case.  —  The  Claim  rejected.  —  Zeal,  Ability,  and 
Ingenuity  of  Stanton  in  conducting  the  Case. 

The  Limantour  case  was  one  which  well  illustrated 
the  proverb  :  "  Truth  is  often  stranger  than  fiction." 
Had  the  story  of  it  appeared  as  a  romance,  it  would 
have  been  pronounced  grossly  improbable.  It  was  a 
gigantic  fraud,  contemplating  large  results,  and  was 
upheld  by  a  conspiracy  extending  into  Mexico,  includ- 
ing among  its  participants  an  ex-member  of  the  Mexi- 
can cabinet,  a  former  Mexican  governor  of  California, 
and  others  of  consequence.  It  was  bold  in  plan,  but 
lame  in  some  of  the  details  of  its  execution.  The 
measures  of  Mr.  Stanton,  by  which  it  was  completely 
overthrown,  illustrate  the  marvelous  energy,  fertility 
of  resources,  and  strength  of  character  brought  to  the 
service  of  the  United  States,  during  this  the  most 
important  year  in  its  results  of  any  in  his  professional 
career. 

Limantour  alleged  that  his  grants  were  made  in  con- 
sideration of  money  and  goods  furnished  by  him  to  the 
Mexican  government.  The  documents  presented  in 
support  of  his  claims  seemed  to  be  conclusive,  under 
the  Mexican  law  governing  in  such  cases.  Those  in 
relation  to  the  islands  were  a  petition,  and  a  concession 
and  grant  signed   by  the  Mexican   governor  of  Cali- 


58      EAKLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

fornia,  —  Miclieltorana.  Those  on  which  he  relied 
for  the  confiscation  of  the  site  of  San  Francisco  were 
most  formidable.  The  first  of  these  was  a  letter  from 
the  same  governor  asking  Limantour  for  aid,  and  offer- 
ing grants  of  land  in  return.  Following  this  was  a 
petition  by  Limantour  for  a  grant,  designating  the  land 
he  desired.  Upon  the  margin  of  this  was  the  usual 
reference  of  inquiry  as  to  the  character  and  condition 
of  the  land,  signed  by  the  governor  ;  then  a  letter  pur- 
porting to  have  been  written  under  the  governor's 
direction  by  his  secretary  to  the  captain  of  the  port  of 
San  Francisco,  describing  the  lands  solicited ;  and  two 
days  later,  the  grant  for  four  leagues,  dated  February 
27,  1843,  and  signed  by  the  governor.  On  the  margin 
of  this  was  an  approval  or  confirmation  dated  April 
18,  1843,  signed  by  Bocanegra,  who  was  Minister  of 
Exterior  Relations  in  the  government  of  Mexico.  The 
"  Island  "  grant  also  had  his  approval  indorsed  thereon. 
There  was  also  a  letter  from  the  governor  to  the  Min- 
ister, Bocanegra,  dated  February  24,  1843,  inclosing 
Limantour's  petition,  and  that  official's  reply,  October  7, 
1843,  announcing  that  the  "  supreme  government  has 
been  pleased  to  grant  to  Limantour  sufficient  leave  to 
acquire,  besides  the  property  which  he  has  already  ac- 
quired, and  which  has  been  recognized  by  the  supreme 
government,  further  country,  town,  or  any  other  kind 
of  property."  A  copy  of  Bocanegra's  minute  or  direc- 
tion, that  this  letter  be  written  to  Governor  Michel- 
torana,  was  produced  from  the  archives  in  the  City  of 
Mexico.  Two  letters  were  presented  from  Arista,  the 
President  of  the  Mexican  Repubhc,  dated  October  2, 


THE  LIMANTOUR  CASE  59 

1852,  one  addressed  to  the  president  of  the  Board  of 
Land  Commissioners,  and  one  to  the  governor  of  the 
State  of  Cahfornia,  commending  the  claim  of  Liman- 
tour  to  their  favorable  consideration. 

Witnesses  of  reputed  high  character,  who  had  held 
responsible  positions  in  California  under  Governor 
Micheltorana,  were  introduced  to  prove  the  advances 
made  in  money  and  goods  by  Limantour  to  the  govern- 
ment, which  were  said  to  have  been  the  considerations 
upon  which  the  grants  were  made  to  him.  The  genu- 
ineness of  the  signature  of  Governor  Micheltorana  to 
the  grants  and  other  documents  was  clearly  estabHshed. 

Against  this  apparently  invincible  case  Mr.  Stanton, 
on  behalf  of  the  government,  introduced  the  one  wit- 
ness, Augustus  Jouan,  who  had,  as  before  stated,  re- 
lated his  story  to  the  Attorney-General  at  Washington. 
He  testified  that  in  March,  1852,  nearly  six  years  after 
California  became  the  territory  of  the  United  States, 
Limantour  had  exhibited  to  him  in  the  City  of  Mexico 
several  land  grants  signed  by  Micheltorana,  who  was 
the  last  but  one  of  the  Mexican  governors  of  the  De- 
partment of  California,  and  who  held  that  office  from 
December,  1842,  until  early  in  1845.  Only  one  of  these 
titles  was  in  the  name  of  Limantour.  Jouan  says  that 
Limantour  employed  him  to  go  to  California  to  hunt  up 
the  lands  and  survey  them,  and  followed  him  to  Cali- 
fornia later  in  the  year.  He  met  Limantour  on  the 
steamer  when  he  arrived  at  San  Francisco,  and  noticed 
that  he  then  had  in  his  possession  a  bundle  covered  with 
black  glazed  cloth,  and  having  stamped  upon  it  the 
official  seal  of  the  French  legation  at  Mexico.     It  was 


60      EARLY  LIFE  AND   PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

addressed  to  the  French  consul  at  San  Francisco. 
Limantour  told  Jouan  that  it  contained  papers.  He 
afterwards  saw  the  same  bundle  taken  out  of  Liman- 
tour's  trunk  at  the  latter's  hotel  by  his  clerk,  Letan- 
neur,  who  informed  him  that  it  contained  eighty  blank 
petitions  and  titles,  all  signed  with  the  genuine  signa- 
ture of  the  ex-governor,  Micheltorana,  and  which  were 
the  same  as  those  used  by  Limantour  for  his  California 
grants.  Two  days  after  this,  when  Limantour  was 
going  to  dine  with  the  French  consul,  he  carried  with 
him  this  bundle  under  his  overcoat. 

Jouan  said  that  Limantour  gave  him,  for  translation, 
fourteen  titles,  none  of  which  he  had  previously  shown 
him  in  Mexico ;  that  he  "  conversed  freely  with  him, 
without  dissimulation,"  as  to  their  being  fraudulent, 
and  that  "  Limantour  never  denied,  but  on  the  contrary 
always  admitted,"  that  his  titles  were  fraudulent.  He 
said  that  when  Limantour  gave  him  the  islands  grant 
for  translation,  he  noticed  that  the  ratification  of  the 
same  on  the  margin  thereof  by  Bocanegra,  the  Mexican 
Minister  of  the  Exterior,  was  of  a  date  earlier  in  the 
year  1843  than  the  grant  itself.  On  calling  Liman- 
tour's  attention  to  this  discrepancy,  he  was  directed  by 
the  latter  to  erase  the  figure  3  and  substitute  the  fig- 
ure 4,  so  that  the  date  of  ratification  would  read  1844 
instead  of  1843.  This  he  did,  but  intentionally  in 
so  rough  a  manner  as  to  make  a  hole  in  the  paper. 
This  paper,  produced  in  court,  verified  his  statement. 
He  related  conversations  with  Letanneur,  the  clerk  of 
Limantour,  in  which  he  learned  the  place  and  time  at 
which  these  antedated  titles  were  fabricated  and  signed 


THE  LIIVIANTOUR  CASE  61 

by  ex-Governor  Micheltorana,  long  after  California  had 
become  a  part  of  the  United  States,  and,  therefore, 
long  after  he  had  ceased  to  hold  office.  And  finally 
he  produced  and  delivered  in  evidence  to  the  court  a 
blank  title  which  Letanneur  had  given  him,  saying  it 
was  taken  from  the  bundle  before  mentioned.  This 
blank  title  had  upon  it  the  genuine  signature  of  Michel- 
torana, three  times  repeated,  and  the  name  of  Don 
Pablo  de  la  Guerra,  former  administrator  of  the  custom- 
house at  Monterey,  twice  forged.^ 

This  blank  title  consisted  of  two  blank  documents, 
on  one  of  which  room  was  left  for  a  petition  for  land, 
yet  to  be  written,  but  on  the  margin  of  which  Governor 
Micheltorana  had  kindly  written  and  signed  his  consent 
in  advance ;  the  other  was  a  sheet  all  blank  except 
that,  at  the  bottom  of  the  third  page,  Micheltorana  had 
signed  his  name,  as  granting  whatever  lands  the  holder 
might  subsequently  be  pleased  to  choose,  and  of  which 
he  might  fill  in  the  description. 

Mr.  Hopkins,  custodian  of  the  archives,  stated  that 
during  the  summer  of  1857  he  "  spent  much  time 
examining  the  miscellaneous  and,  at  that  time,  disre- 
garded records  and  correspondence  in  the  Spanish 
archives,"  and  that  there  he  one  day  found  copies  of 

^  Under  the  Mexican  system,  grants  for  laud  were  made  only  in 
response  to  petitions  written  upon  stamped  paper.  Each  petition  had 
upon  its  margin  a  brief  order,  signed  by  the  governor  for  the  issuance  of 
the  grant.  The  grant,  also  stamped  upon  paper,  was  of  course  signed 
by  the  governor.  Stamped  or  "  habiliated  "  paper  duly  authenticated  by 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Mexico  was  furnished  for  these  purposes.  If  at 
any  time  the  supply  failed,  the  law  provided  for  the  use  of  paper  having 
the  seal  of  the  custom-house,  and  the  signature  of  the  governor  and 
custom-house  administrator  in  California. 


62      EARLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

correspondence  between  Governor  Micheltorana  and 
Manuel  Castanares,  tlie  Customs  Administrator  at  Mon- 
terey in  1843,  which,  if  genuine,  showed  that  during 
the  early  months  of  that  year  there  was  not  in  existence 
any  stamped  paper  of  the  kind  upon  which  alleged 
grants  to  Limantour  purported  to  have  been  written 
and  dated  within  that  time.  The  governor's  letters 
were  requisitions  for  stamped  paper  to  be  prepared 
because  there  was  none  for  the  year  1843.  And  yet 
the  pretended  grant  of  the  site  of  San  Francisco  was 
written  on  local  stamped  paper,  signed  by  himself, 
and  dated  as  of  the  very  time  when  he  declared  in  this 
correspondence  that  there  was  no  such  stamped  paper 
in  existence. 

The  resources  of  Limantour  were,  however,  equal  to 
this  emergency.  He  produced  as  a  witness  Castanares 
himself,  the  very  official  with  whom  Micheltorana  had 
this  supposed  correspondence,  who  testified  that  he  had 
caused  the  stamped  paper  on  which  Limantoui-'s  grant 
was  written  to  be  prepared  in  November  or  December, 
1842,  in  ample  time  for  such  a  purpose.  This  testi- 
mony of  one  of  the  parties  to  the  alleged  correspond- 
ence of  course  outweighed  mere  pretended  copies  of 
letters,  the  existence  of  the  originals  of  which,  so  far 
from  being  proven,  was  thus  apparently  disproven. 

Castanares  came,  as  he  stated,  from  Mexico,  for  the 
purpose  of  giving  evidence  in  this  cause,  and  by  per- 
mission of  the  President  of  Mexico,  obtained  through 
the  intervention  of  the  French  Minister.  His  evidence 
carried  with  it,  at  the  time,  convincing  weight.  The 
cause  of  the  government  seemed  enveloped  in  darkness. 


THE   LIMANTOUR  CASE  63 

On  the  one  side  the  Limautour  claim,  commended  by 
the  President  of  Mexico,  supported  by  every  docu- 
ment deemed  necessary,  and  by  the  testimony  of  swift 
Mexican  witnesses,  one  of  whom  was  given  leave  of 
absence  from  high  official  duties,  at  the  intercession  of 
the  French  Minister  at  the  City  of  Mexico,  to  enable 
him  to  go  as  a  witness  to  San  Francisco  ;  on  the  other 
side,  Jouan,  the  discarded  tool  and  accompHce  of  the 
claimant. 

Limantour's  triumph  was  of  but  short  duration.  One 
of  the  four  boxes  of  records  found  by  Stanton  himself 
at  Benicia  contained  the  evidence  which  convicted 
Castanares  of  perjury.  This  evidence  consisted  of  the 
original  correspondence  concerning  the  stamped  paper, 
of  which  Hopkins  had  found  the  copies.  This  original 
correspondence  clearly  established  the  non-existence,  in 
February,  1843,  of  the  sealed  paper  on  which  Liman- 
tour's pretended  grant  of  that  date  was  executed.  It 
established  with  equal  certainty  the  fact  that  Governor 
Micheltorana  and  Castanares  had  been  guilty,  at  a  later 
date,  of  the  crime  of  fabricating  stamped  paper,  as  of 
February,  1843,  to  be  used  in  manufacturing  a  false 
grant  of  that  date. 

The  discovery  of  this  vital  testimony  is  thus  recorded 
in  Mr.  Stanton's  diary  of  April  27  :  — 

At  the  archives  office  in  the  morning.  Opened  one  box 
of  Benicia  papers  and  found  :  1,  The  original  correspondence 
of  Micheltorana  and  Castanares  as  to  the  sealed  paper. 
2.  The  original  accounts  as  to  the  cargo  of  the  Fannata. 

On  the  29th  of  the  same  month  Stanton's  diary 
shows  that  he  found  "  the  books  of  Abrego  for  1845." 


64     EARLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

Abrego  was  the  Mexican  conmii&sary  under  Governor 
Micheltorana,  and  had  testified  to  large  advances  by 
Limantour  to  the  government,  both  in  money  and 
goods.  His  book  of  accounts  flatly  contradicted  his 
testimony,  and  his  certificate  that  they  embraced  all 
that  had  transpired  closed  the  door  against  all  theories 
that  other  books  might  contain  them. 

Stanton  searched  the  records  until  he  had  found 
overwhelming  proof  of  the  truth  of  Jouan's  story,  and 
much  more.  De  la  Guerra  testified,  in  spite  of  direct 
threats  of  assassination,  that  his  name  had  been  forged 
in  every  instance  where  it  appeared  on  Limantour's 
paper  as  Customs  Administrator  for  1844. 

August  2  Stanton  wrote  to  Judge  Black  as  fol- 
lows :  — 

Last  week  I  had  an  examination  made  by  Lieutenant 
Fairfield  (of  the  coast  survey)  of  every  seal  in  the  (Califor- 
nia-Mexican) archives,  some  10,000  or  upwards,  and  a  com- 
parison with  the  Limantour  seal.  This  examination  shows 
but  two  seals  in  the  archives  of  the  custom-house  of  Mon- 
terey. 1st,  the  genuine  seal  of  Pablo  de  la  Guerra ;  2d,  the 
Limantour  seal.  Of  the  last  there  are  only  eleven  impres- 
sions —  all  found  on  grants  to  Limantour  or  his  witnesses. 

Stanton  had  the  archives  of  the  Mexican  ofovernment 
in  the  City  of  Mexico  searched,  and  produced  cer- 
tificates showing  that  they  contained  no  trace  of  the 
confirmation  of  the  grants  by  Bocanegra,  Mexican 
Minister  of  the  Exterior,  although  such  pretended 
confirmation  appeared  on  the  margin  of  Limantour's 
grants.  He  filed  protographic  exhibits  in  the  case, 
concerning  which  he  wrote,  September  5,  1858  :  — 


LIMANTOUR'S  CLAIM  REJECTED  65 

They  are  the  most  expensive  and  valuable  work  that  has 
been  clone.  They  constitute  an  epitome  of  the  Mexican  and 
Spanish  archives,  265  in  number,  and  will  cost  about  $4,000. 
They  will  afford  you  and  the  several  departments  of  the 
government  the  means  of  knowing  what  the  archives  are,  the 
forgeries  that  have  been  committed,  the  means  of  detecting 
them,  and  will  protect  about  two  thousand  square  leagues  of 
land.  .  .  . 

The  photographic  exhibits  embrace  256  photographic 
copies  of  original  documents,  about  one  third  being  foi'geries 
against  the  United  States.  In  the  face  of  these  all  Mexico 
may  perjure  itself  at  leisure.  A  lie  can't  be  made  the  truth, 
as  these  photographs  will  prove. 

The  array  of  proofs  of  the  fraudulent  character  of 
Liinantour's  claims  was  so  overwhelmino^  that  his  law- 
yers  deserted  him  at  the  end  of  five  years  of  service. 
Of  one  firm  Stanton  wrote,  October  3 :  "  The  archives 
and  photographic  proofs  have  driven  them  from  the 
field."  Of  the  one  remaining  lawyer,  he  wrote,  Octo- 
ber 16,  that  he  "had  fled  two  days  before."  The 
argument  on  behalf  of  the  government  was  exhaustive. 
The  reading  of  the  proofs  and  exhibits  occupied  a 
week.  Not  a  word  was  uttered  in  reply.  The  claim 
was  rejected  by  the  District  Court,  and  of  course  no 
appeal  was  ever  taken.  Limantour  was  indicted  for 
his  crimes,  and  fled  the  country. 

The  following  extracts  from  the  opinion  of  United 
States  District  Judge  Hoffman  convey  some  idea  of 
the  magnitude  of  the  work  in  this  case  and  the  thor- 
oughness with  which  it  had  been  performed  :  — 

Whether  we  consider  the  enormous  extent  or  the  ex- 
traordinary character  of  the  alleged  concessions  to  Liman- 


66      EARLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

tour ;  the  official  positions  and  the  distinguished  antecedents 
of  the  principal  witnesses  who  have  testified  in  support  of 
them,  or  the  conclusive  or  unanswerable  proofs  by  which 
their  falsehood  has  been  exposed ;  whether  we  consider  the 
unscrupulous  and  pertinacious  obstinacy  with  which  the 
claims  now  before  the  court  have  been  persisted  in,  — 
although  six  others  presented  to  the  Board  have  long  since 
been  abandoned,  —  or  the  large  sums  extorted  from  property 
owners  in  this  city  as  the  price  of  the  relinquislunent  of 
the  fraudulent  pretensions ;  or,  finally,  the  conclusive  and 
irresistible  proofs  by  which  the  perjuries  by  which  they  have 
been  attempted  to  be  maintained  have  been  exposed  and 
their  true  character  demonstrated,  it  may  safely  be  affirmed 
that  these  cases  are  without  parallel  in  the  judicial  history  of 
the  country.  .  .  . 

It  is  no  slight  satisfaction  that  the  evidence  has  been 
such  as  to  leave  nothing  to  inference,  suspicion,  or  conjecture, 
but  that  the  proofs  of  fraud  are  as  conclusive  and  irresist- 
ible as  the  attempted  fraud  itself  has  been  flagrant  and 
audacious. 


CHAPTER  X 

Overthrow  of  the  Forged  Claim  to  the  New  Almaden  Quicksilver 
Mine.  —  Stanton's  AVork  in  California.  —  Land  Cases  in  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States. 

Mr.  Stanton  further  greatly  distinguished  himself 
•while  in  California  by  his  conduct  of  a  suit  in  the 
United  States  Circuit  Court  against  the  New  Almaden 
Quicksilver  Mining  Company.  This  suit  was  brought 
in  the  summer  of  1858  in  the  name  of  the  United 
States,  and  was  for  an  injunction  against  the  further 
working  of  the  mine,  until  the  title  thereto  should  be 
determined.     (1  McAUister,  271.) 

The  New  Almaden  Mine  was  claimed  under  a  pre- 
tended grant  to  Andre  Castillero,  which  the  Board  of 
Land  Commissioners  had  confirmed,  and  from  which 
decision  an  appeal  was  then  pending  in  the  District 
Court  of  the  United  States.  It  was  in  the  possession 
of  an  English  company.  It  had  already  yielded  about 
$8,000,000,  and  about  $1,000,000  a  year  was  still 
being  taken  out. 

The  ground  upon  which  the  suit  was  brought  was 
that  certain  official  Mexican  documents,  constituting  a 
part  of  the  documentary  title  set  up  by  the  defendants, 
were  false,  fraudulent,  antedated,  and  forged,  and  that 
they  had  been  thus  fraudulently  contrived  and  fabri- 
cated since  the  termination  of  Mexican  rule  in  Cah- 


68      EARLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

fornia.  At  the  hearing  the  correspondence  was  pro- 
duced in  which  the  arrangements  were  made  for  the 
fabricating  of  the  false  documents.  This  consisted 
mainly  of  letters,  forty  in  number,  between  the  chief 
conspirators,  one  residing  at  San  Francisco  and  the 
other  at  Tepic  in  Mexico.  The  genuineness  of  these 
letters  was  admitted  by  the  counsel  for  the  claimant. 

In  them  the  California  party  informed  his  co-worker 
in  Mexico  just  what  documents  were  wanted,  and  how 
they  must  be  worded.  These  the  latter  was  expected 
to  procure  in  Mexico.  California  ceased  to  be  a  Mexi- 
can province,  and  became  territory  of  the  United  States, 
July  7,  1846 ;  the  earliest  of  the  letters  between  these 
conspirators  for  obtaining  the  New  Almaden  mine,  by 
a  fabricated  Mexican  title  not  yet  in  existence,  was 
dated  six  months  later,  viz.,  January  7,  1847.  They 
ran  through  more  than  three  years. 

The  associates  of  the  conspirators,  in  admitting  the 
genuineness  of  the  letters,  as  they  were  compelled  to 
do,  disclaimed  any  previous  knowledge  of  them.  The 
proof  these  letters  gave  of  the  fraudulent  character 
of  the  claim  of  Castillero  was  overwhelming,  and  the 
Circuit  Court  granted  the  injunction. 

The  District  Court,  in  January,  1861,  on  a  hearing 
of  the  appeal  from  the  Land  Commission,  confirmed 
Castillero' s  claim  in  part,  and  rejected  it  in  part.  Both 
parties  appealed  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States.  The  case  was  argued  in  that  tribunal  January 
30,  1863.  The  array  of  counsel  was  exceptionally 
strong.  For  the  government  there  appeared  the  Attor- 
ney-General (Mr.  Bates),  Benjamin  R.  Curtis,  Jeremiah 


NEW  AL^IADEN   QUICKSILVER   MINE  69 

S.  Black,  and  Edwin  M.  Stanton.  For  the  claimant, 
A.  C.  Peachy,  Reverdy  Johnson,  Charles  O'Conor, 
John  J.  Crittenden,  and  Hall  McAllister.  A  brief  sub- 
mitted by  Mr.  Edmund  Randolph  in  the  District  Court 
was  also  filed  in  behalf  of  the  United  States.  (Mr. 
Randolph  had  died  during  the  appeal.)  The  argument 
of  Mr.  Judah  P.  Benjamin  before  the  District  Court 
was  also  filed  on  behalf  of  the  claimant.  Mr.  Benja- 
min had  then  become  a  member  of  the  Cabinet  of 
Jefferson  Davis ;  Mr.  Stanton  was  Secretary  of  War  of 
the  United  States. 

The  title  was  held  to  be  fabricated  and  void,  and 
Castillero's  entire  petition  for  the  land  was  ordered  to 
be  dismissed. 

In  rendering  its  decision,  the  Supreme  Court  recited 
the  material  portions  of  the  criminating  letters,  and 
said :  — 

Counsel  for  claimants  admit  that  every  one  of  these  let- 
ters are  genuine,  and  the  proofs  in  the  case  are  full  to  that 
effect.  Comments  upon  these  extraordinary  documents  are 
unnecessary,  as  they  disclose  their  own  construction,  and 
afford  a  demonstration  that  those  in  the  possession  of  the 
mine,  holding  it  under  conveyances  from  the  claimant,  knew 
full  well  that  he  had  no  title. 

The  report  of  many  other  cases  of  fraudulent  land 
claims  defeated  by  Mr.  Stanton  may  be  found  in  the 
special  message  of  President  Buchanan  of  May  22, 
1860,  transmitting  to  the  House  of  Representatives  the 
communication  of  Attorney-General  Black  on  the  sub- 
ject ;  also  in  the  twenty-one  cases  argued  by  Mr.  Stan- 
ton in  the  Supreme  Court  during  the  December  term, 


70      EARLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

1859,  and  reported  in  the  22d  and  23d  of  Howard, 
U.  S.  Supreme  Court  Reports. 

Stanton's  work  in  California  destroyed  the  occupa- 
tion of  the  fabricators  of  false  land  grants,  and  pro- 
tected both  the  United  States  and  the  owners  of  valid 
Mexican  grants.  It  was  an  open  book,  in  which  could 
be  read  all  rights  to  land  under  the  treaty  of  1848,  and 
by  which  the  public  domain  was  rescued  from  spolia- 
tion, and  the  settlement  of  land  titles  in  California 
made  possible.  He  explored  the  sources  of  the  Spanish 
and  Mexican  systems  of  land  law,  and  collected  and 
arranged  the  records  of  the  successive  departmental 
governments  of  California  with  such  fidelity  that  he 
was  able  to  instruct  the  court  not  only  as  to  those  laws, 
but  as  to  their  administration  in  the  minutest  detail, 
and  even  to  successfully  dispute  those  records  when 
they  showed  the  exercise  of  official  power  by  the  smallest 
pretended  officer  whose  lawful  authority  had  ceased  at 
the  time  of  such  act. 

He  received  the  well-earned  encomiums  of  bench  and 
bar  for  the  great  results  he  had  thus  achieved  in  a 
single  year. 


CHAPTER  XI 

Mr.  Stanton's  Political  Views,  Antecedents,  and  Antagonisms.  — 
A  Freesoiler  in  1848.  —  The  "  Union-Saving  "  Era  from  1850  to 
1860.  —  Pro-Slavery  Whigs  adopt  the  Anti-Slavery  Shibboleth. 
—  Stanton's  Aversion  to  the  Whigs.  —  His  Position  in  1856-60. 
— The  Support  he  gave  Buchanan. 

Mr.  Stanton  was  in  no  sense  of  the  word  a  politi- 
cian. He  was  devoted  to  his  profession,  and  outside 
of  that  he  had  no  ambition.  His  poHtical  opinions 
were  formed  and  his  party  affiliations  established  at  a 
time  when  Democracy  meant  Jacksonism.  He  was 
enthusiastic  in  politics  while  Jackson  and  Van  Buren 
were  in  the  lead.  With  them  he  was  opposed  to  nulH- 
fication,  secession,  a  national  bank,  state  bank  mono- 
poly, and  a  high  tariff.  When  Van  Buren  was  defeated 
for  the  nomination  at  Baltimore  in  1844  by  the  two- 
thirds  rule,  the  adoption  of  which  was  made  possible  by 
the  votes  of  men  instructed  to  support  him,  Mr.  Stanton 
lost  interest  in  party  contests.  He  felt  that  the  result 
had  been  attained  by  an  unfair  assertion  of  Southern 
power  for  exclusively  Southern  interests,  and  he  shared 
the  strong  feehng  of  resentment  it  aroused  among 
Northern  Democrats.  A  letter  he  wrote  to  the  Hon. 
Jacob  Brinkerhoff,  a  Representative  in  Congress  from 
Ohio,  exhibits  the  disposition  then  prevailing  among 
Northern  Democrats  to  resist  Southern  domination 
within   the   Democratic   party.     Mr.  Brinkerhoff   had 


72     EARLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

made  a  speech  against  the  annexation  of  Texas  unless 
freedom  should  be  guaranteed  in  a  portion  of  the  new 
acquisition.     In  the  course  of  his  speech  he  was  very 
severe  on  the  Southern  Democratic  leaders.* 
Mr.  Stanton  wrote  him :  — 

I  cannot  refrain  from  expressing  the  satisfaction  with 
which  I  have  read  your  speech  on  the  Texas  question.  It 
would  have  delighted  me  to  have  been  able  to  hear  you 
deliver  it ;  but  the  effect  will  tell  upon  the  public  mind  as 
"  a  word  in  season."  There  is  too  much  inclination  among 
Northern  men  to  submit  in  silence  to  the  insolent  demands 
of  the  South.  And  one  of  the  chief  duties  that  will  devolve 
upon  us  as  citizens  of  free  and  independent  States  will  be  to 
curb  the  spirit  of  domination  that  has  too  long  been  suffered 
to  prevail.  You  have  set  a  noble  and  manly  example  in 
which  many  besides  myself  will  to  the  uttermost  sustain  you. 
I  trust,  therefore,  that  the  ground  you  have  taken  will  be 
maintained. 

From  that  time  forward,  although  he  adhered  to  his 
old-time  opinions  on  the  questions  that  divided  parties 
during  the  existence  of  the  Jackson  dynasty,  he  took 
no  hand  in  party  work. 

In  1847-48  he  favored  the  Wilmot  Proviso  in 
common  with  Martin  Van  Buren,  Samuel  J.  Tilden, 
Sanford  B.  Church,  and  others,  then  and  afterwards 
eminent  leaders  in  the  Democratic  party.  That  proviso 
would  have  excluded  slavery  from  all  territory  acquired 
from  Mexico.  It  was  adopted  by  the  aid  of  Whigs  in 
a  Democratic  House  of  Representatives  in  1846,  and 
defeated  by  the  aid  of  Democrats  in  a  Whig  House  in 
1848. 

•  Congressional  Globe,  28th  Congress,  2d  session,  page  131. 


A  FREESOILER  73 

Prior  to  the  Ohio  Democratic  state  convention  of 
the  latter  year,  Mr.  Stanton  wrote  to  Salmon  P. 
Chase :  — 

There  is  no  doubt  that  a  struggle  will  be  made  to  put  down 
the  spirit  of  freedom  in  the  8th  of  January  convention. 
Another  Syracuse  is  just  as  likely  to  occur,  but,  if  it  does, 
there  must  be  another  Herkimer. 

This  meant  that  if  resolutions  approving  the  Wilmot 
Proviso  should  be  defeated,  its  friends  must  support 
them  in  another  convention  to  be  called  for  the  pur- 
pose, as  had  been  done  in  New  York. 

That  he  did  not  conceal  from  Southern  men  his 
views  on  the  subject  is  shown  by  the  following  letter 
addressed  to  him  by  Senator  Yulee,  of  Florida,  Febru- 
ary 23,  1848 :  — 

I  have  been  for  some  time  intending  to  write  you  in  token 
of  remembrance,  but  one  cause  or  other  has  prevented.  I 
now  send  you  a  copy  of  a  speech  I  have  lately  inflicted  upon 
the  country  relative  to  the  subject  which  proved  so  consider- 
able a  subject  of  conversation,  during  the  very  agreeable  trip 
on  the  Ohio,  when  it  was  my  good  fortune  to  meet  you.  You 
will  recognize  in  my  remarks  in  the  Senate  almost  an  old 
acquaintance,  for  we  went  over  the  same  ground  together. 
You  did  not  seem  at  that  time  convinced.  I  shall  be  glad  to 
learn  if  printing  will  have  more  weight  with  you. 

The  speech  referred  to  in  the  above  letter  was  an 
argument  in  support  of  the  ultra-Southern  view  on  the 
subject  of  slavery  in  the  Territories. 

After  the  defeat  of  Cass  in  the  presidential  election 
of  that  year,  he  wrote  as  follows  to  his  sister,  Mrs. 
Wolcott :  — 


74     EAKLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

The  presidential  election  has  resulted  in  an  overthrow  of 
Cass,  which,  for  one,  I  do  not  regret.  The  manner  in  which 
the  Freesoil  men  adhered  to  their  ticket  in  the  Reserve  grat- 
ified me  very  much,  but  I  am  disappointed  with  the  result 
in  New  York  and  Pennsylvania.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the 
friends  of  liberty  will  keep  up  an  organization,  and,  by  pre- 
serving an  armed  neutrality,  hold  as  they  may  the  balance  of 
power  in  the  Free  States,  until  one  or  other  party,  by  falling 
in  line,  secure  our  principles. 

In  1852  he  was  in  Washington  during  the  session 
of  the  national  Democratic  convention  in  Baltimore 
which  nominated  Pierce,  but  did  not  feel  sufficient 
interest  in  its  proceedings  to  visit  that  city.  To  his 
mother  he  wrote,  May  5  :  — 

Washington  has  been  very  full  of  strangers  coming  to  the 
convention.  .  .  .  The  convention  has  not  yet  been  able  to 
nominate  a  candidate  for  President,  and  it  is  very  uncertain 
when  they  will  succeed,  if  they  do  so  at  all.  Baltimore  is 
said  to  be  crowded  to  overflowing  with  strangers.  I  have 
not  been  there  and  shall  not  go.  As  soon  as  my  business  is 
ended  here,  I  shall  hasten  home. 

During  the  campaign  of  that  year  he  wrote  her 
from  Pittsburg,  October  25  :  — 

John  P.  Hale,  your  candidate  for  the  presidency,  is  in 
town  to  deliver  a  lecture  this  evening  before  the  Young 
Men's  Mercantile  Literary  Society.  .  .  .  Politicians  are  busy 
electioneering  for  the  presidential  election,  and  the  Scott  men 
still  have  strong  hopes  of  electing  him,  although  their  chance 
looks  slim  enough. 

The  "  Freesoil "  movement  of  1848  was  succeeded 
by  a  "Union-Saving"  era,  which  continued  through 
two  campaigns.     The  conquest  of  California,  and  the 


THE  "UNION-SAVING"  ERA  76 

prolonged  struggle  between  the  North  and  South  over 
her  admission  as  a  free  State  in  1850,  ended  in  the 
compromise  measures  which  included  the  new  Fugitive 
Slave  Law,  and  the  admission  of  slavery  into  New  Mex- 
ico. The  two  great  political  parties  of  that  day  —  the 
Whigs  and  Democrats  —  vied  with  each  other  in  pro- 
claiming their  devotion  to  what  was  called  "  this  new 
settlement  of  the  slavery  question,"  and  in  anathema- 
tizing any  who  should  attempt  to  disturb  it.  In  1852 
the  national  conventions  of  both  parties  vehemently 
applauded  it,  and  each  singled  out  the  Fugitive  Slave 
Law  as  the  especial  object  of  its  admiration  and  devo- 
tion. 

All  but  155,000  of  those  who  voted  on  the  presi- 
dency that  year  supported  either  the  pro-slavery  De- 
mocracy, or  the  j)ro-slavery  Whigs.  That  insignificant 
number  recorded  their  protest  against  slavery  extension 
by  voting  for  John  P.  Hale,  of  New  Hampshire. 

Thus  the  South  dominated  both  parties  equally. 
The  Whigs,  who  had  in  some  Northern  States  opposed 
the  Mexican  war  on  the  professed  ground  that  it  was 
waged  to  extend  slavery,  had  made  haste  to  apologize 
in  1848  by  putting  forward  for  President  General  Tay- 
lor, one  of  its  heroes ;  in  1852  they  nominated  another, 
in  the  person  of  General  Scott. 

It  was  very  generally  believed  that  the  Union  was 
endangered  by  the  increasing  agitation  of  the  slavery 
question ;  and  its  preservation  was  more  precious  to  the 
hearts  of  the  great  body  of  the  Northern  people  than 
any  other  cause.  This  was  well  understood  by  the 
ultra-Southern  leaders,  and  they  made  the  most  of  the 


76      EAKLY  LIFE  AND   PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

fact.  Having  abeady  defaced  the  federal  statute-book 
with  the  superfluous  brutalities  of  the  Fugitive  Slave 
Law/  and  exacted  submission  to  them  as  the  price  of 
national  existence,  they  next  inaugurated  a  crusade  for 
the  admission  of  slavery  into  the  Territories,  and  its 
protection  there  by  a  federal  enactment. 

The  defeat  of  Scott,  in  1852,  led  to  the  complete 
overthrow  of  the  Whig  party.  He  had  received  but 
42  out  of  the  296  electoral  votes.  A  recast  of  political 
parties  became  inevitable.  At  this  juncture  the  main 
body  of  the  Whig  party  did  what  their  opponents 
would  probably  have  done,  had  their  positions  been 
reversed.  They  determined  to  appeal  to  the  sentiment 
they  thought  would  enlist  the  most  recruits  to  their 
number,  and  to  invite  the  formation  of  a  new  party. 
Unable  to  agree  as  to  what  issue  would  yield  the  best 
result  in  votes,  they  divided,  —  one  portion,  under  the 
name  of  "  Americans,"  presenting  hostility  to  foreign- 
ers as  their  shibboleth,  and  the  other,  under  the  name 

^  This  law  denied  to  the  alleged  fugitive  slave  the  right  of  trial  by 
jury  of  the  issue  whether  he  was  a  slave  or  not.  It  gave  the  United 
States  Commissioner  a  fee  of  ten  dollars  in  each  case  when  he  decided 
the  black  man  to  be  a  slave,  and  only  five  dollars  when  he  decided  him 
to  be  a  free  person.  It  authorized  the  summoning  of  the  posse  comitatus 
in  advance  of  any  resistance  to  the  arrest  of  the  alleged  fugitive.  The 
famous  Crittenden  compromise  measures,  voted  down  in  the  Senate 
March  2,  1861,  included  amendments  to  remove  from  the  Fugitive  Slave 
Law  the  above  recited  obnoxious  provisions.  There  were  others  equally 
offensive  to  operate  to  the  disadvantage  of  a  free  Northern  black  who 
might  be  claimed  as  a  fugitive  slave. 

It  is  a  notable  fact  that  Senator  Lewis  Cass,  who  had  been  the  Demo- 
cratic candidate  for  the  presidency  two  years  before,  refused  to  vote  for 
the  Fugitive  Slave  Law  of  1850,  because  it  denied  the  right  of  trial  by 
jury  to  the  black  man  claimed  as  a  slave. 


AVERSION  TO  THE  WHIGS  77 

of  "  Republicans,"  the  non-extension  of  slavery.  Each 
drew  something  from  the  Democratic  party,  but  that 
party  elected  Mr.  Buchanan  President,  in  1856,  over 
the  divided  opposition,  by  the  votes  of  every  slave 
State  save  Maryland,  and  those  of  the  Northern  States 
of  Pennsylvania,  New  Jersey,  Illinois,  Indiana,  and 
California. 

Stanton,  having  become  a  resident  of  Washington, 
had  no  vote  at  the  presidential  election  of  that  year. 
He  was  wholly  absorbed  in  his  law  business.  As  he 
had  taken  no  active  part  in  politics  for  years,  his  con- 
tinuance in  that  course  did  not  affect  his  standing  as  a 
Democrat.  It  is  certain  that  his  old  enemies,  the 
Whigs,  found  no  more  favor  in  his  sight  that  year, 
under  their  new  names  of  "  Republicans  "  and  "  Amer- 
icans," than  they  had  when  marshaled  against  Jackson 
in  support  of  the  national  bank,  or  when  they  surren- 
dered to  the  South  Carolina  Nullifiers,  in  1833,  under 
the  coalition  between  Clay  and  Calhoun. 

In  the  breach  between  Mr.  Buchanan's  adminis- 
tration and  those  who  opposed  his  Kansas  pohcy  in 
1857-58,  Mr.  Stanton  stood  unmistakably  with  Mr. 
Buchanan,  as  appears  by  the  following  letter  written 
by  him  to  Judge  Black  from  San  Francisco,  September 
5,  1858:  — 

This  steamer  will  bear  the  news  of  a  great  administration 
victory  in  this  State.  It  has  been  a  most  triumphant  and 
glorious  victory.  From  the  hour  that  Broderick  reached  this 
shore,  imtil  the  last  moment,  his  energies  were  devoted  to  the 
contest,  and  his  overthrow  is  signal  and  ignominious.  You 
say  to  the  President  that  his  own  great  name  achieved  the 


78     EARLY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

triumpli  —  to  that  victory  is  due.  Gwin  and  Scott  were  both 
absent.  Broderick  was  in  the  field  in  person.  The  organ- 
ization was  feeble  and  incomplete,  and  the  election  is  but  an 
emphatic  overwhelming  indorsement  of  the  President  and 
his  administration. 

Senator  Broderick  and  his  friends  had  bolted  the 
Democratic  organization  in  California,  on  the  issue 
which  Mr.  Douglas  had  successfully  made  within  the 
party  in  Illinois.  The  campaign  in  California  had 
been  waged  with  extreme  bitterness  against  Mr.  Bu- 
chanan personally.  The  above  letter  indicates  the 
strong  s}Tnpathy  Mr.  Stanton  felt  with  the  President 
in  such  a  controversy.     Judge  Black  says  of  him  :  — 

He  was  always  sound  on  the  Kansas  question,  and  faith- 
ful among  the  faithless  on  the  Lecompton  Constitution.  So 
far  as  we,  his  Democratic  associates,  were  permitted  to  know 
him,  no  man  detested  more  than  he  did  the  knavish  trick  of 
the  abolitionists  in  preventing  a  vote  on  slavery,  by  which 
it  would  have  been  expelled  from  Kansas,  and  the  whole 
trouble  settled  in  the  way  they  pretended  to  wish.^ 

The  Kansas  convention  at  Lecompton,  which  was 
dominated  by  the  pro-slavery  men,  had  submitted  the 
Constitution  to  be  voted  on  in  the  following  manner : 
"  For  the  Constitution  with  slavery,"  or  "  For  the  Con- 
stitution without  slavery."  In  no  case  could  a  man 
vote  against  the  Constitution.  The  free  state  men  be- 
lieved they  had  little  reason  to  hope  for  a  fair  election, 
and  therefore  abstained  from  voting.  According  to 
Judge  Black's  testimony,  Mr.  Stanton  believed  they 
could  have  made  Kansas  a  free  State  at  that  election. 

1  Letter  to  Henry  Wilson,  Atlantic  Monthly,  April,  1870. 


STANTON'S  POSITION  IN  1860  79 

Being  still  a  resident  of  the  District  of  Columbia, 
he  was  not  a  voter  in  1860.  His  son,  Edwin,  after  a 
visit  to  Washington  that  year,  informed  Stanton's  old 
friend,  John  F.  Oliver,  at  Steubenville,  that  his  father 
was  for  Breckinridge.  To  his  sister,  Mrs.  Wolcott, 
Stanton  wrote,  June  28  of  that  year :  — 

I  suppose  you  aU  look  forward  to  Lincoln's  election  and 
expect  to  come  on  here  to  the  coronation.  .  .  .  The  election 
of  Lincoln  is  as  certain  as  any  future  event  can  be.  The 
Democratic  party  are  hopelessly  shivered,  and  will  not  re- 
unite for  many  years,  if  ever. 

Says  Judge  Black :  — 

He  was  out  and  out  for  Breckinridge  in  1860,  and  re- 
garded the  salvation  of  the  country  as  hanging  on  the  forlorn 
hope  of  his  election. 

To  sum  all  up :  Mr.  Stanton  was  in  1860  and  1861, 
and  prior  to  that,  a  Democrat,  opposed  to  slavery,  but 
a  firm  upholder  of  the  laws  constitutionally  enacted  for 
its  protection. 

That  he  believed  the  success  of  the  Republican  party 
would  endanger  the  Union,  and  that  he  adhered  to  the 
extreme  wing  of  the  Democratic  party  after  it  had 
subordinated  all  other  questions  to  the  protection  of 
slavery  in  the  rights  guaranteed  it  by  the  Constitution, 
as  interpreted  by  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  in 
the  Dred  Scott  case,  must  be  admitted.  That  when 
the  apprehended  danger  to  the  Union  followed  Repub- 
lican success,  he  rose  superior  to  all  party  trammels, 
and,  in  the  Cabinet  of  Mr.  Buchanan,  acted  with  high 
courage  and  the  most  unselfish  patriotism,  none  can 


80     EAELY  LIFE  AND  PROFESSIONAL  CAREER 

deny.  He  strengthened  the  hands  of  Mr.  Buchanan 
in  all  that  he  safely  and  lawfully  did  to  avert  a  colli- 
sion, because,  at  that  time,  it  was  obvious  to  all  intel- 
ligent persons  that  the  sympathies  of  foreign  nations 
as  well  as  the  support  of  a  large  body  of  our  own 
people  would  be  with  the  side  that  remained  on  the 
defensive  until  attacked.  When  the  retired  President 
was  overwhelmed  with  the  imprecations  of  people  who 
held  him  responsible  for  the  perils  which  beset  the 
country,  and  was  apprehensive  that  proceedings  might 
be  taken  against  him  in  Congress,  Mr.  Stanton  was  his 
chosen  counselor,  and  his  considerate,  unselfish,  and 
trusted  friend. 


PART  II 

THE  SECESSION  WINTER.  —  STANTON    IN    BUCH- 
ANAN'S  CABINET 


CHAPTER   XII 

Appointed  Attorney-General,  December  20,  I860.  —  Review  of  the 
Political  Situation.  —  The  Presidential  Election.  —  The  Disunion 
Conspiracy.  —  Movements  in  South  Carolina.  —  Her  Agents  in 
"Washington.  —  Floyd's  Treason.  —  Buchanan's  Message  revised 
by  JefPerson  Davis. 

On  the  20th  of  December,  1860,  Mr.  Stanton,  then 
forty-six  years  of  age,  was  appointed  Attorney-General 
of  the  United  States.  Up  to  that  time,  with  the  excep- 
tions in  early  Hfe  of  one  year's  service  as  a  county  pro- 
secuting attorney,  and  three  years  as  a  state  Supreme 
Court  reporter  (both  in  the  line  of  his  profession),  he 
had  never  held  office,  nor  sought  or  desii'ed  to. 

His  appointment  was  not  a  political  one.  He  had 
rendered  no  political  services  entitling  him  to  recogni- 
tion at  the  hands  of  the  President  or  his  party.  It  is 
impossible  to  imagine  that  he  desired  the  office,  for  it 
was  an  invitation  to  leave  a  lucrative  practice,  and  share 
with  an  administration  about  to  go  out  in  eclipse  the 
buffetings  it  was  receiving  from  the  triumphant  opposi- 
tion, and  which  it  must  also  receive  from  the  Southern 


82  THE  SECESSION  WINTER 

faction  of  its  own  party,  unless  it  should  lend  itself  to 
their  revolutionary  aims. 

The  administration  of  Mr.  Buchanan  had  already 
drifted  with  extraordinary  fatuity  into  a  position  in 
which  it  dared  not  remain,  and  yet  from  which  retreat 
was  both  difficult  and  dangerous.  To  form  some  idea 
of  the  stormy  sea  upon  which  it  was  being  tossed  at 
that  time,  it  will  be  necessary  to  review  what  had 
occurred  during  the  forty-four  days  between  the  presi- 
dential election  and  the  date  of  Stanton's  appointment. 
The  United  States  government  at  that  time  seemed 
to  have  no  rights  that  anybody  was  bound  to  respect. 
It  had  been  so  longf  under  the  control  of  the  men 
then  bent  on  the  dismemberment  of  the  Union  that, 
although  they  had  been  defeated  at  the  polls,  resistance 
to  their  will  seemed  to  them  a  Httle  short  of  rebeUion 
against  established  authority. 

The  presidential  struggle  of  1860  had  been  con- 
ducted by  the  extreme  Southern  leaders,  from  the  open- 
ing of  the  president-making  Congress  in  December, 
1859,  until  the  closing  of  the  polls  in  November,  1860, 
upon  the  express  plan  of  securing  the  election  of  the 
Repubhcan  candidate,  as  a  pretext  for  the  long-threat- 
ened and,  by  them,  ardently  desired  dissolution  of  the 
Union.  The  delegates  from  the  cotton  States  to  the 
national  Democratic  convention  at  Charleston  had  been 
instructed  in  their  state  conventions  to  demand  of  the 
convention  a  platform  on  the  slavery  question,  which 
it  was  known  would  defeat  the  party  if  adopted ;  and, 
faihng  to  secure  it,  they  were  instructed  to  disrupt 
that  body,  which  would  be  equally  certain  to  accom- 


THE  POLITICAL  SITUATION  83 

plish  the  desired  result.  Unable  to  secure  a  majority 
to  support  their  views,  they  seceded  from  the  con- 
vention, in  accordance  with  their  instructions,  and 
subsequently  put  forward  a  third  candidate  for  the 
presidency.  Having  thus,  with  premeditation,  insured 
Republican  success  through  Democratic  division,  they 
committed  themselves  and  their  heated  followers  during 
the  canvass  in  the  most  explicit  terms,  by  public  re- 
solves, speeches,  and  writings,  to  secession  and  disunion 
in  the  event  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  election,  and  to  a  war  to 
the  knife  if  the  nation  should  refuse  to  be  unresistingly 
put  to  death. 

This  action  of  theirs  was  the  culmination  of  many 
years  of  debate,  in  which  they  had  vainly  endeavored  to 
stem  the  rising  tide  of  opinion  against  the  system  of 
slavery. 

The  election  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  thus  contrived,  was 
deemed  so  certain  that  definite  revolutionary  measures 
were  set  on  foot  a  full  month  before  it  took  place.  The 
election  day  was  November  6.  On  the  5th  of  the  pre- 
ceding month  Governor  Gist,  of  South  Carolina,  ad- 
dressed a  confidential  circular  letter  to  the  several  gov- 
ernors of  the  other  cotton  States,  in  which  he  said  that 
the  great  probability,  nay,  almost  certainty  of  Abraham 
Lincoln's  election  to  the  presidency  rendered  it  impor- 
tant that  there  should  be  a  full  and  free  interchanjre  of 
views  between  the  executives  of  the  Southern  and  more 
especially  the  cotton  States.  He  then  gave  his  own 
views  as  to  the  probable  action  of  his  State,  and  asked 
them  as  to  their  States  respectively.  South  Carolina, 
he  declared,  would  rather  follow  or  accompany  some 


84  THE  SECESSION  WINTER 

other  State  than  lead.  She  would  follow  any  single 
State  that  would  secede ;  and  if  no  other  State  took  the 
lead,  she  would,  in  his  opinion,  secede  alone,  if  assured 
that  she  would  be  soon  followed  by  another  or  other 
States.     Otherwise  he  said  it  would  be  doubtful. 

To  this  the  governor  of  North  Carolina  replied, 
October  18,  that  he  thought  the  people  of  that  State 
would  not  consider  the  occurrence  of  the  event  referred 
to  as  sufficient  gfround  for  dissolvins:  the  Union  of  the 
States,  but  he  did  not  think  his  State  would  become  a 
party  to  the  enforcement  of  "  the  monstrous  doctrine  of 
coercion."     In  no  event  would  he  assent  to  that. 

The  governor  of  Louisiana  wrote,  October  26,  that 
he  should  not  advise  secession  in  case  of  Lincoln's  elec- 
tion, and  did  not  think  the  people  of  his  State  would 
favor  it ;  but  he  believed  in  the  right  of  secession,  and 
would  sustain  any  seceded  State  against  attempted  coer- 
cion by  the  general  government. 

The  governor  of  Mississippi  wrote,  October  26,  to 
the  effect  that  his  State  would  follow  any  other  State 
that  would  secede. 

The  governor  of  Georgia  wrote,  October  31,  that 
he  thought  his  State  would  wait  for  an  overt  act  before 
secedino".  He  favored  a  conference  of  Southern  States, 
but  events  not  yet  foreseen  might  lead  to  action  by 
Georgia,  without  waiting  for  other  States. 

The  governor  of  Alabama  wrote,  October  25,  that 
in  his  opinion  Alabama  would  secede,  if  two  or  more 
States  would  cooperate  with  her,  and  that  she  would 
rally  to  the  rescue  of  any  one  seceded  State  against  the 
use  of  force  by  the  federal  government. 


THE  DISUNION  CONSPIRACY  85 

The  governor  of  Florida  did  not  reply  until  after  the 
election  (November  9),  when  he  assured  Governor  Gist 
that  his  State  would  wheel  into  line  with  South  Caro- 
lina or  any  other  State. 

Governor  Gist's  diligence  in  the  disunion  cause  did 
not  stop  with  this  interstate  correspondence.  He  com- 
menced to  make  ready  for  war  by  secret  negotiations 
for  the  purchase  of  arms  from  the  United  States  through 
his  accomplice,  John  B.  Floyd,  the  Secretary  of  War. 

As  early  as  October  22,  1860,  Thomas  F.  Drayton, 
an  emissary  of  his,  visited  Washington  on  this  business, 
and  in  company  with  Senator  Wigfall,  of  Texas,  called 
upon  the  Secretary  of  War  to  make  inquiries  as  to  the 
efficiency  and  price  of  certain  muskets  belonging  to 
the  United  States.  Upon  his  return  to  Charleston  he 
reported  to  the  governor,  under  date  of  November  3, 
that  these  muskets  "  would  shoot  for  200  yards  as  well 
as  any  smooth-bore  gun  in  the  service,  and  would  carry 
a  conical  ball,  made  lighter  by  enlarging  the  hollow  at 
the  base  of  the  cone,  700  yards ; "  that  he  could  have 
these  particulars  authenticated  by  the  Board  of  Ord- 
nance officers,  of  which  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston 
was  president,  who  had  inspected  and  reported  on  the 
muskets  to  the  Secretary  of  War ;  that  ten  thousand  of 
them  could  be  purchased  for  the  State  of  South  Caro- 
lina at  $2.00  each,  and  that  the  accommodating  secre- 
tary had  agreed  to  have  them  rifled  at  the  reasonable 
additional  cost  of  $1.00  per  barrel.  Texas  had,  he 
said,  abeady  engaged  20,000  of  these  muskets.  "  As 
this  interview  with  Mr.  Secretary  Floyd,"  wrote  the 
discreet  Drayton,  "  was  both  semi-official  and  confiden- 


86 


THE  SECESSION  WINTER 


tial,  your  Excellency  will  readily  see  the  necessity,  should 
this  matter  be  pursued,  of  appointing  an  agent  to  nego- 
tiate with  him,  rather  than  conduct  the  negotiations 
directly  between  the  State  and  the  department." 

His  Excellency  saw  the  necessity,  and  gave  Drayton 
the  suggested  authority.  The  latter,  in  accepting  the 
agency,  wrote  the  governor  that  the  only  remedy  for 
existing  ills  was  "  to  break  up  with  dispatch  the  present 
confederacy  and  construct  a  new  and  better  one."  He 
urged  privacy,  and  said  he  would  at  once  write  Floyd  to 
have  the  rifles  put  in  preparation  so  as  to  have  them 
ready  for  use  at  an  early  day. 

This  letter  was  written  on  the  day  of  the  presidential 
election.  It  was  delivered  into  Mr.  Floyd's  hands  two 
days  later  by  Mr.  Trescott,  of  South  Carolina,  then 
Assistant  Secretary  of  State. 

The  South  CaroHna  legislature  met,  in  called  ses- 
sion, November  5.  The  message  of  the  governor  pre- 
dicted Mr.  Lincoln's  election  on  the  following  day, 
recommended  the  secession  of  the  State,  and  urged  that 
she  be  placed  at  once  on  a  war  footing  by  arming 
every  man  between  eighteen  and  forty -five  years  of  age, 
and  accepting  the  services  of  10,000  volunteers. 

At  a  gathering  of  prominent  poHticians  of  the  State, 
including  the  governor  and  all  the  congressional  dele- 
gation but  one,  held  October  25,  at  the  residence  of 
United  States  Senator  Hammond,  it  had  been  unani- 
mously resolved  that  South  Carolina  should  secede  in 
the  event  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  election. 

No  demonstration  was  omitted  which  was  calculated 
to  aid  in  precipitating  the  crisis.     The  most  theatrical 


MOVEMENTS  IN  SOUTH  CAROLINA  87 

scene  of  all  was  enacted  in  the  United  States  District 
Court  room  at  Charleston,  on  the  day  following  that  of 
the  presidential  election,  and  before  the  result  could 
have  been  certainly  known.  The  foreman  of  the 
Grand  Jury  addressed  the  court,  saying  that  that  body 
decHned  to  proceed  with  their  presentments  because  the 
last  hope  for  the  stability  of  the  federal  government 
had  been  swept  away  "  by  the  verdict  of  the  Northern 
section  of  the  confederacy,  solemnly  announced  to  the 
country  through  the  ballot-box  on  yesterday."  Where- 
upon the  judge  of  the  court,  A.  G.  Magrath,  arose, 
and  instead  of  punishing  the  foreman  for  contempt  of 
court,  resigned  his  office  in  a  grandiloquent  speech  in 
support  of  secession.  The  resignation  of  the  United 
States  attorney  and  marshal  followed  immediately. 
This  performance  seems,  in  the  light  of  subsequent 
events,  to  have  been  an  important  step  in  making  up 
an  agreed  case  for  executive  consideration,  and  for  a 
decision  which  it  was  beheved  would  insure  to  the  State 
immunity  from  immediate  federal  interference  with  the 
rebellious  attitude  she  was  about  to  assume. 

The  leofislature  called  a  convention  to  assemble 
December  17.  The  bill  for  that  purpose  passed  the 
Senate  November  10,  and  the  House  on  the  12th. 

While  South  Carolina  was  thus  being  borne  rapidly 
along  in  the  direction  of  her  heart's  desire  by  the  restless 
zeal  and  audacity  of  her  sons  at  home,  she  was  served 
with  no  less  fidelity  and  ability  at  the  national  capi- 
tal. There  she  had  an  unofficial  representative,  still 
in  the  official  harness  of  the  federal  government,  in  the 
person  of  William  H.  Trescott,  the  Assistant  Secretary 


88  THE  SECESSION  WINTER 

of  State.  That  lie  enjoyed  the  confidence  of  President 
Buchanan  in  a  marked  degree  is  evidenced  by  the  fact 
that  from  June  to  October  of  that  year  he  had  been 
Acting  Secretary  of  State,  by  presidential  designation, 
in  the  temporary  absence  of  Secretary  Cass.  He  was 
equally  in  the  confidence  of  the  disunion  leaders,  and 
often  went  between  them  and  their  allies  in  the  Cabinet. 
For  example,  on  the  1st  of  November  he  wrote  to  Mr. 
Rhett,  of  South  Carolina,  that,  while  he  could  not,  of 
course,  say  anything  about  his  own  views  or  opinions 
of  the  administration,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
Mr.  Howell  Cobb,  of  Georgia,  had  authorized  him  to 
communicate  his  views  in  confidence.  The  substance 
of  them  was  that  Mr.  Cobb  was  an  ardent  disunionist, 
and  thouo-ht  Georg-ia  would  and  shoidd  secede  in  the 
event  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  election,  but  not  until  the  4th 
of  March.  He  feared  earHer  action  would  peril  una- 
nimity. 

Mr.  Trescott  called  upon  Secretary  Floyd  November 
8,  with  the  letter  of  November  6  from  Drayton, 
agent  of  South  Carolina,  before  referred  to,  propos- 
ing to  buy  10,000  muskets  for  the  use  of  the  State. 
This  enabled  Drayton  to  write  to  Governor  Gist,  No- 
vember 16,  from  Charleston,  that,  although  he  had 
been  prevented  by  an  accident  from  going  to  Washing- 
ton, his  absence  had  not  delayed  the  execution  of  the 
order  for  the  rifles ;  the  Secretary  of  War  had  had 
the  preparation  of  them  in  hand  for  some  time.  He 
requested  the  governor  to  address  him  at  Washington 
in  Mr.  Trescott's  care. 

On  the  19th  of  November  Drayton  was  in  Washing- 


FLOYD'S  TREASON  89 

ton,  and  wrote  to  Governor  Gist  that  he  had  been 
greatly  disappointed  at  being  informed  by  Secretary 
Floyd  that  it  would  take  three  or  four  months  to  rifle 
the  muskets,  for  that  functionary  had  assured  Mr. 
Trescott  as  well  as  himself  that  they  would  be  ready 
for  delivery  on  his  arrival.  But  Secretary  Floyd's 
good  faith  towards  the  disunion  cause  was  made  clear 
by  his  kindly  suggestion  that  they  should  "  purchase 
the  10,000  smooth-bored  muskets  instead,  as  a  more 
ef&cient  arm,  particularly  if  large-sized  buckshot  should 
be  used,  which,  if  put  in  a  wire  case  capable  of  contain- 
ing twelve  of  them,  would  go  spitefully  through  an 
inch  plank  at  200  yards."  Drayton  was  also  advised 
by  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  then  Quartermaster- 
General,  "that  for  the  purpose  the  smooth-bored  musket 
is  preferable  to  the  altered  rifle."  Later  on  the  same 
busy  day  Drayton  wrote  that  Secretary  Floyd  deemed  it 
important  that  he  should  go  to  New  York  to  arrange 
for  shipping  the  arms  from  that  point  instead  of  Wash- 
ington. He  said  he  was  also  getting  some  of  the  same 
muskets  for  Georgia.  On  the  23d  of  November  Dray- 
ton telegraphed  to  Governor  Gist  from  Washington : 
"  Your  order  for  rifles  of  the  17th  instant  cannot  be 
had.  To  manufacture  them  will  take  a  year.  The 
rest  of  the  order  I  hope  to  fill.  Will  send  10,000 
smooth-bore.  Reply  by  wire."  At  the  same  time  he 
wrote,  saying  he  had  just  returned  from  New  York, 
whither  he  had  gone  at  the  suggestion  of  Secretary 
Floyd  to  engage  G.  B.  Lamar,  president  of  the  Bank 
of  the  Republic,  to  make  an  offer  to  the  Secretary  for 
the  number  of  muskets  required  for  South  Carolina. 


90 


THE  SECESSION  WINTER 


"The  Secretary  of  War,"  he  wrote,  "was  reluctant  to 
dispose  of  them  to  me,  preferring  the  intermediate 
agency."  He  also  stated  that  Secretary  Floyd  had  that 
day  written  to  tlie  officers  in  charge  of  the  Watervliet 
arsenal  to  deliver  5000  or  10,000  to  Mr.  Lamar's 
order.  Drayton  expressed  much  anxiety  to  get  the 
arms  immediately  forwarded  to  Charleston,  as  "  the 
Cabinet  may  break  up  at  any  moment  on  differences  of 
opinion  with  the  President  as  to  the  right  of  secession, 
and  a  new  Secretary  of  War  might  stop  the  muskets 
going  South,  if  not  already  on  their  way,  when  he 
comes  into  office."  On  the  following  day,  November 
24,  he  telegraphed  Governor  Gist  as  follows :  "  The 
quota  for  eighteen  hundred  and  sixty-one  ordered  from 
Harper's  Ferry." 

While  the  Secretary  of  War  was  thus  selling  mus- 
kets, which  would  send  twelve  buckshot  "  spitefully 
through  an  inch  plank  at  200  yards,"  to  conspirators 
who  were  making  ready  to  use  them  against  the  sol- 
diers of  the  army  of  which  he  was  the  sworn  guardian, 
he  was  professing  to  President  Buchanan  and  Attor- 
ney-General Black  to  be  opposed  to  the  Southern 
movement.^ 

Mr.  Trescott  kept  the  governor  of  South  Carolina 
well  informed  as  to  the  attitude  of  Mr.  Buchanan,  and 
was  the  faithful  sentinel  of  the  "  sovereign  State  "  of 
South  Carolina  within  the  federal  camp,  ready  to  notify 
her  authorities  if  any  movement  should  make  it  advis- 
able for  her  to  commence  hostilities.  On  the  19th  of 
November  he  wrote  to  Drayton  that  no  action  of  any 

1  Black's  Essays  and  Speeches,  page  267. 


BUCHANAN'S   MESSAGE  REVISED  BY  DAVIS     91 

sort  would  be  taken  until  the  message  of  the  President 
had  been  sent  to  Congress.  The  contents  of  that  mes- 
sage were  correctly  foreshadowed  by  him.  He  could 
not  tell  what  the  President  would  do  when  the  State 
should  secede,  but  he  thought  that  as  long  as  Cobb  and 
Thompson  retained  seats  in  the  Cabinet,  it  would  be 
evidence  that  no  action  had  been  taken  seriously  affect- 
ing the  position  of  any  Southern  State.  He  thought  he 
could  rely  upon  his  own  knowledge  of  what  would  be 
done,  and  he  would  resign  as  soon  as  that  knowledge 
satisfied  him  of  "any  move  in  a  direction  positively 
injurious  to  us,  or  altering  the  present  condition  of 
thino;s  to  our  disadvantage." 

Two  of  the  Southern  members  of  the  Cabinet  tele- 
graphed at  about  this  time  to  Jefferson  Davis,  in  Mis- 
sissippi, to  come  immediately  to  Washington,  and  use  his 
influence  with  the  President  in  relation  to  the  forth- 
coming message.  He  obeyed  the  summons,  and  was 
well  rewarded  for  his  trouble.  He  called  on  Mr. 
Buchanan,  who  read  hun  the  message  and  invited  sug- 
gestions, and,  as  Mr.  Davis  states,  "  kindly  accepted  all 
the  modifications  which  I  suggested."  ^ 

While  these  things  were  going  on,  the  rebellion  in 
South  Carolina  was  rapidly  progressing.  Mr.  Buchanan 
knew,  as  did  all  the  world,  that  the  convention  which 
was  to  meet  there  on  the  17th  of  December  would 
surely  take  the  first  formal  step  in  a  revolt  against  the 
government  of  the  United  States,  by  an  act  of  secession 
which,  if  unchallenged  by  federal  power,  would  speedily 

^  Jefferson  Davis,  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,  vol.  i. 
p.  59. 


92  THE  SECESSION  WINTER 

be  followed  by  similar  acts  in  other  States.  This  was 
known,  because  the  successive  steps  contemplated  by 
the  disunionists  had  been  as  plainly  and  publicly  an- 
nounced by  them  in  advance,  as  are  the  plot  and  inci- 
dents of  a  modern  drama  in  the  play-bill. 

It  was  obvious  that  if  anything  could  prevent  a  sepa- 
rate and  hostile  government  of  confederated  slave  States 
from  springing  up  at  once  within  the  territorial  limits 
of  the  United  States,  it  would  be  a  prompt  demonstra- 
tion by  the  administration  at  Washington  of  a  firm, 
patriotic,  and  unmistakable  purpose  to  defend  the  rights 
of  the  government  wherever  and  under  whatever  pre- 
text or  authority  they  might  be  assailed,  followed  by 
popular  uprisings  in  the  North,  without  regard  to  party 
hues,  which  such  a  stand  would  surely  evoke.  Such  a 
course  might  have  given  pause  even  to  South  Carolina. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  was  in  the  President's  power,  if 
he  chose,  to  promote  the  cause  of  disunion,  and  divide 
public  opinion  at  the  North,  by  assurances  to  those  who 
were  instigating  and  organizing  rebellion  that  the  na- 
tional government  had  not  the  power  under  the  Consti- 
tution to  adopt  the  measures  necessary  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  Union.  The  secession  doctrine  had  been 
debated  for  thirty  years,  and  not  a  statesman  in  the 
land  but  had  a  definite  opinion  concerning  it.  Those 
who  believed  it  to  be  simply  revolution  knew  whether 
they  thought  a  justification  existed  for  a  resort  to  it. 
The  President  was  an  experienced  statesman,  and  had 
gathered  around  him  a  Cabinet  containing  some  able 
men.  It  was  not  an  unreasonable  expectation  that  as 
the  chief  magistrate  of  the  nation,  he  would  oppose  the 


THE  CRISIS  93 

threatened  revolution,  and  purge  the  Cabinet  of  any 
who  might  be  found  promoting  it.  The  hot  discussions 
of  the  campaign  had  left  no  room  to  doubt  that  the 
election  of  Mr.  Lincoln  would  create  a  crisis  in  which 
either  a  revolution  or  the  government  must  go  down. 
The  extent  of  that  revolution  was  the  only  question. 
It  might  be  confined  to  South  CaroHna  ;  it  might  extend 
through  the  cotton  States,  or  it  might  finally  include 
all  the  slave  States.  The  crisis  might  be  precipitated 
immediately  after  the  election,  and  tax  all  the  patriotism 
and  energies  of  the  outgoing  administration,  or  it  might 
be  procrastinated  until  the  advent  to  power  of  the  Pre- 
sident whose  election  was  made  the  pretext  for  it.  It  is 
reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  former  contingency  was 
contemplated  by  Mr.  Buchanan  and  his  advisers,  and 
some  views  interchanged  as  to  the  manner  in  which  it 
should  be  met  in  whichever  of  many  possible  forms  it 
might  present  itseK. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

Mr.  Buchanan  asks  Attorney-General  Black's  Opinion.  —  The  Opin- 
ion, November  20,  1860.  —  The  same  analyzed  and  reviewed.  — 
The  Anti-CoQrcion  Doctrineo 

On  the  ITth  of  November,  President  Buchanan  called 
upon  Attorney-General  Jeremiah  S.  Black,  for  an  official 
opinion  as  to  the  powers  and  duties  of  the  Executive  in 
the  crisis  then  impending. 

Judge  Black's  opportunity  was  such  as  seldom  falls 
to  the  lot  of  any  man.  He  could  point  out  to  the  Presi- 
dent in  direct  and  unequivocal  terms  all  that  the  patri- 
otic people  of  the  country  had  a  right  to  hope  from  their 
government,  and  all  that  those  who  were  openly  threat- 
ening its  destruction  had  to  fear.  Never  had  any  man 
more  completely  in  his  grasp  the  destinies  of  a  great 
people.  He  was  the  President's  chosen  friend,  and  was 
by  him  deemed  so  able  and  so  reliable  that  his  view  of 
the  law  was  likely  to  be  the  chart  by  which  the  ship  of 
state  would  be  navigated  in  that  tempestuous  time  by 
its  constitutional  commander.  His  opinion  was  given 
on  the  20th  of  November,  1860,  just  one  month  before 
the  adoption  of  the  ordinance  of  secession  by  the  State 
of  South  Carohna.^  It  was  by  far  the  most  important 
paper  he  ever  wrote,  and  in  it  he  might  reasonably  have 
been  expected  to  show  the  breadth  of  his  capacity  as  a 

1  Attorney-General's  Opinions,  vol.  ix.  p.  523. 


ATTORNEY-GENERAL  BLACK'S  OPINION        95 

legal  and  constitutional  expounder.  Learned  in  consti- 
tutional law  and  in  the  history  and  art  of  government, 
trained  in  the  Jackson  school  of  Democracy,  and  gifted 
with  unusual  strength  and  facility  of  language  in  which 
to  clothe  his  ideas,  he  was  called  upon  to  speak  the 
words  that  were  to  be  potent  either  for  peace  or  war. 

The  opinion  was  written  in  response  to  questions  pro- 
pounded by  President  Buchanan,  the  vital  one  of  which 
dealt  with  affairs  as  they  actually  existed  in  South  Caro- 
lina.    It  was  as  follows :  — 

Can  a  military  force  he  used  for  any  purpose  whatever 
under  the  Acts  of  1795  and  1807,  loithin  the  limits  of  a  State 
where  there  are  no  judges,  marshals,  or  other  civil  officers  ? 

The  Attorney-General  replied  emphatically  that  it 
could  not!  He  had  in  reply  to  minor  questions  elabo- 
rated at  length,  what  nobody  denied,  that  under  those 
acts,  in  support  of  the  United  States  Marshal,  resisted 
in  the  execution  of  judicial  process,  military  force  might 
be  appHed. 

"  But,"  he  now  asked,  "  what  if  the  feehng  in  any 
State  against  the  United  States  should  become  so  uni- 
versal that  the  federal  officers  themselves  (including 
judges,  district  attorneys,  and  marshals)  would  be 
reached  by  the  same  influences  and  resign  their  places?  " 

The  federal  court  officials  in  South  Carolina  had 
created  exactly  this  situation  two  weeks  before. 

"  Of  course,"  he  continued,  "  the  first  step  would  be 
to  appoint  others  in  their  stead,  if  others  could  be  got 
to  serve.  But  in  such  an  event,  it  is  more  than  prob- 
able that  great  difficulty  would  be  found  in  filling  the 


96 


THE  SECESSION  WINTER 


offices.  We  can  easily  conceive  how  it  might  become 
altogether  impossible." 

It  had  then,  as  all  men  knew,  become  altogether  im- 
possible, without  federal  protection,  in  South  Carolina. 
The  people  of  that  State  would  have  handled  any  men 
who  would  have  dared  to  accept  appointments  to  those 
offices  as  roughly  as  they  would  any  who  had  attempted 
to  dehver  abolition  haranofues  to  their  slaves. 

What  then?  What  should  the  President  of  the 
United  States  do  when  the  federal  courts  in  a  State  are 
thus  closed  by  a  reign  of  terror  ?  If  he  could  use  the 
army  and  call  out  the  militia  to  enforce  a  process  in  the 
hands  of  a  marshal,  what  could  he  do  if  the  process 
could  not  be  obtained  against  the  law-breakers  because 
no  man  could  accept  the  judicial  office  with  safety  to 
his  life  ?     Here  is  Judge  Black's  answer :  — 

In  that  event,  troops  would  certainly  be  out  of  place  and 
their  use  wholly  illegal.  If  they  are  sent  to  aid  the  courts 
and  marshals,  there  must  be  courts  and  marshals  to  be  aided. 
Without  the  exercise  of  those  functions  which  belong  exclu- 
sively to  civil  service,  the  laws  cannot  be  executed  in  any  event, 
no  matter  what  may  be  the  physical  strength  which  the  gov- 
ernment has  at  its  command.  Under  such  circumstances  to 
send  a  military  force  into  any  State,  with  orders  to  act  against 
the  people,  would  be  simply  making  war  upon  them. 

Contrast  Judge  Black's  reply  with  the  law  of  the  case 
as  laid  down  by  Judge  Grier,  speaking  for  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  in  the  Prize  cases,  after  the 
commencement  of  the  war.^ 

^  67  United  States  Reports,  page  635. 


ATTORNEY-GENERAL  BLACK'S  OPINION        97 

As  a  civil  war  is  never  publicly  proclaimed,  eo  nomine^ 
against  insurgents,  its  actual  existence  is  a  fact  in  our  domestic 
history  which  the  court  is  bound  to  notice  and  to  know. 

The  true  test  of  its  existence,  as  found  in  the  writings  of 
the  sages  of  the  common  law,  may  be  thus  summarily  stated : 
When  the  regular  course  of  justice  is  interrupted  by  revolt, 
rebellion,  or  insurrection,  so  that  the  courts  of  justice  cannot 
be  kept  open,  civil  war  exists,  and  hostilities  may  be  prose- 
cuted on  the  same  footing  as  if  those  opposing  the  government 
were  foreign  enemies  invading  the  land. 

When  Judge  Black  wrote  his  opinion,  revolt  was 
already  rife  in  South  Carolina,  and  was  rapidly  "  fester- 
ing into  rebellion."  "  The  regular  course  of  justice  " 
had  been  "  interrupted  "  there,  and  indeed  wholly  sus- 
pended, "  by  revolt." 

Judge  Black  had  cited  the  Act  of  1795,  which  pro- 
vides that  the  President  may  call  forth  the  militia  "  when- 
ever the  laws  of  the  United  States  shall  be  opposed,  or 
the  execution  thereof  obstructed  in  any  State  by  combi- 
nations too  powerful  to  be  suppressed  by  the  ordinary 
force  of  judicial  proceedings,  or  by  the  power  vested  in 
the  marshals,"  and  also  the  act  of  1807,  which  author- 
izes the  employment  of  the  army  and  navy  for  the  same 
purpose.  He  had  admitted  that  these  acts  imposed  upon 
the  President  the  responsibility  of  deciding  whether  the 
exigency  had  arisen  which  required  the  use  of  military 
force ;  but  he  held  that  under  them  the  power  of  the 
President  was  restricted  to  the  aiding  of  marshals  in  the 
execution  of  process  duly  issued  in  the  ordinary  course 
of  judicial  proceedings.  MiKtary  force  could  be  used 
to  uphold  a  marshal  with  a  writ  in  his  hand,  but  not  to 


98  THE  SECESSION  WINTER 

restrain  the  violence  which  made  it  impossible  for  a 
newly  commissioned  judge  to  enter  upon  the  duties  of 
his  office,  and  issue  such  a  writ.  In  short,  he  held  that 
"  combinations  "  in  opposition  to  the  laws  of  the  United 
States  "  too  powerful  to  be  suppressed  by  the  ordinary 
course  of  judicial  proceedings,  or  by  the  power  vested 
in  the  marshals,"  could  not  be  suppressed  at  all.  If 
they  were  powerful  enough  to  suppress  the  courts  and 
abolish  judicial  proceedings,  then,  according  to  the 
opinion  of  Judge  Black,  the  statutes  of  1795  and  1807 
conferred  no  power  upon  the  President  to  interfere. 

But  the  Supreme  Court,  in  the  case  above  cited,  sub- 
sequently declared  that  those  enactments  do  authorize 
the  President  "  to  call  out  the  militia  and  use  the  mih- 
tary  forces  of  the  United  States  in  case  of  invasion  by 
foreign  nations,  and  to  suppress  insurrection  against  the 
government  of  a  State,  or  of  the  United  States." 

It  might  be  said  that  although  the  federal  courts  in 
South  Carolina  were  no  longer  open,  and  could  not  be 
because  of  the  violent  condition  of  public  feeling  in 
that  State,  yet  there  had  been  no  actual  outbreak  in 
the  nature  of  an  armed  insurrection.  But  the  violence 
against  United  States  authority  which  had  not  yet  thus 
visibly  demonstrated  itself,  because  none  had  dared  to 
provoke  it,  ruled  in  South  Carolina  as  completely  on  the 
20th  of  November,  1860,  as  it  did  at  any  time  during 
the  civil  war.  It  is  true  that  the  overt  acts  of  treason 
were  yet  to  come  which  the  secession  leaders  had  for 
months  solemnly  and  publicly  announced  it  to  be  their 
purpose  to  commit,  if  their  work  of  erecting,  within  the 
territorial  Hmits  of  the  United  States,  a  government  in- 


JUDGE  BLACK'S  OPINION  ANALYZED  99 

imical  and  hostile  thereto,  should  be  interfered  with  by 
the  national  authority.  But  rebellion  was  sharpening 
its  sword  and  shotting  its  cannon.  Daniel  S.  Dickinson, 
a  Democratic  leader  in  New  York,  said :  "  The  South 
commenced  scraping  Hnt  before  the  presidential  elec- 
tion." Active  hostilities  had  not  commenced  in  South 
Carolina,  only  because  conspiracy  and  revolt,  busily  and 
openly  organizing  rebelHon,  went  unchallenged,  and 
therefore  found  no  obstacle  with  which  to  collide. 

Such  a  condition  of  affairs,  constituting  civil  war  as 
defined  by  the  Supreme  Court  and  by  the  "  sages  of 
the  common  law,"  was  not  the  less  "insurrection"  be- 
cause shot  and  shell  had  not  been  actually  discharged 
from  the  throats  of  rebel  cannon.  Yet  Judge  Black 
advised  the  President  that  the  acts  of  1795  and  1807 
did  not  authorize  the  intervention  of  federal  power  to 
guard  against  the  unexploded  violence  in  South  Carolina 
in  the  consuming  heat  of  which  a  federal  court  could 
not  live.  Let  us  now  see  whether  on  the  20th  of  No- 
vember, 1860,  he  thought  the  Constitution  conferred 
upon  Congress  the  power  to  enact  laws  authorizing  the 
use  of  mihtary  force  for  the  preservation  of  the  Union, 
and  whether,  in  his  opinion,  the  exercise  of  such  power 
would  be  justified  by  overt  acts  of  treason  and  flagrant 
rebellion. 

He  said  :  — 

Whether  Congress  has  the  constitutional  right  to  make 
war  against  one  or  more  States,  and  require  the  Executive  of 
the  federal  government  to  carry  it  on  by  means  of  force  to 
be  drawn  from  the  other  States,  is  a  question  for  Congress 
itself  to  consider.    It  must  be  admitted  that  no  such  power  is 


100  THE  SECESSION  WINTER 

expressly  given,  nor  are  there  any  words  in  the  Constitution 
which  imply  it. 

The  question  before  the  country  at  that  time  was 
whether,  in  an  aggressive  war  about  to  be  waged  upon 
the  United  States  government  by  rebellious  States,  the 
former  could  constitutionally  fight  for  its  life.  Judge 
Black  maintained  that  it  could  not. 

In  suj)port  of  this  position  he  said :  — 

Among  the  powers  enumerated  in  Article  1,  Section  8,  is 
that  "  to  declare  war,  grant  letters  of  marque  and  reprisal,  and 
to  make  rules  concerning  captures  on  laud  and  water."  This 
certainly  means  nothing  more  than  the  power  to  commence 
and  carry  on  hostilities  against  the  foreign  enemies  of  the 
nation. 

This  comment  was  wholly  gratuitous  on  his  part,  for 
the  Constitution,  as  correctly  quoted  by  him,  makes  no 
distinction  between  a  foreign  and  a  domestic  or  civil 
war. 

He  continued  :  "  Another  clause  in  the  same  section 
gives  Congress  the  power  '  to  provide  for  calling  forth 
the  militia '  and  to  use  them  within  the  limits  of  the 
State." 

The  words  "  and  to  use  them  within  the  limits  of  the 
state  "  are  Judge  Black's,  and  are  also  gratuitous. 

He  continued  :  "But  this  power  is  so  restricted  by 
the  words  which  immediately  follow  that  it  can  be  exer- 
cised only  for  one  of  the  following  purposes :  1.  *  To 
execute  the  laws  of  the  Union.'  "  (Here  he  adds  to  the 
words  of  the  Constitution  his  own  as  follows :  "  That  is, 
to  aid  the  federal  officers  in  the  performance  of  their 
regular    duties.")      "  2.  To   ^  suppress   insurrection.'  " 


JUDGE  BLACK'S   OPINION  ANALYZED  101 

(Here  he  adds  to  the  words  of  the  Constitution  his  own 
as  follows:  "  against  the  State,"  and  makes  this  com- 
ment :  "But  this  is  confined  by  Article  4,  Section  4, 
to  cases  in  which  the  State  herself  shall  apply  for  assist- 
ance against  her  own  people.")  "  3.  To  repel  invasion 
of  a  State  by  enemies  who  come  from  abroad  to  assail 
her  in  her  own  territory."  (This  last  subdivision  is 
Judge  Black's  substitute  for  the  three  simple  words  of 
the  Constitution,  "to  repel  invasions.") 

He  adds :  "  All  these  provisions  are  made  to  protect 
the  State."  He  certainly  went  far  out  of  his  way,  and 
made  many  interpolations,  in  his  vain  endeavor  to  wrest 
such  a  conclusion  from  the  simple  language  of  the  Con- 
stitution, which  is  as  follows  :  — 

"  To  provide  for  calling  forth  the  militia  to  execute 
the  laws  of  the  Union,  suppress  insurrection,  and  repel 
invasion."  ^ 

This  is  all ;  not  a  word  here  about  "  the  States ; " 
they  are  provided  for  in  another  article  of  the  Consti- 
tution. This  section  relates  to  "  the  laws  of  the  Union," 
insurrections  against  the  federal  government,  and  inva- 
sions of  the  United  States. 

When  the  militia  is  needed  to  aid  in  the  execution  of 
the  laws  of  the  Union,  it  may  be  sent  into  any  State 
in  which  any  of  these  laws  are  resisted.  It  would,  in 
case  of  widespread  resistance  within  a  State,  naturally 
be  called  from  other  States. 

Article  IV,  Section  4,  of  the  Constitution  deals  with 
insurrections  and  invasions  against  States,  and  reads 
thus :  — 

i  Article  I,  Section  8. 


102 


THE  SECESSION  WINTER 


The  United  States  shall  guarantee  to  every  State  in  this 
Union  a  Republican  form  of  government,  and  shall  protect 
each  of  them  against  invasions,  and  on  application  of  the 
Legislature,  or  of  the  Executive  (when  the  Legislature  cannot 
be  convened)  against  domestic  violence. 

Judge  Black  says  the  power  to  suppress  insurrec- 
tions, granted  in  Article  I,  is  confined  by  this  pro- 
vision, in  Article  IV,  to  insurrections  against  States. 
The  Supreme  Court,  on  the  contrary,  held  that  the 
President  had  the  power,  under  constitutional  enact- 
ments then  already  in  existence,  "  to  call  out  the  militia 
and  use  the  military  forces  of  the  United  States  in  case 
of  invasion  by  foreign  nations,  and  to  suppress  insurrec- 
tions against  the  government  of  a  State  or  of  the  United 
States."  That  tribunal  found  the  power  in  the  first 
article  of  the  Constitution  to  deal  with  insurrections 
against  the  United  States,  and  in  the  fourth  article  to 
deal  with  insurrections  against  a  State.  It  did  not 
agree  with  Judge  Black  that  the  first  article  was  in 
part  nullified  by  the  fourth,  or  that  they  bore  any 
relation  to  each  other.  Nor  did  the  court  agree  with 
him  that  only  invasions  against  a  State  could  be  re- 
pelled by  the  United  States.^ 

Having  asserted  that  all  the  powers  granted  to  the 
general  government  for  carrying  on  war  relate  only  to 
foreign  enemies,  and  that  it  cannot  "  carry  on  hostilities" 
against  domestic  assailants  in  a  civil  war ;  and  having 
further  explained  that  the  general  government  can  only 
suppress  insurrections  against  States,  and  must  allow 
those  against  its  own  authority  to  spend  their  fury  unin- 

^  Prize  Cases,  67  United  States  Reports,  page  635. 


JUDGE   BLACK'S  OPINION  REVIEWED         103 

terrupted,  Judge  Black  concluded  with  gloomy  predic- 
tions that  the  Union  must  utterly  perish  if  any  attempts 
were  made  to  defend  it  from  those  who  were  arming  for 
its  destruction.  That  this  is  not  too  strongly  put,  let  his 
own  words  attest.     He  said :  — 

If  it  be  true  that  war  cannot  be  declared,  nor  a  system 
of  general  hostilities  carried  on  by  the  central  government 
against  a  State,  then  it  seems  to  follow  that  an  attempt  to  do 
so  would  be  ipso  facto  an  expulsion  of  such  State  from  the 
Union.  Being  treated  as  an  alien  and  an  enemy,  she  would 
be  compelled  to  act  accordingly. 

And  this  was  while  discussing  the  question  of  how  to 
meet  the  case  of  a  government  of  a  State  treating  the 
Union  as  an  alien  and  an  enemy.  Then,  as  if  to  con- 
vey the  impression  that  the  Unionists,  instead  of  the 
Secessionists,  were  stirring  up  strife,  he  continues :  — 

And  if  Congress  shall  break  up  the  present  Union  by 
unconstitutionally  putting  strife  and  enmity  and  armed  hos- 
tility between  different  sections  of  the  country,  instead  of  the 
domestic  tranquillity  which  the  Constitution  was  meant  to  in- 
sure, wiU  not  all  the  federal  States  be  absolved  from  their 
obligations  ?  Is  any  portion  of  the  people  bound  to  contribute 
their  money  or  their  blood  to  carry  on  a  contest  like  that  ? 

This  seemed  a  suQforestion  to  the  Northern  and  border 
States  to  withhold  troops  and  supplies  for  the  suppres- 
sion of  the  rebellion. 

Not  a  word  in  all  this  of  the  desperate  designs  of  the 
secession  leaders  ;  nothing  but  a  protest  against  the  in- 
terruption of  their  disunion  scheme  by  force.  He  still 
mingled  phrases  about  "  the  right  of  the  general  govern- 
ment to  preserve  itself  in  its  whole  constitutional  vigor 


104  THE  SECESSION  WINTER 

by  repelling  a  direct  and  positive  aggression  upon  its 
property  or  its  officers/'  with  other  phrases  flatly  deny- 
ing this  right,  if  the  assertion  of  it  required  the  use  of 
military  force  against  a  domestic  foe  making  an  aggres- 
sive war  upon  the  Union.  He  declared  that  "  the  Union 
must  utterly  perish  at  the  moment  when  Congress  shall 
arm  one  part  of  the  people  against  another  for  any 
purpose  beyond  that  of  merely  protecting  the  general 
government  in  the  exercise  of  its  proper  constitu- 
tional functions ; "  but  that  the  general  government 
had  any  "  proper  constitutional  functions  "  except  to 
aid  United  States  marshals  in  States  which  allowed 
federal  courts  to  be  held  within  their  borders,  and  to 
recapture  forts  from  States  that  had  seized  them  when 
it  could  be  done  without  fighting,  nowhere  appears  in 
this  most  remarkable  state  paper. 

Of  course  Judge  Black  claimed  that  in  his  opinion  he 
was  simply  defining  the  terms  of  the  Constitution  itself. 
We  have  seen  what  interpolations  and  transpositions  he 
found  it  necessary  to  make  to  extort  from  that  instru- 
ment the  semblance  of  such  a  doctrine  as  he  announced. 
The  Southern  leaders  were  professing  to  believe  their 
treasonable  plan  to  be  entirely  constitutional.  They 
intended  to  dissolve  the  union  of  the  States,  but  in 
doing  so  they  affected  a  scrupulous  regard  for  the  Con- 
stitution of  that  Union.  That  sacred  instrument  was, 
in  some  mysterious  manner,  to  be  saved  from  the  general 
conflagration,  and  to  survive  the  nation  of  which,  by 
its  own  express  terms,  it  was  the  supreme  law.  Those 
of  their  friends  at  the  North  who  denied  the  constitu- 
tionality of  secession,  were  only  asked  to  deny  also  the 


THE  ANTI-COERCION  DOCTRINE  105 

legality  of  any  action  by  which  their  work  could  be 
arrested  or  retarded.  They  wanted  to  be  "  let  alone." 
They  were  opposed  to  coercion  —  of  themselves.  The 
mildness  of  this  demand  must  have  been  a  great  rehef 
to  those  in  the  North  who  had  made  up  their  minds  to 
go  to  the  last  extremity  in  the  service  of  the  revolting 
faction,  stopjjing  only  at  the  line  drawn  by  penal  laws. 
They  could  be  for  the  Union  without  hurting  the  seces- 
sion cause,  if  they  could  only  find  some  weak  spot  or 
omission  in  the  Constitution  which  would  enable  them 
to  maintain  the  new  doctrine  of  "  anti-coercion."  The 
paternity  of  this  remarkable  scheme  for  pinioning  the 
nation's  arms,  while  unresisted  treason  flourished  over 
it,  is  not  absolutely  known.  It  was  first  broached  in 
letters  of  governors  of  cotton  States,  already  quoted, 
written  to  Governor  Gist  during  the  month  before  Mr. 
Lincoln's  election ;  but  Judge  Black  was  probably  the 
first  of  our  Northern  statesmen  and  publicists  to  an- 
nounce the  grotesque  doctrine  that  in  a  civil  war  com- 
menced against  its  authority  by  an  alhance  of  rebelhous 
state  governments  and  people,  the  nation  had  no  right 
to  do  any  of  the  fighting. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

President  Buchanan's  Last  Annual  Message.  —  Censure  of  the  North 
and  Apology  for  the  South.  —  Unconstitutional  to  use  Force  to 
preserve  the  Union. 

The  President,  fortified  by  his  Attorney-General, 
bettered  the  instructions  of  his  teacher.  Of  all  the 
inflammatory  appeals  of  that  year  to  the  passions  of 
the  Southern  people,  then  already  in  revolt,  his  mes- 
sage of  December  3  was  perhaps  the  most  incendiary. 
It  represented  the  South  as  a  meek  and  patient  sufferer 
at  the  hands  of  the  cruel  North.  The  Northern  people 
were  represented  as  tolerating  if  not  actually  encour- 
aging a  class  of  fanatics  who  had  long  been  in  a  scheme 
to  incite  insurrections  among  the  negro  slaves,  in  which 
women  and  children  were  to  be  the  victims  of  the  most 
barbarous  atrocities.  The  inference  was  that  the  election 
of  the  previous  month  had  resulted  favorably  to  this 
scheme.  "Northern  agitation,"  he  said,  had  "at  length 
produced  its  malign  influence  upon  the  slaves,  and 
inspired  them  with  vague  notions  of  freedom."  Follow- 
ing in  the  train  of  this  horror,  had  come  the  "  sense  of 
insecurity  around  the  family  altar."  "  Many  a  matron 
in  the  South  on  retiring  at  night  dreaded  what  might 
befall  herself  and  children  before  morning."  * 

^  This  venerable  piece  of  nonsense  was  well  punctured   during  the 
civil  war.     Southern  men  bore  uniform  testimony  to  the  fidelity  with 


BUCHANAN'S  LAST  ANNUAL  MESSAGE         107 

The  President  thought  disunion  must  naturally  fol- 
low the  extension  of  these  fears.  The  Union  could 
not,  he  said,  long  continue  if  the  necessary  conse- 
quence be  to  render  the  homes  and  firesides  of  nearly 
half  the  parties  to  it  habitually  and  hopelessly  insecure. 
He  thought  the  fatal  period  had  not  yet  arrived.  But 
agitation  must  cease.  The  freedom  of  speech  and  of 
the  press  must  not  be  exercised  in  the  North  in  dis- 
cussing  the  system  of  slavery,  although  Southerners 
might  everywhere,  North  as  well  as  South,  speak  and 
write  the  most  furious  denunciations  of  all  who  pre- 
ferred a  free  labor  system  for  new  States.  But  the 
President  advised  his  much  injured  slave-holding  friends 
—  who  he  admitted  had  as  yet  never  been  denied  any- 
thing they  demanded  of  the  North,  except  electoral 
votes  in  1860  for  Breckenridge  and  Lane  —  to  give 
Mr.  Lincoln  a  trial.  "  Let  us  wait,"  said  he,  "  for  an 
overt  act "  —  referring  to  a  possible  failure  to  execute 
the  fusfitive  slave  law.  He  said  the  Southern  States 
would  be  "  justified  in  revolutionary  resistance  to  the 
government  of  the  Union  "  unless  the  state  legislatures 
of  the  North  repealed  the  laws  for  the  protection  of 
the  personal  liberty  of  their  own  colored  citizens.^ 

Having  thus  added  fuel  to  the  revolutionary  flames 
by  sustaining  the  Southern  conspirators  in  all  their 
contentions,  and  pleading  guilty  for  the  North  on  each 
count  of  the  secession  indictment,  the  President  gently 

which  their  slaves  guarded  the  Southern  matrons  and  their  children, 
whose  husbands,  sons,  and  fathers  were  absent  in  the  field,  fighting,  as 
they  knew,  for  the  preservation  of  slavery. 

^  These  were  enacted  to  prevent  freemen  from  being  kidnapped  as 
fugitive  slaves,  as  they  could  be  under  the  fugitive  slave  act  of  1850. 


108  THE  SECESSION  WINTER 

remonstrated  with  his  enraged  friends  against  the  form 
of  their  remedy.  He  argued  against  the  technical 
legal  right  of  a  State  to  secede  from  the  Union,  and 
said  that  secession  was  revolution.  "  It  may  or  may 
not  be  a  justifiable  revolution  ;  but  still  it  is  revolu- 
tion." As  the  South  had  long  been  demanding,  with- 
out favorable  results,  the  repeal  by  certain  Northern 
States  of  their  personal  liberty  laws,  before  referred  to, 
and  as  the  President  in  his  message  declared  such  a 
refusal  to  be  a  sufficient  "  justification  for  revolutionary 
resistance  to  the  government  of  the  Union,"  he  left  no 
room  for  doubt  that  he  believed  the  impending  revolu- 
tion entirely  justifiable. 

He  then  proceeded  to  discuss  his  own  responsibility 
in  the  presence  of  the  revolution  against  the  govern- 
ment of  which  he  was  the  executive  head.  Here  he 
closely  followed  the  opinion  of  Judge  Black.  He  said 
that  in  South  Carohna  "  the  whole  machinery  of  the 
Federal  government  necessary  for  the  distribution  of 
remedial  justice  among  the  people  had  been  demolished, 
and  it  would  be  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  replace 
it."  There  being  no  judge  to  issue  a  writ,  and  no 
marshal  to  execute  one,  and  the  local  community  being 
opposed  to  having  any  United  States  courts,  the  sup- 
pression of  the  United  States  authority  seemed  to  him 
complete  and  irremediable.  If  South  Carohna  seceded, 
he  could  not  himself  officially  recognize  her  as  an  inde- 
pendent nation,  without  authority  from  Congress,  but 
he  would  lay  her  case  before  that  body.  He  volun- 
teered the  opinion  to  Congress  that  the  Constitution 
had  not  delegated  to  that  body  the  power  "  to  coerce  a 


PRESERVING  THE  UNION  BY  FORCE         109 

State  into  submission  which  is  attempting  to  withdraw, 
or  has  actually  withdrawn  from  the  confederacy."  He 
said :  — 

Congress  possesses  many  means  of  preserving  it  (the 
Union)  by  conciliation  ;  but  the  sword  was  not  placed  in 
their  hands  to  preserve  it  hy  force. 

He  recommended  a  convention  of  the  States  and  the 
adoption  thereby  of  amendments  to  the  Constitution, 
which  would  be  satisfactory  to  the  847,953  voters  who 
had  at  the  presidential  election  supported  Brecken- 
ridge,  against  the  3,814,217  who  had  voted  for  the 
other  three  candidates,  Lincoln,  Douglas,  and  Bell. 

Mr.  Buchanan  had  no  plan  to  suggest  for  staying 
the  progress  of  the  rebellion,  then  already  on  foot,  but 
an  appeal  to  the  forbearance  of  the  disunionists,  and 
for  the  compliance  of  all  others  with  their  final  de- 
mands. It  never  once  occurred  to  his  mind  that  the 
Union  could  be  preserved  otherwise  than  by  the  con- 
sent of  its  implacable  enemies,  who  had  for  a  genera- 
tion lain  in  wait  for  its  destruction.  Towards  them  he 
never  lost  his  temper.  All  his  frowns  were  reserved 
for  those  by  whose  ballots  they  had  been  politically 
inundated.  If  slavery  should  go  down,  chaos  would 
come  again.  The  usual  surrender  to  the  Southern 
extremists  by  all  who  differed  from  them  seemed  to  him 
too  obvious  a  demand  on  patriotism  to  require  argument. 
The  Union  had  thus  been  saved  in  1820  by  the  admission 
of  Missouri  as  a  slave  State  ;  in  1833  by  repeahng  the 
tariff  act  of  1828,  because  South  Carolina  refused  to 
obey  it ;  and  in  1850  by  the  enactment  of  the  harsh, 


110  THE   SECESSION  WINTER 

despotic,  and  unconstitutional  provisions  of  the  fugitive 
slave  law.  Why  should  any  other  course  be  now 
adopted  ?  Was  not  the  preservation  of  the  Union 
paramount  to  every  other  consideration?  And  since 
persuasion  only  could  be  used  for  that  end,  was  it  not 
plain  that  those  who  wanted  it  dissolved  could  dictate 
their  own  terms  to  those  who  wanted  it  preserved  ? 
Such  seemed  to  be  the  reasoning  of  the  President.^ 

1  Referring  to  this  period  John  Van  Buren  said  :  "  Mr.  Buchanan  in 
the  White  House  was  like  a  bread-and-milk  poultice  drawing  the  rebel- 
lion to  a  head." 


CHAPTER  XV 

The  Southern  Forts.  —  Resignation  of  Cass,  Secretary  of  State.  — 
Secession  Pronunciamento  at  Washington.  —  Secession  of  South 
Carolina.  —  Demand  for  Surrender  of  Fort  Sumter. 

The  secessionists  had  been  the  backbone  of  the  sup- 
port of  Buchanan's  administration.  He  wanted  them 
to  be  satisfied;  but  he  greatly  preferred  that  they 
should  consent  to  remain  in  the  Union  if  allowed  to 
rule  it,  than  to  go  out  and  dissolve  it.  It  cannot  be 
doubted  that  he  had  a  strong  desire  to  preserve  the 
Union  intact,  and  to  transfer  his  of&cial  trust  unim- 
paired to  his  constitutional  successor.  All  that  was  in 
his  nature  to  do  to  that  end  he  did.  He  dreaded  a  colli- 
sion during  his  term,  and  in  seeking  to  avoid  it,  gave 
assurances  to  the  South  CaroHna  representatives  which 
seriously  compromised  him,  and  which,  if  adhered  to, 
would  have  resulted  in  the  unresisted  seizure  of  all  the 
Southern  forts,  including  Fort  Sumter,  and  would  have 
saved  the  insurgents  from  the  fatal  disadvantage  of 
being  compelled  to  fire  the  first  shot  of  the  civil  war. 

When  it  became  apparent  that  the  South  Carolina 
convention,  which  was  to  assemble  December  17, 
would  adopt  an  ordinance  of  secession,  it  became  equally 
apparent  that  this  act  would  be  an  absurd  nulHty  unless 
the  federal  government  could  either  be  at  once  per- 
suaded to  abdicate  its  authority  within  that  State,  or  be 


112  THE  SECESSION  WINTER 

forcibly  expelled  therefrom.  The  nation  would  not  be 
wholly  effaced  from  that  portion  of  its  territory  which 
it  occupied  jointly  with  the  government  of  South  Caro- 
lina, so  long  as  it  held  even  one  of  the  forts  in  Charles- 
ton harbor.  Appreciating  the  potency  of  this  fact,  the 
authorities  of  that  State  desperately  resolved  that  pend- 
ing the  preliminaries  to  secession  the  forts  should  not 
be  reinforced.  They  were  desirous  of  avoiding  any  col- 
lision, but  they  acted  upon  the  theory  that  the  United 
States  and  South  Carolina  were  already  separate  nations, 
and  that  any  attempt  by  the  United  States  to  reinforce 
its  garrisons  at  Charleston  would  be,  not  merely  a  pos- 
sible menace,  concerning  which,  by  the  law  of  nations, 
they  might  demand  an  explanation,  but  an  act  of  war 
which  it  would  be  mere  self-preservation  for  them  to 
resist.  They  did  not  allow  themselves  to  be  at  all 
embarrassed  by  the  fact  that  until  their  State  claimed 
to  be  out  of  the  Union  by  an  act  of  secession,  she  was, 
under  their  own  view  of  State  and  Federal  relations, 
still  a  State  in  the  Union,  and  that  the  United  States 
had,  under  what  they  termed  the  "  compact "  of  the 
Constitution  —  not  yet  dissolved  —  exclusive  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  forts  and  arsenals  within  her  limits. 

Had  the  President  reinforced  those  forts  upon  the 
first  conditional  threat  of  revolt,  made  long  before  the 
presidential  election,  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that 
the  secession  of  even  South  Carolina  would  have  taken 
place.  While  the  number  of  troops  that  could  then 
have  been  sent  would  have  been  few,  as  compared  with 
South  Carolina's  power  to  resist  them,  any  augmenta- 
tion of  the  garrison  would  have  been  a  plain  notice  that 


THE  SOUTHERN  FORTS  113 

the  followers  of  Buchanan,  as  well  as  the  followers  of 
Lincoln,  would  regard  secession  simply  as  a  revolution 
to  be  put  down  by  military  force.  The  people  of  South 
Carolina  had  been  educated  up  to  a  belief  that  seces- 
sion did  not  necessarily  mean  war.  We  have  the  valu- 
able testimony  of  Mr.  Trescott,  that  a  reinforcement  of 
the  forts,  or  any  demonstration  whatever  by  the  United 
States  at  that  time,  was  regarded  by  the  Southern  mem- 
bers of  the  Cabinet  as  dangerous  to  the  Southern  cause. 
When,  at  one  time,  the  President  had  apparently  deter- 
mined in  favor  of  reinforcement,  it  seemed  important 
for  them  to  devise  some  means  of  rendering  it  unneces- 
sary. They  wanted,  as  Mr.  Trescott  said,  time  for  the 
development  of  a  unity  of  purpose  in  all  the  Southern 
States  in  favor  of  disunion  upon  the  advent  of  Mr. 
Lincoln  to  power.^ 

Believing  that  a  premature  explosion  would  be  dis- 
astrous to  the  cause  of  the  Southern  Confederacy,  Mr. 
Trescott  undertook,  and,  with  the  aid  of  three  cabinet 
officers,  carried  out  with  consummate  tact,  the  difficult 
task  of  restraining  both  the  federal  and  state  govern- 
ments from  any  hostile  movement  whatever  prior  to 
secession.  The  three  cabinet  officers  were  Floyd,  Cobb, 
and  Thompson.^ 

The  President's  chief  anxiety  was  for  the  safety  of 
the  forts  until  the  end  of  his  term  of  office,  or  until 
their  surrender  by  Congress.  To  allay  this  anxiety, 
Mr.  Trescott  obtained  from  Governor  Gist  a  written 
assurance,    dated   November   29,  that   if   no   men   or 

^  Crawford's  Genesis  of  the  Civil  War,  page  28. 
2  Ibid.,  page  27. 


114  THE   SECESSION  WINTER 

munitions  of  war  were  sent  to  the  forts,  "the  state 
authorities  had  no  desire  to  attack  them  "  before  the 
passage  of  the  ordinance  of  secession,  and  not  then 
unless  compelled  to  do  so  by  the  refusal  of  the  Presi- 
dent to  surrender  them  to  the  seceded  State !  ^ 

This  communication  was  shown  to  the  President  on 
Sunday  evening,  December  2,  and  he  was  at  the  same 
time  assured  by  Mr.  Trescott  that  the  people  of  South 
Carolina  would  take  especial  pride  in  being  allowed  to 
dissolve  the  Union  peaceably,  and  that  it  would  mortify 
them  to  be  compelled  to  resort  to  force.  They  would 
pass  the  ordinance  of  secession,  said  the  Assistant  Sec- 
retary of  State,  and  then  send  regularly  accredited 
agents  to  negotiate  with  the  government.  The  Presi- 
dent said  he  could  not  himself  recognize  them ;  he 
could  only  refer  them  to  Congress.  Mr.  Trescott  told 
him  that  he  believed  "  such  a  reference,  courteously 
made  and  in  good  faith,  would  be  accepted,  and  that 
the  State  would  wait  a  reasonable  time  for  the  decision 
of  Cono-ress."  With  this  the  President  seemed  satis- 
fied,  but  still,  testifies  Mr.  Trescott,  "he  was  very 
cautious,  and  his  great  hope  seemed  to  be,  by  temporiz- 
ing, to  avoid  an  issue  before  the  4th  of  March."  ^ 

At  the  President's  request,  Mr.  Trescott  started  for 
South  Carolina  the  next  morning,  taking  with  him,  as  a 
peace-offering  to  the  South  Carolina  governor,  a  copy 
of  the  message  which  was  to  be  transmitted  that  day  to 
Congress.  He  was  to  "  explain  in  Columbia  what 
might  not  be  understood  there."  ^ 

^  Genesis  of  the  Civil  War,  page  31. 

^  Ibid.,  page  34.  ^  Ibid.,  page  33, 


RESIGNATION  OF  SECRETARY  CASS  115 

Governor  Gist's  reply  to  the  President  was  that  the 
State  would  under  no  circumstances  delay  secession 
until  March  4,  and  he  declared,  as  an  ultimatum,  that 
the  concession  of  the  right  of  secession  could  alone  pre- 
vent a  resort  to  force. 

On  the  8th  of  December,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
Cobb  resigned,  and  on  the  same  day  members  of  Con- 
gress from  South  Carolina  waited  upon  the  President 
to  arrange  with  him  that  the  "  relative  military  status" 
of  that  State  and  the  United  States  should  remain 
unchanged  until  after  an  offer  should  be  made  by  the 
State  to  negotiate  for  an  amicable  arrangement  between 
the  two  governments.  In  return  for  this  the  Congress- 
men would  say  they  did  not  believe  the  forts  would  be 
taken  in  the  face  of  such  an  agreement. 

The  extent  to  which  the  President  entered  into  this 
proposed  arrangement  became  afterwards  the  subject  of 
high  discussion,  and  brought  on  a  crisis  in  the  Cabinet, 
which  compelled  him  to  choose  at  last  whether  the 
Union  or  the  Secession  members  should  leave  it. 

On  the  10th  of  December  Mr.  Trescott  tendered  his 
resignation  as  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  to  General 
Cass,  who  persuaded  him  to  temporarily  continue  in 
office.  The  next  day  General  Cass  himself  resigned 
because  the  President  refused  to  reinforce  the  Charles- 
ton garrisons,  in  accordance  with  his  advice.  Mr. 
Trescott  says  in  his  narrative  that  "  the  refusal  to  adopt 
the  advice  of  General  Cass  was  in  the  interest  of  the 
State  "  (South  Carolina),  and  that  "  under  the  circum- 
stances "  he  felt  bound  "  to  save  the  President  the 
embarrassment  of  being  without  either  a  Secretary  or 
Assistant  Secretary." 


116  THE  SECESSION  WINTER 

•  To  accommodate  the  President,  therefore,  who  had 
thus  protected  the  interests  of  South  CaroUna,  even  to 
the  driving  of  General  Cass  out  of  the  Cabinet,  Mr. 
Trescott  acted  as  Secretary  of  State  until  Judge  Black 
came  in,  December  17,  and  as  Assistant  Secretary 
under  Black  until  the  20th.  The  President  then  parted 
with  Mr.  Trescott,  —  the  latter  said,  reluctantly,  —  but 
thought  it  was  due  to  him  to  make  an  appointment  of 
a  successor  as  soon  as  possible,  and  had  promised  him 
that  it  should  certainly  be  done  before  the  Convention 
of  South  Carolina  had  taken  any  action.^  Mr.  Trescott 
had  been  requested  by  Governor  Gist  to  act  as  the  con- 
fidential Washington  agent  of  the  Executive  Depart- 
ment of  South  CaroHna,  when  his  duty  to  the  federal 
government  should  cease.^  His  duty  to  the  federal 
government  would,  in  his  view,  necessarily  terminate 
when,  by  the  secession  of  his  State,  he  should  cease  to 
be  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  and  become,  there- 
fore, inehgible  longer  to  hold  of6.ce  therein.  The 
President's  delicate  perceptions  taught  him  how  embar- 
rassing it  would  be  to  a  newly  made  alien  to  remain  in 
the  foreign  of&ce  of  a  government  with  which  his  own 
was,  with  his  approval  and  active  support,  preparing  for 
war ;  hence  his  assurance  that  he  would  reheve  Mr. 
Trescott  before  his  State  actually  seceded,  —  not,  as  it 
appeared,  because  of  solicitude  for  the  interest  of  the 
government  of  which  he  was  the  head,  but  because 
it  was  due  to  the  South  Carolinian,  who  would  nat- 
urally be  impatient  to  enter  exclusively  into  his  new 
service. 

^  Genesis  of  the  Civil  War,  page  38.  ^  Ibid.,  page  32. 


SECESSION  PRONUNCIAMENTO  117 

Mr.  Trescott's  official  duty  to  the  federal  government 
ceased  on  the  very  day  his  State  seceded,  and  from 
being  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United 
States,  he  instantly  became  vu-tually  the  Minister  resi- 
dent of  the  pseudo  nation  of  South  Carolina  at  Wash- 
ington. His  position  had,  up  to  that  time,  been  a  most 
difficult  one.  He  had  been  serving  two  masters  whose 
interests  were  so  diametrically  opposed  to  each  other 
that  war  between  them  was  a  question  of  days  only, 
unless  the  federal  government  would  consent  to  the 
peaceable  dismemberment  of  the  Union.  He  had,  by 
his  own  confession,  stayed  the  hand  of  the  President, 
when  reinforcement  of  the  forts  in  Charleston  harbor 
would  have  imperiled  the  disunion  cause  by  provoking 
collision  too  soon,  and  by  losing  to  that  cause  the 
advantage  of  the  continued  control  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment under  Floyd.  It  must  have  been  a  great  relief 
to  him  when  the  secession  of  his  State  compelled  Judge 
Black  to  take  notice  of  his  resignation,  which  had  been 
in  the  State  Department  for  ten  days. 

On  the  14:th  of  December,  while  a  House  Committee 
was  considering  plans  for  a  compromise  to  appease  the 
South,  and  when  none  had  been  rejected,  the  "  Consti- 
tution "  newspaper,  the  administration  organ  at  Wash- 
ington, published  a  pronunciamento,  signed  by  seven 
Senators  and  twenty-three  Representatives  in  Congress 
from  the  Southern  States,  and  addressed  to  then*  con- 
stituents, in  which  they  declared  that  all  hope  of  the 
Union  was  extinguished,  proclaimed  their  conviction 
that  the  honor,  safety,  and  independence  of  the  South- 
ern people  required  the  organization  of  the  Southern 


118  THE  SECESSION  WINTER 

Confederacy,  and  urged  the  separate  secession  of  their 
respective  States. 

The  same  issue  of  the  "  Constitution  "  also  contained 
a  proclamation  by  the  President  for  a  day  of  humilia- 
tion, fasting,  and  prayer,  on  which  the  people  were 
exhorted  "  to  implore  the  Most  High  to  remove  from 
their  hearts  that  false  pride  of  opinion  which  would 
impel  them  to  persevere  in  wrong  for  the  sake  of  con- 
sistency, rather  than  yield  a  just  submission  to  the 
unforeseen  exigencies  by  which  they  were  surrounded." 
Of  course  only  the  recalcitrant  and  contumacious  people 
of  the  North  were  here  referred  to,  as  he  had  before 
said  they  only  were  in  the  wrong. 

It  was  about  this  time  that  Secretary  of  the  Interior 
Thompson,  still  a  member  of  the  Cabinet,  was  appointed 
a  commissioner  by  the  State  of  Mississippi  to  visit 
North  Carolina  and  urge  her  to  secede.  He  accepted 
the  honor,  went  on  his  mission,  and  was  given  a 
public  reception  by  the  legislature.  He  then  returned 
and  resumed  his  duties  in  the  Cabinet  of  the  govern- 
ment against  which  he  had  been  thus  publicly  inciting 
insurrection. 

On  the  17th  of  December,  on  which  day  Judge 
Black  was  appointed  Secretary  of  State,  the  secession 
convention  assembled  in  South  Carolina.  On  the  day 
following,  the  President  dispatched  Caleb  Cushing  to 
Columbia,  the  capital  of  that  State,  to  persuade  the 
secessionists  not  to  secede.  His  departure  was  so  timed 
that  he  was  not  likely  to  arrive  before  the  ordinance  of 
secession  had  been  passed ;  but  owing  to  the  presence 
of  a  contagious  disease  in  that  city  the  work  was  unex- 


SECESSION  OF  SOUTH  CAROLINA  119 

pectedly  retarded  for  a  whole  day  by  the  enforced 
removal  of  the  convention  to  Charleston,  and  the  ordi- 
nance was  not  passed  until  near  noon  on  December  20, 
the  day  of  his  arrival.  He  enjoyed  the  distinction  of 
being  invited  by  a  joint  committee  of  the  legislature 
to  attend  and  represent  the  government  of  the  Union 
at  a  pubHc  celebration  of  its  dissolution,  which  honor 
he  decHned.^ 

On  the  same  day  a  messenger  arrived  in  Washington 
with  a  letter  for  the  President  from  F.  W.  Pickens,  the 
new  governor  of  South  CaroHna,  dated  on  the  day  of 
his  inauguration,  December  17,  urging  that  all  work  of 
repairs  on  the  forts  be  suspended,  and  requesting  that 
Fort  Sumter  be  turned  over  to  him  for  safe  keeping. 
This  he  thought  "  could  be  done  with  perfect  pro- 
priety," as  "  the  Convention "  of  the  State  was  then 
"  in  full  authority."  Unless  these  demands  were  com- 
plied with,  he  said,  he  could  not  answer  for  the 
consequences.^  The  messenger  was  presented  to  the 
President  by  Mr.  Trescott,  who  had,  as  we  have  seen, 
on  that  very  day  passed  from  the  employ  of  the  federal 
government  into  that  of  South  CaroHna.  He  was 
promised  an  answer  on  the  next  day,  and  one  was  pre- 
pared in  which  Mr.  Buchanan  said  he  had  thus  far 
decHned  to  reinforce  the  forts,  "  relying  upon  the  honor 
of  the  South  Carolinians  that  they  would  not  be 
assaulted  "  while  they  remained  as  they  were,  but  that 
commissioners  would  first  be  sent  by  the  convention 
"to   treat   with    Congress   on   the  subject."     He  dis- 

1  Genesis  of  the  Civil  War,  page  88. 

2  Ibid.,  page  81. 


120  THE  SECESSION  WINTER 

claimed  the  power,  which,  however,  he  asserted  that 
Congress  possessed,  to  treat  with  insurgent  citizens  for 
the  dismemberment  of  the  Republic.^ 

Mr.  Trescott  saw  that  Governor  Pickens's  demand 
would,  if  the  President  chose,  operate  as  a  release  from 
the  understanding  already  had  with  South  Carolina 
representatives  concerning  the  forts,  and  terminate  the 
truce  thereby  established.  He  at  once  consulted  with 
some  of  these  representatives,  and  the  result  was  that 
the  governor  was  telegraphed  to  for  a  withdrawal  of 
his  ill-timed  letter,  which  was  immediately  sent.^ 

Such  is  the  story  of  the  most  important  of  the  events 
which  were  crowded  into  the  period  between  the  elec- 
tion of  Mr.  Lincoln,  November  6,  and  the  20th  of 
December,  1860,  on  which  day  South  Carolina  declared 
the  Union  dissolved.  On  this  latter  date  Edwin  M. 
Stanton  was  appointed  Attorney-General  in  place  of 
J.  S.  Black,  appointed  Secretary  of  State.  Stanton  did 
not  enter  actively  upon  the  duties  of  his  office  until 
the  27th. 

1  Curtis's  Life  of  Buchanan,  vol.  ii.  p.  384. 
^  Genesis  of  the  Civil  War,  page  84. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

Stanton  accepts  Appointment.  —  Judge  Black's  Influence  in  the 
Matter.  —  Why  exercised.  —  His  New  Attitude.  —  Perils  of  the 
Administration. 

That  the  appointment  of  Mr.  Stanton  was  mainly 
due  to  the  recommendation  of  Judge  Black  there  can 
be  no  doubt.  The  two  lawyers  had  long  been  close 
friends,  and  possessed  each  the  confidence  of  the  other 
to  an  unlimited  degree. 

At  the  time  of  Mr.  Stanton's  appointment,  December 
20,  Judge  Black  had  reconsidered  the  views  expressed 
in  his  opinion  of  thirty  days  before  ^  and  had  notified 
the  President  accordingly.  He  no  longer  believed,  as 
therein  laid  down,  that  in  a  civil  war  the  government 
was  powerless  to  open  its  purse  or  to  draw  its  sword. 
He  no  longer  denied  the  power  of  Congress  to  provide 
for  suppressing  insurrections  against  the  United  States, 
otherwise  than  by  judicial  process.  He  did  not  place 
himself  on  the  public  record  by  a  formal  opinion,  re- 
versing the  one  he  had  rendered,  but  he  furnished  the 
President  with  a  written  "  memorandum  for  his  private 
use."  This  was  "  early  in  December ;"  the  exact  date 
is  not  given.  This  private  "  memorandum  "  contained 
the  following  words  :  — 

The  Union  is  necessarily  perpetual.     No  State  can  law- 
fully withdraw  or  be  expelled  from  it.     The  federal  consti- 
1  See  chapter  xiii. 


122  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S   CABINET 

tution  is  as  much  a  part  of  the  constitution  of  every  State  as 
if  it  had  been  textually  inserted  therein.  The  federal  gov- 
ernment is  sovereign  within  its  own  sphere,  and  acts  directly 
upon  the  individual  citizens  of  every  State.  Within  these 
limits  its  coercive  power  is  ample  to  defend  itself,  its  laws, 
and  its  property.  It  can  suppress  insurrections,  fight  battles, 
conquer  armies,  disperse  hostile  combinations,  and  punish  any 
or  all  of  its  enemies.  It  can  meet,  repel,  and  subdue  all  those 
who  rise  against  it. 

A  copy  of  this  brief  but  important  document  was 
furnished  by  Judge  Black  to  Col.  Frank  A.  Burr  more 
than  twenty  years  later,  with  the  information  that  it  was 
a  copy  of  a  "  memorandum  "  which  he  gave  to  the  Presi- 
dent for  his  private  use  "  early  in  December,"  1860.^ 

This  same  document  appears  in  the  speeches  and 
essays  of  Judge  Black,  collected  after  his  death  by  his 
son,  Chauncey  F.  Black.  It  forms  no  portion  of  the 
opinion  of  Attorney-General  Black  of  November  20, 
1860.  It  is,  on  the  contrary,  in  direct  conflict  with 
that  opinion. 

When  Judge  Black  said,  therefore,  in  1870,  that  he 
urged  the  appointment  of  Mr.  Stanton  as  Attorney- 
General,  December  20,  1860,  because  he  knew  that  they 
were  "  in  perfect  accord  on  all  questions,  whether  of  law 
or  policy,"  ^  he  could  only  have  meant  that  they  were 
agreed  on  the  views  of  his  "  memorandum  "  of  "  early 
in  December,"  and  not  on  those  of  his  opinion  of 
November  20,  which  the  former  contradicted  and  re- 
tracted. 

^  It  was  printed  with  this  statement,  in  an  interview  had  with  Judge 
Black  in  his  own  house,  occupying  six  columns  of  the  Philadelphia  Press 
of  August  7,  1881. 

2  Black's  Speeches  and  Essays,  page  269. 


JUDGE  BLACK'S  INFLUENCE  123 

Judge  Black  asserted  in  a  letter  addressed  to  Senator 
Wilson  of  Massachusetts,  in  1870,  and  published  in  the 
"  Galaxy  Magazine,"  that  Mr.  Stanton  indorsed  his 
opinion  of  November  20,  1860,  "in  extravagant  terms 
of  approbation,  and  adhered  steadily  to  the  doctrines  of 
the  annual  message."  If  this  were  true,  it  would  not 
abate  one  jot  the  heretical  character  of  those  documents. 
But  how  can  it  be  true  when  eleven  years  later,  — 
1881,  —  we  are  furnished  by  Judge  Black  himself  with 
a  copy  of  a  "  memorandum "  in  which  he  privately 
recanted,  "  early  in  December,"  1860,  the  odious  doc- 
trines of  his  opinion  of  the  preceding  month,  and  after- 
wards urged  the  appointment  of  Mr.  Stanton,  because 
they  were  then  fully  agreed  on  all  questions  of  law  ? 

However  "early  in  December"  Judge  Black  had  seen 
fit  to  thus  privately  warn  the  President  to  disregard  the 
official  advice  of  his  November  opinion,  he  was  too  late. 
The  President's  annual  message  had  already  gone  forth, 
laden  with  comfort  for  the  rising  revolt,  and  had  been 
like  a  victory  of  arms  for  the  nation's  enemies.  He  la- 
bored hard  in  his  special  message  of  January  8  to  explain 
away  its  odious  doctrines  by  saying  that  he  had  "  no 
right  to  make  aggressive  war  upon  any  State."  Judge 
Black,  in  the  "  Press  "  interview,  called  attention  to  this 
passage.  He  was  unable,  however,  to  show  his  chief 
how  to  carry  on  even  a  defensive  war  without  the  sword, 
the  use  of  which,  for  such  a  purpose,  both  had  a  few 
weeks  before  pubhcly  and  officially  declared  was  not 
authorized  by  the  Constitution,  except  to  aid  in  the 
execution  of  judicial  process.  President  Buchanan's 
annual  message  of  December,  1860,  and  Attorney-Gen- 


124  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S   CABINET 

eral  Black's  opinion  of  November  20  of  tliat  year 
must  stand  in  history ;  and  later  utterances,  entirely 
patriotic,  and  consequently  at  variance  with  them,  do 
not  change  their  character. 

The  only  rational  explanation  that  can  be  made  of 
them,  consistent  with  the  patriotism  of  their  authors,  is 
that  neither  had  been  able  at  that  time  to  break  away 
from  the  influence  of  party  spirit,  or  to  realize  the  deadly 
earnestness  of  their  Southern  political  associates.  They 
seemed  to  have  calculated  upon  saving  the  Union  by 
the  old  method  of  Northern  compliance  with  Southern 
demands,  and  to  have  relied  upon  securing  that  com- 
pliance by  specious  arguments  against  the  power  of  the 
federal  government  to  maintain  its  authority  in  any 
State  which  declared  itself  out  of  the  Union.  They 
probably  never  contemplated  the  thought  of  consenting 
to  disunion.  They  doubtless  supposed  at  first  that  their 
Southern  Democratic  friends  would,  as  they  had  done 
before,  name  some  terms  upon  which  they  would  aban- 
don their  disunion  scheme,  and  that  these  would  be 
eagerly  assented  to  at  the  North. 

When  Mr.  Stanton  entered  Mr.  Buchanan's  Cabinet, 
the  question  with  the  President  and  Judge  Black  was 
not  how  fully  he  would  adopt  the  positions  they  had 
taken,  but  how  well  he  could  aid  them  in  the  retreat 
from  the  dangers  upon  which  they  were  running.  The 
secessionists  had  not  heeded  the  entreaties  of  the  Pre- 
sident to  continue  their  old  alliance  with  him  and  his 
pohtical  associates  within  the  Union,  but,  on  the  con- 
trary, had  left  him  and  them  to  take  care  of  themselves 
in  the  rapid  march  of  events.     The  mighty  passion  of 


JUDGE  BLACK'S  INFLUENCE  125 

a  great  People,  threatened  -with  the  destruction  of  their 
nationality,  was  about  to  be  unloosed,  and  the  President 
and  his  favorite  cabinet  minister,  whose  attitude  had 
thus  far  given  comfort  and  encouragement  only  to  their 
enemies,  were  environed  by  many  perils.  They  did  not 
now  so  much  need  a  courtier,  who  would  say  that  they 
had  done  well,  as  a  bold  and  resolute  pilot,  who  could, 
by  wearing  ship,  save  the  administration  from  total 
wreck. 

Judge  Black  refused  to  accept  the  office  of  Secretary 
of  State,  as  successor  to  General  Cass,  unless  Mr.  Stanton 
should  succeed  him  as  Attorney-General.  It  is  evident 
in  the  light  of  history  that  he  wanted  him  there  to  aid 
in  saving  the  administration  from  the  possible  conse- 
quences of  his  own  advice,  —  consequences  he  had  not 
sufficiently  considered  when  that  advice  was  given. 

The  withdrawal  of  Senators  and  members  of  cot- 
ton States  would  leave  the  impeachment  power  in  the 
hands  of  Union  men,  who  might  call  the  President  to 
account  for  virtually  licensing  the  rebelKon  by  a  pro- 
clamation of  safety  to  its  authors,  and  allowing  the  forts 
to  remain  weak  while  the  enemy  grew  strong.  The 
President's  attitude  had  been  doctrinally  the  same  as 
that  of  his  Attorney-General,  but,  unlike  the  latter,  he 
had  to  apply  it  by  official  acts  or  omissions.  They  had 
agreed  that  while  war  with  States  would  be  unconstitu- 
tional, it  was  entirely  constitutional  to  defend  the  forts, 
if  done  without  a  resort  to  war ;  but  then  war  was  sure 
to  be  the  inevitable  consequence  of  defending  the  forts. 
He  was  therefore  running  dangerously  near  the  Scylla 
of  impeachment  by  leaving  the  forts  exposed  to  capture, 


126  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S   CABINET 

to  avoid  the  Charybdis  of  a  civil  war  which  seemed  in- 
volved in  then-  defense,  and  which  could  only  be  carried 
on,  as  he  maintained,  over  a  violated  Constitution. 

The  Attorney-General  was  in  less  peril.  While  he 
had  advised  the  President  that  he  must  avoid  war  or  be 
a  usurper,  he  had  nevertheless  constantly  put  himself  on 
record  as  insisting  upon  the  reinforcement  of  the  forts, 
although  that  would,  in  fact,  have  been  the  beginning 
of  a  war.  Thus  the  President  was  impaled  upon  the 
opinion  of  Judge  Black.  He  was  called  upon  to  prac- 
tice what  his  adviser  had  only  to  teach.  He  could 
finally  act  only  on  one  side ;  but  whichever  side  that 
might  be,  it  coidd  be  shown,  if  it  resulted  disastrously, 
that  his  action  was  against  the  advice  of  his  Attorney- 
General. 

What  new  pitfalls  might  be  dug  into  which  the  Presi- 
dent would  allow  himself  to  be  led,  who  could  foresee  ? 
Certain  it  is  that  in  the  dangers  of  the  time.  Judge 
Black  chose  to  have  Stanton  as  a  fellow  counselor.  At 
the  threshold  of  the  latter' s  service  in  the  Cabinet,  they 
both  found  themselves,  with  Judge  Holt,  engaged  in 
rescuing  the  country  from  immediate  peril,  and  the 
President  from  final  ruin  and  disgrace. 


CHAPTER  XVn 

The  South  Carolina  Commissioners.  —  Anderson's  Movement  at 
Charleston.  —  Jefferson  Davis  urges  the  President  to  surrender 
Fort  Sumter.  —  Submission  of  the  Question  to  the  Cabinet. 

Judge  Black  continued  to  act  as  Attorney-General 
until  and  including  December  26,  although  he  took 
office  as  Secretary  of  State  on  the  20th  of  that  month. 
The  President  and  his  new  Secretary  of  State  were  to- 
gether on  the  26th,  when  the  latter's  immediate  prede- 
cessor, Mr.  Trescott,  then  the  agent  of  South  Carolina, 
presented  himself  and  announced  the  arrival  at  the 
federal  capital  of  the  commissioners  from  that  State. 
They  had  come,  as  stated  in  their  credentials,  to  treat 
with  the  United  States  government  for  the  delivery 
to  their  own  nationality  of  the  forts  which  had  been 
erected  within  its  borders  by  the  former,  the  money 
value  of  which  they  were  authorized  to  recognize,  and 
account  for  in  the  division  which  it  was  assumed  would 
now  be  made  of  the  public  property.  One  o'clock  of 
the  following  day  was  designated  by  the  President  as 
the  hour  at  which  he  would  receive  them. 

On  the  next  morning,  however,  news  came  which 
caused  this  appointment  to  be  canceled.  Major  An- 
derson, in  command  of  the  garrisons  in  Charleston  har- 
bor, had  spiked  the  guns  of  Fort  Moultrie  during 
the  night,  and  transferred  his  troops  to  Fort  Sumter, 


128  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S   CABINET 

from  which  he  could  better  resist  a  rebel  attack.  This 
information  came  first  to  the  Southern  leaders  in  Wash- 
ington, the  Southern  telegraph  lines  being  under  seces- 
sion control.  Senator  Wigfall  made  it  known  to  Mr. 
Trescott  and  the  South  Carolina  commissioners  at  the 
residence  of  the  latter.^ 

Secretary  Floyd  first  heard  it  during  an  early  morn- 
ing call  upon  them.  He  refused  to  believe  it,  and  said 
to  Mr.  Trescott :  — 

It  would  not  only  be  without  orders,  but  in  the  face  of 
orders.  To  be  very  frank,  Anderson  was  instructed  in  case 
he  had  to  abandon  his  position  to  dismantle  Fort  Sumter. 

Telegrams  to  one  of  the  commissioners  speedily  re- 
moved all  doubt,  and  Mr.  Trescott  says  he  then  drove  at 
once  to  the  Capitol,  gave  the  news  to  Jefferson  Davis 
and  Senator  Hunter,  and  asked  them  to  go  with  him  to 
the  President,  which  they  did.  In  his  narrative,^  he 
gives  the  following  interesting  account  of  the  interview : 

We  drove  to  the  White  House,  sent  in  our  names,  and 
were  asked  into  the  President's  room,  where  he  joined  us  in 
a  few  moments.  When  he  came  in  he  was  evidently  ner- 
vous, and  immediately  commenced  the  conversation  by  mak- 
ing some  remark  to  Mr.  Hunter,  concerning  the  removal  of 
the  consul  at  Liverpool,  to  which  Mr.  Hunter  made  a  general 
reply.  Colonel  Davis  then  said :  "  Mr.  President,  we  have 
called  upon  an  infinitely  graver  matter  than  any  consulate." 
"  What  is  it  ?  "  said  the  President.  "  Have  you  received  any 
intelligence  from  Charleston  in  the  last  few  hours  ? "  asked 
Colonel  Davis.  "  None,"  said  the  President.  "  Then,"  said 
Colonel  Davis,  "  I  have  a  great  calamity  to  announce  to  you." 
^  Genesis  of  the  Civil  War,  page  143.  ^  Ibid. 


ANDERSON'S  MOVEMENT  AT  CHARLESTON    129 

He  then  stated  the  facts,  and  added :  "  And  now,  Mr.  Pre- 
sident, you  are  surrounded  with  blood  and  dishonor  on  all 
sides."  He  sat  down  as  Colonel  Davis  finished,  and  ex- 
claimed :  "  My  God,  are  calamities  (or  misfortunes,  I  forget 
which)  never  to  come  singly?  I  call  God  to  witness,  you 
gentlemen,  better  than  anybody,  know  that  it  is  not  only 
without  but  against  my  orders.  It  is  against  my  policy." 
He  then  expressed  his  doubt  of  the  truth  of  the  telegram  ; 
thought  it  strange  that  nothing  had  been  heard  at  the  War 
Department ;  said  that  he  had  not  seen  Governor  Floyd,  and 
finally  sent  a  messenger  for  him.  When  Governor  Floyd 
came,  he  said  that  no  news  had  come  to  the  department; 
that  the  heads  of  the  bureaus  there  thought  it  unlikely,  but 
that  he  had  telegraphed  to  Major  Anderson. 

Mr.  Trescott's  narrative  thus  continues  :  — 

The  President  was  urged  to  take  immediate  action  ;  he 
was  told  that  the  probability  was  that  the  remaining  forts 
and  the  arsenal  would  be  seized  and  garrisoned  by  South 
Carolina,  and  that  Fort  Sumter  would  be  attacked ;  that  if 
he  would  only  say  that  he  would  replace  matters  as  he  had 
pledged  himself  that  they  should  remain,  there  was  yet  time 
to  remedy  the  mischief.  The  discussion  was  long  and  ear- 
nest. At  first  he  seemed  disposed  to  declare  that  he  would 
restore  the  status,  then  hesitated ;  said  he  must  call  his  Cab- 
inet together ;  he  could  not  condemn  Major  Anderson  un- 
heard. He  was  told  that  nobody  asked  that ;  only  that  if 
the  move  had  been  made  without  a  previous  attack  on  Ander- 
son, he  would  restore  the  status,  assure  us  of  that  determina- 
tion, and  then  take  what  time  was  necessary  for  consultation 
and  information.  That  resolution  telegraphed  would  restore 
confidence  and  enable  the  commissioners  to  continue  their 
negotiations.  This  he  declined  doing,  and  after  adjourning 
his  appointment  to  receive  the  commissioners  until  the  next 
day,  we  left. 


130  STANTON  EST  BUCHANAN'S  CABINET 

Mr.  Jefferson  Davis  gives  the  following  account  of 
this  interview :  — 

After  the  removal  of  the  garrison  to  the  stronger  and 
safer  position  of  Fort  Sumter,  I  called  upon  him  again  to 
represent  from  my  knowledge  of  the  people  and  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case,  how  productive  the  movement  would  be 
of  discontent,  and  how  likely  to  lead  to  collision.  .  .  .  My 
opinion  was  that  the  wisest  and  best  course  would  be  to  with- 
draw the  garrisons  altogether  from  the  harbor  of  Charleston. 

The  President's  objection  to  this  was  that  it  was  his 
bounden  duty  to  preserve  and  protect  the  property  of  the 
United  States.  To  this  I  replied,  with  all  the  earnestness 
the  occasion  demanded,  that  I  would  pledge  my  life,  that  if 
an  inventory  were  taken  of  all  the  stores  and  munitions  in 
the  fort,  and  an  ordnance  sergeant  with  a  few  men  left  in 
charge  of  them,  they  would  not  be  disturbed.  As  a  further 
guarantee  I  offered  to  obtain  from  the  governor  of  South 
Carolina  full  assurance  that  in  case  any  marauders  or  lawless 
combinations  of  persons  should  attempt  to  seize  or  disturb 
the  property,  he  would  send  them  from  the  citadel  of  Charles- 
ton an  adequate  guard  to  protect  it,  and  to  secure  its  keepers 
against  molestation. 

The  President  promised  me  to  reflect  upon  this  proposi- 
tion, and  to  confer  with  his  Cabinet  upon  the  propriety  of 
adopting  it.  All  cabinet  consultations  are  secret ;  which  is 
equivalent  to  say  that  I  never  knew  what  occurred  in  that 
meeting  to  which  my  proposition  was  submitted.  The  result 
was  not  communicated  to  me,  but  the  events  which  followed 
proved  that  the  suggestion  was  not  adopted.^ 

^  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,  vol.  i.  p.  215. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

The  Cabinet  Crisis,  —  Anderson's  Instructions.  —  Buchanan's 
Pledge  to  South  Carolina.  —  Floyd's  Demand.  —  The  President's 
Irresolution. 

The  Cabinet  was  at  once  convened  to  deal  with  the 
new  situation.  It  was  the  first  cabinet  meeting  at- 
tended by  Mr.  Stanton.  Floyd  commenced  the  discus- 
sion by  loudly  echoing  the  complaints  of  Mr.  Jefferson 
Davis  and  the  South  Carolina  commissioners.  He 
assailed  the  action  of  Major  Anderson  vehemently, 
asserting  that  his  instructions  contained  nothing  which 
could  justify  his  removal  to  Fort  Sumter,  and  charging 
that  the  movement  was  a  violation  of  pledges  made  by 
the  government.  He  angrily  demanded  its  immediate 
disavowal  by  the  President,  and  the  withdrawal  of  the 
garrison. 

The  first  question  discussed,  therefore,  was  whether 
Anderson  had  acted  under,  or  in  violation  of  his  orders. 
The  President  was  inclined  to  agree  with  Floyd.^  The 
instructions  were  sent  for  and  found  to  be  a  "  memo- 
randum "  by  an  army  officer,  of  "  verbal "  instructions, 
sent  through  him  to  Major  Anderson  by  the  Secretary 
of  War,  under  the  following  circumstances :  — 

From  the  time  Major  Anderson  took  command  at 
Fort  Sumter,  under  an  order  of  November  15,  1860, 
1  Black's  Speeches  and  Essays,  page  12. 


132  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S   CABINET 

he  was  constantly  brouglit  face  to  face  with  the  avowed 
determination  of  the  South  Carolina  authorities  to  seize 
all  forts  as  soon  as  secession  should  fail  of  recognition 
by  Congress.  It  was  made  equally  plain  that  they 
would  be  seized  before  that  time  if  the  least  suspicion 
should  be  aroused  that  the  task  would  be  made  more 
difficult  by  delay.  He  therefore  urged  the  War  De- 
partment to  allow  him  to  occupy  the  strong  position  of 
Fort  Sumter,  which  commanded  all  the  other  mihtary 
works  and  the  harbor,  before  it  should  fall  into  the 
hands  of  the  enemy.  His  importunity  for  instructions 
of  some  sort  finally  compelled  enough  attention  to  cause 
some  conversation  in  the  Cabinet  upon  the  subject  of 
his  perilous  situation.  This  resulted  in  leaving  every- 
thing to  the  discretion  of  the  Secretary  of  War.  Floyd, 
thus  compelled  to  make  some  show  of  action,  sum- 
moned Major  D.  C.  Buell,  of  the  adjutant-general's 
office,  and  sent  him  to  South  CaroHna  with  verbal  in- 
structions to  Anderson  on  the  7th  of  December.  These 
instructions  were  of  the  most  general  character.  He 
was  to  communicate  to  Major  Anderson  the  general 
policy  of  the  government,  which  was  to  avoid  a  colli- 
sion with  the  state  authorities.  He  was  to  do  nothing 
that  could  offend  them  or  provoke  aggression  by  them. 
If  they  should  attack  he  might  defend.  This  was  aU. 
Not  a  word  did  Floyd  put  in  writing,  or  direct  it  to  be 
done  by  Buell.  But  after  the  latter  had  delivered  his 
verbal  message  he  told  Anderson  that  he  thought  it 
was  due  to  him  that  he  should  have  it  in  writing,  and 
accordingly  put  on  paper  what  he  considered  to  be  its 
proper  interpretation,  in  view  of  the  situation.     This 


ANDERSON'S  INSTRUCTIONS  133 

paper  he  entitled  "  Memorandum  of  verbal  instructions 
to  Major  Anderson."  In  it  he  conveyed  all  the  desired 
precautions  against  aggressive  movements,  and,  as  the 
sequel  proved,  much  more  than  Floyd  desired  as  to 
defensive  action ;  Anderson  was  instructed  not  only  to 
defend  if  attacked,  but  he  might  regard  any  attempt 
to  take  either  of  the  forts  as  an  act  of  hostility,  and 
thereupon  might  put  his  command  into  the  stronger 
fort;  but  more  than  this,  he  need  not  wait  for  the  overt 
act,  after  which  defense  would  probably  be  useless ;  he 
might  anticipate  the  action,  if  convinced  of  the  inten- 
tion.    The  words  were  :  — 

You  are  also  authorized  to  take  similar  steps  whenever 
you  have  tangible  evidence  of  a  design  to  proceed  to  a  hostile 
act. 

Major  Buell's  report  of  this  mission  to  Charleston 
was  oral,  but  he  delivered  a  copy  of  his  "  memorandum," 
which  was  dated  December  11,  to  a  clerk  in  the  War 
Department.  It  remained  there  unnoticed  until  the 
secession  of  South  Carolina  was  announced  in  the  press 
of  the  21st.  The  President  then  called  upon  the  Sec- 
retary of  War  for  a  report,  and  was  furnished  with  a 
copy  of  Buell's  memorandum,  to  which  the  Secretary 
then  appended,  over  his  signature,  these  words :  — 

This  is  in  conformity  to  my  instructions  to  Major  Buell. 

So  much  for  the  written  instructions.  They  placed 
upon  Major  Anderson  the  entire  responsibility  of  decid- 
ing as  to  the  tangibility  of  the  evidence  he  might  have 
of  an  intended  attack  upon  him.  Major  Buell  said,  in 
after   years,  that  the  impression   produced   upon    his 


134  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S  CABINET 

mind  was  that  any  committal  to  writing  was  purposely 
avoided  by  the  Secretary.^  Floyd  could  not  foresee 
that  what  he  meant  to  leave  uncertain  would,  by  Buell, 
be  made  explicit  and  reduced  to  writing,  and  that  he 
would  then  have  to  verify  Buell's  memorandum,  as  the 
only  construction  of  his  own  verbal  instructions  consist- 
ent with  honest  intention.  The  evidence  on  which 
Anderson  acted,  and  was  authorized  to  act,  was  that 
which  the  secession  leaders  had  freely  published  to 
the  world:  that  they  meant  to  have  the  forts,  and 
would  take  them  as  soon  as  Congress,  after  secession, 
should  refuse  to  surrender  them  on  demand.  Says 
General  Crawford :  — 

When  the  commissioners  had  been  formally  sent  to 
Washington  by  the  convention,  Anderson  anticipated  their 
reception  and  the  rejection  of  their  proposals  by  the  govern- 
ment, and  believing  that  the  critical  moment  as  to  his  posi- 
tion had  come,  he  resolved  to  take  advantage  of  the  "  tangible 
evidence "  he  believed  he  had,  and  to  act  under  the  plain 
instructions  given  him  through  Major  Buell.^ 

In  a  letter  to  the  War  Department,  in  answer  to 
inquiries,  he  wrote  :  — 

Many  things  convinced  me  that  the  authorities  of  the 
State  designed  to  proceed  to  a  hostile  act. 

As  they  had  publicly  and  positively  declared  that  the 
forts  would  be  seized  if  not  surrendered  as  soon  as  the 
commissioners  of  the  State  should  demand  them,  and  as 

^  Crawford's  Genesis  of  the  Civil  War,  page  72.  Crawford  was  a  sur- 
geon in  the  United  States  Army,  and  was  stationed  at  Charleston,  in 
November,  1860. 

2  Ibid.,  page  101. 


ANDERSON'S  INSTRUCTIONS  135 

the  latter  had  then  gone  to  Washington  to  make  this 
demand,  the  evidence  of  an  intended  attack  was  per- 
fect, unless,  indeed,  a  surrender  was  contemplated. 

But  whether  or  not  Anderson  was  justified  by  his 
instructions,  the  main  question  now  was  whether  he 
should  be  sustained  or  compelled  to  withdraw. 

His  brilliant  movement,  unless  disavowed  and  un- 
done, would  defeat  the  plans  by  which  the  State 
expected  to  be  able,  without  a  conflict  of  arms,  to 
finally  expel  the  last  vestige  of  United  States  authority 
from  her  borders.  He  had  supplies  for  four  months, 
and  could  be  dislodged  only  by  an  attack  so  sharp  and 
strong  that  all  the  world  would  see  that  it  was  the 
commencement  of  an  aggressive  and  unprovoked  war 
against  the  government  of  the  United  States. 

The  Southern  cause,  which  was  but  yesterday  all  cov- 
ered over  with  peaceful  disguises,  now  bristled  with 
threats  of  war.  The  honest  soldier  at  Charleston  had 
baffled  all  the  arts  of  conspiring  diplomacy,  and  made 
treason  show  its  open  hand. 

At  this  session  of  the  Cabinet  the  excitement  was  too 
great  for  deliberation,  and  after  Floyd's  explosion  and 
some  violent  discussion  of  it,  an  adjournment  was  had 
until  evening.^ 

^  Judge  Holt,  who  was  present  on  the  occasion  as  a  member  of  the 
Cabinet,  thus  referred  to  it  in  a  speech  made  by  him  in  Charleston,  April 
14,  1865,  on  the  occasion  of  restoring  the  flag  of  the  Union  on  Fort 
Sumter  :  — 

"  When  intelligence  reached  the  capital  that,  by  a  bold  and  dexterous 
movement,  this  command  had  been  transferred  from  Moultrie  to  Sumter, 
and  was  safe  from  the  disabled  guns  left  behind,  the  emotions  of  Floyd 
were  absolutely  uncontrollable,  —  emotions  of  mingled  mortification  and 
disgust  and  rage  and  panic.     His  fury  seemed  that  of  some  baffled  fiend, 


136  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S   CABINET 

At  the  evening  session  Floyd  renewed  the  attack, 
demanding  the  withdrawal  of  the  garrison  from 
Charleston  harbor  altogether,  on  the  ground  that,  as 
Major  Anderson  had  "  violated  the  solemn  pledge  of 
the  government,"  no  other  course  could  "  vindicate  our 
honor  or  prevent  civil  war." 

The  "  solemn  pledge  of  the  government "  he  referred 
to  had  been  made  by  the  President  unofficially  to  South 
Carolina  representatives  in  Congress  on  the  10th  of 
December.  On  the  8th  they  had  called  upon  him  to 
confer  as  to  the  best  means  of  preventing  a  collision 
between  the  federal  government  and  South  Carolina. 
As  the  government  contemplated  no  attack,  the  subject 
really  discussed  was  the  terms  on  which  South  Carolina 
would  desist  from  attacking  the  government  and  seiz- 
ing the  forts  prior  to  the  secession  of  the  State.  At 
the  President's  request  they  put  their  conditions  in 
writing,  and  returned  to  him  with  them  December  10. 
They  were  signed  by  five  members,  viz.,  Messrs. 
McQueen,  Miles,  Bonham,  Joyce,  and  Keitt,  and  were 
in  the  following  words  :  — 

In  compliance  with  our  statement  to  you  yesterday,  we 
now  express  to  you  our  strong  convictions  that  neither  the 

who  suddenly  discovers  opening  at  his  feet  the  gulf  of  ruin  he  has  been 
preparing  for  another.  Over  all  the  details  of  this  passionate  outburst 
of  a  conspirator,  caught  and  entangled  in  his  own  toils,  the  veil  of  official 
secrecy  still  hangs,  and  it  may  be  that  history  will  never  be  privileged  to 
transfer  this  memorable  scene  to  its  pages.  There  is  one,  however, 
whose  absence  to-day  we  have  all  deplored,  and  to  whom  the  nation  is 
grateful  for  the  masterly  ability  and  lion-like  courage  with  which  he  has 
fought  this  rebellion  in  all  the  vicissitudes  of  its  career,  —  your  Secretary 
of  War  (Mr.  Stanton),  who,  were  he  here,  could  bear  testimony  to  the 
truthfulness  of  my  words." 


THE  PLEDGE  TO  SOUTH  CAROLINA    137 

constituted  authorities  nor  any  body  of  the  people  of  the 
State  of  South  Carolina  will  either  attack  or  molest  the 
United  States  forts  in  the  harbor  of  Charleston  previously 
to  the  action  of  the  convention,  and,  we  hope  and  believe, 
not  until  an  offer  has  been  made  through  an  accredited  repre- 
sentative to  negotiate  for  an  amicable  settlement  of  the 
matter  between  the  state  and  federal  governments,  provided 
that  no  reinforcements  shall  be  sent  into  those  forts  and 
their  relative  military  status  remains  as  at  present.^ 

This  was  plain  notice  to  the  President  that  the  forts 
would  be  attacked,  whether  reinforced  or  not,  as  soon 
as  the  federal  government  should  decide  against  the 
demand  of  the  seceded  State  of  South  Carolina  for  their 
surrender ;  and  that  they  were  likely  to  be  attacked  at 
any  time  after  the  action  of  the  secession  convention. 

This  brief  respite  granted  to  the  nation  by  South 
CaroHna  was,  Mr.  Buchanan  tells  us,  "welcomed  as  a 
happy  omen  "  by  him,  that  by  means  of  the  influence 
of  the  signers,  collision  might  be  prevented  and  time 
afforded  to  all  parties  for  reflection  and  for  a  peaceable 
adjustment.  From  abundant  caution,  however,  he  says 
he  objected  to  the  word  "  provided  "  in  their  document, 
lest,  if  he  should  accept  it  without  remark,  it  might 
possibly  be  construed  into  an  agreement  on  his  part 
not  to  reinforce  the  forts.  Such  an  agreement,  he 
informed  them,  he  would  never  make.  It  would  be 
impossible  for  him,  from  the  nature  of  his  official 
responsibility,  thus  to  tie  his  own  hands  and  restrain 
his  own  freedom  of  action.  Had  he  stopped  here,  the 
South  Carolinians  might  well  have  wondered  what  had 

^  Curtis's  Buchanan,  vol.  ii.  p.  377. 


138  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S  CABINET 

been  accomplished  by  the  formal  interviews  and  a 
written  treaty  which  was  to  bind  one  side  only.  He 
proceeded,  however,  to  explain  that  they  had  nothing 
to  fear  from  his  cautionary  remark.  He  only  meant 
that,  while  he  would  not  reinforce,  he  could  not  law- 
fully enter  into  an  official  agreement  to  that  effect. 
His  account  reads  thus :  — 

Still,  they  might  have  observed  from  his  message  that 
he  had  no  present  design,  under  existing  circumstances,  to 
change  the  condition  of  the  forts  at  Charleston.  He  must, 
notwithstanding,  be  left  entirely  free  to  exercise  his  own  dis- 
cretion according  to  the  exigencies  that  might  arise.^ 

Mr.  Curtis  asserts  that  Mr.  Buchanan  "  gave  no 
pledge,  express  or  implied,  formal  or  informal,  that  no 
reinforcements  should  be  sent  into  Charleston  harbor, 
or  that  the  military  status,  as  it  existed  at  the  time 
of  this  interview,  should  remain  unchanged,"  and  that 
he  in  no  way  fettered  himself  upon  the  subject.^  In  a 
footnote  Mr.  Curtis  says  that  two  of  the  gentlemen 
who  signed  the  letter  —  Messrs.  Miles  and  Keitt  — 
pubHshed  at  Charleston  an  account  of  the  interview, 
in  which  they  did  not  intimate  that  anything  in  the 
nature  of  a  pledge  passed  on  either  side.^  He  gives 
as  his  authority  for  this  statement  Appleton's  "  Annual 
Cyclopaedia  for  1861,"  page  703.  Mr.  Buchanan 
makes  precisely  the  same  assertion  and  gives  the  same 
authority.*  The  authority  they  thus  refer  to  flatly 
contradicts  their  statement  of  the  transaction.  The 
narrative  of  Miles  and  Keitt,  printed  on  the  page  and 

1  Buchanan's  Defence,  page  167.     ^  Life  of  Buchanan,  vol.  ii.  p.  378. 
8  Ibid.  ■*  Buchanan's  Defence,  page  185. 


THE  PLEDGE  TO  SOUTH  CAROLINA     139 

in  the  volume  of  the  cyclopaedia  above  named,  refers 
first  to  their  own  lack  of  authority  to  pledge  the  State, 
and  the  fact  that  they  were  treating  with  the  President 
only  "  as  gentlemen  in  prominent  positions,"  and  then 
proceeds  to  state  the  attitude  they  understood  him  as 
occupying.     They  say  :  — 

The  President  was  acting  in  a  double  capacity ;  not  only 
as  a  gentleman  whose  influence  in  carrying  out  his  share  of 
the  understanding  or  agreement  was  potential,  but  as  the 
head  of  the  army,  and  therefore  having  absolute  control  of 
the  whole  matter  of  reinforcing  or  transferring  the  gar- 
risons at  Charleston.  Considering  the  President  as  bound  in 
honor,  if  not  by  treaty  stipulations,  not  to  make  any  change 
in  the  forts,  or  to  send  reinforcements  to  them  unless  they 
were  attacked,  we  of  the  delegation  who  were  elected  to 
the  convention  felt  equally  bound  in  honor  to  do  every- 
thing on  our  part  to  prevent  any  premature  colhsion. 

This  is  the  authority  referred  to  (but  not  quoted) 
by  Mr.  Buchanan  and  Mr.  Curtis  to  show  that  the 
authors  "  did  not  intimate  that  anything  in  the  nature 
of  a  pledge  passed  on  either  side."  They  are  Mr. 
Buchanan's  own  witnesses,  and  their  testimony  cannot 
be  attacked  on  his  behalf.  They  state  most  explicitly 
that  there  was  an  "  understanding  or  agreement "  by 
which  the  President  was  "bound  in  honor"  "not  to 
make  any  change  in  the  forts,  unless  they  were 
attacked."  The  South  Carolinians  say  they  felt  bound 
by  it,  although  they  held  no  authority  from  the  State 
to  make  the  agreement.  The  two  governments  were 
not  bound,  but  the  men  were  personally  pledged  to 
each  other.     In  their  statement  to  the  South  CaroHna 


140  STANTON  IN   BUCHANAN'S   CABINET 

secession  convention,  a  portion  only  of  which  is  quoted 
in  the  cyclopaedia  article,  Messrs.  Miles  and  Keitt 
further  say  that,  as  the  delegates  rose  to  go,  the  Presi- 
dent said  substantially :  "  After  all,  this  is  a  matter 
among  gentlemen,  and  I  do  not  know  that  any  paper 
or  writing  is  necessary.  We  understand  each  other." 
And  these  are  the  witnesses  called  by  Mr.  Buchanan 
and  his  biographer. 

One  more  witness  to  the  pledge  will  suffice.  Gen- 
eral Crawford  makes  the  following  interesting  state- 
ment :  — 

On  the  22d  of  March,  1882,  I  had  a  long  and  earnest 
conversation  with  Judge  Black  upon  the  subject  of  the  inter- 
view between  the  President  and  the  congressional  delegation 
of  South  Carolina,  as  to  the  understanding  agreed  upon  at 
that  interview.  The  details  of  this  interview  with  the  Presi- 
dent, when  the  commissioners  of  South  Carolina  were  in 
Washington,  were  stated,  when  at  the  end  I  said:  "Well, 
then.  Judge  Black,  there  appears  to  be  but  one  inference  to 
be  drawn,  but  one  conclusion  to  be  reached :  the  President 
did  make  that  agreement."  The  judge  rose,  and,  looking 
steadily  at  me  for  a  moment,  said :  "  Remember  that  is  your 
conclusion."  ^ 

Judge  Black  confided  still  further  to  General  Craw- 
ford the  fact  that  the  President  did  confess  to  him  an 
"  understanding  or  agreement,"  in  the  maintenance  of 
which  his  personal  honor  as  a  gentleman  was  involved.^ 

This  understanding,  to  which  the  personal  honor  of 
a  President  was  pledged,  was  that  he  would  leave  our 
forts  naked  and  defenseless  to  a  public  enemy,  upon  the 

1  Genesis  of  the  Civil  War,  page  25.  ^  Ibid.,  page  152. 


FLOYD'S   DEMAND  141 

assurance  of  unautliorized  "  gentlemen  "  that  they  felt 
sure  South  Carolina  would  give  Congress  an  oppor- 
tunity to  surrender  them  before  she  would  attack  and 
seize  them.  Under  no  circumstances  were  they  to 
remain  in  the  undisputed  possession  of  the  United 
States  an  hour  after  their  surrender  should  be  refused 
upon  formal  demand.  His  public  denial  goes  only  to 
the  technical  point  that  he  entered  into  no  obligation 
by  which  he  could  be  officially  bound,  but  only  gave 
an  assurance  as  a  gentleman  that,  as  the  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  army,  he  would  stake  the  safety  of  the 
government  fortresses  upon  the  assurances  of  men  who 
had  fau-ly  notified  him  that  their  people  were  engaged 
in  efforts  to  dissolve  the  Union  peaceably,  and  that, 
failing  in  that,  they  would  forthwith  levy  war  against 
the  United  States  and  take  those  forti-esses  by  force. 

It  was  in  fulfillment  of  this  pledge  that,  on  the  27th 
of  December,  Floyd  and  Thompson,  within  the  Cabi- 
net, and  United  States  Senator  Jefferson  Davis,  the 
South  Carolina  commissioners,  and  the  ever  vigilant 
Trescott,  without,  demanded  that  Fort  Sumter  be 
evacuated  and  made  as  easy  of  capture  as  it  had  been 
on  the  25th.  The  President  was  irresolute,  and  neither 
yielded  to  the  demand  nor  refused.  He  disclaimed  all 
responsibility  for  the  instructions  under  which  Ander- 
son had  acted.  He  was  silent  under  the  charge  of 
having  made  a  pledge  which  that  act  violated.  With- 
out having  arrived  at  any  conclusion,  the  Cabinet 
adjourned  until  the  next  day. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

The  President  confers  with  the  Commissioners.  —  The  Struggle  in 
the  Cabinet.  —  Stanton's  Attitude.  —  Resignation  of  Floyd.  — 
The  President's  Letter  to  the  South  Carolina  Commissioners.  — 
His  Final  Break  with  the  Secessionists. 

The  failure  of  the  secessionists  to  secure  the  evacua- 
tion of  Fort  Sumter  on  the  27th  of  December  prompted 
them  to  seize  Fort  Moultrie  and  Castle  Pinckney  during 
that  night. 

On  the  28th  Mr.  Buchanan  gave  an  audience  to  the 
South  Carolina  commissioners.  Although  he  refused 
to  recognize  them  as  the  diplomatic  representatives  of 
a  foreign  nation,  he  expressed  a  willingness  to  sub- 
mit to  Congress  any  propositions  they  might  make.^ 
As  they  had  no  other  business  in  Washington  but  to 
assert  the  independence  of  their  State,  and  to  arrange 
terms  for  the  transfer  to  her  of  the  forts  and  other 
property  of  the  United  States,  an  official  reference  to 
Congress  of  their  demands  would  have  been  an  execu- 
tive recognition  as  complete  as  any  that  could  have  been 
given  in  words. 

According  to  Mr.  Buchanan's  account,  they  "insisted 
upon  the  immediate  withdrawal  of  the  major  and  his 
troops,  not  only  from  Fort  Sumter,  but  from  the  harbor 
of  Charleston,  as  a  sine  qua  non  to  any  negotiation."  ^ 

^  Buchanan's  Defence,  page  181. 
2  Ibid.,  page  182. 


THE  PRESIDENT  AND  THE  COMMISSIONERS   143 

Mr.  James  L.  Orr,  one  of  the  commissioners,  stated 
in  1871  that  the  question  debated  was  whether  Ander- 
son should  be  ordered  back  to  Moultrie  and  the  former 
status  restored.  Mr.  Barnwell,  the  chairman,  brought 
to  the  attention  of  the  President  the  arrangfemeut  he 
had  made  with  the  South  Carolina  delegation,  and  said 
to  him  that  "  Anderson's  removal  violated  that  aaree- 
ment  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  government, 
and  that  the  faith  of  the  President  and  the  o-overnment 

o 

had  been  thereby  forfeited."     Says  Mr.  Orr :  — 

The  President  made  various  excuses  why  he  shoidd  be 
allowed  time  to  decide  the  question  whether  Anderson  should 
be  ordered  back  to  Moultrie  and  the  former  status  restored. 
Mr.  Barnwell  pressed  him  with  great  zeal  and  earnestness  to 
issue  the  order  at  once.  Mr.  Buchanan  still  hesitating,  Mr. 
Barnwell  said  to  him,  at  least  three  times  during  the  inter- 
view :  "  But,  Mr.  President,  your  personal  honor  is  involved  in 
the  matter ;  the  faith  you  pledged  has  been  violated,  and  your 
personal  honor  requires  you  to  issue  the  order."  Mr.  Barn- 
well pressed  him  so  hard  upon  this  point  that  the  President 
said  :  "  You  must  give  me  time  to  consider,  —  this  is  a  grave 
question."  Mr.  Barnwell  replied  for  the  third  time  :  "  But, 
Mr.  President,  your  personal  honor  is  involved  in  this  ar- 
rangement." Whereupon,  Mr.  Buchanan  with  great  earnest- 
ness said :  "  Mr.  Barnwell,  you  are  pressing  me  too  importu- 
nately, you  don't  give  me  time  to  consider ;  you  don't  give 
me  time  to  say  my  prayers.  I  always  say  my  prayers  when 
required  to  act  upon  any  great  state  affair."  ^ 

The  interview  resulted  in  nothing.     The  President 
still  wavered  between  his  duty  and  his  pledge,  and  the 
battle  was  resumed  in  the  Cabinet  between  the  factions 
1  Genesis  of  the  Civil  War,  page  148. 


144  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S   CABINET 

which  contended  with  each  other  for  the  mastery  over 
him.  It  raged  through  the  day  and  evening,  and  con- 
tinued through  the  next  day.  The  persistence  of  the 
Southern  members  showed  that  they  hoped  to  prevail. 
Mr.  Buchanan  had  never  failed  them  up  to  that  time. 
If  now  he  would  stand  by  his  pledge,  South  Carolina 
would  have  no  federal  foot  upon  her  soil,  no  federal 
flag  on  any  fort  within  her  border.  If  the  President 
had  been  left  to  struggle  against  them  alone,  they 
might  have  worked  their  will  upon  him.  But  Stanton 
was  a  lion  in  their  path,  and  Holt  and  Black  were  with 
him.  Stanton's  opposition  was  not  like  that  of  most 
men.  It  was  propelled  by  a  torrent  of  strong  impulses, 
and  was  not  to  be  arrested  by  argument  or  persua- 
sion. In  his  view,  the  demand  of  Floyd  and  his  co-con- 
spirators was  not  a  matter  for  argument.  From  the 
moment  it  was  made,  he  treated  it  as  an  insult  to  be 
resented,  a  criminal  proposition  to  be  spurned. 

On  the  third  day  of  this  intense  struggle  between 
the  unionists  and  the  secessionists  of  the  Cabinet  for 
the  possession  of  the  Executive  Department  of  the  gov- 
ernment, it  became  apparent  that  the  President  would 
refrain  from  any  action  at  all.  He  would  have  been 
willing  to  send  Anderson  back  to  Fort  Moultrie,  if  the 
South  Carolinians  would  have  surrendered  it  to  him  for 
that  purpose,  but  they  showed  no  disposition  to  make 
the  exchange.^ 

By  not  withdrawing  the  garrison  entirely  from 
Charleston,  he  decided,  as  much  as  it  was  possible  for 
him   to   decide  anything,  that,  as  the  United   States 

*  Buchanan's  Defence,  page  182. 


THE  RESIGNATION   OF  FLOYD  145 

had  no  other  phice  in  South  CaroHna  in  which  Ander- 
son and  his  troops  could  take  shelter,  they  must,  at 
least  for  the  time  being;,  remain  at  Fort  Sumter. 

The  Southern  leaders  now  abandoned  the  contest, 
and  tlie  result  was  made  known  to  the  world  by  the 
resignation  of  Floyd.  As  the  President  had  not  yet 
formally  refused  to  comply  with  the  rebel  demand,  the 
Secretary  was  compelled  to  base  his  resignation  on  the 
ground  that  delay,  equally  witli  refusal,  was  certain  to 
inaugurate  civil  war,  and,  therefore,  he  could  not  con- 
sent to  remain  in  of&ce.  His  resignation  had  been 
demanded  by  the  President  immediately  after  the  dis- 
covery of  his  fraudulent  acceptances,  six  days  before, 
with  a  distinct  intimation  that  if  it  was  not  forthcom- 
ing, he  would  be  removed.^ 

The  amiable  weakness  of  Mr.  Buchanan's  character  is 
well  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  after  this  the  disgraced 
Secretary  was  not  only  allowed  to  be  present  at  cabinet 
meetings,  but  for  three  days  and  nights  to  disturb  their 
proceedings  with  violent,  insulting,  and  boisterous  con- 
duct, and  with  propositions  which  proved  him  a  traitor 
to  the  government.  He  was  subsequently  indicted  for 
issuing  fraudulent  acceptances,  but  acquitted  on  the 
technicality  that  having  been  a  witness  before  a  com- 
mittee of  Congress,  he  was  thereby  exempted  by  a  stat- 
ute from  punishment  for  the  transactions  concerning 
which  he  had  testified. 

Although  the  resignation  of  Floyd  virtually  termi- 
nated the  dangerous  crisis  which  Anderson's  patriotic 
act  had  precipitated,  the  President  seemed  unwiUing  to 

^  Buchanan's  Defence,  page  185. 


146  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S   CABINET 

treat  the  matter  as  closed.  He  stood  charged  by  the 
Southern  members  of  his  Cabinet,  and  by  the  South 
Carolina  commissioners,  with  having  violated  a  pledge 
of  honor,  which  three  Northern  members  of  the  Cabi- 
net and  the  patriotic  people  of  the  country  maintained 
it  would  have  been  treason  for  him  to  redeem,  if  made. 
The  commissioners  had,  on  that  same  day,  addressed 
him  a  communication,  in  which  they  repeated  the 
charges  against  him  of  violated  faith,  and  he  seemed 
impressed  with  the  idea  that  he  could  set  himself  right 
with  both  sides  of  the  controversy  by  a  reply.  His 
effort  in  that  direction  was  laid  before  the  Cabinet  late 
on  the  evening  of  the  29th.  It  was  satisfactory  to  but 
one  member  :  Toucey.  He  never  differed  from  the 
President.  Black,  Stanton,  and  Holt  objected  to  the 
concessions  it  made  to  South  Carolina ;  Thompson  and 
Thomas  to  the  lack  of  such  concessions.  Floyd  was  no 
longer  in  the  Cabinet.  The  paper  seems  to  have  been 
read  for  information  rather  than  to  elicit  comment. 
Not  much  criticism  was  bestowed  on  it  at  the  time.^ 
No  action  was  taken  upon  it,  and  the  meeting  ad- 
journed. 

On  the  following  day  (Sunday,  the  30th)  the  Presi- 
dent learned  from  Mr.  Toucey  that  Judge  Black  had 
expressed  a  determination  to  resign,  if  the  letter  he  had 
seen  the  night  before  should  be  sent  to  the  commission- 
ers. The  President  sent  for  his  friend,  and  the  inter- 
view resulted  in  delivering  the  document  to  him  for 
such  changes  as  he  might  suggest.  Black  went  to  the 
Attorney-General's  office,  and   wrote   a   memorandum 

^  Black's  Speeches  and  Essays,  page  14. 


J 


THE  PRESIDENT'S  FINAL  EFFORT  147 

embracing  the  \dews  upon  which  he  and  Stanton  were 
agreed.  The  latter  made  and  retained  a  copy.  The 
original  went  to  the  President  as  a  guide  in  the  changes 
to  be  made.  A  comparison  of  this  document  ^  with  the 
letter  finally  sent  to  the  commissioners  ^  shows  that  the 
President  substantially  disregarded  it. 

No  explanation  has  ever  been  given  why  Mr.  Buch- 
anan adhered  to  the  objectionable  features  of  his  reply 
to  the  commissioners,  in  the  face  of  his  promise  to 
modify  it  in  accordance  with  Judge  Black's  "  memo- 
randum." To  what  extent  he  did  modify  it  is  not 
known,  as  neither  the  original  draft  nor  a  copy  of  it 
exists.^ 

His  final  effort  to  placate  the  commissioners,  and  at 
the  same  time  to  save  himself  harmless,  was  a  lament- 
able failure.  His  letter  to  them  was  dated  December  31. 
Their  reply,  dated  January  2,  was  so  offensive  that 
immediately,  on  the  day  of  its  date,  it  was  returned 
to  the  commissioners  with  the  following  indorsement : 

This  paper,  just  presented  to  the  President,  is  of  such  a 
character  that  he  declines  to  receive  it. 

A  few  days  later  this  letter  was  presented  to  the 
Senate  by  Jefferson  Davis,  who  caused  it  to  be  printed 
in  the  "Globe."* 

Says  Mr.  Buchanan  :  — 

Mr.  DaWs,  not  content  with  this  success,  followed  it  up 
by  a  severe  and  unjust  attack  upon  the  President,  and  his 

1  Black's  Speeches  and  Essays,  page  14. 

2  Curtis's  Life  of  Buchanan,  vol.  ii.  p.  386. 
8  Ibid.,  vol.  ii.  p.  380. 

4  January  9,  1861. 


148  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S   CABINET 

example  was  followed  by  several  of  his  adherents.  From 
this  time  forward,  as  has  already  been  stated,  all  social  and 
political  intercourse  ceased  between  the  disunion  Senators 
and  the  President.^ 

This  terminated  the  efforts  of  President  Buchanan  to 
maintain  friendly  relations  with  men  wholly  absorbed  in 
a  treasonable  enterprise  against  the  government,  and  at 
the  same  time  to  protect  that  government  against  their 
machinations.  He  had  trusted  them  at  the  expense 
of  his  reputation,  and  when  he  had  reached  a  line  he 
could  not  pass  with  safety,  they  turned  upon  him,  and 
accused  him  of  treachery  to  the  government  as  well  as 
to  themselves.  This  result  was  of  real  benefit  to  him. 
It  enabled  him  to  show  from  that  time  forward  that  in 
temporizing  with  the  secessionists,  it  had  been  his  aim 
to  arrest  their  movements,  — not  to  join  them.  There 
was  no  longer  any  apprehension  that  the  United  States 
would,  by  executive  action,  relinquish  its  jurisdiction  in 
South  Carolina.  The  national  flag  still  waved  there 
over  a  government  fort,  to  contradict  her  claim  that 
secession  had  made  her  an  independent  and  sovereign 
power. 

^  Buchanan's  Defence,  page  184. 


CHAPTER  XX 

Stanton's  Account  of  the  Cabinet  Crisis.  —  Judge  Holt  on  the  Same. 

A  CONDENSED  accouiit  of  the  struggle  in  the  Cabinet 
which  preceded  Floyd's  resignation  was  written  by  Mr. 
Stanton  himself  in  18G3,  under  the  following  circum- 
stances :  in  February,  1862,  Mr.  Thurlow  Weed,  then  in 
London,  wrote  a  communication  for  a  news^Japer  there, 
in  which,  after  ref errmg  to  Mr.  Stanton's  ajDpointment  by 
President  Lincoln  as  Secretary  of  War  on  the  20th  of 
the  preceding  month,  he  gave  an  account  of  the  crisis 
in  Mr.  Buchanan's  Cabinet  in  1860.  Mr.  Buchanan 
and  his  friends  complained  of  its  inaccuracy,  but  no  one 
who  had  been  a  member  of  that  Cabinet  came  forward 
to  deny  its  truth.  The  following  year  Mr.  Augustus 
Schell,  a  New  York  Democratic  poHtician  and  a  near 
friend  of  Mr.  Buchanan,  addressed  a  letter  to  Mr.  Stan- 
ton, and  to  others  of  the  Buchanan  Cabinet,  asking 
them  to  say  whether  the  statements  in  Mr.  Weed's  com- 
munication were  true  or  not.  To  this  Mr.  Stanton 
wrote  a  reply,  which  he  read  to  Judge  Holt  at  that  time, 
but  which  he  finally  decided  not  to  send.  It  was  found 
after  his  death  in  his  private  papers.  Of  this  letter  and 
of  the  reasons  which  governed  Mr.  Stanton  in  with- 
holding it.  Judge  Holt  wrote  as  follows  in  1870  :  — 

Several  years  ago  Mr.  Stanton  read  to  me,  in  the  War 
Department,  a  letter  addressed  by  him  to  Mr.  Schell,  of  New 


150  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S  CABINET 

York,  in  answer  to  one  from  that  gentleman,  wherein  he  set 
forth  quite  in  detail  what  was  said  and  done  at  the  meeting 
of  Mr.  Buchanan's  Cabinet,  which  was  followed  at  once,  as  I 
now  remember  it,  by  Mr.  Floyd's  resignation.  The  delibera- 
tions and  discussions,  as  of  other  cabinet  meetings,  being  then 
and  still  held  under  the  seal  of  official  confidence,  I  cannot  of 
course  repeat  what  the  statements  of  this  letter  were,  but  can 
only  affirm  that  they  accorded  with  my  own  recollection  of  the 
facts.  I  requested  of  Mr.  Stanton  a  copy  of  this  letter,  which 
he  promised  to  furnish  me,  but  under  the  pressure  of  his 
official  labor  and  engagements  the  matter  was  probably  lost 
sight  of,  as  the  copy  never  reached  me.  Subsequently  he 
informed  me  that  the  letter  had  never  been  sent,  he  having, 
as  I  uudejTstood  it,  come  to  the  conclusion  that  such  disclos- 
ures would  not  be  justified  unless  made  with  the  consent  of 
the  parties  to  the  cabinet  meeting  and  to  the  deliberations 
referred  to.^ 

This  unsent  letter  of  Mr.  Stanton's  has  upon  it  no 
comment  or  direction  of  any  kind.  Its  publication  in 
this  place  seems  to  be  justified  and  required  by  reason 
of  the  complaints  made  of  his  silence  by  Mr.  Buchanan's 
biographer,^  and  by  Mr.  Buchanan  himself  in  private 
letters,  published  for  the  first  time  in  his  biography 
many  years  after  Mr.  Stanton's  death.^  His  letter  sheds 
new  light  upon  momentous  events,  and  is  the  only 
account  written  by  a  participant  of  what  did  actually 
occur  in  the  meetings  of  the  Cabinet  in  the  three  days 
and  nights  commencing  December  27,  1860.  It  will 
be  observed  that  Mr.  Stanton  was  replying  to  an  inquiry, 

1  Atlantic  Monthly,  April,  1870,  Henry  Wilson's  article. 

2  Curtis's  Buchanan,  vol.  ii.  p.  623. 
8  Ibid.,  pp.  580,  587,  and  588. 


STANTON'S  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  CRISIS  151 

written  in  1863,  as  to  the  truth  of  a  statement  made  in 
1862  of  things  that  happened  in  1860. 

LETTER  OF  MR.  STANTON  TO  MR.  SCHELL.   (Not  sent.) 

War  Department, 
Washington,  D.  C,  October  8,  1863. 
Dear  Sir,  —  Three  days  ago  I  received  from  you  a  letter, 
to  which  the  pressure  of  public  duties  has  prevented  me  from 
replying  until  now,  and  of  which  the  following  is  a  copy  :  — 

New  York,  October  3,  1863. 

Dear  Sir,  —  You  will  find  below  an  extract  from  a  letter 
published  in  the  London  "  Observer  "  on  the  9th  of  February, 
1862,  subscribed  with  initials  of  T.  W.  The  signature  is 
known  to  be  that  of  Mr.  Thurlow  Weed  of  Albany,  who  was, 
at  the  time,  in  London  :  — 

"  In  February,  Major  Anderson,  commanding  Fort  Moultrie, 
Charleston  harbor,  finding  his  position  endangered,  passed 
his  garrison,  by  a  prompt  and  brilliant  movement,  over  to  the 
stronger  fortress  of  Sumter,  whereupon  Mr.  Floyd,  Secretary 
of  War,  much  excited,  called  upon  the  President  to  say  that 
Major  Anderson  had  violated  express  orders,  and  thereby 
seriously  compromised  him  (Floyd),  and  that  iniless  tbe  major 
was  immediately  remanded  to  Fort  Moultrie,  he  should  resign 
the  War  Office. 

"  The  Cabinet  was  assembled  directly. 

"  a\Ir.  Buchanan,  explaining  the  embarrassment  of  the  Sec- 
retary of  War,  remarked  that  the  act  of  Major  Anderson 
would  occasion  exasperation  to  the  South.  He  had  told  Mr. 
Floyd  that,  as  the  government  was  strong,  forbearance  towards 
erring  brethren  might  win  them  back  to  their  allegiance,  and 
that  that  officer  might  be  ordered  back. 

"  After  an  ominous  silence,  the  President  asked  how  the 
suggestion  struck  the  Cabinet. 

"  Mr.  Stanton,  just  now  called  to  the  War  Office,  but  then 


152  STANTON  IN   BUCHANAN'S   CABINET 

Attorney-General,  answered :  '  That  course,  Mr.  President, 
ought  certainly  to  be  regarded  as  most  liberal  towards  erring 
brethren,  but  while  one  member  of  your  Cabinet  has  fraudu- 
lent acceptances  for  millions  of  dollars  afloat,  and  while  the 
confidential  clerk  of  another  —  himself  in  South  Carolina 
teaching  rebellion  —  has  just  stolen  $900,000  from  the  Indian 
Trust  Fund,  the  experiment  of  ordering  Major  Anderson 
back  to  Fort  Moultrie  would  be  dangerous.  But  if  you  in- 
tend to  try  it,  before  it  is  done  I  beg  that  you  will  accept  my 
resignation.' 

" '  And  mine  too,'  added  the  Secretary  of  State,  Mr. 
Black. 

"  '  And  mine  also,'  said  the  Postmaster-General,  Mr.  Holt. 

" '  And  mine  too,'  followed  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
General  Dix. 

"  This  of  course  opened  the  bleared  eyes  of  the  President,  and 
the  meeting  resulted  in  the  acceptance  of  Mr.  Floyd's  resig- 
nation." 

Inasmuch  as  you  were  a  member  of  Mr.  Buchanan's  Cabi- 
net, and  one  of  the  persons  alluded  to  among  the  members  of 
the  Cabinet  who  dissented  from  the  proposition  alleged  to 
have  been  made  by  Mr.  Floyd,  I  have  thought  it  not  improper 
to  call  upon  you  to  state  whether  the  subject  matter  of  Mr. 
Weed's  communication  is  or  is  not  true. 

As  for  myself,  I  do  not  believe  it  to  be  true,  and  regard  it 
as  one  of  the  numerous  slanders  which  have  been  disseminated 
to  reflect  discredit  upon  the  late  excellent  President  of  the 
United  States.  I  shall  esteem  it  a  favor  if  you  will  inform 
me  by  letter  of  the  precise  circumstances  attending  the  action 
of  Mr.  Buchanan's  Cabinet  at  the  time  of  the  transaction 
referred  to,  if  any  such  took  place,  to  the  end  that  the  public 
may  be  truthfully  informed  of  the  actual  occurrence. 

I  have  written  this  letter  without  the  knowledge  of  Mr. 
Buchanan,  and  solely  for  the  purpose  that  the  public  record  of 
Mr.  Buchanan's   administration   may  be  vindicated   from   a 


STANTON'S  ACCOUNT  OF  THE   CRISIS         153 

charge  which  those  who  know  him,  as  you  and  I  do,  cannot 
but  feel  has  originated  from  personal  or  political  malice. 
Yours  very  respectfully, 

Augustus  Schell. 

Hon.  E.  M.  Staxton, 
Washlngton  City. 

The  article  of  which  your  letter  furnishes  an  extract  appears 
to  have  been  published  more  than  eighteen  months  ago,  and 
contains  certain  allegations,  to  wit :  — 

First.  That  in  respect  to  Major  Anderson's  patriotic  and 
brilliant  movement  from  Fort  Moultrie  to  Fort  Sumter,  John 
B.  Floyd,  then  Secretary  of  War,  asserted  that  Major  Ander- 
son had  violated  express  orders,  and  thereby  seriously  com- 
promised him  (Floyd),  and  that  unless  the  major  was  imme- 
diately remanded  to  Fort  IMoultrie,  he  should  resign  the  War 
Office  ;  and  that  the  Cabinet  were  assembled  to  consider  the 
proposition. 

This  allegation,  except  as  to  date,  is  substantially  true. 

The  meeting  at  which  the  action  of  Major  Anderson  in 
moving  his  garrison  from  Fort  Moultrie  to  Fort  Sumter  was 
laid  before  the  Cabinet  by  Mr.  Buchanan  took  place,  not 
in  February,  but  on  the  afternoon  of  the  27th  of  December, 
1861,  —  the  movement  having  been  made  the  preceding  night. 
It  was  the  first  cabinet  meeting  that  I  attended  after  being 
sworn  in  as  Attorney-General.  Floyd  proposed  to  withdraw 
the  garrison  from  Charleston  harbor,  on  the  ground  that  Major 
Anderson  had  violated  his  orders,  and  also  that  the  solemn 
pledges  of  the  government  had  been  violated.  The  violation 
of  orders  by  Major  Anderson  was  denied  by  some  members  of 
the  Cabinet,  and  the  orders  were  called  for.  At  a  second 
meeting  of  the  Cabinet,  in  the  evening  of  the  27th,  Floyd  read 
a  paper,  which  was  incorporated  in  his  resignation  two  days 
afterwards,  in  which  he  said  nothing  about  violating  orders, 
but  reiterated  that  Major  Anderson,  by  his  movement,  had 


154  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S   CABINET 

violated  solemn  pledges  of  the  government.  This  paper  is 
incorporated  in  his  resignation,  presented  on  the  29th,  which 
was  published  in  the  "  Constitution  "  of  January  1,  and  is  as 

follows :  — 

War  Department,  December  29,  1860. 
Sir,  —  On  the  evening  of  the  27th  inst.,  I  read  the  follow- 
ing paper  to  you  in  the  presence  of  the  Cabinet :  — 

Council  Chamber,  Executive  Mansion. 
Sir,  —  It  is  evident  now  from  the  action  of  the  commander 
at  Fort  Moultrie,  that  the  solemn  pledges  of  the  government 
have  been  violated  by  Major  Anderson.  In  my  judgment 
but  one  remedy  is  now  left  us  by  which  to  vindicate  our  honor 
and  prevent  civil  war.  It  is  in  vain  now  to  hope  for  confi- 
dence on  the  part  of  the  people  of  South  Carolina  in  any 
further  pledges  as  to  the  action  of  the  military.  One  remedy 
only  is  left ;  that  is,  to  withdraw  the  garrison  from  the  harbor 
altogether.  I  hope  the  President  will  allow  me  to  make  that 
order  at  once.  This  order,  in  my  judgment,  can  alone  pre- 
vent bloodshed  and  civil  war. 

John  B.  Floyd, 

Secretary  of  War. 
To  The  President, 
December  27,  1860. 

I  then  considered  the  honor  of  the  administration  pledged 
to  maintain  the  troops  in  the  position  they  occupied  ;  for  such 
had  been  the  assurances  given  to  the  gentlemen  of  South  Car- 
olina, who  had  a  right  to  speak  for  her.  South  Carolina,  on 
the  other  hand,  gave  reciprocal  pledges,  that  no  force  should  be 
brought  by  them  against  the  troops  or  against  the  property  of 
the  United  States.  The  sole  object  of  both  parties  to  these 
reciprocal  pledges  was  to  prevent  collision  and  effusion  of 
blood  in  the  hope  that  some  means  might  be  found  for  a  peace- 
ful accommodation  of  the  existing  trouble,  the  two  Houses  of 
Congress  having  both  raised  committees  looking  to  this  object. 


STANTON'S  ACCOUNT  OF  THE   CRISIS  155 

Thus  affairs  stood  until  the  action  of  Major  Anderson 
(taken,  unfortunately,  while  commissioners  were  on  their  way 
to  this  capital,  on  a  peaceful  mission  looking  to  the  avoidance 
of  bloodshed)  has  complicated  matters  in  the  existing  manner. 
Our  refusal,  or  even  delay,  to  place  matters  back  where  they 
stood  under  our  agreement  invites  collision,  and  must  inevita- 
bly inaugurate  civil  war  in  our  land. 

I  cannot  consent  to  be  the  agent  of  such  a  calamity. 

I  deeply  regret  to  feel  myself  under  the  necessity  of  ten- 
dering to  you  my  resignation  as  Secretary  of  War,  because  I 
can  no  longer  hold  it,  under  my  convictions  of  patriotism, 
with  honor,  subjected,  as  I  am,  to  the  violation  of  solemn 
pledges  and  plighted  faith. 

"With  the  highest  personal  regard  I  am, 

Most  truly  yours, 

John  B.  Floyd. 

To  his  Excellency, 

The  President  of  the  United  States. 

Second.  That  "  Mr.  Buchanan,  explaining  the  embarrass- 
ment of  the  Secretary  of  War  (Floyd),  remarked  that  the 
act  of  Major  Anderson  would  occasion  exasperation  in  the 
South.  He  had  told  Floyd  that  as  the  government  was 
strong,  forbearance  towards  erring  brethren  might  win  them 
back  to  their  allegiance,  and  that  that  officer  might  be  ordered 
back." 

I  cannot  at  this  distance  of  time  state  the  exact  words  of 
Mr.  Buchanan  before  the  Cabinet.  According  to  my  recol- 
lection, the  statement  in  the  "  extract "  is  substantially  true. 
For  a  considerable  period  during  the  pendency  of  the  discus- 
sion, which  continued  several  days,  Mr.  Buchanan  manifested 
a  determination  to  order  Major  Anderson  back,  upon  the 
ground  that  it  was  essential  to  the  peace  of  the  country,  and 
also  that  the  movement  was  a  violation  of  some  pledge  or 
promise  of  his,  which  he  was  bound  to  fulfill.     Floyd  and 


156  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S   CABINET 

Thompson  both  asserted  repeatedly,  in  Mr.  Buchanan's  pre- 
sence, that  such  pledge  had  been  given  by  him,  and  during 
three  days'  debate  I  did  not  hear  him  deny  it,  although  mem- 
bers of  tlae  Cabinet  asked  for  a  specification  of  the  time  and 
place,  and  insisted  that  it  was  impossible  that  such  a  pledge 
could  have  been  given. 

Third.  That  Floyd's  proposition  to  withdraw  the  garrison 
was  earnestly  opposed  by  members  of.  the  Cabinet,  including 
myself ;  that  direct  allusion  was  made  by  me,  in  debate,  to 
the  then  recently  discovered  theft  of  Indian  Trust  Funds  in 
the  Interior  Department,  by  a  clerk  of  that  department,  and 
Floyd's  complicity  in  the  transaction ;  and  that  I  asserted 
that  to  add  to  these  crimes  the  crime  of  surrendering  Fort 
Sumter  would  be  a  dangerous  experiment  to  those  concerned 
in  it. 

This  allegation  is  also  true.  From  the  first,  the  proposi- 
tion received  my  determined  hostility,  and  that  of  two  other 
members  of  the  Cabinet.  Allusion  was  made  by  me  to  the 
fraudulent  acceptances  of  Floyd,  and  the  abstraction  of  the 
Indian  Trust  Funds  from  the  Interior  Department,  and  to 
the  just  fury  that  would  be  excited  by  a  greater  crime. 

Fourth.  That  the  adoption  of  Floyd's  proposition  by  Mr. 
Buchanan  would  have  been  instantly  followed  by  my  resigna- 
tion and  that  of  other  members  of  the  Cabinet. 

This  allegation  is  also  substantially  true.  Apprehending 
that  the  proposition  would  be  adopted  by  Mr.  Buchanan,  my 
resignation  was  signed  and  ready  to  be  delivered  on  the  spot, 
the  instant  the  order  should  be  made.  Two  other  members 
of  the  Cabinet  informed  me  that  they  would  also  resign,  and 
I  believe  they  would  have  done  so. 

The  "  Observer  "  article  is  erroneous  in  the  statement  that 
General  Dix  was  present  on  the  occasion.  He  was  not  then 
in  the  Cabinet.  But  from  his  openly  declared  opinion,  I 
have  no  doubt  that  ordering  Major  Anderson  from  Foi't  Sum- 
ter, at  any  time  after  he  came  into  the  Cabinet,  would  have 


STANTON'S  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  CRISIS         157 

met  his  earnest  opposition,  and  would  have  been  followed  by 
his  immediate  resignation. 

Fifth.  That  the  refusal  to  order  Major  Anderson  from 
Fort  Sumter  resulted  in  Floyd's  resignation. 

This  allegation  is  true.  Floyd's  resignation  (as  you  will 
see  by  reading  it)  is  placed  on  the  distinct  ground  of  violated 
pledges  and  the  refusal  or  delay  to  "jilace  affairs  back," 
viz.,  withdrawing  the  garrison  altogether  from  the  harbor  of 
Charleston. 

The  foregoing  covers  substantially,  I  think,  all  the  points 
made  in  the  article  of  which  you  have  given  me  an  extract. 
According  to  my  recollection,  the  extract  from  the  article, 
which  you  call  Mr.  Weed's,  is,  except  in  the  particulars  men- 
tioned, substantially  true. 

The  principal  error  of  the  "  Observer  "  article  is,  perhaps, 
in  ascribing  to  me  more  credit  than  is  due  in  awakening  Mr. 
Buchanan  to  the  real  character  of  Floyd's  contemplated 
treason.  Whatever  could  be  done  to  that  end  was  done  by 
Judge  Black  and  Mr.  Holt,  as  well  as  by  myself,  and  with  the 
earnestness  of  men  who  felt  that  our  national  existence  was 
at  stake. 

After  most  careful  examination,  it  does  not  appear  to  me 
that  the  article  alluded  to  contains  any  "  slander  "  upon  Mr. 
Buchanan,  or  that  it  originated  in  any  "  personal  or  political " 
malice.  The  proposition  to  give  up  Fort  Sumter  was  made 
by  Floyd.  Mr.  Buchanan  considted  his  Cabinet  upon  it, 
some  of  whom  violently  advocated  it,  while  others  opposed  it 
resolutely  as  a  crime ;  and,  after  several  days'  angry  debate, 
it  was  rejected.  I  asserted  then  to  Mr.  Buchanan,  and  assert 
now,  that  the  surrender  of  Fort  Sumter  by  the  government 
would  have  been,  in  my  opinion,  a  crime  equal  to  the  crime 
of  Arnold,  and  that  all  who  participated  in  the  act  should  be 
hung  like  Andre. 

In  thus  fully  replying  to  your  communication,  I  do  not 
recognize  any  obligation  on  my  part  to  answer  inquiries  as  to 


158  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S   CABINET 

the  truth  or  falsehood  of  statements  made  by  Mr.  Weed,  or 
any  other  person,  as  to  what  is  supposed  to  have  taken  place 
in  cabinet  meetings ;  but  your  personal  and  political  rela- 
tions to  Mr.  Buchanan,  and  your  professed  purpose  to  vindi- 
cate the  record  of  his  administration,  leave  no  room  to  doubt 
that,  while  your  letter  to  me,  and  similar  letters  to  other  mem- 
bers of  his  Cabinet,  may  have  been  written  without  his  know- 
ledge, you  are  acting,  if  not  by  his  direction,  at  least  with  his 
assent;  and  as  the  matter  relates  to  an  important  national 
event,  I  do  not  recognize  any  obligation  of  secrecy  to  prevent 
the  public  from  being  truthfully  informed,  as  they  were  at 
the  time  of  the  actual  occurrences,  in  respect  to  Floyd's  trai- 
torous proposition. 

When  this  letter  was  found  among  Mr.  Stanton's 
papers,  it  was  submitted  to  Judge  Holt.  He  listened 
attentively  while,  at  his  request,  it  was  read  to  him,  and 
conversed  freely  on  the  matters  with  which  it  deals. 
He  said  it  was  evidently  the  same  one  that  Mr.  Stanton 
had  read  to  him  at  the  War  Department  in  1863,  and 
finally  decided  not  to  send ;  and  that  while  it  fell  far 
short  of  what  might  have  been  written,  it  was  correct 
as  far  as  it  went.  He  said  that  Mr.  Stanton's  protest 
against  acceding  to  the  demands  of  Floyd  was  even 
more  vigorous  than  therein  represented.  He  not  only 
said  that  it  would  be  a  crime  equal  to  the  crime  of 
Arnold,  and  that  all  who  participated  in  it  ought  to  be 
hung  like  Andre,  but  he  also  said  that  "  a  President  of 
the  United  States  who  would  make  such  an  order  would 
be  guilty  of  treason."  "  At  this  point,"  said  Judge 
Holt,  —  "and  I  remember  the  scene  as  clearly  as  though 
it  happened  but  yesterday,  —  Mr.  Buchanan  raised  his 
Lands  deprecatingly  and  said,  as  if  wounded  by  the 


JUDGE  HOLT  ON  THE  CABINET  CRISIS        159 

intensity  of  Mr.  Stanton's  language  and  manner :  *  Oh, 
no !  not  so  bad  as  that,  my  friend !  —  not  so  bad  as 
that ! '  " 

Judge  Holt  pronounced  a  glowing  tribute  to  Stanton 
as  a  patriot  and  a  man,  saying,  among  other  things : 
"  His  loyalty  to  the  Union  cause  was  a  passion.  He 
could  not  open  his  hps  on  the  subject  without  giving 
utterance  to  the  strongest  expressions.  He  never 
changed  from  first  to  last  in  his  devotion  to  the  coun- 
try, nor  in  the  resolute  manner  in  which  he  asserted 
and  upheld  his  convictions." 

Referring  to  this  crisis,  Mr.  Stanton  wrote  to  his 
brother-in-law,  the  Hon.  Christopher  P.  Wolcott,  then 
attorney-general  of  Ohio,  as  follows  :  — 

The  great  contest  for  the  Union  commenced  a  few  minutes 
after  I  parted  from  you  here.  On  reaching  my  office,  I  found 
a  summons  to  the  cabinet  council.  On  entering  the  chamber, 
I  found  treason  with  bold  and  brazen  front  demanding  the 
surrender  of  Fort  Sumter.  The  contest  continued  until  dark, 
when  dispute  ran  so  high  that  we  adjourned  until  eight  o'clock 
in  the  evening.  What  followed  is  now  history,  —  the  details 
I  will  give  you  when  we  meet. 

One  by  one  the  secessionists  have  been  worked  out.  We 
are  now  a  unit.  Who  will  come  into  the  present  vacancies  is 
uncertain.  I  think  no  retrograde  step  will  be  made.  How 
far  we  can  advance  is  imcertain. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

New  Departure  of  the  Administration.  —  Anderson's  Act  approved. 

—  Attempt  to  reinforce  Sumter.  —  Rebel  Attack  on  the  Star 
of  the  West.  —  Treason  of  Jacob  Thompson.  —  His  Resignation. 

—  Anderson's  Truce.  —  The  Confederacy  erected.  —  Attempts  at 
Compromise.  —  War  not  then  seriously  thought  of.  —  No  War 
Party.  —  The  Government  and  the  Secessionists  equally  disin- 
clined to  open  Hostilities. 

When  tlie  President  had  returned  to  the  South  Caro- 
lina commissioners  their  final  and  offensive  communi- 
cation of  January  2,  he  declared  very  emphatically  that 
"reinforcements  must  now  be  sent."  General  Scott 
accordingly  dispatched  the  chartered  steamer  Star  of 
the  West  to  Charleston  with  troops.  Subsequent  ad- 
vices from  Anderson,  that  he  felt  secure  in  his  position 
and  that  troops  could  be  sent  him  at  leisure,  led  to  an 
order  countermanding  that  for  reinforcements,  but  it 
reached  New  York  after  the  steamer  had  sailed. 

On  the  10th  of  January  Acting  Secretary  of  War 
Holt  wrote  to  Anderson,  approving  his  course  in  trans- 
ferring his  troops  from  Sumter. 

Jacob  Thompson,  Secretary  of  the  Interior,  tele- 
graphed to  one  of  the  insurgent  party  in  South  Carolina, 
on  the  8th  of  January,  that  the  Star  of  the  West  had 
sailed  for  Charleston  with  recruits,  and  had  the  satis- 
faction of  knowing  that  his  dispatch  was  received  in 
time  to  cause  her  repulse  by  rebel  cannon.     He  then 


TREASON  OF  JACOB  THOMPSON  161 

resigned  bis  place  in  the  Cabinet  in  a  communication 
expressive  of  a  sense  of  injury  because  the  order  for 
reinforcements  bad  been  sent  witbout  notice  to  bim. 
To  tbis  tbe  President  repHed  tbat  tbe  order  had  been 
decided  on  in  a  special  cabinet  meeting,  at  which  Mr. 
Thompson  himself  was  present,  and  that  there  was  no 
dissenting  voice.    Judge  Black's  testimony  is  as  follows : 

The  order  was  made  in  the  Cabinet,  but  Mr.  Thompson, 
Secretary  of  the  Interior,  did  not  hear  it ;  perhaps  it  was  not 
intended  he  should.^ 

Known  to  be  a  conspirator,  —  because  he  had  then  but 
recently  returned  from  North  Carolina,  where  he  had 
been  publicly  received  as  the  Commissioner  of  the  State 
of  Mississippi,  duly  appointed  by  her  legislature,  to 
urge  the  secession  of  the  former  State,  —  Thompson 
was  still  tolerated  in  the  Cabinet  of  a  President  whose 
orders  for  the  safety  of  the  government  it  was  not 
deemed  prudent  for  bim  to  know. 

It  is  probable  that  Thompson  resigned  partly  because 
be  saw  that  he  w^ould  no  longer  be  trusted,  and  partly 
because  he  scented  the  approach  of  the  "  tyranny  "  soon 
to  be  practiced  upon  bis  sort  of  people.  After  his 
resignation  he  went  home  to  Mississippi,  and  made  an 
exultant  public  speech,  in  which,  after  boasting  that  he 
gave  notice  to  the  South  Carolinians  of  the  sailing  of 
the  Star  of  the  West  with  reinforcements,  he  said :  — 

The  troops  were  thus  put  on  their  guard,  and  when  the 
Star  of  the  West  arrived,  she  received  a  warm  welcome  from 
booming  cannon,  and  soon  beat  a  retreat.^ 

1  Black's  Speeches  and  Essays,  page  20. 

^  National  Intelligencer,  newspaper,  Washington,  March  2,  1861. 


162  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S   CABINET 

Thus  was  the  first  shot  of  the  RebelHon  fired  under 
the  direction  of  a  member  of  the  Cabinet  of  Mr.  Buch- 
anan. 

Major  Anderson  chose  to  treat  the  firing  upon  the 
Star  of  the  West  as  an  act  not  authorized  by  any 
organized  enemy,  but  at  once  notified  the  governor  that 
unless  disavowed,  it  would  be  treated  as  an  act  of  war. 
The  latter  avowed  and  justified  the  act,  whereupon 
Major  Anderson,  unwilling  with  his  little  force  to  enter 
upon  actual  hostilities,  agreed  to  refrain  from  any  action 
until  he  could  submit  the  matter  to  the  government  at 
Washington,  and  receive  orders.  The  governor  asked 
that  Fort  Sumter  be  delivered  to  him,  with  a  bill  for  its 
money  value.  The  situation  was  declared  by  him  to  be 
a  "  state  of  hostilities,"  which  of  course  was  true.  He 
sent  his  Attorney-General,  Hayne,  to  Washington  with 
his  ultimatum,  accompanied  by  a  United  States  officer 
bearing  dispatches  from  Major  Anderson. 

On  the  16th  of  January  Secretary  of  War  Holt 
wrote  to  Maj  or  Anderson  :  "  You  rightly  designated 
the  firing  into  the  Star  of  the  West  as  an  ^  act  of  war.'  " 
But  he  informed  him  that  under  the  circumstances  his 
forbearance  in  not  returning  the  fire  was  fully  ap- 
proved by  the  President.  He  was  assured  that  a  prompt 
and  vigorous  effort  would  be  made  to  forward  suppHes 
and  reinforcements  whenever  he  should  require  them. 

Major  Anderson's  truce  with  the  South  Carolina 
authorities,  pending  orders  from  Washington  after  the 
firing  on  the  Star  of  the  West  January  9,  was  pro- 
longed until  January  31  by  the  withholding  from  the 
President,  by  Attorney-General  Hayne,  of  that  State,  of 


THE  CONFEDERACY  ERECTED  163 

Governor  Pickens's  written  demand  for  the  surrender 
of  Fort  Sumter,  and  still  further,  until  February  6,  by 
delay  in  reply  to  that  letter,  when  deUvered.  On  the 
latter  date  the  surrender  was  peremptorily  refused,  and 
the  South  Carolina  governor  was  notified  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  War,  by  order  of  President  Buchanan,  that  an 
attack  upon  the  fort  would  place  upon  the  assailants  the 
responsibility  of  inaugurating  civil  war. 

On  the  1st  of  February  seven  States  had  adopted 
ordinances  of  secession.  On  the  4th  of  that  month 
the  Congfress  of  those  States  had  assembled  at  Mont- 
gomery,  Alabama;  on  the  8th  adopted  the  provisional 
Constitution  of  the  Confederate  States  of  America ;  on 
the  9th  chosen  Jefferson  Davis  President,  and  on  the 
18th  inducted  him  into  that  office. 

The  energies  of  Congress  were  wholly  devoted,  during 
the  remainder  of  the  session,  to  the  discussion  of  propo- 
sitions for  compromise.  It  was  not  proposed  by  any 
that  the  government  should  make  any  hostile  movement 
against  the  South.  War  measures  were  not  seriously 
thought  of  in  or  out  of  Congress.  The  formation  of 
a  rebel  government  at  Montgomery  was  treated,  as  the 
secession  of  the  States  had  been,  as  void  and  not  calling 
for  any  action  by  the  federal  authorities,  unless  followed 
up  by  overt  acts  of  treason  in  the  form  of  aggressive 
war  upon  the  United  States  government.  The  entire 
North  was  still  skeptical  as  to  the  probabihty  of  a  war. 
Those  of  the  Republicans  who  opposed  all  compromises 
were  divided  into  two  classes,  —  one  of  which  desired 
separation,  while  the  other  believed  the  South  would 
surrender  if  the  North  stood  firm.     The  Union  Demo- 


164  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S   CABINET 

crats  and  those  of  the  Repubhcans  who  favored  com- 
promise still  hoped  there  would  be  some  peaceful  settle- 
ment. The  complaints,  therefore,  of  Mr.  Buchanan^  and 
of  Mr.  Curtis,  his  biographer,^  and  Judge  Black,^  that 
Congress  refused  to  vote  an  army  with  which  to  fight 
secessionists,  and  the  counter  complaints  by  the  Presi- 
dent's opponents  because  he  remained  inactive  while 
rebellion  made  head,  instead  of  inaugurating  hostilities 
against  it,  are  equally  unjust.  The  nation,  in  all  its 
departments,  drifted  under  both  Buchanan  and  Lincoln, 
from  December  until  April,  because  to  assert  authority 
by  force  might  invite  more  resistance  than  could  then  be 
overcome,  and  because  rebellion,  though  eager  enough 
in  seizing  public  property  not  guarded,  including 
$500,000  in  gold  coin  in  the  United  States  mint  at 
New  Orleans,  had  not  yet  deemed  it  wise  to  attack  any 
forts  where  military  resistance  was  probable.  Each  side 
was  endeavoring  to  put  upon  the  other  the  awful  respon- 
sibility of  commencing  actual  hostilities,  if  such  was  to 
be  the  outcome. 

^  See  Lis  Defence,  page  160. 

2  Life  of  Buchanan,  vol.  ii.  p.  478. 

8  Black's  Speeches  and  Essays,  page  277. 


CHAPTER   XXII 

Mr.  Stanton's  "Work  during  the  Remainder  of  his  Term  as  Attor- 
ney-General. —  Freedom  from  Disguises.  —  He  affiliates  with 
Union  Men  of  all  Parties,  and  antagonizes  all  others.  —  Fidel- 
ity to  the  President.  —  The  Plot  to  seize  the  National  Capital.  — 
Stanton's  Interview  with  Sumner.  —  Alarm  of  Black.  —  The 
Real  Peril.  —  How  it  was  averted  by  the  Presence  of  Troops. 
—  Importance  of  Stanton's  Services  at  that  Time. 

Mr.  Stanton  found  work  enouofh  durinof  the  re- 
mainder  of  his  term  even  for  his  irrepressible  energy. 
He  devoted  himself  to  the  pati-iotic  cause.  It  aroused 
all  his  powers  and  took  possession  of  all  his  faculties. 
He  was  inspired  with  a  passionate  ardor  that  broke 
forth  with  vehemence  whenever  occasion  arose.  He 
set  on  foot  inquiries  as  to  the  purposes  of  the  secession- 
ists in  Washington  and  its  vicinity,  and  prosecuted 
them  with  untiring  zeal.  He  made  proselytes  and 
denounced  heretics.  To  Democrats  and  Republicans 
he  set  the  example  of  sinking  partisanship  in  the  ser- 
vice of  the  Union.  He  counseled  with  all  true  men, 
who  were  certainly  opposed  to  secession,  whether  they 
agreed  with  him  or  not  on  the  subject  of  compromise 
plans. 

While  cooperating  with  the  most  radical  RepubHcans 
to  uncover  and  thwart  plots  and  conspiracies,  he  re- 
mained most  faithful  to  his  chief,  and  to  his  associates 


166  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S  CABINET 

in  the  reconstructed  Cabinet,  who  were  a  unit  against 
the  conspirators.^ 

His  cooperation  with  the  most  conservative  of  the 
Union  Democrats  and  Republicans,  in  advocating  a 
constitutional  amendment  which  would  secure  the  bor- 
der States  to  the  Union  by  protecting  slavery  in  all  the 
rights  secured  for  it  under  the  Constitution  as  it  then 
was,  involved  no  departure  from  his  understanding  with 
the  uncompromising  element  among  the  Republicans, 
for  he  had  not  agreed  with  these  upon  anything  except 
hostility  to  the  common  enemy.  He  deceived  none. 
His  attitude  was  known  of  all  men.  We  have  the  tes- 
timony of  Judge  Black  that  he  and  President  Buch- 
anan were  at  that  time  pursuing  the  same  course,  and 
that  he  frequently  conferred  with  Mr.  Seward,  from 
whom  he  kept  nothing  secret,  which  related  to  public 
duties.     Here  are  his  words  :  — 

The  administration  kept  nothing  back  ;  the  President  vol- 
unteered to  give  all  he  knew  concerning  the  state  of  the 
Union ;  every  call  for  information  was  promptly  and  fully 
answered.  If  that  had  not  been  enough,  every  member  of 
the  Cabinet  would  have  been  perfectly  free  to  speak  with  any 
member  of  Congress,  or  to  go  in  person  before  any  com- 
mittee. Mr.  Seward  did  confer  fuUy  with  me  at  the  State 
Department.^ 

Senator  Sumner  stated  to  Senator  Wilson,  in  1870,^ 

^  Secretary  Seward  said,  in  a  letter  to  Henry  Wilson,  that  Stanton 
expressed  "  entire  confidence  in  the  loyalty  of  the  President,  and  of  the 
heads  of  the  departments  who  remained  in  association  with  him  until  the 
close  of  that  administration."     Henry  Wilson,  in  Atlantic  Monthly,  1870. 

*  Black's  Speeches  and  Essays,  page  279. 

8  Atlantic  Monthly,  April,  1870. 


THE  PLOT  TO  SEIZE  THE  CAPITAL  167 

that  in  the  month  of  January,  1861,  he  called  on  Mr. 
Stanton  at  the  department ;  that  the  latter  made  an 
appointment  to  see  him  at  his  lodgings  at  a  late  hour 
that  night,  and  at  this  conference  described  the  deter- 
mination of  the  Southern  leaders,  and  developed  partic- 
ularly their  plan  to  obtain  possession  of  the  national 
capital  and  the  national  archives,  so  that  they  might 
substitute  themselves  for  the  existing  government. 

I  was  struck  [says  Mr.  Sumner],  not  only  by  the  know- 
ledge he  showed  of  hostile  movements,  but  by  his  instinctive 
insight  into  men  and  things.  His  particular  object  was 
to  make  all  watchful  and  prepared  for  the  traitors.  I  saw 
nobody  at  the  time  who  had  so  strong  a  grasp  of  the  whole 
terrible  case. 

Mr.  Stanton's  apprehensions  for  the  safety  of  the 
capital  were  based  partly  upon  his  knowledge  of  the 
men  who  favored  the  rebel  cause,  and  partly  upon 
the  open  threats  indulged  in  by  the  less  prudent  of 
their  clans.  To  these  were  added,  of  course,  the  know- 
ledge of  revolutionary  methods  and  possibilities,  common 
enouo'h  with  all  who  had  read  of  civil  commotions  in 

o 

other  lands. 

One  of  their  favorite  ideas,  boldly  advanced  and 
stoutly  maintained,  was  that,  if  Maryland  should 
secede,  the  District  of  Columbia  would  "  revert "  to 
that  State,  by  which  it  had  been  ceded  to  the  general 
government.  This  argument  was  certainly  as  sound 
as  that  which  claimed  Fort  Sumter  as  the  property  of 
South  Carolina. 

The  revolutionary  spirits  who  dominated  pubhc  opin- 
ion at  the  capital  appeared  to  take  it  for  granted  that 


168  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S   CABINET 

every  obstacle  to  their  wishes  could  and  would  be 
removed,  and  that  every  necessary  and  desirable  step 
leading  to  the  triumph  of  their  plans  would  be  success- 
fully taken.  That  the  secession  of  Maryland  was  con- 
fidently relied  upon  by  them  is  well  known,  and  if  it 
could  have  been  accomplished  before  the  count  of  the 
electoral  vote,  which  was  to  take  place  on  the  13th  of 
February,  the  rebel  plan  was  understood  to  include  the 
seizure  of  the  capital. 

Said  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  in  his  last  public  speech 
(May  1,  1861),  at  Chicago  :  — 

If  the  disunion  candidate  in  the  late  presidential  contest 
had  carried  the  united  South,  their  scheme  was,  the  Northern 
(Candidate  successful,  to  seize  the  capital  last  spring,  and  by 
a  united  South  and  divided  North  hold  it.^ 

Edwin  L.  Stanton,  the  Secretary's  son,  thus  wrote :  ^ 

Every  department  in  Washington  then  contained  numer- 
ous traitors  and  spies.  Only  a  handfid  of  United  States 
troops  were  assembled  at  Washington,  and  the  residents  of 
the  capital  were  mainly  in  sympathy  with  the  Southern  peo- 
ple. To  a  greater  extent  probably  than  any  of  his  associates 
in  the  Cabinet,  Mr,  Stanton's  mind  was  filled  with  forebod- 
ing that  attempts  would  be  made  by  insurrection  or  assassina- 
tion to  prevent  the  inauguration  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  and  to  seize 
and  hold  for  the  Southern  States  the  capital  and  insignia 
of  the  government,  and  thus  enable  those  States  to  appear 
before  the  world  as  a  government  de  facto,  succeeding  to 
the  power  and  authority  of  the  United  States.  Oppressed 
by  appreciation  of  this  imminent  peril  and  by  anxiety  to  a 
greater  extent  than  his  associates,  Mr.  Stanton  conveyed  fre- 
quently and  urgently  his  impressions  and  his  information  to 

*  McPherson's  Rebellion,  page  392.  *  Manuscript. 


ALARM  OF  JUDGE  BLACK         169 

General  Scott,  and  to  friends  and  supporters  of  Mr.  Lincoln. 
He  deemed  the  most  careful  and  thorough  precautions  neces- 
sary to  prevent  a  coup  d'etat  which  might  be  fatal  to  the 
Union.  It  is  impossible  now  to  estimate  the  intensity  of  Mr. 
Stanton's  conviction  of  this  danger,  or  the  efforts  which  he 
made,  and  stimulated  others  to  make,  with  a  view  to  prepare 
against  and  prevent  occurrences  which  might  have  attended 
the  installation  of  the  new  administration. 

Judge  Black  fully  shared  Mr.  Stanton's  belief  that 
the  capital  was  in  imminent  danger.  As  late  as  the 
22d  of  January,  being  confined  to  his  room  with  an 
attack  of  rheumatism,  he  wrote  to  President  Buchanan 
on  the  subject  as  follows  :  ^  — 

You  must  be  aware  that  the  possession  of  this  city  is  abso- 
lutely essential  to  the  ultimate  designs  of  the  secessionists. 
They  can  establish  a  Southern  Confederacy  with  the  capital 
of  the  Union  in  their  hands,  and  without  it  all  the  more 
important  part  of  their  scheme  is  bound  to  fail.  If  they  can 
take  it,  and  do  not  take  it,  they  are  fools.  Knowing  them  as 
I  do  to  be  men  of  ability  and  political  good  sense,  not  likely 
to  omit  that  which  is  necessary  to  forward  their  ends,  I  take 
it  for  granted  that  they  have  their  eye  upon  Washington. 
To  prove  their  desire  to  take  it  requires  no  evidence  at  all 
beyond  the  intrinsic  probability  of  the  fact  itself.  The 
affirmative  presumption  is  so  strong  that  he  who  denies  it  is 
bound  to  establish  the  negative.  But  there  are  additional 
and  very  numerous  circumstances  tending  to  show  that  a 
conspiracy  to  that  effect  has  actually  been  formed,  and  that 
large  numbers  of  persons  are  deeply  and  busily  engaged  in 
bringing  the  plot  to  a  head  at  what  they  conceive  to  be  the 
proper  time.     I  do  not  mean  now  to  enumerate  all  the  facts. 

1  Crawford's  Genesis  of  the  Civil  War,  page  241  ;  Curtis's  Life  of 
Buchanan,  vol.  ii.  p.  491. 


170  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S   CABINET 

They  form  a  body  of  circumstantial  evidence  that  is  over- 
whelming and  irresistible. 

I  know  that  you  do  not  believe  this,  or  did  not  when  I  saw 
you  last.  Your  incredulity  seemed  then  to  be  founded  upon 
the  assurances  of  certain  outside  persons,  in  whom  you  con- 
fided, that  nothing  of  that  kind  was  in  contemplation.  The 
mere  opinion  of  these  persons  is  worth  nothing  apart  from 
their  own  personal  knowledge.  They  can  have  no  personal 
knowledge  unless  they  are  themselves  a  part  of  the  con- 
spiracy. In  the  latter  case  fidelity  to  their  fellows  makes 
treachery  to  you  a  sort  of  a  moral  necessity. 

He  implored  the  President  to  prepare  for  the  worst, 
because  "  preparation  can  do  no  possible  harm  in  any 
event,  and  in  the  event  which  seems  to  me  most  likely, 
it  is  the  country's  only  chance  of  salvation." 

In  a  controversy  which  arose  soon  after  Mr.  Stan- 
ton's death  concerning  the  events  which  transpired 
during  that  period,  Judge  Black  made  the  following 
reference  to  Mr.  Sumner's  statement  of  his  interview 
with  Mr.  Stanton,  and  to  the  danger  which  menaced 
the  capital :  — 

Early  in  the  winter  somebody  started  the  sensational  rumor 
that  on  or  before  the  4th  of  March  a  riot  would  be  got  up 
in  Washington  which  might  seriously  endanger  the  peace  of 
the  city.  It  was  discussed  and  talked  about  and  blown  upon 
in  various  ways,  but  no  tangible  evidence  of  its  reality  could 
ever  be  found.  The  President  referred  to  it  in  a  message  to 
Congress,  and  said  he  did  not  share  in  such  apprehensions ; 
but  he  pledged  himself  in  any  event  to  preserve  the  peace. 
When  the  midnight  meeting  took  place  (between  Stanton 
and  Sumner),  the  rumor  had  lived  its  life  out,  —  had  paid  its 
breath  to  time  and  the  mortal  custom  of  such  things  at  Wash- 


STANTON'S  INTERVIEW  WITH  SUMNER       171 

iugton  ;    it  was  a  dead  canard  which  had  ceased  to  alarm 
even  women  or  children.^ 

If  Judge  Black's  statement  of  1870  is  true,  —  that 
Mr.  Stanton,  "  in  January,  1861,"  attempted  to  impose 
upon  Mr.  Sumner  "a  dead  canard,"  —  it  follows  that 
Judge  Black,  in  his  letter  of  January  22,  to  President 
Buchanan  above  quoted,  was  attempting  the  same 
imposition  upon  his  chief.  The  noble  anger  to  which 
he  was  then  stirred  by  the  machinations  of  the  country's 
enemies  spoke  out  in  that  letter  in  terms  too  earnest 
to  admit  of  a  doubt  of  its  genuineness.  His  language 
of  1870  must  be  attributed  to  a  frame  of  mind  which 
rendered  it  impossible  for  him  to  do  justice  to  Mr. 
Stanton  on  any  subject  whatever. 

Four  days  after  the  date  of  this  letter  of  1861  a  reso- 
lution was  adopted  in  the  House  for  an  inquiry  whether 
any  secret  organization  hostile  to  the  government  of 
the  United  States  existed  in  the  District  of  Columbia, 
and  whether  any  federal  or  city  officers  were  members 
thereof. 

Without  awaiting  the  result  of  this  investigation, 
and  before  the  count  of  the  electoral  vote,  the  President 
ordered  a  body  of  regular  troops  to  Washington.  This 
action  caused  the  introduction  of  a  resolution  into 
the  House  (February  11,  1861),  calhng  upon  the  Presi- 
dent for  the  reason  which  prompted  it,  and  inquiring 
whether  he  had  "any  information  of  a  conspiracy  on 
the  part  of  any  portion  of  the  citizens  of  the  country 
to  seize  the  capital  and  prevent  the  inauguration  of 
the  President-elect." 

1  Black's  Speeches  and  Essays,  page  81. 


172  STANTON  IN   BUCHANAN'S   CABINET 

On  the  12tli  of  February  the  committee  of  the  House 
reported  that,  after  the  presidential  election,  disaffected 
persons  of  high  and  low  position  consulted  together  on 
the  question  of  submission,  and  also  upon  various  modes 
of  resistance  to  the  result. 

Among  other  modes  [says  their  report]  resistance  to  count- 
ing the  ballots  ;  to  the  inauguration  of  Mr.  Lincoln ;  the 
seizure  of  the  capital  and  District  of  Columbia  were  discussed 
informally  in  this  city  and  elsewhere.  But  too  much  diver- 
sity of  opinion  seems  to  have  existed  to  admit  of  the  adop- 
tion of  any  well-organized  jilan,  until  some  of  the  States 
commenced  to  reduce  their  theories  of  secession  to  practice. 
Since  then  the  persons  thus  disaffected  seem  to  have  adopted 
the  idea  that  all  resistance  to  the  government,  if  there  is  to 
be  any,  should  have  at  least  the  color  of  state  authority.  If 
the  purpose  was  at  any  time  entertained  of  forming  an 
organization,  secret  or  open,  to  seize  the  District  of  Columbia, 
attack  the  capital,  or  prevent  the  inauguration  of  Mr.  Lincoln, 
it  seems  to  have  been  rendered  contingent  upon  the  secession 
of  either  Maryland  or  Virginia,  or  both,  and  the  sanction  of 
one  of  those  States. 

The  committee  said  that  certain  political  organiza- 
tions in  Maryland  and  in  the  District  had,  since  the 
election,  been  changed  into  military  organizations,  but 
"there  was  no  proof  that  they  intended  to  attack  the 
capital  or  the  District,  unless  the  surrender  should  be 
demanded  by  a  State  to  which  they  professed  a  higher 
degree  of  allegiance."  From  this  it  appeared  that  if 
Maryland  should  secede,  the  federal  capital  was  to  be 
claimed  by  her,  on  the  same  authority  of  state  sover- 
eignty by  which  sixteen  forts  with  over  twelve  hundred 
guns,   that  had  cost  the  government  six  and  a  half 


THE  REAL  PERIL  173 

millions  of  dollars,  had  then  already  been  seized  and 
held  in  the  Southern  Confederacy  which  had  been 
formed  at  Montgomery  some  days  before. 

On  the  18th  of  February  Secretary  of  War  Holt,  to 
whom  the  President  had  referred  the  House  resolution 
of  inquiry  concerning  the  cause  of  stationing  troops  in 
Washington,  made  a  report.  Alluding  to  the  revolu- 
tion, which  he  said  had  been  in  progress  during  the 
three  preceding  months,  he  recited  what  had  been 
accompHshed  by  its  "  surprises  and  treacherous  and 
ruthless  spoliations :  "  arsenals  seized  and  arms  appro- 
priated ;  forts  captured  and  garrisoned ;  and  more 
than  half  a  million  of  dollars  stolen  from  the  New 
Orleans  Mint,  and  placed  in  the  state  treasury  of  Loui- 
siana. He  told  of  the  surrender  of  revenue  cutters  to 
the  enemy  by  the  officers  in  command  of  them,  and  of 
the  treasonable  conduct  of  men  occupying  the  highest 
positions  in  the  public  service.  He  said  that  "  the 
earnest  endeavors  made  by  men  known  to  be  devoted 
to  the  revolution,  to  hurry  Virginia  and  Maryland 
out  of  the  Union,  were  regarded  as  preparatory  steps 
for  the  subjugation  of  Washington."  His  belief  in  the 
existence  of  such  a  scheme  "  rested  upon  information, 
some  of  which  was  of  a  most  conclusive  character,  that 
reached  the  government  from  many  parts  of  the  coun- 
try, not  merely  expressing  the  prevalence  of  the  opinion 
that  such  an  organization  had  been  formed,  but  also 
furnishing  the  plausible  ground  on  which  the  opinion 
was  based."  To  these  were  added  "  the  oft  repeated 
declarations  of  men  in  high  political  positions  here,  and 
who  were  known  to  have  intimate  relations  with  the 


174  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S  CABINET 

revolution,  if,  indeed,  they  did  not  hold  its  reins  in 
their  hands  —  to  the  effect  that  Mr.  Lincoln  would  not, 
or  should  not,  be  inaugurated  in  Washington." 

President  Buchanan,  in  a  special  message  to  Con- 
gress of  March  2,  said :  — 

At  the  present  moment,  when  all  is  quiet,  it  is  difficult  to 
realize  the  state  of  alarm  which  prevailed  when  the  troops 
were  first  ordered  to  this  city.  This  almost  immediately 
subsided  after  the  arrival  of  the  first  company. 

Thus  the  President  and  his  Secretary  of  War,  the 
committee  of  Congress,  and  Judge  Black  himself  all 
bore  witness  that  Mr.  Stanton  was  not  imposing  a 
"  dead  canard "  upon  Mr.  Sumner  at  the  midnight 
conference  they  had  "  in  the  month  of  January,"  1861, 
as  charged  by  Judge  Black  in  1870. 

It  is  beyond  controversy  that  the  early  plans  of  the 
disunionists  included  the  secession  of  Maryland  at  all 
hazards,  and  under  whatever  coercion  might  be  neces- 
sary and  possible,  in  order  that  the  nation's  capital 
might  be  proclaimed  either  the  capital  of  the  Southern 
Confederacy  as  such,  or  as  the  successor  of  the  sub- 
verted government  of  the  United  States.  The  careless 
prediction  of  this  scheme,  by  individuals  who  were  in 
full  sympathy  with  the  secession  movement,  was  like 
the  smoke  that  first  indicates  the  existence  of  a  dan- 
gerous fire  beneath  the  surface.  Had  it  been  allowed 
to  smoulder  uninterruptedly,  and  without  menace  or 
admonition  from  the  government,  the  Union  element 
of  Maryland  might  have  been  discouraged  and  over- 
powered, from  without  and  within,  and  a  cou])  d'etat 
have  preceded  the  electoral  count. 


IMPORTANCE  OF  HIS  SERVICES  176 

Stanton,  Black,  and  Holt  cooperated  in  arousing  the 
President  to  the  necessity  of  guarding  the  capital ;  and 
a  few  hundred  troops  served  to  remind  the  conspirators 
that  there  would  be  two  sides  to  the  question  if  force 
should  attempt  in  Washington  what  had  already  been 
done  in  the  cotton  States.  Perhaps  Mr.  Stanton  never 
served  his  country  more  effectively  within  a  like  period 
than  he  did  in  January,  1861,  by  his  unremitting  zeal 
in  showing  its  friends  the  dangers  above  described,  and 
leading  them  in  creating  the  pressure  under  which  the 
President  fmally  took  measures  to  guard  against  them. 
The  presence  of  the  troops  ordered  to  Washington  by 
Mr.  Buchanan  was  the  first  evidence  the  secessionists 
had  seen  that  even  mider  an  administration  they  had 
helped  to  create,  and  with  which  they  had  separated 
less  than  thirty  days  before,  the  nation  would  resort  to 
arms  against  rebellion.  It  doubtless  gave  a  check  to 
the  secession  movement  in  the  border  States,  for  it 
brought  home  to  them  the  reaUty  that  secession  ulti- 
mately meant  war,  in  which,  from  their  position,  they 
must  be  the  greatest  sufferers. 


CHAPTER   XXIII 

Mr.  Stanton's  Democracy  and  his  Patriotism.  —  His  Attitude 
towards  Slavery.  —  The  Pro-Slavery  Constitution.  —  His  Views 
on  Compromise  Propositions,  compared  with  those  of  Mr.  Lin- 
coln. —  Patriotic  Motives  of  Both.  —  Necessity  of  making  Union 
and  not  Anti-Slavery  the  Test.  —  The  Outlook  for  Emancipa- 
tion at  that  Time.  —  The  Northern  Disunionists. 

It  is  to  the  everlasting  honor  of  Mr.  Stanton  that 
from  the  time  he  came  in  contact  with  pubhc  affairs  he 
became,  and  to  the  end  remained,  an  object  of  intense 
hatred  to  every  enemy  of  his  country.  To  those  Dem- 
ocrats who  claimed  the  right  of  secession  to  be  a  funda- 
mental plank  in  the  Democratic  creed,  and  to  those  who, 
although  denying  it,  were  so  imbued  with  party  spirit 
that  they  would  not  sustain  the  government  when  under 
an  opposition  administration,  he  was  equally  odious. 
To  be  for  the  Union  cause  was,  in  their  view,  to  be  an 
"abolitionist,"  because  it  was  upholding  the  national 
authority  under  an  administration  opposed  to  the  na- 
tionalization of  slavery.  The  attempt  was  made  to 
dragoon  all  Democrats  into  sympathy  with  the  rebelHon 
by  denouncing  unconditional  unionists  as  abolition- 
ists. Mr.  Stanton  was  one  of  those  with  whom  this 
utterly  failed.  He  was  for  upholding  the  laws,  whether 
their  enforcement  was  intrusted  to  one  party  or  another, 
and  whether  the  offenders  against  them  had  been  polit- 
ically his  friends  or  his  opponents. 


MR.   STANTON'S   DEMOCRACY  177 

But  he  did  not  go  over  to  the  Republicans  in  1861, 
nor  profess  to  agree  with  them  in  their  treatment  of  the 
slavery  question.  He  entered  the  Cabinet  of  Mr. 
Buchanan  a  Democrat  in  December,  1860,  and  left  it 
a  Democrat  in  March,  1861.  It  has  been  said  that  he 
was  a  "  pro-slavery  Democrat."  He  was  a  lawyer,  and 
a  good  one.  He  beheved  in  obeying  the  Constitution 
and  the  laws,  and  he  had  the  lawyer's  habit  of  acqui- 
escing in  the  opinions  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  upon  all  questions  arising  under  them. 
In  this  obedience  he  made  no  mental  reservation,  and 
appealed  to  no  "  liigher  law." 

There  were  gTOwing  numbers  in  the  RepubHcan 
party  who,  without  rebuke  from  their  associates,  resisted 
the  enforcement  of  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law,  in  obedi- 
ence to  what  they  termed  a  "higher  law."  This  was 
an  assertion  of  the  right  of  each  citizen  to  determine 
for  himself  not  only  which  laws  he  would  approve,  but 
which  he  would  obey.  It  was,  of  coui-se,  a  menace  to 
every  private  right  that  depended  for  its  protection 
upon  the  authority  of  the  law.  Mr.  Stanton  did  not 
rise  to  the  heights  occupied  by  these  men  ;  like  Mr. 
Lincoln,  he  favored  obedience  to  all  the  laws  of  the 
land. 

As  orderly  people  in  our  day  uphold  the  rights  of 
property,  notwithstanding  the  apparent  lack  of  Chris- 
tian spirit  which  some  of  them  think  governs  its  acqui- 
sition and  distribution  under  existing  systems,  so  the 
men  of  his  school  maintained  the  supremacy  of  the 
law  above  all  indi\ddual  protests  concerning  slavery. 
Slavery  was  an  established  wrong,  for  which  no  lawful 


178  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S   CABINET 

remedy  existed  short  of  a  constitutional  amendment. 
This  remedy  seemed  impossible,  for  no  change  could 
be  made  without  the  assent  of  three  fourths  of  the 
States,  and  fifteen  of  the  thirty-one  States  then  consti- 
tuting the  Union  were  slave  States.  It  would  require 
an  addition  of  twenty-nine  new  free  States  to  the  exist- 
ing sixteen  to  make  the  requisite  number  of  three 
fourths,  even  if  every  free  State  should  then  favor 
abolition.  When  it  is  remembered  that  the  abolition- 
ists were  then  despised,  persecuted,  and  mobbed  even 
in  New  England,  and  that  Pennsylvania  voted  for  pos- 
sible slavery  extension  as  late  as  1856,  the  reader  of 
this  generation  will  see  how  seemingly  hopeless  was  the 
cause  of  the  slave.  Indeed,  while  sympathy  for  his 
condition  was  an  impulse  of  human  nature,  which  could 
not  be  extinguished  by  law,  it  did  not  seem  to  most 
people  a  duty  to  engage  in  a  bloody  revolution  for  his 
liberation.  Previous  to  the  civil  war,  the  great  body 
of  the  Northern  people,  including  most  of  the  Republi- 
cans, were  in  favor  of  living  up  to  the  terms  made  with 
the  slave-holders  when  the  Constitution  was  framed,  and 
without  which  it  would  never  have  existed.  Mr.  Stan- 
ton preferred,  as  did  Mr.  Lincoln,  a  reaffirmation  of 
that  agreement,  with  a  clear  settlement  of  all  disputed 
points,  to  an  appeal  to  arms  which  might  imperil  the 
Union.  They  preferred  the  Republic,  even  with  slavery 
interwoven  in  its  structure  at  its  birth,  to  the  unknown 
evils  which  would  follow  if  it  should  go  down  in  the 
flames  of  a  civil  war. 

The  grim  declaration  of  Garrison,  the  great  leader  of 
the  "immediate   emancipationists,"  that  the  Constitu- 


HIS  ATTITUDE  TOWARDS  SLAVERY  179 

tion  of  the  United  States  was  "  a  covenant  •with  death 
and  an  agreement  with  hell,"  was  but  his  way  of  stat- 
ing the  historical  fact  that  the  States  which,  in  1789, 
deemed  the  continuance  of  slavery  desirable  joined  the 
States  in  the  North  which  desired  commerce  to  be 
under  national  control,  in  the  formation  of  a  national 
government  only  on  the  conditions  plainly  expressed  in 
the  federal  Constitution,  that  their  peculiar  institu- 
tion should  remain  undisturbed ;  that  the  slave  trade 
might  continue  unmolested  by  Congress  for  twenty 
years ;  that  fugitive  slaves  should  not  become  free  by 
escaping  into  free  States ;  and  that  in  addition  to  the 
representation  in  Congress  based  upon  free  population, 
they  should  have  additional  representation  proportioned 
to  three  fifths  of  the  slaves  owned  by  their  people. 
The  commercial  States  made  the  bargain  without  re- 
serve, and  the  nation  came  into  existence,  not  only 
committed  to  the  toleration  of  slavery  as  an  interest 
sanctioned  by  the  Constitution,  but  bound  to  the  en- 
forcement by  Congress  of  all  the  guarantees  it  had 
secured.  Just  what  these  guarantees  were  became  the 
theme  of  differences  and  discussions  which  finally 
resulted  in  the  civil  war.  The  views  of  Northern  men 
as  well  as  Southern  men  concerning  them  underwent 
many  changes.  The  slavery  propaganda  carried  along 
with  it,  in  every  new  pretension,  parties  and  politicians. 
Presidents  and  Congresses,  and  finally  the  Supreme 
Court,  —  the  authoritative  expounder  of  the  Consti- 
tution. 

The  Democratic  and  many  of  the  Republican  union- 
ists of  1860-61,  including  Mr.  Lincoln  himself,  found 


180  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S   CABINET 

it  easy  to  tolerate  differences  of  opinion  among  them- 
selves, and  were  willing  to  preserve  the  Union  by 
amendments  to  the  Constitution,  intended  to  fairly  set- 
tle all  disj)uted  questions  as  to  the  true  meaning  of 
the  original  terms.  On  the  20th  of  January,  1861, 
Mr.  Stanton  wrote  as  follows  to  his  friend,  John  F. 
Ohver,  at  Steubenville,  Ohio  :  — 

I  am  very  much  obliged  to  you  for  your  note  of  the  17th 
instant.  It  was  the  first  information,  and  all  that  I  have 
received  as  to  the  proceedings  in  Steubenville,  in  respect  to 
the  present  state  of  public  affairs.  If  the  resolutions  of  your 
meeting  were  sanctioned  by  the  Republican  party  in  Congress, 
I  think  that  the  troubles  that  now  disturb  and  endanger  the 
country  would  speedily  be  removed. 

The  Steubenville  resolutions  referred  to  approvingly 
in  this  letter  were  adopted  at  a  meeting  of  citizens, 
assembled  without  regard  to  party,  on  the  15th  of  Jan- 
uary. They  favored  the  border-state  compromise  pro- 
positions, and  if  these  could  not  be  had,  then  a  war  for 
the  Union.  These  propositions  were  all  subsequently 
indorsed  by  Mr.  Lincoln,  except  the  one  to  restore  the 
Missouri  Compromise  line  of  36°  30'  as  the  boundary 
between  slavery  and  freedom  in  all  the  Territories. 
Upon  one  to  make  slavery  perpetual  in  the  slave  States 
Mr.  Lincoln  said  in  his  inaugural  address  :  — 

I  understand  a  proposed  amendment  to  the  Constitution 
—  which  amendment,  however,  I  have  not  seen  —  has  passed 
Congress,  to  the  effect  that  the  federal  government  shall 
never  interfere  with  the  domestic  institutions  of  the  States, 
including  that  of  persons  held  to  service.  To  avoid  miscon- 
struction of  what  I  have  said,  I  depart  from  my  purpose  not 


COMPROMISE  PROPOSITIONS  181 

to  speak  of  particular  amendments,  so  far  as  to  say  that, 
holding  such  a  provision  to  now  be  implied  constitutional 
law,  I  have  no  objections  to  its  being  made  express  and  irre- 
vocableJ 

Mr.  Lincoln  was  inflexibly  opposed  to  making  any 
concession  on  the  territorial  question,  by  which  slavery 
could  occupy  any  newly  acquired  territory ;  but  he 
wrote  to  Thurlow  Weed,  December  17,  1860,  that  he 
might  say  for  him,  to  a  convocation  of  governors,  that 
he  thought  "all  opposition,  real  and  apparent,  to  the 
fugitive  slave  clause  ought  to  be  withdrawn,"  and  to 
Mr.  Seward  he  wrote  February  1,  1861,  after  again 
asserting  his  unalterable  opposition  to  slavery  exten- 
sion :  — 

As  to  fugitive  slaves.  District  of  Columbia,  slave  trade 
among  the  slave  States,  and  whatever  springs  of  necessity 
from  the  fact  that  the  institution  is  amongst  us,  I  care  but 
little  so  that  what  is  done   be  comely,  and  not  altogether 

^  The  proposed  amendment  to  the  Constitution  here  referred  to  by 
Mr.  Lincoln  was  known  as  the  Corwiu  amendment,  and  was  as  follows  :  — 

"  Be  it  resolved  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  in  Congress  assembled,  two  thirds  of  both  Houses  concur- 
ring, — 

"That  the  following  Article  be  proposed  to  the  legislatures  of  the 
several  States  as  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
which,  when  ratified  by  three  fourths  of  said  legislatures,  shall  be  valid 
to  all  intents  and  purposes  as  a  part  of  the  said  Constitution,  namely  :  — 

"Art.  XIII.  No  amendment  shall  be  made  to  the  Constitution  which 
will  authorize  or  give  to  Congress  the  power  to  abolish  or  interfere 
within  any  State  with  the  domestic  institutions  thereof,  including  that 
of  persons  held  to  labor  or  service  by  the  laws  of  said  State." 

This  joint  resolution  passed  the  House  on  the  28th  of  February  by  a 
vote  of  133  to  Go.  It  passed  the  Senate  on  the  2d  of  March  by  a  vote  of 
24  to  12. 


182  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S  CABINET 

outrageous.     Nor  do  I  care  about  New  Mexico,  if  further 
extension  were  hedged  against. 


The  motives  which  actuated  Democratic  and  Repub- 
lican unionists  in  thus  offering  their  several  plans  for 
an  amicable  settlement  of  the  great  conflict  were  in 
the  highest  degree  patriotic.  They  sought  to  give 
Southern  unionists  ground  on  which  to  stand.  They 
believed  the  advocates  and  defenders  of  slavery  would 
prevail,  if  united,  and  they  sought  to  divide  them. 
Confronted  with  a  revolution  against  the  lawful  author- 
ities, they  felt  the  necessity  of  resting  their  own  feet 
firmly  upon  the  rock  of  the  law.  They  did  not  deem 
it  wise  to  meet  revolution  with  counter-revolution. 

The  cause  of  the  Union  was  still  dear  to  a  larofe 
portion  of  the  people  in  some  of  the  slave  States.  The 
secessionists  were  endeavoring  to  show  them  that 
unionism  and  abolitionism  were  convertible  terms,  and 
that  only  outside  of  the  Union  would  their  slave  pro- 
perty be  safe.  On  the  other  hand,  the  unconditional 
unionists  were  laboring  with  equal  zeal  and  energy  to 
satisfy  them  that  the  laws  for  the  protection  of  slavery 
would  be  as  faithfully  enforced  as  other  laws  within 
the  Union.  If  ten  slave  States  should  secede  and  suc- 
ceed in  establishing  a  new  confederacy,  the  remaining 
five  would  be  powerless  to  prevent  the  adoption  by  the 
sixteen  free  States  of  an  amendment  to  the  Constitu- 
tion abolishing  slavery.  To  place  the  border  State 
slave-holders  beyond  the  reach  of  this  apprehended 
danger  and  incentive  to  secession  was  the  object  of 
those  who  favored  the  proposed  Corwin  amendment, 


HIS  VIEWS   AND  MR.  LINCOLN'S  183 

making  slavery  perpetual  unless  terminated  by  its  own 
votaries. 

Mr.  Seward  wrote  to  Mr.  Lincoln  December  16, 
I860:  — 

The  action  of  the  border  States  is  uncertain.  Sympathy 
there  is  strong  with  the  cotton  States,  while  prudence  and 
patriotism  dictate  adhesion  to  the  Union.  Nothing  could 
certainly  restrain  them  but  the  adoption  of  Mr.  Crittenden's 
compromise,  and  I  do  not  see  the  slightest  indication  of  its 
adoption  on  the  Republican  side  of  Congress. 

The  only  proposition  of  Mr.  Crittenden's  to  which 
Mr.  Lincoln  objected  was  that  which  looked  to  a  rees- 
tablisliment  of  36°  30'  as  a  line  below  which  slavery 
should  be  permitted  in  newly  acquired  territory.  Mr. 
Stanton  thought,  with  Mr.  Seward,  that  there  was  no 
certainty  of  preventing  the  secession  of  the  border 
States  with  any  less  concession  than  this.  Of  the  then 
existing  Territories,  only  Arizona  and  New  Mexico 
would  have  been  affected  by  it.  Stanton  was  not 
ready  then  to  peril  the  existence  of  the  Republic  upon 
a  struggle,  on  one  side  of  which  were  those  who  were 
for  the  Union  with  or  without  slavery,  and  on  the 
other  all  who  were  for  slavery  with  or  without  the 
Union.  Had  such  a  division  been  forced  at  that  time, 
the  result  would  have  been  extremely  doubtful,  with 
the  probabilities  against  the  Union  and  in  favor  of 
slavery. 

Abraham  Lincoln  was  willing  to  place  the  nation 
under  perpetual  bonds  to  keep  the  peace  towards  sla- 
very, and  even  to  see  that  institution  extended  into 
New  Mexico,  rather  than  see  the  Union  go  down,  or 


184  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S   CABINET 

even  to  encounter  the  perils  of  a  war  for  its  preser- 
vation. He  preferred  the  Union  with  slavery  to  no 
Union.  Mr.  Stanton  was  willing  to  add  to  Mr.  Lin- 
coln's offer  the  extension  of  slavery  into  Arizona,  and 
into  any  new  territory  that  might  be  acquired  south 
of  36°  30'.  Both  were  intensely  devoted  to  the  Union, 
and  sought  its  preservation  by  peaceful  means  ;  and 
both  were  unconditionally  for  its  preservation,  whether 
with  or  without  slavery,  by  any  means  that  resistance 
to  its  authority  might  render  necessary. 

Republicans  there  were  who  preferred  separation 
either  to  war  or  to  further  concessions  to  slavery.  Had 
they  prevailed,  the  slaves  in  the  seceding  States  would 
have  been  doomed  to  a  bondage  as  hopeless  as  that 
proposed  in  the  constitutional  amendment  forbidding 
any  abolition  amendment ;  and  it  cannot  be  doubted 
that  all  of  the  slave  States  would  then  have  seceded. 
These  advocates  of  a  peaceable  separation  would,  of 
course,  have  flourished  better  poHtically  in  a  free 
Northern  Confederacy,  but  their  success  would  have 
indefinitely  delayed  the  ultimate  triumph  of  the  cause 
of  human  freedom. 

The  unconditional  unionists  knew  as  well  as  did  the 
unconditional  disunionists,  that  the  Union  and  slavery 
could  not  both  long  exist.  The  former  were  wilHng  to 
trust  to  the  logic  of  events  to  deal  with  slavery,  while 
they  battled  for  the  Union.  Union  slave-holders  there 
were  who  loved  their  country  more  than  they  did  their 
slave  property,  and  it  was  a  wise  policy  as  well  as  sim- 
ple justice  to  give  them  a  voice  in  determining  the  best 
means  to  be  employed,  and  the  best  tone  to  be  adopted. 


UNION,  NOT  ANTI-SLAVERY,  THE  TEST        185 

for  strengihenino;  the  Union  cause  in  the  border  slave 
States.  Dismal  as  was  the  outlook  apparently  for  the 
slave,  there  seemed  good  ground  for  hope  that  if  the 
nation  marshaled  its  power  against  secession  and  rebel- 
lion only,  the  supporters  of  slavery  would  divide,  and 
that  ultimately  those  of  them  whose  patriotism  mean- 
while stood  fire  would  consent  to  cripple  the  enemy  by 
every  means  known  in  civilized  warfare,  including,  if 
need  be,  the  liberation  of  their  slaves.  Good  faith  to- 
wards this  element  was  the  best  policy  for  the  govern- 
ment, for  they  knew  best  how  to  widen  the  breach 
which  secession  was  making  among  the  slave-holders, 
and  were  interested  in  making  the  most  of  such  know- 
ledge. 

If  the  results  of  this  so-called  border  state  policy 
seem  to  have  been  meagre  in  the  way  of  proselytizing 
slave-holders  to  the  Union  cause,  they  were  of  vital 
and  controlling  importance  in  building  up  at  the  North 
a  Union  party  irrespective  of  previous  political  affilia- 
tions. Stanton,  Holt,  Douglas,  Dix,  Butler,  Dickinson, 
Grant,  Sherman,  Sheridan,  Logan,  and  Thomas  were 
representative  men  of  the  great  body  of  Union  Demo- 
crats who  would  not  have  enlisted  in  an  anti-slavery 
crusade  as  the  counterpart  of  the  secession  movement. 
They  were  incensed  against  lawbreakers,  and  whatever 
their  views  may  have  been  as  to  the  system  of  slavery, 
they  saw  it  in  its  legal  aspect  only,  and  felt  that  it 
could  not  then  be  menaced  without  doing  violence  to 
the  majesty  of  the  law,  to  uphold  which  the  nation  was 
about  to  be  called  to  arms. 

If  patriotism  went  before  humanity  with  the  Union 


186  STANTON  IN   BUCHANAN'S   CABINET 

Democrats,  so  it  did  with  the  main  body  of  the  Repub- 
licans, who  were  pledged  as  a  party  not  to  disturb 
slavery  in  the  slave  States.  When  the  time  came  for 
slavery  to  die  that  the  nation  might  live,  none  saw  it 
earlier  or  declared  for  it  with  more  alacrity  than  men 
like  Stanton,  who  in  those  days  were  stigmatized  as 
"pro-slavery"  Democrats  by  some  pro-slavery  Whigs. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

Expiration  of  Buchanan's  Administration.  —  Summary  of  his  Course 
towards  the  South.  —  Stanton's  Great  Influence  upon  him. 

The  administration  of  Mr.  Buchanan  expired  without 
havinof  either  surrendered  or  reinforced  the  two  remain- 
ing  Southern  forts,  Sumter  and  Pickens.  The  legacy 
it  left  was  a  hostile  nation  on  a  war  footing  within  the 
limits  of  the  United  States,  and  a  powerful  faction  in 
the  adhering  States  denying  the  right  of  the  government 
to  return  the  blows  its  enemy  was  openly  preparing  to 
deliver.  The  Southern  leaders,  however,  heeded  the 
warning  of  the  President,  speaking  through  Secretary 
of  War  Holt,  February  6,  that  an  attack  upon  Fort 
Sumter  would  be  regarded  as  an  act  of  war,  which  the 
government  would  meet  with  all  its  powers.  The  assault 
was  postponed,  and  Anderson's  little  garrison  still 
pinned  the  Palmetto  State,  frantic  with  rage,  to  the 
Union  from  which,  with  much  pomp  and  circumstance, 
she  had  declared  herself  free. 

There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  Mr.  Buchanan  was 
willing  to  see  the  Union  dismembered,  or  that  he  was 
conscious  of  having  given  dangerous  aid  or  encourage- 
ment to  the  secession  cause.  He  was  infatuated  with 
the  idea  that  slavery  had  been  greatly  injured  by  all 
who  had  questioned  any  of  its  demands,  and  seemed  to 
imagine  that  its  upholders  could  be  placated  by  being 


188  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S   CABINET 

told  so  by  him.  Ignoring  the  fact  that  the  Republi- 
cans had  been  voted  into  power,  he  continued,  probably 
from  sheer  force  of  habit,  to  argue  that  it  was  their 
duty  to  renounce  their  principles,  as  an  inducement  to 
the  defeated  political  South  to  acquiesce  in  the  result 
of  a  presidential  election  and  to  remain  in  the  Union. 
Unable  to  discard  the  political  prejudices  of  years,  he 
adhered  to  and  proclaimed  them  at  the  expense  of  his 
reputation,  at  a  time  when  they  but  added  to  the  exas- 
peration of  the  hour. 

After  he  had  finally  made  a  stand  against  the  inad- 
missible demands  of  the  secessionists,  and  had  formally 
approved  the  movement  of  Anderson  into  Fort  Sumter, 
no  act  or  omission  of  his  deserved  unfriendly  criticism. 
Had  his  course  from  the  beginning  been  as  clear  of 
offense  as  it  was  from  and  after  the  10th  of  January, 
his  anxiety  to  avoid  a  collision  would  have  been  ap- 
proved. The  country  would  then  have  believed  that  it 
was  founded  on  solicitude  for  the  Union,  and  not  for 
the  Southern  cause.  When  this  same  policy  was  con- 
tinued by  Mr.  Lincoln,  —  as  it  was,  —  none  thought  of 
attributing  it  to  a  want  of  patriotism.  Mr.  Buchanan 
was  distrusted  rather  for  the  advance  of  false  doctrines 
at  first,  and  for  the  far-reaching  consequences  of  such 
action,  with  which  he  was  fairly  chargeable,  than  for 
any  subsequent  enforcement  of  those  political  heresies, 
— for  of  this  he  was  innocent.  The  unionists  were  not 
offended  because  of  his  failure  to  provoke  collision  or 
war  with  the  South,  at  a  time  when  the  country  was  all 
unprepared,  but  because  he  had  encouraged  the  revolu- 
tionary faction,  by  declaring  that  the  government  could 


Ni 


ii 


'■  W'  i 


MU.   STANTON'S   \VASHIN(;r()N    HUMK,   iS6i-iSoy 
J'/ie  /witse  w/ien  hi-  <iit\i 


HIS   GREAT  INFLUENCE  UPON  BUCHANAN     189 

not  constitutionally  defend  itself  against  a  rebellion, 
except  at  the  back  of  a  United  States  Marshal  with  a 
writ  in  his  hand. 

Mr.  Stanton's  influence  in  the  councils  of  Mr.  Buchanan 
had  been  instant  and  controlling.  The  President  had, 
before  his  entrance  into  the  Cabinet,  been  guided  to  a 
dangerous  extent  by  Southern  political  friends,  who  had 
suddenly  been  transformed  from  the  arrogant  leadership 
of  a  dominant  party  to  the  management  of  the  treason- 
able conspiracies  which  necessarily  precede  rebellion. 
It  was  difficult  for  him  to  immediately  realize  that  some 
of  his  most  trusted  counselors  and  supposed  personal 
friends  were,  in  very  fact,  traitors,  plotting  for  the 
overthrow  of  the  nation  he  was  sworn  to  defend.  He 
had  allowed  General  Cass  to  resign  rather  than  break 
with  these  men.  Black  and  Holt  had  been  unable  to 
reverse  the  tendency  which  was  thus  drifting  him  to 
final  ruin,  and  threatening  the  safety  of  the  government. 
Not  until  Stanton  entered  his  councils  was  he  aroused 
to  a  sense  of  his  duty  and  of  his  danger. 

Stanton  instantly  changed  the  tone  of  debate,  and,  in 
a  cabinet  discussion  as  to  the  binding  force  of  a  shuf- 
fling unofficial  agreement  to  leave  Sumter  unprotected, 
thundered  out  the  blunt  truth  to  Floyd  and  Thompson, 
that  they  were  advocating  the  commission  of  a  crime 
for  which,  if  committed,  they  ought  to  be  hanged,  and 
were  urging  the  President  to  an  act  of  treason  for 
which,  if  performed,  he  could  be  impeached,  removed 
from  office,  and  punished  under  the  penal  code.  Floyd, 
who  had  up  to  that  very  time  posed  as  a  unionist,  now 
appeared  in  his  true  character,  and  gave  up  the  contest 


190  STANTON  IN  BUCHANAN'S  CABINET 

by  resigning.  Thompson  soon  followed  on  a  false  pre- 
tense, and  Thomas,  Cobb's  successor,  followed  him. 
The  President  surrounded  himself  with  a  patriotic  Cabi- 
net, and  thus  escaped  the  fate  false  friends  had  been 
preparing  for  him. 


PART  III 

STANTON'S    DISCONTENT.  —  OPENING  OF    THE 
REBELLION 


CHAPTER   XXV 

1861.  —  The  Accession  of  Mr.  Lincoln.  —  The  Situation.  —  Jeal- 
ousy and  Distrust  among  the  Unionists. 

The  Republican  party  made  its  advent  into  power  in 
1861  under  difficulties  and  hindrances  not  easy  to  be 
understood  by  the  present  generation.  Not  the  least 
of  these  were  its  own  inconsistencies  and  incongruities. 
Its  principles  were  shifting  and  its  purposes  vague. 
Appealing  to  the  highest  humanity  against  the  system 
of  slavery,  it  confessed  itself  bound  by  the  Constitution 
to  tolerate  that  system,  and  pledged  itself  to  obedience. 
A  sufficient  number  of  its  Senators  and  Representatives 
in  Congress  voted  with  others  to  carry  through  that 
body  in  1861,  by  the  requisite  two-thirds'  vote,  a 
proposed  amendment  to  the  Constitution,  which,  if 
adopted,  would  have  forbidden  any  further  amendment 
to  that  instrument  on  the  subject.  Mr.  Lincoln  gave 
this  his  sanction  in  his  inaugural,  although  he  had  pre- 
viously declared  that  agitation  on  the  subject  of  slavery 
would  never  cease  until  the  system  had  been  placed 


192  STANTON'S  DISCONTENT 

where  the  pubHc  mind  would  rest  in  the  belief  that  it 
was  in  the  course  of  ultimate  extinction.  Organized 
upon  the  main  proposition  that  slavery  must  be  ex- 
cluded fi'om  the  Territories  by  congressional  enactment, 
it  abandoned  that  poHcy  the  first  time  it  had  the  power 
to  enforce  it.  It  organized  Colorado,  Nevada,  and 
Dakota  Territories  with  no  restriction  against  slavery 
in  either  of  them,  and  allowed  a  slave-code  to  remain 
undisturbed  upon  the  statute-book  of  the  Territory 
of  New  Mexico.  Rallying  the  people  in  some  of  the 
States  by  loud  denunciations  of  the  iniquities  of  the 
Fugitive  Slave  Law,  its  great  leader  signalized  his 
induction  into  the  presidency  by  adding  to  his  oath  of 
of&ce  a  specific  pledge  that  the  odious  law  should  be 
enforced.  Thus  it  came  in,  promising  to  chain  the 
emotions  and  suppress  the  aspirations  to  which  it  owed 
success,  and  lost  its  identity  before  it  took  the  reins  of 
power. 

It  was  made  up  of  heterogeneous  elements,  between 
the  leaders  of  which  hostiUties  broke  out  before  the 
Cabinet  had  been  formed.  Whig  and  Democratic 
"  war-horses,"  who  bore  the  scars  of  many  a  poHtical 
battle  in  which  they  had  been  arrayed  against  each 
other,  were  now  united  in  one  party,  agreed  only  on 
the  pohcy  of  saying  enough  against  slavery  to  secure 
the  favor  of  the  anti-slavery  men  of  the  North,  just 
as  they  had,  ten  years  before,  in  their  respective  par- 
ties, pursued  the  policy  of  doing  enough  in  favor  of 
slavery  to  secure  the  support  of  the  slave-holders  of  the 
South.  The  party  had  created  hopes  among  sincere 
anti-slavery  men  which  it  would  have  been  lawless  to 


THE  ACCESSION  OF  MR.  LINCOLN  193 

fulfill,  and  had  aroused  fears  among  the  defenders  of 
slavery  which  it  felt  called  upon  to  allay  in  the  interest 
of  peace  and  the  safety  of  the  Union.  Within  its 
ranks  were  every  shade  and  variety  of  opinion  on  the 
slavery  question,  as  well  as  every  degree  of  indifference 
on  the  subject.  In  the  Cabinet  sat  Chase,  a  pioneer  of 
the  Liberty  party,  and  Blair,  the  head  of  the  "  clay- 
bank  "  Repubhcans  of  the  slave  State  of  Missoiu'i.  It 
had  met  with  no  tolerance  at  the  hands  of  its  enemies, 
and  had  exhibited  none  for  them.  Its  orators  and 
writers  had  a  copious  vocabulary  of  expletives  for  op- 
ponents, such  as  "  slave-drivers  "  and  "  doughfaces," 
and  in  turn  it  was  derided  as  a  party  of  "  negro- 
worshipers"  and  "black  Republicans."  It  embraced 
most  of  the  radical  anti-slavery  element  which  had  for 
years  advocated  the  dissolution  of  the  Union  as  an 
escape  from  continued  Northern  responsibility  for  "  the 
sin  of  slavery,"  and  all  who  had  joined  their  ranks  in 
later  years  as  nulhfiers  of  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law. 

The  secession  movement  now  developed  a  new  ele- 
ment, headed  by  prominent  Republican  leaders,  like 
Greeley  and  Chase,  who  thought  that  a  Union  of  non- 
slave-holding  States  only  would  be  preferable  to  any 
attempt  to  maintain  by  force  the  Union  with  the  slave 
States.  The  Republican  party  was,  by  this  element, 
placed  under  suspicion  of  caring  less  for  the  whole 
Union  than  for  so  much  of  it  as  they  could  with  cer- 
tainty control. 

The  Union  Whigs  who  had  voted  for  Bell,  and  the 
Union  Democrats  who  had  voted  for  Douglas,  —  num- 
bering, together,  nearly  a  hundred  thousand  more  than 


194  STANTON'S   DISCONTENT 

those  by  whose  votes  Mr.  Lincoln  had  been  elected,  — 
were  exasperated  by  defeat,  irritated  by  the  reproaches 
of  the  extremists,  North  and  South,  and  inclined  to 
force  the  new  administration  to  some  concessions. 
They  clamored  for  new  security  for  the  property  rights 
of  the  slave-holders,  many  of  whom  were  earnestly  pro- 
testing against  disunion. 

Union  men  there  were  who  had  voted  for  Brecken- 
ridge ;  but  the  main  body  of  his  supporters  were 
Southern  secessionists  or  their  Northern  sympathizers. 
Those  of  them  who  were  for  the  Union  proved  the 
sincerity  of  their  patriotism  by  boldly  advocatmg  "  all 
means  to  crush,"  since  conciliation  had  failed.  They 
felt  keenly  the  ingratitude  of  the  South,  which  would 
leave  them  naked  to  their  political  enemies.  They  had 
not  hoped  for  success  at  the  presidential  election,  but 
some  of  them  had  assurances  that,  after  defeat,  the 
Southern  leaders  would  join  them  in  an  appeal  to  the 
Democratic  party  to  unite  for  the  campaign  of  1864 
on  the  doctrine  of  the  Breckenridge  wing,  to  wit,  that 
slavery  should  be  protected  by  the  federal  government 
wherever  not  excluded  by  state  laws.  They  labored 
for  a  peaceful  settlement,  and  parted  reluctantly  with 
those  of  their  associates  who,  one  after  another,  took 
their  stand  for  disunion.  But  they  did  part  with  them, 
and  were  as  resolute  and  reliable  in  their  patriotism  as 
any  men  of  that  period. 

Not  only  the  several  parties,  but  factions  within  each 
party,  looked  with  distrust  upon  each  other.  The 
Republicans  were  bewildered  by  the  conflicting  views 
of  their  leaders,  and  by  what  seemed  non-committalism 


DISTRUST  AMONG  THE  UNIONISTS  195 

on  the  part  of  the  President  himself.  From  his  inau- 
guration on  the  4th  of  March  until  the  firing  on  Fort 
Sumter  on  the  12th  of  April,  the  country  was  agitated 
by  doubts  as  to  the  intentions  of  the  administration 
towards  the  Southern  confederacy,  which  was  all  that 
time  under  full  and  uninterrupted  operation  as  a  de 
facto  government.  The  purpose  to  hold  the  remain- 
ing forts  within  the  rebel  States  was  announced  in 
the  President's  inaugural,  but  semi-official  givings  out 
seemed  to  indicate  that  this  purpose  had  been  aban- 
doned. Negotiations  with  the  rebels,  similar  to  those 
which  Mr.  Buchanan  had  been  drawn  into  by  one 
portion  of  his  Cabinet,  and  led  out  of  by  another, 
were  now  resumed  with  Mr.  Lincoln's  Secretary  of 
State,  through  the  medium  of  justices  of  the  Supreme 
Court ;  *  and  it  seemed  as  though  the  ship  of  state 
was  drifting  upon  the  rocks  more  rapidly  under  the 
Republican  than  it  had  under  a  Democratic  admin- 
istration. Nothing  occurred  which,  in  the  light  of 
subsequent  history,  leaves  the  slightest  doubt  upon 
any  mind  as  to  the  inflexible  purpose  of  Mr.  Lincoln 
throughout,  to  preserve  the  Union ;  but  in  his  extreme 
desire  to  demonstrate  to  the  world  the  nation's  forbear- 
ance, and  to  force  the  South  into  the  attitude  of  ag- 
gressors, if  war  they  would  have,  he  unavoidably  risked 
much.  At  the  North  he  endanofered  the  morale  of  the 
Union  element  whenever  he  seemed  to  them  to  waver, 
while  in  the  South,  to  borrow  his  own  expression  of  a 
later  period,  there  was  danger  that  his  magnanimity 
migli  be  mistaken  for  pusillanimity,  and  the  enemy  be 
thereby  made  bolder  and  stronger. 

*  Nelson  and  Campbell. 


196  STANTON'S   DISCONTENT 

The  prevailing  feeling  among  those  Union  men  who 
were  not  Republicans  was  that  the  latter  had  endan- 
gered the  Union  by  an  outcry  against  slavery,  as  an 
evil  for  which  they  had  no  remedy  to  propose,  and  that 
it  was  now  their  duty  to  pacify  those  slave-holders  who 
were  not  secessionists  by  a  surrender  of  some  of  the 
opinions  on  which  they  had  triumphed  at  the  polls. 

Mr.  Lincoln  met  all  these  conditions  with  admirable 
temper  and  marvelous  skill.  He  did  not  stoop  to  con- 
quer ;  he  conquered  by  rising  high  above  the  smoke  of 
the  political  battle  just  fought,  and  beyond  the  din  of 
the  party  chiefs  who  were  fighting  it  over  again.  His 
inaugural  was  so  broad  that  not  only  could  all  Union 
men  stand  upon  it,  but  its  thrilling  peroration  told  of 
still  further  room  there,  where,  if  they  would,  his  "  dis- 
satisfied fellow-countrymen  "  might  gather  without  loss 
of  pride,  or  danger  to  their  real  interests. 

But  the  fierce  antagonisms  of  party  were  not  to  be 
ended  in  a  day.  Not  until  the  country  should  be 
stung  by  an  insult  to  its  flag,  and  assailed  by  armed 
rebellion,  could  even  the  most  patriotic  of  the  opposi- 
tion be  counted  on  to  openly  and  unreservedly  uphold 
the  hands  of  the  President.  Even  then  it  took  a  long 
time  for  some  Democrats  to  learn  that  they  could  not 
serve  the  cause  of  the  Union  and  oppose  the  adminis- 
tration in  power ;  and  it  took  some  Republicans  a  long 
time  to  learn  that  they  could  not  save  the  Union  with- 
out aid,  and  that  there  were  patriots  outside  of  their 
party  organization.  Some  of  both  classes  never  learned 
the  needed  lesson  at  all. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

Surrender  of  Fort  Sumter  favored  by  the  Lincoln  Cabinet.  —  Effect 
of  Supposed  Non-Resistant  Policy  of  Mr.  Lincoln  on  Union  Demo- 
crats. —  Mr.  Stanton  as  a  Representative  Man  of  this  Class.  — 
His  Letter  to  a  Friend  in  1861  on  the  Union  Question.  —  His  Aid 
or  Advice  not  sought  by  the  Republican  Administration.  —  Did 
not  meet  Lincoln  while  President  until  he  was  appointed  Secretary 
of  War.  —  The  Hostility  between  Republicans  and  Union  Demo- 
crats explained.  —  Bombardment  of  Fort  Sumter. 

Letters  of  Mr.  Stanton  written  at  this  time  show  the 
distrust  and  dislike  with  which  the  new  administration 
was  regarded  by  him.  They  show,  too,  a  good  deal  of 
party  spirit,  —  much  more  than  would  be  looked  for 
by  those  who  knew  of  his  great  services  to  the  country 
afterwards,  as  Mr.  Lincoln's  Secretary  of  War.  The 
toleration  of  Republicans  by  Union  Democrats  was  a 
plant  of  slow  growth,  and  Mr.  Stanton  was  no  excep- 
tion among;  his  fellows.  The  toleration  of  Union  Demo- 
crats  by  Republicans  was  equally  slow  in  its  develop- 
ment, and  many  were  permanently  lost  to  the  Union 
cause  by  the  mere  fact  of  finding  themselves  under 
unjust  suspicion.  Mr.  Stanton  wrote  to  Mr.  Buchanan 
March  10  that  he  was  perfectly  satisfied  Major  Ander- 
son would  be  "«ath drawn  from  Fort  Sumter,  and  that 
Fort  Pickens  in  Florida  would  also  be  evacuated.  He 
was,  he  said,  convinced  by  the  general  tone  prevailing 
in  Washington  that  there  was  not  the  least  design  to 


198  STANTON'S  DISCONTENT 

attempt  any  coercive  measures.  On  the  12th  he  wrote 
that  it  was  the  universal  impression  in  Washington  that 
Sumter  and  Pickens  would  both  be  surrendered.  A 
morning  paper  at  the  capital  had  stated  that  this  course 
had  been  determined  on  at  the  cabinet  meeting  of 
March  9. 

Messrs.  Nicolay  and  Hay,  in  their  biography  of  Lin- 
coln, say  that,  on  that  day,  "  after  four  days'  consider- 
ation by  the  Lincoln  government  and  extended  discus- 
sion in  a  cabinet  meeting,  the  loss  of  Sumter  seemed 
unavoidable,  and  the  rumor  was  purposely  given  out  to 
prepare  the  public  mind  if  the  need  should  finally  come 
for  the  great  sacrifice."  They  also  assert  that  on  the 
15th  of  March,  for  the  first  time,  the  Cabinet  voted  on  the 
question,  —  five  voting  to  evacuate  and  two  to  attempt 
to  supply.  The  five  were  Seward,  Cameron,  Welles, 
Smith,  and  Bates.     The  two  were  Chase  and  Blair. 

Mr.  Montgomery  Blair,  then  Postmaster-General,  in 
a  letter  dated  May  17,  1873,  mentions  the  fact  that  the 
way  was  at  one  time  prepared  for  the  surrender  of  the 
fort  by  statements  in  the  press  that  it  was  untenable.^ 

But  although  the  Cabinet  voted  in  favor  of  the  sur- 
render of  Sumter,  Mr.  Lincoln  never  gave  the  order. 
From  the  time  the  rumor  of  its  intended  evacuation  was 
put  forth,  on  the  9th,  to  prepare  the  public  mind  for 
the  humiliating  event,  the  current  of  patriotic  opinion 
was  overwhelmingly  against  it,  and  he  respected  the 
voice  of  the  people  so  given. 

Mr.  Stanton  looked  upon  the  prospect  of  abandoning 
Fort   Sumter  with    unqualified  disfavor.     If  it  was  a 

^  Lincoln  and  Seward,  by  Gideon  Welles,  page  65. 


DISTRUST  OF  THE  LINCOLN  GOVERNMENT      199 

military  impossibility  to  hold  that  fort  against  an  attack, 
it  was,  in  view  of  the  condition  of  the  public  mind  at 
that  time,  a  supreme  political  necessity  that  it  should 
be  held  until  taken  by  force.  Evacuation  would  be 
regarded  as  a  recognition  of  the  independence  of  South 
Carolina,  and  therefore  as  a  consent  by  the  govern- 
ment to  peaceable  disunion.  If  the  Union  was  to  be 
preserved,  it  must  be  either  by  the  consent  of  the  rebels, 
or  by  their  forcible  subjection  to  national  authority.  It 
was  wise  for  the  government  not  to  be  the  aggressor, 
but  this  did  not  necessitate  saving;  the  rebels  from  bein^ 
the  aggressors  by  retreating  before  they  advanced. 

Mr.  Stanton's  letters  during  the  early  months  of  Mr. 
Lincoln's  administration  exhibit  a  fierce  contempt  for 
the  greed  for  office  which  seemed  to  him  oblivious  of 
the  national  peril,  and  a  thorough  distrust  of  the  capacity 
of  the  new  President  and  his  advisers  to  cope  with  the 
enemy.  He  even  seemed  at  times  to  have  contemplated 
the  possibiHty  of  a  total  shipwreck. 

He  wrote  March  10 :  "  The  scramble  for  office  is  ter- 
rific." On  the  15th :  "  The  pressure  for  office  con- 
tinues unabated.  Every  department  is  overrun,  and 
by  the  time  that  all  the  patronage  is  distributed,  the 
Republican  party  will  be  dissolved."  On  the  16th : 
"Lincoln,  it  is  complained  in  the  streets,  has  undertaken 
to  distribute  the  whole  patronage,  small  and  great,  leav- 
ing nothing  to  the  chiefs  of  the  departments." 

Of  the  Supreme  Court  vacancy,  he  wrote  on  the 
14th :  — 

There  has  been  no  further  action  in  respect  to  the  Supreme 
judgeship.    It  is  generally  understood  that  Crittenden  will  not 


200  STANTON'S   DISCONTENT 

be  nominated.  Judge  Campbell  has  reconsidered  his  determi- 
nation and  will  not  resign  immediately.  The  court  adjourns 
to-day.  I  am  now  writing  in  the  Supreme  Court  room.  If 
the  court  ever  reassembles,  there  will  be  considerable  change 
in  its  organization.  Judge  Grier  went  home  sick  two  days 
ago.  Judge  McLean  is  reported  to  be  quite  ill.  Lincoln 
will  probably  (if  his  administration  continues  four  years) 
make  a  change  that  will  affect  the  constitutional  doctrines  of 
the  court. 

Concerning  the  tariff,  he  wrote  on  the  16th :  — 

The  Republicans  are  beginning  to  think  that  a  monstrous 
blunder  was  made  in  the  tariff  bill,  and  that  it  will  cut  off 
the  trade  of  New  York,  build  up  New  Orleans  and  the 
Southern  ports,  and  leave  the  government  no  revenue ,  they 
see  before  them  the  prospect  of  soon  being  without  money 
and  without  credit. 

April  3  he  wrote  to  Mr.  Buchanan :  — 

Although  a  considerable  period  has  elapsed  since  the  date 
of  my  last  letter  to  you,  nothing  has  transpired  here  of 
interest  but  what  is  fully  detailed  in  the  newspapers.  Mr. 
Toucey  left  here  last  week.  Judge  Black  is  still  in  the  city. 
General  Dix  made  a  short  visit  at  the  request  of  the  Sec- 
retary of  the  Treasury.  Mr.  Holt,  I  think,  is  still  here,  but 
I  have  not  seen  him  for  several  days.  You  of  course  saw 
Thompson's  answer  and  Mr.  Holt's  reply.  I  have  not  had 
any  intercourse  with  any  of  the  present  Cabinet,  except  a  few 
brief  interviews  with  Mr.  Bates,  the  Attorney-General,  on 
business  connected  with  his  department.  Mr.  Lincoln  I 
have  not  seen  ;  he  is  said  to  be  very  much  broken  down  with 
the  pressure  that  is  upon  him  in  respect  to  appointments. 
The  policy  of  the  administration  in  respect  to  the  seceding 
States  remains  in  obscurity.  There  has  been  a  rumor  for 
the  last  two  or  three  days  that  notwithstanding  all  that  has 


DISTRUST  OF  THE  LINCOLN  GOVERNMENT      201 

been  said,  there  will  be  an  effort  to  reinforce  Fort  Sumter, 
but  I  do  not  believe  a  word  of  it.  The  special  messenger. 
Colonel  Lamon,  told  me  that  he  was  satisfied  it  could  not 
be  done.  The  new  loan  has  been  bid  for  at  better  rates  than 
I  anticipated ;  and  I  perceive  General  Dix  was  one  of  the 
largest  bidders  at  the  highest  rates.  The  new  tariff  bill 
seems  to  give  the  administration  great  trouble ;  and  luckily 
it  is  a  measure  of  their  own.  The  first  month  of  the  ad- 
ministration seems  to  have  furnished  an  ample  vindication  of 
your  policy,  and  to  have  rendered  all  occasion  of  other  defense 
needless.  The  rumors  from  Richmond  are  very  threatening  ; 
secession  is  rapidly  gaining  strength  there. 

On  April  11  he  wrote  to  Mr.  Buchanan  :  — 

There  is  great  "  soldiering  "  in  town  the  last  two  days. 
The  yard  in  front  of  the  War  Office  is  crowded  with  the  dis- 
trict militia,  who  are  being  mustered  into  service.  The  feel- 
ing of  loyalty  to  the  government  has  greatly  diminished  in 
this  city.  Many  persons  who  would  have  supported  the  gov- 
ernment under  your  administration  refuse  to  be  enrolled. 
Many  who  were  enrolled  have  withdrawn  and  refused  to 
take  the  oath.  The  administration  has  not  acquired  the 
respect  and  confidence  of  the  people  here.  Not  one  of  the 
Cabinet  or  principal  officers  has  taken  a  house  or  brought 
his  family  here.  Seward  rented  a  house  "  while  he  should 
continue  in  the  Cabinet,"  but  has  not  opened  it,  nor  has  his 
family  come.  They  all  act  as  though  they  meant  to  be  ready 
to  "  cut  and  run  "  at  a  minute's  notice,  —  their  tenure  is  like 
that  of  a  Bedouin  on  the  sands  of  the  desert.  This  is  sensi- 
bly felt,  and  talked  about  by  the  people  of  the  city,  and  they 
feel  no  confidence  in  an  administration  that  betrays  so  much 
insecurity.  And  besides,  a  strong  feeling  of  distrust  in  the 
candor  and  sincerity  of  President  Lincoln  and  of  his  Cabinet 
has  sprung  up.  If  they  had  been  merely  silent  or  secret  there 
might  have  been  no  ground  of  complaint.     But  assurances 


202  STANTON'S  DISCONTENT 

are  said  to  have  been  given  and  declarations  made  in  conflict 
with  the  facts  now  transpiring  in  respect  to  the  South,  so 
that  no  one  speaks  of  Lincoln  or  any  member  of  his  Cabi- 
net with  any  respect  or  regard. 

The  facts  about  Sumter  it  is  impossible  to  ascertain,  for 
the  reasons  that  have  been  mentioned,  for  no  one  knows 
what  to  believe.  The  nearest  conjecture  I  can  form  is 
this :  — 

1st.  That  the  Baltic  has  been  sent  with  provisions  for 
Sumter. 

2d.  That  the  Powhatan  has  been  sent  with  forces  to  land 
and  attack  the  batteries. 

3d.  That  a  secret  expedition,  independent  of  General 
Scott,  has  been  sent,  under  charge  of  Fox,  to  make  an  effort 
to  land  in  the  night  at  Sumter. 

The  refusal  to  admit  Captain  Talbot  to  Sumter  may  pre- 
vent concert  of  action  with  Major  Anderson,  and  I  think  the 
whole  thing  will  prove  a  failure.  There  is  no  excitement 
here.  People  are  anxious,  but  the  sensation  telegrams  sent 
from  here  are  without  foundation.  It  is  true,  however,  that 
Ben  McCullough  has  been  here  on  a  scouting  expedition,  and 
he  carefully  examined  all  the  barracks  and  military  posts  in 
this  city,  and  said  that  he  expected  to  be  in  possession  of  the 
city  before  long.  He  stayed  all  night  at  Dr.  Gwin's.  This 
has  a  business  aspect.  It  is  believed  that  a  secession  ordinance 
will  be  passed  by  the  Virginia  convention  to-day. 

Notbino-  could  better  illustrate  the  attitude  towards 
the  new  administration,  at  that  time,  of  the  Union  men 
who  were  not  Republicans  than  these  letters  of  Mr. 
Stanton. 

Under  the  administration  of  Mr.  Buchanan,  during 
the  months  of  November  and  December,  the  nation  had 
seemed  to  be  in  the  throes  of  dissolution  ;  but  in  Janu- 


EVACUATION  OF  FORT  SUMTER  PROPOSED    203 

ary  and  February,  with  a  reconstructed  Cabinet,  it  had 
given  signs  of  life  and  vigor.  The  surrender  of  Fort 
Sumter  had  been  refused  ;  the  rebel  South  Carolina 
commissioners  sent  home  in  disgrace  ;  and  those  who 
sent  them  were  told  that  if  they  wanted  Fort  Sumter, 
they  could  have  it  only  by  taking  it,  and  that  in  taking 
it  they  would  have  to  inaugurate  civil  war.  It  was 
not  doubted  that  they  could  take  it  before  adequate 
defense  could  be  provided,  but  the  idea  of  surrender- 
ing without  resistance  was  spurned  by  the  government 
of  the  United  States,  even  under  the  administration  of 
James  Buchanan. 

Those  Democrats  who  believed  the  Union  to  be  inde- 
structible, and  who  did  not  beHeve  that  separation  was 
preferable  to  war,  read,  therefore,  with  amazement 
and  indignation  in  the  administration  daily  papers,  five 
days  after  Mr.  Lincoln's  inauguration,  the  semi-official 
announcement  that  Sumter  was  to  be  evacuated  on  the 
ground  of  military  necessity.  It  seemed  like  a  procla- 
mation that  the  South  was  to  be  permitted  to  conquer 
without  receiving  a  blow  in  exchange  for  those  it  had 
already  administered  upon  the  patient  and  enduring 
cheek  of  the  nation.  No  hint  accompanied  it  of  any 
hope  that  "  military  necessity  "  would  at  any  time  com- 
pel the  rebellion  to  check  its  march  or  lower  its 
standard.  The  nation  was  literally  lying  "  supinely 
on  its  back,  while  its  enemies  bound  it  hand  and  foot." 
The  agony  of  suspense  with  which  the  patriotic  people 
had  looked  forward  during:  the  winter  to  a  chano^e  of 
administration  was  intensified  by  the  new  uncertain- 
ties, instead  of   being  relieved  by  the  announcement 


204  STANTON'S  DISCONTENT 

o£  a  positive  and  vigorous  policy.  The  warlike  blows 
struck  at  the  nation  during  the  winter  by  the  seizure 
of  its  forts,  and  the  firing  on  the  steamer  Star  of  the 
West,  were  not  only  still  borne  with  a  patient  shrug, 
as  before,  but  it  was  now  given  out  that  the  govern- 
ment would  escape  a  repetition  of  them  by  flight.  A 
war  of  rebellion  would  be  made  unnecessary  if  all  that 
was  claimed  by  rebels  in  arms  was  thus  to  be  yielded 
to  them  by  piecemeal.  They  only  wanted  to  be  "  let 
alone,"  for  the  new  confederacy  would  then  lack  no- 
thing of  actual  and  entire  independence. 

The  government,  under  Mr.  Buchanan,  had  only 
been  bridging  over  the  short  remaining  term  of  his 
official  life.  There  was  some  reason  in  his  not  pre- 
cipitating a  war,  for  the  conduct  of  which  he  would 
not  be  responsible.  He  had  lost  his  opportunity  to 
strangle  the  rebellion  at  its  birth,  and  had,  indeed, 
early  nursed  it  with  nutritious  promises  of  immunity 
from  resistance.  He  was  aroused  too  late  to  a  realiza- 
tion of  its  plans,  purposes,  and  power,  and  could  then 
only  avoid  the  final  collision,  and  turn  the  government 
over  in  as  good  condition  as  possible  to  his  successor. 
But  none  had  supposed  that  the  Republican  adminis- 
tration would  be  even  more  undecided  than  its  prede- 
cessor had  been  in  its  weakest  hour,  or  that  men  newly 
invested  by  the  people  with  the  nation's  power  would 
be  found  temporizing  with  a  faction  which  was  in  rebel- 
lion because  it  had  been  repudiated  at  the  polls. 

Mr.  Stanton  was  one  of  the  men  who  were  angry 
and  disgusted  at  the  situation.  He  believed  that  the 
Union  was  stronger  than  all  its  foes,  and  much  as  he 


HIS   AID   OR  ADVICE   NOT  SOUGHT  205 

preferred  a  peaceful  solution  of  existing  troubles,  he 
was  for  meeting  force  with  force  and  not  with  sur- 
render. The  spirit  which  animated  him  was  expressed 
in  a  letter  written  by  him  in  January  preceding  to  an  old 
friend  who  had  congratulated  him  on  his  appointment 
by  Mr.  Buchanan  as  Attorney-General.     He  wrote  :  — 

Your  kind  letter  was  received  this  morning,  and  I  thank 
you  for  the  confidence  and  regard  it  expresses  for  myself. 
You  are  right  in  supposing  it  to  be  my  determination  to  do 
everything  in  my  power  to  preserve  and  maintain  this  govern- 
ment, and  the  Constitution  under  which  the  United  States 
have  been  so  prosperous.  The  means  you  indicate,  I  agree 
with  you,  are  the  proper  ones  for  this  emergency;  and  so 
far  as  it  is  possible  they  will  be  exerted.  I  have  undoubting 
faith  that  this  government  cannot  be  overthrown  —  that  it 
was  ordained  of  God,  and  that  the  powers  of  hell  cannot  pre- 
vail against  it.  We  may  have  trouble  ;  the  city  of  Washington 
may  be  captured ;  but  every  effort  will  be  made  to  prevent 
that  catastrophe,  and  even  if  it  does  happen  the  revolutionists 
will  be  as  far  as  ever  from  accomplishing  the  destruction  of 
the  government,  —  but  much  nearer  to  their  own  destruction. 

Notwithstanding  the  wilHng  testimony  of  Republican 
leaders  to  Mr.  Stanton's  patriotic  zeal  and  courage, 
during  the  secession  winter,  while  a  member  of  Mr. 
Buchanan's  Cabinet,  it  does  not  appear  that  his  aid  or 
ad\4ce  was  sought  by  the  new  administration  during 
the  year  1861.  Indeed,  we  have  his  own  statement 
that  he  never  once  met  Mr.  Lincoln  during:  all  the 
period  intervening  between  the  4th  of  March,  1861, 
and  the  15th  of  January,  1862. 

No  personal  reason  need  be  sought  to  explain  the 


206  STANTON'S   DISCONTENT 

lack  of  community  of  feeling  between  Union  Repub- 
licans and  Union  Democrats  at  that  time.  Equally 
patriotic  in  intent,  they  were  equally  unable  to  do 
each  other  justice.  They  entertained  for  each  other 
feelings  of  contempt,  distrust,  and  dislike. 

It  is  difficult  for  this  generation  to  comprehend 
how  the  spirit  of  party  swayed  the  most  ardent  Union 
men  in  those  days.  The  Republicans  thought  their 
party  entitled  to  the  advantage  given  it  by  its  neces- 
sary identification  with  the  patriotic  cause,  and  were 
inclined  to  regard  as  disloyal  all  who  were  not  willing 
to  enlist  in  their  party  ranks,  and  under  their  party 
name.  The  Union  Democrats  denied  the  right  of  the 
Republican  party  to  seek  a  partisan  advantage  in  the 
approach  of  a  civil  war.  They  thought  the  largest 
Union  party  could  be  rallied  under  their  lead,  and  that 
if  the  country  was  to  be  saved,  it  must  be  by  a  grand 
uprising  of  the  people  of  all  parties.  They  feared  that 
to  drop  the  name  of  "  Democracy "  would  taint  the 
party  with  "black  Republicanism,"  and  lose  to  its 
support  hundreds  of  thousands  of  men  who  would  not 
be  Union  men  unless  they  might  still  call  themselves 
"  Democrats."  The  victorious  RepubKcans,  of  course, 
naturally  refused  to  entertain  the  idea  of  adopting  the 
names  of  their  opponents  or  of  dropping  their  own. 
And  so  the  struggle  for  precedence  went  on.  The 
leaders  of  each  party  hoped  to  rally  the  masses  to 
their  own  standard,  and  to  leave  the  opposing  leaders 
without  followers.  All  were  endeavoring  to  reconcile 
their  intense  partisanship  with  their  equally  intense 
patriotism. 


BOMBARDMENT   OF  FORT  SUMTER  207 

Such  were  the  currents  of  public  feeHiig  when  the 
rebel  authorities  made  good  the  declaration  of  their 
commissioners  at  Washington,  —  that  the  attempt  to 
provision  Fort  Sumter  would  be  treated  by  them  as 
an  act  of  war.  The  notification  of  April  8  to  Gov- 
ernor Pickens  of  such  an  intention  on  the  part  of  our 
government  was  followed  by  the  rebel  bombardment 
of  that  fort  on  the  12th  of  April,  1861.  President 
Lincoln  immediately  issued  a  call  for  75,000  volunteers 
to  fight  for  the  cause  of  the  Union. 


CHAPTER  XXVII 

The  Attack  on  Sumter.  —  Stanton  on  the  Outlook.  —  His  "Want  of 
Confidence  in  Mr.  Lincoln.  —  The  Reasons  for  it.  —  Mr.  Bu- 
chanan declares  his  Allegiance  to  the  Union  Cause. 

On  the  day  of  the  bombardment  of  Fort  Sumter, 
April  12,  Mr.  Stanton  wrote  to  Mr.  Buchanan  as 
follows :  "  We  have  the  war  upon  us.  The  telegraphic 
news  of  this  morning  you  will  have  seen  before  this 
reaches  you.  The  impression  here  is  held  by  many, 
1st,  that  the  efforts  to  reinforce  will  be  a  failure ; 
2d,  that  in  less  than  twenty  -  four  hours  from  this 
time  Anderson  wiU  have  surrendered ;  3d,  that  in 
less  than  thirty  days  Davis  will  be  in  possession  of 
Washington." 

Mr.  Stanton's  apprehension  for  the  safety  of  the 
national  capital  may  well  have  been  grounded  upon 
the  ready  aggressiveness  of  the  rebels,  and  the  unready 
and  temporizing  policy  of  the  new  administration.  For 
more  than  thirty  days  he  had  seen  the  Cabinet  groping 
in  the  darkness  of  indecision,  —  nerveless  and  purpose- 
less, —  afraid  to  advocate  the  defense  of  the  country, 
and  afraid  to  let  the  country  know  they  were  afraid. 
General  Scott  had  advised  the  surrender  of  whatever 
positions  could  not  be  held  without  force.  The  nation 
seemed  to  be  drifting  towards  an  opportunity  for  the 
scheme  favored  by  many  of  a  national  convention  of  all 


STANTON  ON  THE  OUTLOOK  209 

the  States.  Such  a  convention  would  probably  have 
decided  into  how  many  confederacies  the  nation  should 
be  divided,  if  the  South  still  resisted  moral  suasion,  and 
insisted  upon  being  allowed,  as  General  Scott  phrased 
it,  like  "  wayward  sisters  "  to  "  depart  in  peace." 

The  early  halting  movements  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  ad- 
mmistration  caused  many  patriotic  men  who,  like  Stan- 
ton, were  not  wedded  to  it  by  party  ties,  to  withhold 
from  it  their  confidence,  and  to  criticise  it  in  terms 
which  now  seem  harsh  and  unjust.  To  such  men  the 
attack  on  Sumter  appeared  to  have  precipitated  a  war 
for  which  the  government  had  no  place  in  its  calcula- 
tions. General  Sherman,  in  his  "  Memoirs  "  (page  168), 
expresses  this  view  in  the  following  account  he  gives  of 
a  call  he  made  on  President  Lincoln  late  in  March,  1861, 
when  his  brother  John  introduced  him,  saying :  "  Mr. 
President,  this  is  my  brother.  Colonel  Sherman,  who  is 
just  up  from  Louisiana ;  he  may  give  you  some  infor- 
mation you  want." 

"^  Ah,'  said  Mr.  Lincoln,  *how  are  they  getting  along 
down  there  ? '  I  said,  ^  They  think  they  are  getting 
along  swimmingly — they  are  preparing  for  war.'  ^  Oh 
well,'  said  he,  *  I  guess  we  '11  manage  to  keep  house.'  I 
was  silenced,  said  no  more  to  him,  and  we  soon  left.  I 
was  sadly  disappointed,  and  remember  that  I  broke  out 
on  John,  d — ning  the  politicians  generally,  saying, 
*  You  have  got  things  in  a  hell  of  a  fix,  and  you  may 
get  them  out  as  best  you  can,'  adding  that  the  country 
was  sleeping  on  a  volcano  that  might  burst  forth  any 
moment." 

Nothing  could  better  illustrate  the  provoking  calm- 


210  OPENING  OF  THE   REBELLION 

ness  and  apparent  insensibility  to  facts  which  per- 
vaded the  government  circles  at  that  time  than  this 
brief  colloquy  between  Lincoln  and  Sherman,  just  prior 
to  the  action  of  the  "  volcano "  to  which  the  latter 
referred. 

Stanton's  gloomy  forebodings  of  disaster,  in  his  letter 
above  quoted,  seemed  warranted  by  the  conditions  then 
existing.  To  some  minds  it  seemed  likely  that  the  na- 
tion would  be  subjugated  before  its  rulers  could  realize 
that  it  was  in  any  danger.  Why  the  national  capital 
was  not  seized  at  the  beginning  of  the  rebellion,  as  Mr. 
Stanton  predicted  it  would  be,  is  an  unexplained  mys- 
tery. Hemmed  in  between  two  slave  States,  inhabited 
mainly  by  a  slave-holding  and  secession-sympathizing 
population,  and  with  no  preparations  for  defense  which 
could  for  a  moment  compare  with  the  force  that  could 
any  day  be  thrown  against  it,  it  seemed  only  awaiting 
the  hour  when  its  possession  should  seem  desirable  to 
the  enemy. 

Mr.  Buchanan,  from  his  home  in  Wheatland,  wrote 
to  General  John  A.  Dix,  April  19 :  — 

The  present  administration  had  no  alternative  but  to  accept 
the  war  initiated  by  South  Carolina  or  the  Southern  Confed- 
eracy. The  North  will  sustain  the  administration  almost  to  a 
man ;  and  it  ought  to  be  sustained  at  all  hazards. 

To  Mr.  Stanton,  he  wrote.  May  6 :  — 

The  first  gun  fired  by  Beauregard  aroused  the  indignant 
spirit  of  the  North  as  nothing  else  could  have  done,  and  made 
us  a  unanimous  people.  I  had  repeatedly  warned  them  that 
this  would  be  the  result. 


BUCHANAN  SUPPORTS  THE  UNION  CAUSE      211 

In  "  The  National  Intelligencer  "  (Washington),  May 
16,  a  patriotic  letter  from  Mr.  Buchanan  appeared  in 
support  of  the  defensive  war  measures  adopted  by  the 
administration.  By  public  utterances,  as  well  as  in 
private  correspondence,  he  seemed  to  have  taken  his 
stand  as  an  unreserved  supporter  of  the  Union  cause. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 

The  Two  Uprisings.  —  One  for  the  Union,  and  the  Other  for  Slavery. 
Radicals  and  Conservatives.  —  Discontent  among  Union  Men.  — 
Mr.  Stanton's  Trenchant  Criticisms  of  the  Administration  in 
Private  Letters. 

The  attack  on  Sumter  was  the  signal  of  two  mighty 
uprisings,  which  stirred  to  their  utmost  activity  the 
centripetal  forces  of  national  pride  and  patriotism,  and 
the  centrifugal  forces  of  local  interest  and  passion. 
Positive  men  responded  with  alacrity  to  the  call,  and 
ranged  themselves,  some  on  the  side  of  unconditional 
devotion  to  the  Union,  and  some  of  unconditional  devo- 
tion to  the  institution  of  slavery,  and  incidentally  to 
the  dogma  of  state  sovereignty. 

The  insult  to  the  flag  carried  with  it  a  sense  of  per- 
sonal insult  and  outrage  to  all  who  were  Unionists 
without  an  "  if,"  and  made  them  resolve  on  the  humili- 
ation of  those  who  had  thus  defied  the  nation's 
authority,  and  challenged  it  to  mortal  combat.  On  the 
other  hand,  equally  resolute  were  those  who  were  deter- 
mined that  the  institution  of  slavery  should  not  be  sub- 
jected to  any  abatement  of  its  rights  or  pretensions 
under  an  administration  avowedly  opposed  to  some  of 
those  pretensions,  and  to  them  disunion  seemed  its  only 
protection.  Outside  of  these  two  classes  were  hundreds 
of  thousands  who  were  stunned  and  dazed  by  the  colli- 


THE  TWO  UPRISINGS  213 

sion  between  slavery  and  the  Union,  to  the  defense  of 
both  of  which  they  were  strongly  committed,  and  be- 
tween the  claims  of  which  they  knew  not  how  to 
choose.  To  secure  the  support  of  these,  the  earnest 
men  of  both  sides  at  once  put  forth  every  effort.  The 
rebel  leaders  strove  to  convince  them  that  slavery  was 
safe  only  outside  of  the  Union.  The  Union  men  sought 
to  satisfy  them  that  it  had  always  been  amply  protected 
within  the  Union,  and  would  continue  to  be.  Only 
those  who  lived  in  slavery  days  can  realize  the  terrible 
force  of  public  opinion  on  the  subject.  Sympathy  with 
Abolitionists  was  angrily  disclaimed  by  Republicans, 
but  they  could  not  rid  themselves  of  the  taint.  The 
danger  to  the  Union  cause  was  that  with  many  the 
love  of  country  would  not  be  a  motive  strong  enough 
to  overcome  the  dread  of  the  oj^probrium  that  would 
attach  to  those  who  would  serve  it  under  a  "Black  Re- 
publican "  President. 

Great  Union  meetings  were  held,  officered,  and  ad- 
dressed by  Union  men,  without  regard  to  their  party 
relations.  The  most  imposing  of  these,  as  it  was  one  of 
the  earliest  on  a  large  scale,  was  held  in  New  York  city. 
It  was  called  by  a  Union  committee,  of  which  John  A. 
Dix  was  chairman.  To  him  Mr.  Stanton  wrote  April 
23:  — 

This  will  be  handed  you  by  Mr.  Andrews,  with  whom  you 
are  acquainted.  He  will  inform  you  of  the  state  of  affairs 
here  ;  they  are  desperate  beyond  any  conception. 

If  there  be  any  remedy  —  any  shadow  of  hope  to  preserve 
this  government  from  utter  and  absolute  extinction  —  it  must 
come  from  New  York  without  delay. 


214  OPENING  OF  THE  REBELLION 

Kepublicans  might  well  be  pardoned  if  they  remem- 
bered the  hard  words  of  the  preceding  fall  and  winter, 
and  if,  so  remembering,  they  came  slowly  to  believe  in 
the  unadulterated  patriotism  of  opponents  who  had  pre- 
dicted disunion  as  the  natural  result  of  Republican 
victory.  But  they  had  to  surrender  such  doubts  when 
prominent  Democrats  like  Douglas,  Dickinson,  Butler, 
Stanton,  Logan,  Dix,  Holt,  and  others  came  forward, 
calling  on  the  patriots  of  all  parties  to  stand  by  the 
flag. 

The  President's  call  for  troops  was  responded  to  with 
alacrity,  and  he  had  to  select  generals  to  command 
them.  This  was  the  first  test  of  the  extent  to  which 
the  war  was  to  be  made  to  appear  in  any  manner  sub- 
servient to  party  interests.  The  Republican  party  men 
could  of  course  all  be  relied  on  to  sustain  the  President 
of  their  choice.  But  how  would  the  Democrats  stand 
the  fire  of  a  rebel-sympathizing  press  at  the  North,  ridi- 
culing volunteers  as  "Lincoln's  hirelings,"  and  denoun- 
cing the  war  for  the  Union  as  an  "Abolition  war,"  and 
all  who  favored  meeting  force  with  force  as  "Black  Re- 
publicans "  ?  The  answer  to  this  question  was  largely 
dependent  upon  the  extent  to  which  the  new  adminis- 
tration would  exhibit  confidence  in  the  men  who  were 
wilHng  to  be  thus  denounced  by  old  party  friends  for 
their  devotion  to  the  flag.  It  was  not  in  human  nature 
for  men  to  join  hands  with  political  opponents  for  a 
patriotic  purpose,  if  they  were  to  be  received  coldly 
as  if  with  distrust.  A  Union  party,  and  not  merely  a 
recruited  Republican  party,  was  felt  to  be  necessary  for 
the  safety  of  the  country.     This  necessity  was  met  in 


DISCONTENT  AMONG  UNION  MEN  215 

due  time,  but  not  until  after  much  discontent  had  been 
caused  by  an  apparent  tendency  to  give  Republicans  too 
largely  the  preference  in  the  bestowal  of  honors.  John 
A.  Dix  wrote  complainingly  to  Mr.  Buchanan,  May  28, 
1861  :  — 

Ever  since  I  wrote  you  last,  I  have  been  busy  night  and 
day,  and  am  a  good  deal  worn  out  by  my  labors  on  the  Union 
Defence  Committee,  and  by  superintending  the  organization 
and  equipment  of  nine  regiments,  six  of  which  I  have  sent  to 
the  field,  leaving  three  to  go  to  the  field  to-morrow  and  the 
day  after.  The  post  of  Major-Geueral  of  Volunteers  was 
tendered  to  me  by  Governor  Morgan,  and  I  could  not  decline 
without  subjecting  myself  to  the  imputation  of  hauling  down 
my  flag,  a  thing  altogether  inadmissible.  So  I  am  in  harness 
for  the  war,  though  the  administration  takes  it  easy,  for  I  have 
not  yet  been  accepted,  and  there  are  rumors  that  there  are  too 
many  Democratic  epaulettes  in  the  field.  There  seems  to  be 
no  fear  at  Washington  that  there  are  too  many  Democratic 
knapsacks.  New  York  has  about  15,000  men  at  the  seat  of 
war  without  a  general,  except  Sanford,  who  has  gone  on  tem- 
porarily. How  is  it,  my  dear  sir,  that  New  York  is  always 
overlooked  (or  nearly  always)  except  when  there  are  burdens 
to  be  borne  ?  As  to  this  generalship,  it  was  unsought,  and  I 
am  indifferent  about  it  entirely.  I  am  willing  to  give  my 
strength,  and  life  if  need  be,  to  uphold  the  government  against 
treason  and  rebellion.  But  if  the  administration  prefers  some 
one  else  to  command  New  York  troops,  no  one  will  acquiesce 
half  so  cheerfully  as  myself. 

On  the  8th  of  June,  Mr.  Stanton  wrote  to  Mr. 
Buchanan :  — 

While  every  patriotic  heart  has  rejoiced  at  the  enthusiastic 
spirit  with  which  the  nation  has  aroused  to  maintain  its  exist- 


216  OPENING  OF  THE   REBELLION 

ence  and  honor,  the  peculation  and  fraud  that  immediately 
sprung  up  to  prey  upon  the  volunteers  and  grasp  the  public 
money  as  plunder  and  spoil  has  created  a  strong  feeling  of 
loathing  and  disgust.  And  no  sooner  had  the  appearance  of 
imminent  danger  passed  away,  and  the  administration  recov- 
ered from  its  panic,  than  a  determination  became  manifest  to 
give  a  strict  party  direction,  as  far  as  possible,  to  the  great 
national  movement.  After  a  few  Democratic  appointments, 
as  Butler  and  Dix,  everything  has  been  devoted  to  Black 
Republican  interests.  This  has  already  excited  strong  reac- 
tionary feeling,  not  only  in  New  York,  but  in  the  Western 
States. 

General  Dix  informs  me  that  he  has  been  so  badly  treated 
by  Cameron  that  he  intends  immediately  to  resign.  This  will 
be  followed  by  a  withdrawal  of  financial  confidence  and  sup- 
port to  a  very  great  extent.  Indeed,  the  course  of  things  for 
the  last  four  weeks  has  been  such  as  to  excite  distrust  in  every 
department  of  the  government.  The  military  movements,  or 
rather  inaction,  also  excite  great  apprehension.  It  is  believed 
that  Davis  and  Beauregard  are  both  in  this  vicinity,  —  one  at 
Harper's  Ferry,  and  the  other  at  Manassas  Gap,  —  and  that 
they  can  concentrate  over  sixty  thousand  troops.  Our  whole 
force  does  not  exceed  forty-five  thousand.  It  is  also  reported 
that  discord  exists  between  the  Cabinet  and  General  Scott  in 
respect  to  important  points  of  strategy.  Our  condition,  there- 
fore, seems  to  be  one  of  greater  danger  than  at  any  former 
period,  for  the  consequence  of  success  by  the  secessionists 
would  be  far  more  extensive  and  irremediable  than  if  the 
capital  had  been  seized  weeks  ago.  Ould  is  reported  as 
having  gone  off  and  joined  the  secessionists.  Harvey,  the 
new  minister  to  Spain,  it  is  discovered  was  a  corresi^ondent 
with  the  secessionists,  and  communicated  the  designs  and 
operations  of  the  government  to  Judge  McGrath.  It  is  sup- 
posed he  will  be  recalled.  Cassius  Clay  has  been  playing  the 
fool  at  London,  by  writing  letters  to  the  "  Times,"  which  that 


STANTON'S  TRENCHANT  CRITICISMS  217 

paper  treats  with  ridicule  and  contempt.  The  impression 
here  is  that  the  decided  and  active  countenance  and  support 
of  the  British  government  will  be  given  to  the  Southern  Con- 
federacy. Mr.  Holt  is  still  here,  but  I  seldom  see  him.  I 
should  have  visited  you,  but  dare  not  leave  town  even  for  one 
night.  Our  troops  have  slept  on  their  arms  nearly  every 
night  for  a  week,  anticipating  attack. 

June  11,  Mr.  Stanton  wrote  to  General  Dix :  — 

It  gives  me  great  jjleasure  that  in  the  midst  of  arduous 
duties  you  still  bear  me  in  kind  remembrance.  The  meeting 
of  the  24th  of  April  in  New  York  has  become  a  national 
epoch ;  for  it  was  a  manifestation  of  patriotic  feeling  beyond 
any  example  in  history.  To  that  meeting,  the  courage  it  in- 
spired, and  the  organized  action  it  produced,  this  government 
will  owe  its  salvation  if  saved  it  can  be.  To  the  general 
gratification  of  the  country  at  your  position  as  Chairman  of 
the  Union  Committee,  there  was  added  in  my  breast  a  feeling 
of  security  and  succor  that  until  that  time  was  unknown.  No 
one  can  imagine  the  deplorable  condition  of  this  city  and  the 
hazard  of  the  government  who  did  not  witness  the  weakness 
and  panic  of  the  administration,  and  the  painful  imbecility  of 
Lincoln.  We  looked  to  New  York  in  that  dark  hour,  as  our 
only  deliverance  under  Providence,  and,  thank  God,  it  came. 
The  uprising  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  to  maintain 
their  government  and  crush  rebellion  has  been  so  grand,  so 
mighty  in  every  element,  that  I  feel  it  a  blessing  to  be  alive 
and  witness  it.  The  action  of  your  city  especially  filled  me 
with  admiration,  and  proves  the  right  of  New  York  to  be 
called  the  Empire  City.  But  the  picture  has  a  dark  side  — 
dark  and  terrible  —  from  the  corruption  that  surrounds  the 
War  Department,  and  seems  to  poison  with  venomous  breath 
the  very  atmosphere.  Millions  of  New  York  capital,  the  time, 
strength,  and  perhaps  lives  of  thousands  of  patriotic  citizens 
will  be  wanted  to  gorge  a  ravenous  crew.     On  every  side  the 


218  OPENING  OF  THE  EEBELLION 

government  and  soldiers  are  pillaged.  Arms,  clothing,  trans- 
portation, and  provisions  are  each  and  all  subjects  of  pecida- 
tion  and  spoil.  On  one  side  the  waves  of  treason  and  rebellion 
are  madly  dashing ;  on  the  other  is  a  yawning  gulf  of  national 
bankruptcy.  Our  cause  is  the  greatest  that  any  generation 
of  men  were  ever  called  upon  to  uphold  —  it  would  seem  to 
be  God's  cause,  and  must  triumph.  But  when  we  witness 
venality  and  corruption  growing  in  power  every  day,  and  con- 
trolling the  millions  of  money  that  should  be  a  patriotic  sacri- 
fice for  national  deliverance,  and  treating  the  treasure  of  the 
nation  as  a  booty  to  be  divided  among  thieves,  hope  dies  away. 
Deliverance  from  this  danger  must  also  come  from  New  York. 
Those  who  are  unwilling  to  see  blood  shed,  lives  lost,  treasure 
wasted  in  vain,  must  take  speedy  measures  to  reform  the  evil 
before  it  is  too  late. 

Of  military  affairs  I  can  form  no  judgment.  Every  day 
affords  fresh  proof  of  the  design  to  give  the  war  a  party 
direction.  The  army  appointments  appear  (with  two  or  three 
exceptions  only)  to  be  bestowed  on  persons  whose  only  claim 
is  their  Republicanism,  —  broken-down  politicians  without 
experience,  ability,  or  other  merit.  Democrats  are  rudely 
repelled  or  scowled  upon  with  jealous  and  ill-concealed  aver- 
sion. The  Western  Democracy  are  already  becoming  dis- 
gusted, and  between  the  corruption  of  some  of  the  Republican 
leaders  and  the  self-seeking  ambition  of  others,  some  great 
disaster  may  soon  befall  the  nation.  How  long  will  the 
Democracy  of  New  York  tolerate  these  things  ? 

The  navy  is  in  a  state  of  hopeless  imbecility,  and  is  be- 
lieved to  be  far  from  being  purged  of  the  treachery  that  has 
already  occasioned  so  much  shame  and  dishonor. 

In  respect  to  domestic  affairs,  Mrs.  Stanton  and  I  hoped  to 
visit  New  York  last  month,  but  the  critical  state  of  affairs 
made  it  hazardous  to  leave  our  children,  and  we  could  not 
take  them  with  us.  With  the  enemy  still  at  our  gates,  we 
cannot  venture  to  leave  home. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 

The  Battle  of  Bull  Run.  —  Stanton's  Views  at  the  Time.  —  McCIel- 
lan  called  to  the  Command  in  Virginia. 

The  call  for  troops  which  followed  the  attack  on  Fort 
Sumter  in  April  was  fiercely  assailed  by  the  enemy  as 
an  executive  usurpation,  and  many  good  Northern 
people  could  not  readily  abandon  their  long-cherished 
habit  of  going  to  Southern  statesmen  for  an  opinion 
whenever  a  constitutional  question  was  presented.  To 
convince  those  timid  minds  that  the  Constitution  did 
not  forbid  the  exercise  by  the  nation  of  the  law  of  self- 
preservation  became  an  imperative  necessity  as  it  was  a 
difficult  task.  The  strongest  leaders  of  public  opinion 
in  the  North  and  on  the  border  found  themselves  put 
on  the  defensive  by  men  whose  overt  acts  of  treason 
seemed  to  be  lost  sight  of  by  many,  in  what  appeared 
to  them  to  be  the  still  greater  offense  of  opposing  the 
attempt  upon  the  nation's  life,  by  measures  declared  by 
the  assailants  to  be  unconstitutional.  Such  was  the 
power  of  audacity  over  minds  long  accustomed  to  com- 
pliance with  its  demands.  While  the  early  summer  was 
being  devoted  to  satisfying  these  weak  Union  men  that 
it  was  entirely  constitutional  to  return  rebel  blows,  and 
that  it  would  not  be  an  invasion  of  foreign  soil  for 
federal  troops  to  be  quartered  anywhere  within  the  ter- 
ritorial limits  of  the  United  States,  these  self-evident 


220  OPENING  OF  THE  REBELLION 

propositions,  by  the  very  reason  of  their  discussion, 
seemed  in  July  still  to  be  open  questions. 

Notwithstanding  the  estabHshment  of  a  government 
de  facto  in  the  Southern  Confederacy,  and  its  vigorous 
preparations  for  war ;  and  notwithstanding  the  acts  of 
war  already  committed  in  the  seizure  of  unresisting 
federal  forts;  the  attack  on  the  Star  of  the  West; 
the  bombardment  and  capture  of  Fort  Sumter,  and  the 
almost  complete  expulsion  of  the  federal  government 
from  within  the  limits  which  the  new  Confederacy  had 
prescribed  for  itself,  but  shght  resistance  had  yet  been 
made  to  its  onward  march.  Delay  was  said  to  be  ne- 
cessary to  enable  our  raw  recruits  to  have  some  instruc- 
tion. But  people  could  not  help  realizing  that  the  rebel 
forces  were  likewise  raw  recruits,  and  it  was  discoura- 
ging that  the  rebellion  should,  even  at  the  outset,  appear 
so  much  more  formidable  than  the  government. 

Under  these  circumstances  the  feverish  impatience  of 
the  Unionists  reached  its  limit ;  the  advance  of  McDowell 
in  Virginia  in  the  middle  of  July  was  made  because  the 
government  could  not  longer  stand  passive  before  their 
passionate  and  unyielding  demand  that  something  be 
done  to  indicate  that  the  long  parley  was  ended,  and 
that  there  were  to  be  two  sides  to  the  war  then  already 
begun. 

The  shock  of  battle  came  on  the  21st  of  July,  result- 
ing in  the  flight  of  our  troops  from  the  field  at  Bull 
Run,  while  the  enemy,  also  defeated,  failed  to  pursue.^ 

1  General  Sherman,  who  commanded  a  brigade  in  the  affair,  thus  gives 
his  opinion  of  it  in  his  Memoirs  (page  181)  :  — 

"  We  had  good  organization  ;  good  men,  but  no  cohesion,  no  real  disci- 


THE   BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN  221 

But  the  Unionists  knew  nothing  of  a  drawn  battle ; 
they  knew  only  o£  the  road  from  Manassas  to  the 
capital  crowded  with  Union  soldiers,  fleeing  when  none 
pursued,  and  they  deeply  felt  the  humiliation.  There 
was  much  criticism  of  the  administration  and  much 
abuse  of  those  who  had  led  in  the  cry  of  "  On  to  Rich- 
mond ; "  but  the  general  result  was  most  beneficial  to 
the  Union  cause.  It  brought  the  people  and  the  gov- 
ernment to  a  realizing  sense  of  the  conflict  before  them, 
and  did  much  to  prepare  them  for  whatever  efforts  and 
sacrifices  were  finally  to  be  the  price  of  the  perpetuity 
of  the  Union. 

General  McClellan,  who  had  just  won  a  great  deal  of 
reputation  by  his  operations  in  western  Virginia,  was 
at  once  called  to  the  command,  which  he  assumed  July 
27,  1861.  War  had  not  presented  to  him  the  grim 
visage  with  which  it  had  confronted  McDowell  in  the 
East.  He  had  been  operating  against  skirmishing  par- 
ties in  a  mountainous  region,  where  the  main  body  of 
the  people  were  either  friendly  or  indifferent  to  his  cause. 
McDowell  had  started  through  an  intensely  hostile  popu- 
lation on  a  march  to  Richmond,  and  had  met  the  main 
forces  of  the  rebellion  planted  directly  across  his  path. 
But  McClellan  had  the  prestige  of  success,  and  his  great 
popularity  gave  him  the  power  to  be  of  incalculable 

pline,  no  respect  for  authority,  no  real  knowledge  of  war.  Both  armies 
were  fairly  defeated,  and  whichever  had  stood  fast,  the  other  would  have 
run.  Though  the  North  was  overwhelmed  with  mortification  and  shame, 
the  South  really  had  not  much  to  boast  of,  for  in  the  three  or  four  hours 
of  fighting,  their  organization  was  so  broken  up  that  they  did  not  and 
could  not  follow  our  army  when  it  was  known  to  be  in  a  state  of  disgrace- 
ful and  causeless  flight." 


222  OPENING  OF  THE  REBELLION 

service  to  the  government  at  that  time.  The  national 
pride  had  been  severely  wounded,  and  the  loyal  people 
were  impatient  for  the  healing  effect  of  a  victory  for 
the  federal  arms.  Their  confidence  in  McClellan  was 
such,  however,  that  they  were  prepared  to  wait  until  the 
army  should  reach  a  condition,  as  to  strength  and  disci- 
pline, which  in  his  opinion  would  justify  a  forward 
movement. 

Immediately  after  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  Mr.  Stanton 
wrote  to  his  brother-in-law,  C.  P.  Wolcott :  — 

Affairs  in  Washington  are  to  some  degree  recovering  from 
the  horrible  condition  exhibited  on  Monday  and  Tuesday  — 
the  disorganized  rabble  of  destitute  soldiers  is  being  cleared 
from  the  streets  by  slow  degrees,  the  army  officers  are  not 
swarming  so  thickly  in  the  hotels  and  taverns,  and  are  per- 
haps beginning  to  join  their  men.  The  enemy  have  advanced 
to  Fairfax,  and  their  pickets  extend  some  miles  this  side  — 
but  their  movements  are  as  unpenetrated  a  mystery  as  before. 
Why  they  did  not  take  possession  of  the  city,  as  they  might 
have  done  without  serious  resistance  on  Monday  and  Tuesday, 
is  a  marvel.  The  "  Tribune  "  struck  a  mighty  blow  on  Tues- 
day at  the  cause  of  this  and  all  the  other  late  disasters.  The 
effort  to  cast  the  blame  on  the  "  White  Plume  of  Navarre  " 
(McDowell)  proves  a  ridiculous  failure.  The  confident 
boastings  of  the  Grand  Army's  march  were  too  recent  to  be 
forgotten.  McDowell  is  flat  at  present,  but  who  knows  the 
same  influence  may  pick  him  up  again  ?  Great  expectations 
are  had  of  McClellan.  But  will  he  not  be  thwarted  by  Scott's 
jealousy  and  cabinet  intrigues  at  every  step  ?  There  may  be 
some  reason  to  fear  that  his  arrival  will  be  retarded  by 
General  Lee. 

With  all  the  calamity  that  is  upon  us,  I  still  do  not  by  any 
means  despair  of  the  Republic.     The  power  of  endurance,  I 


STANTON'S  VIEWS  223 

think,  will  prove  equal  to  the  occasion,  and  if  our  people  can 
bear  with  this  Cabinet,  they  will  be  able  to  support  a  great 
many  disasters. 

The  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  will  probably  not  exceed 
four  hundred.  The  chief  loss  is  in  the  prisoners  and  disor- 
ganization of  the  troops.  Until  a  large  portion  of  the  officers 
are  purged  off,  and  their  places  supplied  by  earnest,  capable 
men,  not  much  will  be  accomplished. 

I  shall  be  glad  to  hear  from  you.  Give  my  compliments  to 
Mr.  Greeley  and  Mr.  Dana. 

To  Mr.  Buchanan  he  wrote,  July  26 :  — 

The  dreadful  disaster  of  Sunday  can  scarcely  be  mentioned. 

The  imbecility  of  this  administration  culminated  in  that 
catastrophe  ;  an  irretrievable  misfortune  and  national  disgrace 
never  to  be  forgotten  are  to  be  added  to  the  ruin  of  all  peace- 
ful pursuits  and  national  bankruptcy,  as  the  result  of  Lincoln's 
"  running  the  machine  "  for  five  months. 

You  perceive  that  Bennett  is  for  a  change  of  the  Cabinet, 
and  proposes  for  one  of  the  new  Cabinet  Mr.  Holt,  whose 
opposition  to  Bennett's  appointment  was  bitter  and  intensely 
hostile.  It  is  not  unlikely  that  some  changes  in  the  "War  and 
Navy  Departments  may  take  place,  but  none  beyond  those 
two  Departments  imtil  Jeff  Davis  turns  out  the  whole  con- 
cern. The  capture  of  Washington  seems  now  to  be  inevitable ; 
during  the  whole  of  Monday  and  Tuesday  it  might  have  been 
taken  without  any  resistance.  The  rout,  overthrow,  and  utter 
demoralization  of  the  whole  army  is  complete.  Even  now  I 
doubt  whether  any  serious  opposition  to  the  entrance  of  the 
Confederate  forces  would  be  offered.  "While  Lincoln,  Scott, 
and  the  Cabinet  are  disputing  who  are  to  blame,  the  city  is 
unguarded,  and  the  enemy  at  hand.  General  McClellan 
reached  here  last  evening,  but  if  he  had  the  ability  of  Caesar, 
Alexander,  or   Napoleon,  what  can   he   accomplish?     "Will 


2-24  OPEXCN'G   OF   THE   REBELLION 

nor  Soori's  jealousy,  cabinet  intrigues,  and  Republican  inter- 
ference thwart  him  at  every  step  ?  While  hoping  for  the  best, 
I  cannot  shut  my  eyes  against  the  dangers  that  beset  this 
government,  and  especially  this  city.  It  is  certain  that  Davis 
was  in  the  field  on  Sunday,  and  the  secessionists  here  assert 
that  he  headed  in  person  the  last  victorious  charge.  General 
Dix  is  in  Baltimore ;  after  three  weeks'  neglect  and  insult  he 
was  sent  there." 

His  reference  to  "Scott's  jealousies*'  show  that  he 
thought  General  McDowell  had  not  been  supported 
earnestly.  The  ••mighty  blow"  of  the  ••Tribune"  to 
which  he  alluded  was  that  journal's  severe  criticism  of 
the  failure  of  General  Patterson  to  move  to  McDowell's 
support,  or  to  so  engage  Beauregard  as  to  prevent  him 
from  reinforcino;  Johnston.  Mr.  Stanton  evidentlv  re- 
garded  the  general-in-chie£  as  responsible  for  this  fatal 
blunder. 

These  letters  of  Mr.  Stanton  were  passionate  ebulli- 
tions, not  deliberate  judgments.  They  were  written 
while  he  was  in  a  rage  over  a  humiliating  disaster  to 
the  Union  cause.  They  were  private  letters  to  intimate 
friends  of  the  Union  side,  in  which  he  gave  vent  to  his 
total  want  of  respect  for  ^Ir.  Lincoln  and  his  advisers 
at  that  time.  Hi^  hostility  to  them  was  not  that  of  a 
partisan  Democrat,  but  of  an  ardent  Lnionist,  who 
thought  they  were  not  equal  to  the  great  occasion.  It 
is  needless  to  say  that  he  corrected  his  opinion  of  Mr. 
Lincoln  when  he  came  to  know  him.  as  all  men  did  who 
had  ever  doubted  him.  The  men  of  1S61  knew  not  of 
the  wisdom,  prudence,  and  courage  of  their  new  Presi- 
dent.    This  was  to  become  known  as  the  duties  of  his 


STANTON'S  VIEWS  225 

office  crowded  upon  him.  That  Mr.  Stanton's  aver- 
sion to  him  at  that  time  was  not  because  of  any  lack  of 
patriotic  earnestness  is  certain.  Of  his  position  at  that 
period,  Charles  Sumner  said,  after  referring  to  his 
course  during  the  secession  winter :  — 

In  the  summer  that  followed,  especially  during  the  July 
session  of  Congress  (1861),  I  was  in  the  habit  of  seeing  Mr. 
Stanton  at  his  house  in  the  evening  and  conferring  with  him 
freely.  His  standard  was  high,  and  he  constantly  spoke  with 
all  his  accustomed  power  of  our  duties  in  the  suppression  of 
the  rebellion.  Nobody  was  more  earnest  than  himself.  Com- 
pared with  him,  the  President  and  Congress  seemed  slow.* 

*  Atlantic  Monthly,  April,  1870,  letter  to  Henry  Wilson. 


CHAPTER  XXX 

McClellan  in  Command  of  the  Division  of  the  Potomac.  —  Organiza- 
tion of  the  Army.  —  Fortifying  the  Capital.  —  Confidence  reposed 
in  him.  —  His  Private  Letters  from  August  to  November.  —  Gen- 
eral Scott  retired  and  McClellan  placed  in  Command  of  all  the 
Armies.  —  Stanton's  Relations  with  him  at  that  Time.  —  Public 
impatience  for  Military  Operations.  —  Joint  Committee  of  Con- 
gress on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  to  investigate  the  Causes  of  the 
Inactivity  of  the  Army.  —  Testimony  of  the  Division  Generals 
and  others.  —  McClellan's  Delay  in  appearing  before  the  Com- 
mittee. 

McClellan  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the 
Division  of  the  Potomac  on  the  27th  of  July.  This 
division  was  created  by  an  order  issued  on  the  25th, 
and  consisted  of  the  Department  of  Northeast  Virginia 
and  the  Department  of  Washington.  These  depart- 
ments were  respectively  under  the  command  of  General 
McDowell  and  General  Mansfield.  McClellan  himself 
was,  of  course,  subordinate  to  General  Scott.  In  his 
official  report  he  thus  describes  the  conditions  he  found 
in  and  around  Washington  :  — 

There  was  nothing  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  shelling  the 
city  from  heights  within  easy  range  which  could  be  occupied 
by  a  hostile  column  almost  without  resistance.  Many  soldiers 
had  deserted,  and  the  streets  of  Washington  were  crowded 
with  straggling  officers  and  men,  absent  from  their  stations 
without  authority,  whose  beha\dor  indicated  a  general  want 
of  discipline  and  organization. 


McCLELLAN  IN  COMMAND  227 

From  this  chaos  the  new  commander  was  expected  to 
bring  order,  —  establishing  the  morale  of  the  troops  al- 
ready in  the  service,  and  organizing  and  instructing  the 
troops  that  were  rapidly  enlisting  in  the  loyal  States. 

Congress  was  then  in  extra  session,  and  did  not 
adjourn  until  August  6.  It  validated  the  call  for 
troops  already  made  by  the  President,  and  called  on  the 
States  for  500,000  volunteers ;  at  the  same  time  appro- 
priating $500,000,000  for  the  support  of  the  army, 
and  authorizing  loans  for  raising  the  money. 

The  government  and  the  people  reposed  full  confi- 
dence in  General  McClellan's  energy,  ability,  and  patri- 
otism, and  the  immense  resources  of  the  country  were 
placed  at  his  disposal. 

It  was  conceded  by  all  that  active  operations  by  the 
army  would  be  wholly  impracticable  for  some  time 
to  come.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  yet  to  be 
created.  A  system  of  fortifications  for  securing  the 
capital,  and  rendering  its  defense  possible  by  a  small 
number  of  troops,  had  also  to  be  accomplished.  The 
defense  of  the  capital,  and  not  an  advance  upon  the 
enemy,  was  the  question  with  which  General  McClellan 
had  first  to  deal. 

His  correspondence  with  his  wife,  published  in  his 
"  Own  Story  "  in  1887,  shows  that  he  was  much  elated 
with  his  new  position,  and  with  the  general  confidence 
reposed  in  him.     He  said,  July  27,  1861 :  — 

I  find  myself  in  a  new  and  strange  position  here.  Presi- 
dent, Cabinet,  and  General  Scott  and  all,  deferring  to  me. 
By  some  strange  operation  of  magic  I  seem  to  have  become 
the  power  of  the  land. 


228  OPENING  OF  THE   REBELLION 

On  the  30tli  he  said,  referring  to  a  visit  to  the  Sen- 
ate :  — 

Was  quite  overwhelmed  by  the  congratulations  I  received, 
and  the  respect  with  which  I  was  treated.  I  suppose  half  a 
dozen  of  the  oldest  made  the  remark  I  am  becoming  so  much 
used  to :  "  Why,  how  young  you  look ;  and  yet  an  old  sol- 
dier." It  seems  to  strike  everybody  that  I  am  very  young. 
They  give  me  my  way  in  everything.  Full  swing  and  un- 
bounded confidence.  All  tell  me  that  I  am  held  responsible 
for  the  fate  of  the  nation,  and  that  its  resources  shall  be 
placed  at  my  disposal. 

The  following  extracts  from  the  same  correspondence 
constitute  an  outUne  of  the  history  of  the  first  six 
months  of  his  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
as  written  by  himself,  and  are  here  cited  to  show  the 
conditions  existing  when  Mr.  Stanton  became  Secretary 
of  War  at  the  end  of  that  time. 

August  2,  he  said  :  — 

I  handed  to  the  President  to-night  a  carefully  considered 
plan  for  conducting  the  war  on  a  large  scale.  I  shall  carry 
this  thing  on  en  grande  and  crush  out  the  rebellion  in  one 
campaign.  I  flatter  myself  that  Beauregard  has  gained  his 
last  victory. 

August  8,  he  told  of  "  a  long  interview  with  Sew- 
ard about  my  pronunciamento  about  General  Scott's 
policy." 

He  said  that  General  Scott  was  always  in  the  way, 
adding:  "He  understands  nothing;  appreciates  no- 
thing." 

August  9,  he  said :  — 

General  Scott  is  the  great  obstacle.     He  will  not  compre- 


McCLELLAN'S  PRIVATE  LETTERS  229 

hend  the  danger.  I  have  to  fight  my  way  against  him.  To- 
morrow the  question  will  probably  be  decided  by  giving  me 
absolute  control,  independent  of  him.  I  suppose  it  will 
result  in  enmity  on  his  part  against  me,  but  I  have  no  choice. 
The  people  call  upon  me  to  save  the  country.  I  must  save 
it,  and  cannot  respect  anything  that  is  in  the  way. 

I  receive  letter  after  letter,  have  conversation  after  conver- 
sation, calling  on  me  to  save  the  nation,  alluding  to  the  presi- 
dency, dictatorship,  etc.  As  I  hope  one  day  to  be  united 
forever  with  you  in  heaven,  I  have  no  such  aspirations.  I 
would  cheerfully  take  the  dictatorship  and  agree  to  lay  do^vn 
my  life  when  the  country  is  saved.  I  am  not  spoiled  by  my 
new  unexpected  position. 

On  the  16th  of  August  he  said  :  — 

I  have  no  ambition  in  the  present  affairs.  Only  wish  to 
save  my  country,  but  find  the  incapables  around  me  will  not 
permit  it.  They  sit  on  the  verge  of  the  precipice  and  cannot 
realize  what  they  see.  They  think  everything  impossible 
which  is  against  their  wishes. 

He  seemed  apprehensive  of  an  attack  by  the  enemy, 
but  trusted  to  the  heavy  rains  to  postpone  it.  He 
thought  in  two  weeks  he  could  defy  Beam*egard.  Four 
days  later,  August  20,  he  said :  — 

I  am  gaining  rapidly  in  every  way.  I  can  now  defend 
Washington  with  almost  perfect  certainty.  In  a  week  I 
ought  to  be  perfectly  safe,  and  be  prepared  to  defend  all 
Maryland  ;  in  another  week  to  advance  our  position. 

On  the  25th  he  said  that  the  dangerous  moment  had 
passed. 

September  6,  he  said  :  — 

If  B.  (Beauregard)  attacks  now,  he  would  inevitably  be 


230  OPENING  OF  THE  REBELLION 

defeated  with   terrible   loss.      I   feel  now   perfectly  secure 
against  any  attack.     The  next  thing  will  be  to  attack  him. 

No  attack  followed.    Later  in  September  he  said :  — 

I  inclose  a  card  just  received  from  A.  Lincoln,  which  shows 
too  much  deference  to  be  seen  outside. 

October  (no  date)  he  said  :  — 

We  shall  be  ready  to-morrow  to  fight  a  battle  there  (Mun- 
son's  Hill)  if  the  enemy  should  choose  to  attack,  but  I  don't 
think  they  will  care  to  run  the  risk.  I  presume  I  shall  have 
to  go  after  them,  when  I  get  ready,  but  this  getting  ready  is 
slow  work  with  such  an  administration.  I  wish  I  were  well 
out  of  it. 

And  again :  — 

I  am  becoming  daily  more  disgusted  with  this  administra- 
tion ;  perfectly  sick  of  it. 

October  6,  he  said  :  — 

Preparations  are  slow,  and  I  have  an  infinite  deal  to  do 
before  my  army  is  really  ready  to  fight  a  great  battle.  Wash- 
ington may  now  be  looked  upon  as  quite  safe.  They  cannot 
attack  it  in  front.  My  flanks  are  also  safe,  or  soon  will  be ; 
then  I  shall  take  my  own  time  to  make  an  army  that  will  be 
sure  of  success. 

I  do  not  expect  to  fight  a  battle  near  Washington ;  proba- 
bly none  will  be  fought  until  I  advance,  and  that  will  I  not 
do  until  I  am  fully  ready.  My  plans  depend  upon  circum- 
stances. So  soon  as  I  feel  that  my  army  is  well  organized, 
well  disciplined,  and  strong  enough,  I  will  advance  and  force 
the  rebels  to  a  battle  in  a  field  of  their  own  selection.  A 
long  time  must  elapse  before  I  can  do  this,  and  I  expect  all 
the  newspapers  to  abuse  me  for  delay,  but  I  will  not  mind 
that. 


GENERAL  SCOTT  RETIRED  231 

October  10,  he  said  :  — 

I  was  obliged  to  attend  a  meeting  of  the  Cabinet  at  eight 
p.  M.,  and  was  bored  and  annoyed.  There  are  some  of  the 
greatest  geese  in  the  Cabinet  I  have  ever  seen  ;  enough  to  tax 
the  patience  of  Job. 

October  (no  date)  he  said :  — 

I  am  finally  determined  to  force  the  issue  with  General 
Scott.  A  very  few  days  will  determine  whether  his  policy 
or  mine  is  to  prevail.  He  is  for  inaction  and  the  defensive. 
He  endeavors  to  cripple  me  in  every  way,  yet  I  see  that  the 
newspapers  begin  to  accuse  me  of  a  want  of  energy. 

October  26,  he  told  of  a  conference  with  Senators 
Wade,  Trumbull,  and  Chandler  about  war.  matters,  and 
said :  — 

They  will  make  a  desperate  effort  to-morrow  to  have  Gen- 
eral Scott  retired  at  once.^  Until  this  is  accomplished,  I  can 
effect  but  little  good.  He  is  ever  in  my  way  and  I  am  sure 
desires  no  action.  I  want  to  get  through  with  the  war  as 
rapidly  as  possible. 

On  the  1st  of  November,  1861,  General  Scott  retired 
and  General  McClellan  was  placed  in  command  of  all 
the  armies  of  the  United  States.  This  additional  honor 
bestowed  on  him,  and  the  confidence  in  him  which  it 
exhibited,  seemed  only  to  increase  his  contempt  for  the 
President  and  his  counselors,  for,  sixteen  days  later,  he 
wrote  to  bis  wife  :  — 

It  is  sickening  in  the  extreme  and  makes  me  feel  heavy  at 
heart  to  see  the  weakness  and  unfitness  of  the  poor  beings 
who  control  the  destinies  of  this  great  country. 

1  lie  seemed  at  that  time  willing  to  have  "  the  politicians  dictate  "  as 
to  the  command  of  the  army. 


232  OPENING  OF  THE  REBELLION 

These  extracts  are  General  McClellan's  only  explana- 
tions for  the  inaction  of  the  forces  under  his  command, 
late  in  the  autumn  of  1861,  when  the  weather  was 
fine,  the  Virginia  roads  good,  and  the  army  well  pre- 
pared for  action.  He  was  professing  to  be  eager  for 
an  advance  of  our  armies,  and  only  restrained  by  the 
imbecility  of  the  President  and  his  advisers,  including 
General  Scott ;  from  these  he  had  successfully  appealed 
to  leadino;  "  Radicals  "  like  Wade  and  Chandler  to  aid 
him  in  getting  General  Scott  out  of  the  way. 

He  appears  to  have  succeeded  in  impressing  Mr. 
Stanton  with  the  belief  that  this  was  his  real  attitude, 
and  found  in  him  a  firm  friend.  He  tells  us  that  he 
was  "  first  introduced  to  Mr.  Stanton  a  few  weeks  after 
reaching  Washington,  as  a  safe  adviser  on  legal  points." 
They  became  very  friendly.  On  the  17th  of  Novem- 
ber Mrs.  Stanton  wrote  to  Edwin  L.  Stanton  concern- 
ing his  father  as  follows  :  — 

The  papers  give  him  the  credit  of  being  General  McClel- 
lan's confidential  adviser.  Their  relations  appear  to  me  about 
the  same  as  when  you  were  at  home. 

McClellan  on  that  day  wrote  to  his  wife :  — 

I  shall  try  again  to  write  a  few  lines  before  I  go  to 
Stanton's  to  ascertain  what  the  law  of  nations  is  on  this 
Slidell  and  Mason  seizure.^ 

Later  in  the  same  month  (date  not  given)  he  wrote 
to  his  wife  as  follows  :  — 

I  have  been  at  work  all  day  nearly  on  a  letter  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  (Cameron)  in  regard  to  future  military  opera- 

^  Seizure  of  the  British  mail  steamer  Trent  by  Admiral  Wilkes,  with 
Slidell  and  Mason  on  board. 


STANTON'S  RELATIONS  WITH  McCLELLAN      233 

tions.  I  have  not  been  at  home  for  some  three  hours,  but  am 
concealed  at  Stanton's  to  dodge  all  enemies  in  the  shape  of 
browsing  Presidents,  etc. 

One  A.  M.  —  I  am  pretty  thoroughly  tired  out.  The  paper  is 
a  very  important  one,  and  is  intended  to  place  on  record  that 
I  have  left  nothing  undone  to  make  this  army  what  it  ought 
to  be  and  that  the  necessity  for  delay  has  not  been  my  fault. 
I  have  a  set  of  men  to  deal  with  unscrupulous  and  false.  If 
possible,  they  will  throw  whatever  blame  there  is  on  my 
shoulders,  and  I  do  not  intend  to  be  sacrificed  by  such 
people.  .  .  . 

I  cannot  guess  at  my  movements,  for  they  are  not  witliin 
my  control.  I  cannot  move  without  more  means,  and  I  do 
not  possess  the  jDower  to  control  those  means.  The  people 
think  me  all-powerful.  Never  was  there  such  a  mistake.  I 
am  thwarted  and  deceived  by  these  incapables  at  every  turn. 
I  am  doing  all  I  can  to  get  ready  to  move  before  winter  sets 
in,  but  it  now  begins  to  look  as  if  we  were  condemned  to  a 
winter  of  inactivity.  If  it  is  so  the  fault  will  not  be  mine ; 
there  will  be  that  consolation  for  my  conscience,  even  if  the 
world  at  large  never  knows  it. 

This  letter  shows  that  General  McClellan  was  chafing 
under  the  complaints  that  were  then  being  made  among 
the  people  because  of  no  military  movements.  It  is 
important  to  note  that  he  wrote  it  in  Mr.  Stanton's 
house,  where  he  was  concealed  to  "  dodge  "  the  Presi- 
dent. All  day  he  had  been  writing  a  letter  to  the 
Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Cameron,  to  go  on  record,  in 
which  he  was  laying  the  blame  for  the  inaction  of  the 
army  at  the  door  of  the  "  false  and  unscrupulous  men  " 
who  were,  according  to  his  account,  refusing  him  the 
means,  wdthout  which  the  army  could  not  be  moved. 
In  this  he  could  only  have  had  reference  to  the  Presi- 


234  OPENING  OF  THE  EEBELLION 

dent  and  his  Cabinet,  and  especially  to  Mr.  Cameron, 
then  Secretary  of  War.  The  fact  that  he  found 
asylum  in  Mr.  Stanton's  house  while  indicting  this 
letter,  and  that  there  he  felt  secure  from  any  interrup- 
tion by  "  enemies,"  is  an  indication  that  the  former  was 
not  at  that  time  (late  in  November,  1861)  one  of  those 
who  believed  him  to  be  at  fault.  We  have  already 
seen  that  Mr.  Stanton  had  no  confidence  in  the  admin- 
istration, and  that  he  was  in  the  habit  of  exj^ressing  his 
views  freely.  General  McClellan  says  that  to  him  Stan- 
ton opposed  the  President,  the  administration,  and  the 
Republican  party  with  extreme  virulence,  but  he  adds : 
"  As  he  always  expressed  himself  as  in  favor  of  putting 
down  the  rebellion  at  any  cost,  I  always  regarded  these 
extreme  views  as  the  ebullitions  of  an  intense  and 
patriotic  nature." 

Certainly  the  inertia  of  the  army  was  well  calculated 
to  arouse  public  indignation  against  whoever  was  re- 
sponsible for  it.  The  press  reflected  the  pubHc  impa- 
tience ;  but  few  were  disposed  to  attack  the  popular 
idol  then  in  command  of  the  army,  when  it  was  so 
much  easier  to  blame  the  President  and  the  War 
Department. 

November  went  by  without  any  indication  that  a 
forward  movement  was  contemplated.  December  came 
and  Congress  assembled,  representing  the  people  whose 
homes  had  been  decimated  to  produce  the  vast  army 
now  in  camp,  and  whose  substance  was  maintaining  it. 
The  country  had  become  exceedingly  anxious  over  the 
inexplicable  delay,  and  demanded  to  know  whether  it 
was  a  necessity,  and  if  not,  who  was  at  fault.     The 


PUBLIC  IMPATIENCE  235 

public  feeling  made  itself  manifest  in  Congress  and 
took  the  form  of  an  inquiry  into  the  conduct  of  the 
war.  A  joint  committee  of  the  Senate  and  House  was 
appointed  for  that  purpose,  consisting  of  Senators 
Benjamin  F.  Wade  of  Ohio,  Zachary  Chandler  of 
Michigan,  and  Andrew  Johnson  of  Tennessee,  and 
Representatives  D.  W.  Gooch  of  Massachusetts,  John 
Covode  of  Pennsylvania,  George  \V.  Julian  of  Indiana, 
and  Moses  F.  Odell  of  New  York.  Its  duty  was  to 
ascertain  by  all  the  evidence  it  could  obtain  the  condi- 
tion of  the  army,  what  had  been  accomplished  by  it, 
and  whether  all  had  been  done  that  could  reasonably 
have  been  expected  of  it.  If  it  had  fallen  short  of 
such  expectations  it  would  examine  into  and  report  the 
cause  therefor,  placing  the  responsibility  where  it  was 
found  to  belonof.  If  the  o-eneral  in  command  had  not 
received  proper  support  at  the  hands  of  the  Executive 
th-e  people  must  know  it.  If  the  War  Department  had 
been  lacking  in  vigor  of  administration,  then  the  cen- 
sure should  fall  there.  If  the  general  had  received 
adequate  materials  of  war,  and  with  an  army  equal  to 
the  serious  work  before  him,  had  given  it  no  more 
difficult  task  than  to  stand  in  review  and  shout  huzzas 
for  him  as  he  galloped  up  and  down  the  lines,  then 
the  illusion  must  be  dispelled  and  the  blame  fall  upon 
him. 

Under  our  constitutional  government  Congress  has 
the  sole  power  to  declare  war  and  to  govern  the  army. 
It  was  in  the  exercise  of  this  undoubted  power  and 
duty  that  Congress  undertook  an  inquiry  into  the  con- 
duct of  the  war,  which  thus  far  had  been  fruitful  only 


236  OPENING  OF  THE  EEBELLION 

in  disaster,  and  seemed  now  to  have  settled  down  per- 
manently to  the  defense  of  a  besieged  eaiDital. 

On  Saturday,  the  21st  of  December,  the  chairman 
was  directed  to  inform  General  McClellan  of  the  unani- 
mous desire  of  the  committee  to  have  an  interview  with 
him  at  the  capital.  He  appointed  the  23d  for  the  pur- 
pose, but  when  the  day  arrived  pleaded  illness  as  a 
reason  for  not  keeping  the  engagement.  It  was  not 
until  the  15th  of  January,  twenty-five  days  later,  that 
he  finally  appeared  before  them.  During  the  time 
which  intervened  a  great  deal  of  history  had  been 
written,  in  the  form  of  testimony  given  before  the 
committee  by  Generals  McDowell,  Heintzelman,  Keyes, 
Porter,  Franklin,  Richardson,  Wadsworth,  Meigs,  Lan- 
der, Slocum,  Barnard,  and  others.  The  result  of  this 
inquiry  was  the  discovery  that  the  fortifications  around 
Washington  were  not  properly  garrisoned ;  that  no 
council  of  war  or  other  meeting  of  the  generals  had 
been  held  for  consultation  with  the  general-in-chief, 
and  that  the  latter  had  not  consulted,  or  even  con- 
versed, with  any  of  his  division  generals,  except  Fitz 
John  Porter  and  W.  B.  Franklin,  upon  the  subject 
of  operations  by  the  army.  These  two  generals  testi- 
fied that  they  knew  something  of  General  McClellan's 
plans,  but  declined  to  state  what  they  were  without  his 
permission.  The  general  opinion  of  the  mihtary  wit- 
nesses was  that  the  army  could  and  ought  to  make  a 
movement  against  the  enemy  without  further  delay. 
General  Franklin  was  emphatic  in  his  expression  of 
this  opinion,  and  he  was  second  only  to  Fitz  John 
Porter  in  the  favor  of  General  McClellan.     General 


TESTIMONY  OF  DIVISION   GENERALS         237 

Porter  said  the  army  was  not  ready  to  move ;  it  had 
not  what  was  requisite  to  move  with ;  but  he  decHned 
to  explain  further.     He  stood  alone  in  this  opinion. 

It  was  evident  that  no  present  movement  was  con- 
templated by  General  McClellan,  and  it  was  equally 
evident  that  he  did  not  intend  to  inform  either  the 
President  or  Congress  whether  or  not  he  had  in  view 
any  plan  of  operations  whatever  for  the  immense  army 
which  had  been  placed  under  his  command. 


PART  IV 

STANTON  AS   SECRETARY  OF  WAR 


CHAPTER  XXXI 

Stanton's  Appointment  as  Secretary  of  War.  —  Without  Previous 
Consultation  with  him.  —  Stanton  consults  McClellan  before 
accepting.  —  Reasons  for  the  Appointment.  —  Comments  on  the 
Appointment  by  Men  of  Distinction.  —  Stanton's  Conception  of 
the  Duties  of  his  Office. 

On  the  ISth  of  January,  1862,  President  Lincoln, 
■without  previous  consultation  with  him,  nominated  Mr. 
Stanton  to  the  Senate  to  be  Secretary  of  War.  The 
two  men  had  not  met  since  the  former's  inauguration, 
and  did  not  meet  until  Stanton  presented  himself  on 
the  15th  to  receive  his  commission. 

General  McClellan  states  that  Stanton  called  upon 
him  immediately  upon  being  nominated,  to  confer  with 
him  as  to  his  acceptance,  and  gives  the  following  ac- 
count of  the  interview :  — 

He  said  that  acceptance  would  involve  very  great  personal 
sacrifices  on  his  part,  and  that  the  only  possible  inducement 
was  that  he  might  have  it  in  his  power  to  aid  me  in  putting 
down  the  rebellion,  by  devoting  all  his  energy  and  ability  to 
my  assistance,  and  that  together  we  could  soon  bring  the  war 
to  a  close.     If  I  wished  him  to  accept  he  would  do  so,  but  on 


STANTON   CONSULTS  McCLELLAN  239 

my  account  only.  He  had  come  to  know  my  wishes  and  de- 
termine accordingly.  I  told  him  I  hoped  he  would  accept  the 
nomination.^ 

General  McClellan  was  a  Democrat,  and  many  of  his 
friends  at  Washington  were  Union  men  of  Democratic 
antecedents.     Mr.  Stanton  was  one  of  these. 

It  was  wise  in  Mr.  Lincoln  to  call  into  his  Cabinet  at 
this  juncture  a  Union  Democrat  of  Mr.  Stanton's  char- 
acter and  reputation.  Through  such  a  representative 
man  the  whole  body  of  Union  Democrats  in  the  coun- 
try would  soon  learn  whether  it  was  a  Repubhcan 
President  or  a  Democratic  general  who  was  inviting 
political  and  financial  disaster,  and  foreign  interven- 
tion, by  a  failure  to  use  the  army  which  the  uprising  of 
a  great  people  had  provided  to  crush  out  the  rebellion. 

From  the  21st  of  December  until  the  14th  of  Janu- 
ary the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  had 
been  unable  to  secure  the  attendance  before  them  of 
General  McClellan ;  but  on  the  last-named  day,  he 
informed  them  of  his  readiness  to  confer  with  them.. 
This  date,  it  will  be  observed,  was  coincident  with  Mr. 
Stanton's  call  upon  him,  informing  him  of  his  nomina- 
tion as  Secretary  of  War.  McClellan  appeared  before 
the  committee  on  the  15th.  The  record  states  that 
"  some  time  was  passed  in  a  full  and  free  conference 
between  him  and  the  committee  in  relation  to  various 
matters  connected  with  the  conduct  of  the  present 
war." 

On  the  same  day  the  nomination  of  Mr.  Stanton  was 
confirmed  by  the  Senate ;  he  was  commissioned  at  once, 

1  McClellan's  Oum  Story,  page  153. 


240     STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

but  did  not  enter  upon  the  duties  of  his  office  until  Jan- 
uary 20th. 

The  appointment  of  Mr.  Stanton  was  not  made  on 
party  or  personal  considerations;  nor  was  it  made  to 
gain  personal  support  for  the  President  in  the  Cabinet, 
or  for  his  methods  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war ;  for 
no  man  of  note  had  more  freely  expressed  his  disap- 
probation of  those  methods,  or  been  more  lavish  of 
expressions  of  dislike  for  the  President  himself,  than 
had  Mr.  Stanton.  He  was  appointed  because,  in  ad- 
dition to  his  great  ability,  his  restless  energy,  and  his 
absolute  honesty,  he  was  an  unconditional  Unionist  of 
the  Democratic  faith,  and  his  appointment  would  be  a 
proof  to  the  country  that  Mr.  Lincoln  regarded  the 
war  as  the  people's  war,  and  not  that  of  a  party.  His 
personal  relations  with  General  McClellan  were  known 
to  be  good,  and  it  was  hoped  that  his  administration 
of  the  War  Department  would  set  in  motion  the  army, 
the  inactivity  of  which  the  general  in  command  had 
attributed  to  a  want  of  support  from  the  Executive. 

The  positive  qualities  exhibited  by  Mr.  Stanton  as 
Attorney-General,  during  the  latter  part  of  Mr.  Buch- 
anan's administration,  had  placed  him  high  in  the  esti- 
mation of  the  patriotic  leaders.  The  agents  of  the 
press  promptly  spread  before  their  readers  information, 
obtained  from  those  who  had  been  in  contact  with  him 
during  the  secession  winter,  of  his  patriotism,  will,  and 
courage,  and  the  country  hailed  his  accession  to  the 
War  Department  as  proof  that  an  aggressive  policy 
against  the  rebellion  had  at  last  been  determined  on. 

From  all  parts  of  the  country,  and  from  citizens  in 


COMMENTS   ON  THE  APPOINTMENT  241 

various  stations  in  life,  came  letters  not  of  formal  eon- 
Gfratulation,  but  of  intense  satisfaction.  Followins:  are 
extracts  from  a  few  of  them.  The  Hon.  Joseph  Holt, 
who  had  served  with  him  in  the  Cabinet  of  Mr.  Buch- 
anan, wrote  to  the  lieutenant-governor  of  Ohio  as 
follows :  — 

The  selection  of  Hon.  Edwin  M.  Stanton  as  Secretary  of 
War  has  occasioned  me  unalloyed  gratification.  It  is  an  im- 
mense stride  in  the  direction  of  the  suppression  of  the  rebel- 
lion. So  far  as  I  can  gather  the  popular  sentiment,  there  is 
everywhere  rejoicing  over  the  appointment ;  but  that  rejoicing 
would  be  far  greater,  did  the  people  know,  as  I  do,  the  cour- 
age, loyalty,  and  the  genius  of  the  new  secretary  as  displayed 
in  the  intensely  tragic  struggles  that  marked  the  closing  days 
of  the  last  administration.  He  is  a  great  man,  intellectually 
and  morally  —  a  patriot  of  the  true  Roman  stripe,  who  wiU 
gi'apple  with  treason  as  the  lion  grapples  with  his  prey.  We 
may  rest  well  assured  that  all  man  can  do  will,  in  his  present 
position,  be  done  to  deliver  our  poor  bleeding  country  from 
the  bayonets  of  the  traitors  now  lifted  against  its  bosom. 

Gen.  Robert  Anderson,  the  hero  of  Fort  Sumter, 
thus  expressed  his  feeling  :  — 

This  morning's  paper  gives  me  the  gratifying  intelligence 
of  your  appointment  as  Secretary  of  War  having  been  unani- 
mously confirmed  by  the  Senate.  You  will  undoubtedly  re- 
ceive the  congratulations  of  hosts  of  friends,  but  I  venture 
to  say  that  your  nomination  and  confirmation  will  be  heard 
by  none  with  more  heartfelt  pleasure  than  they  were  by  your 
sincere  friend,  etc. 

Governor  Andrew  of  Massachusetts  wrote  a  friend  in 
Washington  :  — 


242     STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

I  am  glad  to  see  the  high  ability  and  former  patriotic  ser- 
vices of  Mr.  Stanton  thus  conspicuously  recognized  by  the 
President, 

A  letter  from  Stanton's  old  pastor,  the  Rev.  H.  Dyer, 

says  :  — 

On  opening  my  morning  paper  this  morning,  the  first 
thing  that  met  my  eye  was  your  appointment  as  Secretary  of 
War.  I  thank  God  for  it,  and  I  cannot  help  telling  you  how- 
rejoiced  I  am  at  it.  It  has  been  a  source  of  constant  and 
sincere  regret  that  any  political  necessity  should  have  pre- 
vented at  the  outset  the  nomination  of  yourself,  Mr.  Holt, 
and  Mr.  Dix  as  members  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  Cabinet. 

Gen.  John  A.  Dix  wrote  Stanton  from  Baltimore :  — 

If,  as  they  say,  you  are  Secretary  of  War,  I  do  not 
congratulate  you,  but  I  congratulate  the  country  and  army 
greatly. 

Justice  Grier  of  the  Supreme  Court  wrote  him  as 
follows  :  — 

As  soon  as  I  passed  the  door  of  the  Senate  Chamber  I  was 
informed  of  your  nomination.  It  was  a  secret  no  longer. 
Senators  had  freely  communicated  the  fact.  I  afterwards 
met  Nelson,  Clifford,  and  Catron  at  Catron's  room.  They 
were  talking  of  your  nomination.  All  agreed  you  should 
accept ;  that  it  would  restore  confidence  in  the  nation ;  your 
antecedents  being  known  to  the  President,  he  should  ask  no 
pledge,  you  should  give  none,  and  require  none  at  present ; 
the  great  Democratic  party  of  the  North  and  conservative 
Whigs  (now  a  large  majority)  would  support,  strengthen, 
and  hold  you  up ;  that  you  are  young,  strong,  and  can  bear 
labor,  can  do  great  good,  and  in  this  crisis  your  country  de- 
mands every  sacrifice  of  individual  comfort.     You  can  gain 


COMMENTS   ON  THE  APPOINTMENT  243 

great  glory  if  there  be  success  to  our  arms,  and  can  only 
sink  in  the  common  ruin  in  case  of  defeat.  I  concur  with 
them. 

Said  Horace  Greeley  in  the  New  York  "  Tribune :  " — 

There  is  a  very  general  conviction  that  the  appointment  of 
the  new  Secretary  means  business,  and  that  it  is  not  likely  to 
be  popular  at  Beauregard  or  Johnston's  headquarters.  We 
believe  the  general  impression  is  for  once  in  the  right.  No 
man  ever  entered  upon  the  discharge  of  the  most  momentous 
public  duties  under  more  favorable  auspices,  so  far  as  public 
confidence  and  support  can  create  such  auspices.  In  all  the 
loyal  States  there  has  not  been  one  dissent  from  the  general 
acclamation  which  hailed  Mr.  Stanton's  appointment  as  emi- 
nently wise  and  happy.  The  attempt  at  first  made  to  repre- 
sent it  as  a  triumph  of  border-State  twaddling  on  the  slavery 
question  has  been  abandoned,  and  even  disavowed  in  some 
quarters.  The  simple  truth  is  that  Mr.  Stanton  was  not 
appointed  to,  and  does  not  accept,  the  War  Department  in 
support  of  any  programme  or  policy  whatever,  but  the  un- 
qualified and  uncompromising  vindication  of  the  authority 
and  integrity  of  the  Union.  Whatever  views  he  may  have 
respecting  slavery  will  not  be  allowed  to  swerve  him  one  hair 
from  the  line  of  paramount  and  single-hearted  devotion  to 
the  national  cause.  If  slavery  or  anti-slavery  shall  at  any 
time  be  found  obstructing  or  impeding  the  nation  in  its 
efforts  to  crush  out  this  monstrous  rebellion,  he  will  walk 
straight  on  in  the  path  of  duty,  though  that  path  should  lead 
him  over  or  through  the  impediment,  and  insure  its  annihila- 
tion. 

The  public  expects  of  Mr.  Stanton  an  administration  of 
remarkable  energy  and  vigor,  and  this  expectation  will  not 
be  disappointed.  This  vigor  will  not  be  displayed  in  dicta- 
tion to  the  general-in-chief  of  our  armies,  nor  in  the  prompting 
of  a  hasty  or  ill-advised  offensive  movement  in  any  or  every 


244  STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

quarter.  We  feel  assured  that  our  military  commander  wiU 
find  in  Mr.  Stanton  a  capable  and  zealous  cooperator  rather 
than  a  harsh  critic  or  a  lordly  superior.  But  there  are  broad 
fields  of  public  duty,  peculiarly  his  own,  in  which  we  are  con- 
fident Mr.  Stanton  will  evince  an  energy  and  decision  terrible 
to  evil-doers,  and  first  in  importance  among  these  is  that  of 
treason  which  wears  the  garb  of  Unionism,  or  at  least  pre- 
tends to  abstain  from  acts  of  flagrant  disloyalty. 

Mr.  Stanton's  predecessor,  Simon  Cameron,  was  a 
man  of  large  experience  and  conceded  wisdom  in 
political  and  legislative  affairs;  but  he  was  not  Stan- 
ton's equal  in  the  executive  faculty,  which,  while  keep- 
ing the  main  object  in  view,  masters  the  knowledge  of 
all  details,  divides  the  labor  between  wisely  selected 
subordinates,  and  energizes  their  action  by  his  own 
vigilant  supervision,  and  by  holding  them  to  a  strict 
accountability  for  their  work. 

Mr.  Stanton  fully  met  all  these  requirements.  He 
knew  that  upon  the  Secretary  of  War  rested  the  vast 
responsibility  of  bringing  to  the  highest  state  of  per- 
fection the  various  instrumentalities  in  his  department, 
through  which  alone  the  war  power  of  the  government 
could  be  exercised.  Each  bureau  of  that  department 
was  charged  with  duties,  the  neglect  or  slack  perform- 
ance of  which  might  be  fatal  to  the  success  of  our 
armies.  The  enlisting  and  equipment  of  soldiers,  the 
furnishing  them  with  supplies  of  food  and  clothing, 
munitions  of  war,  and  medical  stores  and  transporta- 
tion, were  all  dependent  upon  the  proper  administration 
of  the  War  Office.  He  rapidly  acquired  a  knowledge 
of  the  methods  by  which  these   functions  were   per- 


HIS  CONCEPTION  OF  HIS  DUTIES  24o 

formed,  and  the  efficiency  of  the  several  bureaus  charged 
with  their  performance.  He  supplemented  their  eli'orts 
with  his  own  energy  and  with  his  own  fertility  in  ex- 
pedients. He  looked  to  it  that  the  army  should  lack 
nothing  which  it  was  the  duty  of  the  government  to 
supply. 

He  knew  all  the  powers  which,  by  the  Constitution, 
are  lodged  with  the  government,  and  he  wanted  to  see 
every  one  of  them  exercised  to  its  utmost  in  the  strusfSfle 
with  treason.  In  that  instrument  he  found  the  war- 
making  power  granted  to  Congress  without  limit,  and 
he  found  the  President  vested  by  Congress  with  full 
authority  to  do  all  that  may  be  done  in  civilized 
warfare. 

He  longed  to  see  the  President  assert  his  whole 
authority  and  mass  the  nation's  power,  which,  he  firmly 
believed,  no  enemy  could  successfully  resist.  Animated 
by  these  convictions,  and  bent  upon  seeing  them  made 
the  basis  of  the  future  action  of  the  government,  he 
entered  upon  the  discharge  of  the  duties  of  Secretary 
of  War  with  all  the  energy  and  power  of  his  nature. 


,  CHAPTER  XXXII 

Mr.  Stanton  at  Work.  —  Some  of  his  Duties  and  Some  of  his  An- 
noyances. 

It  is  impossible  to  convey  any  adequate  idea  of  the 
daily  work  of  the  War  Department  at  that  time.  In 
the  vast  army,  military  promotion  was  eagerly  sought 
for  by  nearly  every  colonel  and  general  in  the  field. 
As  Mr.  Lincoln  graphically  expressed  it,  "  There  were 
ten  pegs  where  there  was  one  hole  to  put  them  in." 
Senators  and  members  of  Congress,  upon  whose  appro- 
bation the  administration  was  dependent  for  war  mea- 
sures and  appropriations,  had  their  earnest  opinions  in 
favor  of  the  promotions  of  military  of&cers  from  their 
own  States ;  governors,  whose  zeal  in  raising  volunteers 
was  so  highly  appreciated,  had  their  views  to  urge; 
different  clashing  military  coteries  added  to  the  num- 
ber of  currents  which  set  in  upon  the  Secretary  of  War 
in  an  endeavor  to  control  his  action  in  recommending 
promotions.  The  great  generals  of  the  country,  and  for 
that  matter  the  lesser  ones  too,  also  contributed  their 
advice.  Wealthy  contractors,  and  sturdy  beggars  who 
desired  to  become  contractors,  sought  to  promote  their 
advantage  by  aiding  in  the  selection  of  officers  with 
whom  they  were  to  be  brought  in  contact. 

The  hotels  and  bar-rooms  of  Washington  swarmed 
with  newly  made  generals,  appointed  upon  influences 


MR.  STANTON  AT  WORK  247 

which  could  not  be  ignored,  and  whose  services,  in 
some  instances,  were  as  valuable  there  as  they  would 
have  been  in  the  field  had  the  army  been  in  motion. 
The  capital  was  a  sort  of  loafer's  paradise,  if  only 
the  loafer  wore  stars  or  epaulettes.  Officers  obtruded 
themselves  into  the  War  Department,  absenting  them- 
selves from  duty  without  leave,  in  order  to  apply  in 
person  for  leave  of  absence. 

In  addition  to  the  official  persons  who  flocked  in 
upon  Stanton,  there  came  swarms  of  private  persons 
on  business,  who  wanted  "  just  a  word  "  with  the  Sec- 
retary, for  information  or  profit.  He  always  decided 
for  himself  whom  he  would  see,  when  he  would  see 
them,  and  how  much  time  he  would  give  to  each. 

In  his  private  office  he  received  those  who  had 
orders  to  come,  or  who,  from  their  position  or  official 
relation  to  him,  were  entitled  to  admittance.  There, 
too,  he  received  visitors  whose  calls  he  deemed  impor- 
tant. On  his  reception  days,  and  at  other  times  when 
it  was  possible,  he  was  in  the  habit  of  coming  out  into 
the  general  office  and  stationing  himself  where  but  one 
person  could  converse  with  him  at  a  time.  The  proces- 
sion then  passed  rapidly  in  front  of  him.  It  included 
high  dignitaries,  both  civil  and  military.  Each  one 
soon  understood  that  he  must  make  his  errand  known 
without  special  privacy,  without  circumlocution,  and  in 
the  briefest  terms ;  and  unless  he  was  ready  to  do  this, 
he  got  no  hearing  at  all.  Having  stated  his  case,  the 
Secretary  answered  him  instantly  and  decisively,  yes  or 
no.  Having  thus  decided,  he  heeded  no  remonstrance, 
and  tolerated  no  repetition  of  the  request,  but  simply 


248     STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

dismissed  the  case  and  the  person  together,  hurried  him 
on,  and  received  the  next  one.  This  often  led  to  bitter 
feehngs  against  him,  and  by  many  who  were  disap- 
pointed or  rebuffed  he  was  regarded  as  tyrannical, 
arbitrary,  and  unjust.  But  he  was  there  to  decide,  and 
not  they.  The  business  of  the  government  had  to  go 
on.  It  was  more  important  that  he  should  keep  up 
with  it  than  that  in  every  case  he  should  make  the 
right  decision.  Hundreds  of  frivolous  requests  were 
made,  and  dismissed  merely  because  they  were  frivo- 
lous or  purely  personal. 

At  these  general  levees  he  did  not  always  listen  to 
the  people  in  the  order  of  their  reaching  him  in  the 
line  of  the  procession,  but,  looking  over  the  assembled 
crowd,  would  call  to  him  individuals  whom  he  chose  to 
hear  at  once.  Sometimes  it  would  be  some  person 
wholly  unknown  to  him,  upon  whom  his  eye  had  rested 
with  interest. 

But  the  Secretary's  contact  with  the  multitude  of 
of&cials  and  private  persons,  wearing  as  it  was  and  sub- 
jecting him,  as  it  frequently  did,  to  the  importunities 
of  men  of  strongest  will  and  unlimited  self-assertion, 
formed  but  a  small  portion  of  his  hard  work.  He  had 
daily  consultations  with  the  heads  of  the  several  bu- 
reaus in  his  department,  requiring  and  receiving  from 
each  of  them  full  information  as  to  the  demands  that 
were  being  made  upon  them  in  the  organization  and 
equipment  of  the  army,  and  their  reports  as  to  the 
thoroughness  with  which  they  had  complied  with  these 
demands.  He  placed  himself  in  touch  with  the  com- 
mittees of  Congress,  which  had  to  deal  with  miHtary 


SOME  OF  HIS   DUTIES  249 

questions,  and  those  committees  looked  to  him  largely 
for  the  shaping  of  measures  necessary  for  calling  out 
the  strength  of  the  nation  in  men  and  material  for  the 
prosecution  of  the  war.  The  President,  whose  right 
arm  he  speedily  became,  was  much  in  his  department, 
going  over  the  situation  with  him,  and  a  council  of  mil- 
itary men  advised  them  at  times  in  the  consideration  of 
purely  mihtary  matters. 

He  aided  the  congressional  Committee  on  the  Con- 
duct of  the  War  in  giving  their  inquiries  such  direction 
as  would  bring  out  clearly  tlie  condition  of  the  army 
and  its  equipment,  and  its  fitness  for  active  operations. 
The  records  of  the  committee  show  frequent  requests 
for  conferences  with  him  and  of  meetings  in  response 
thereto.  Adjoining  his  private  office  there  was  a  tele- 
graph room,  in  which  he  spent  much  time  every  day, 
and  often  much  of  the  night,  communicating  with  gen- 
erals in  the  various  commands,  governors  of  States,  and 
others  ha^-ing  relations  with  the  government.  The 
President  spent  much  time  with  the  Secretary  in  this 
room. 


CHAPTEE  XXXin 

His  First  Official  Order.  —  Care  for  Union  prisoners.  —  Conference 
with  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War.  —  The  Military- 
Situation  made  known  to  him  through  the  Testimony  of  McClel- 
lan's  Generals. —  His  First  War  Bulletin.  —  In  this  the  President's 
INIilitary  Supremacy  asserted. 

The  first  official  order  made  by  Mr.  Stanton  bears 
date  of  January  20,  tlie  day  he  entered  upon  liis  duties 
as  Secretary  of  War.     It  was  as  follows :  — 

No.  1.  —  Provisions  for  Union  Prisoners. 

Wab  Department,  January  20,  1862. 

This  department  recognizes  as  the  first  of  its  duties  to  take 
measures  for  the  relief  of  the  brave  men  who,  having  im- 
periled their  lives  in  the  military  service  of  the  government, 
are  now  prisoners  and  captives.     It  is  therefore, 

Ordered,  —  That  two  commissioners  be  appointed  to  visit 
the  city  of  Richmond,  Virginia,  and  wherever  else  prisoners 
belonging  to  the  army  of  the  United  States  may  be  held ;  and 
there  take  such  measures  as  may  be  needed  to  provide  for  the 
wants  and  contribute  to  the  comforts  of  such  prisoners,  at  the 
expense  of  the  United  States,  and  to  such  extent  as  may  be 
permitted  by  the  authorities  under  whom  such  prisoners  are 
held. 

A  few  days  later,  the  Reverend  Bishop  Ames  of  the 
Methodist  Episcopal  Church,  and  the  Hon.  Hamilton 
Fish  of  New  York  were  appointed  as  such  Commis- 
sioners. 


CARE  FOR  UNION  PRISONERS  251 

On  the  30tli  of  January,  Secretary  Stanton  issued  an 
order  that  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  United  States 
made  prisoners  of  war  should,  during  their  imprison- 
ment, receive  the  same  pay  as  if  they  were  doing  active 
duty. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  conceive  of  any  method  better 
adapted  to  reconcile  the  people  to  the  sacrifices  they 
were  making  than  the  issuance  of  these  humane  orders 
which  would  be  read  in  every  home  of  the  North,  sad- 
dened by  the  absence  in  the  army  of  husbands,  brothers, 
and  sons. 

From  the  following  entry  in  the  official  report  of  the 
proceedings  of  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War,  for  January  20,  it  will  be  seen  that  Mr.  Stanton 
was  placed  in  communication  with  that  committee  on 
the  first  day  of  his  actual  service  as  Secretary  of  War. 

At  eight  o'clock  p.  m.,  the  committee  reported  for  session ;  all 
the  members  present,  and  had  a  conference  of  several  hours' 
duration  with  the  Honorable  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of 
War. 

At  this  conference  the  new  Secretary  was  made 
acquainted  with  the  military  situation,  as  shown  by  the 
testimony  already  taken  before  the  committee.  We 
have  seen  from  that  testimony  that  General  McClellan 
consulted  none  of  his  generals  except  Porter  and  Frank- 
lin ;  that  all  of  them  except  Porter  declared  that  the 
army  was,  and  had  long  been,  in  condition  for  an  ad- 
vance upon  the  enemy,  and  that  it  ought  to  take  the 
offensive  ;  that  it  could  not  be  discovered  that  General 
McClellan  had  any  plan,  or  that  he  contemplated  any 


252  STANTON  AS   SECRETARY   OF  WAR 

movement ;  and,  finally,  it  was  evident  that  his  attitude 
was  that  of  persistent  inactivity,  and  of  sullen  defiance 
towards  Congress  and  the  administration. 

This  was  not  the  McCleUan  into  whose  confidence 
Stanton  supposed  he  had  been  taken.  To  him,  and 
before  the  country  at  large,  McClellan  had  successfully 
posed  as  an  impatient  warrior,  chafing  under  the  restraint 
that  was  keeping  him  from  the  field.  Late  in  the  pre- 
ceding November,  he  had  taken  refuge  at  Stanton's 
house  for  the  privacy  necessary  to  writing  a  document, 
showing  that  he  was,  and  had  been  all  along,  trying  to 
get  at  the  enemy,  but  that  the  administration  "  incapa- 
bles  "  were  in  some  way  preventing  him. 

On  the  day  after  he  became  Secretary  of  War,  an 
opportunity  was  given  Stanton,  which  he  promptly 
improved,  to  remind  the  country  that  the  President  was 
the  constitutional  commander-in-chief,  and  that  all 
generals  were  his  miHtary  subordinates.  He  received 
a  dispatch  from  General  George  H.  Thomas,  giving  an 
account  of  the  battle  of  Mill  Spring,  Kentucky.  The 
rebels,  12,000  strong,  under  General  Zollicoffer,  had  at- 
tacked Thomas,  who  repulsed  and  routed  them.  The 
rebels  lost  114  killed,  including  their  general,  116 
wounded,  and  45  prisoners.  The  Union  loss  was  127 
wounded  and  39  killed.  A  large  amount  of  munitions 
of  war,  supplies,  and  horses  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
victors.  This  was  the  most  encouraging  exhibition  of 
energy  and  thoroughness  on  the  part  of  a  Union  gen- 
eral that  had  been  made  up  to  that  time.  Mr.  Stanton 
at  once  issued  the  following  order :  — 


HIS  FIRST  WAR  BULLETIN  253 

War  Department,  January  22,  1862. 
The  President,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Army  and 
Navy,  has  received  information  of  a  brilliant  victory  achieved 
by  the  forces  of  the  United  States  over  a  large  body  of  armed 
traitors  and  rebels  at  Mill  Spring  in  the  State  of  Kentucky. 
He  returns  thanks  to  the  gallant  officers  and  soldiers  who  won 
that  victory,  and  when  the  official  reports  shall  be  received, 
the  military  and  personal  valor  displayed  in  battle  will  be 
acknowledged  and  rewarded  in  a  fitting  manner.  The  cour- 
age that  encountered  and  vanquished  the  greatly  superior 
number  of  the  rebel  force,  pursued  and  attacked  them  in  their 
intrenchments,  and  paused  not  until  the  enemy  was  completely 
routed,  merits  and  receives  commendation.  The  purpose  of 
this  war  is  to  attack,  pursue,  and  destroy  a  rebellious  enemy, 
and  to  deliver  the  country  from  danger  menaced  by  traitors. 
Alacrity,  daring,  courageous  spirit,  and  patriotic  zeal  on  all 
occasions,  and  under  every  circumstance,  are  expected  from 
the  Army  of  the  United  States.  In  the  prompt  and  spirited 
movements,  and  daring  battle  of  Mill  Spring,  the  nation  will 
realize  its  hopes,  and  the  people  of  the  United  States  will  re- 
joice to  honor  every  soldier  and  officer  who  proves  his  cour- 
age with  the  bayonet,  and  storming  intrenchments,  or  in  the 
blaze  of  the  enemy's  fire.     By  order  of  the  President. 

This  was  more  than  a  mere  exultation  over  a  victory ; 
more  than  an  honorable  gazetting  of  the  -victors.  It 
was  equivalent  to  an  order  by  the  commander-in-chief, 
assuming  the  command,  which  was  not  only  his  by 
right,  but  was  his  under  an  obligation  which  he  could 
not  transfer  to  another.  Still  more  than  this,  it  was  an 
admonition  to  all  in  the  military  service,  that  the  army 
was  expected  to  do  something  and  to  risk  something, 
and  that  if  there  had  been  unnecessary  delays,  they 
must  cease.     It  stated  the  real  objects  of  the  war  to  be 


254     STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

the  destruction  of  the  enemy,  and  not  a  mere  effort  to 
ascertain  on  what  terms  treason  would  lower  its  hostile 
front  and  allow  peace  to  be  restored.  It  applied  to  the 
enemies  of  the  country  the  names  of  "  rebels "  and 
"  traitors,"  and  held  them  up  to  the  public  execration, 
instead  of  treating  them  as  misguided  brethren  with 
whom  a  conflict  was  to  be  avoided,  in  the  hope  of  a 
peaceable  compromise.  It  furnished  the  keynote  of 
what  the  administration  of  the  War  Office  would  be ; 
and,  finally,  it  was  notice  to  the  rebels  that  they  need 
not  count  upon  the  Democratic  antecedents  of  North- 
ern Union  men  to  qualify  their  patriotism  because  of 
previous  political  affiliations. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV 

Important  War  Measures  enacted  by  Congress  on  Mr.  Stanton's 
Recommendation.  —  Work  in  the  Department.  —  Congress  calls 
for  Information, 

At  his  conference  with  the  committee  of  Congress,  on 
the  day  of  his  entrance  into  the  War  Department,  Mr. 
Stanton  impressed  on  them  the  importance  of  securing 
the  adoption,  by  the  two  Houses,  of  a  rule  providing  for 
the  immediate  consideration,  in  secret  session,  of  all 
war  measures  deemed  urgent  by  the  Executive.  Such 
a  rule  was  submitted  to  the  Senate  on  the  following  day. 
It  was  adopted  by  both  Houses  on  the  29th. 

At  the  same  conference  he  urged  the  passage  of  a 
bill  to  authorize  the  President  to  take  possession  of  all 
the  railroad  and  telegraph  lines  of  the  country.  Such 
a  bill  was  reported  to  the  Senate  by  the  committee  on 
the  22d,  and  passed  both  Houses  on  the  29th.  These 
measures  were  both  passed  on  the  assurance  that  they 
were  deemed  urgent  by  the  Secretary  of  War. 

The  folio  win  2:  letter  from  Stanton  to  Senator  Wade 
shows  the  zeal  with  which  he  followed  up  any  sug- 
gestion made  by  him  to  the  committee :  — 

Most  Confidential. 

Dear  Sir,  —  An  order  has  this  day  been  made  by  the 
President  requiring  all  the  armies  in  the  field  to  place  them- 


256  STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

selves  in  fighting  order  immediately,  and  to  commence  opera- 
tions by  a  certain  specified  date. 

The  success  of  these  measures  wiU  in  a  great  measure 
depend  upon  the  control  of  the  railroad  and  telegraph  lines, 
and  the  immediate  passage  of  the  bill  before  the  Senate  may 
and  must  have  a  great  influence  on  the  war. 

It  is  no  less  important  that  Congress  should  at  once  place 
itself  in  fighting  condition  by  the  rule  for  executive  session  in 
both  Houses.  Any  hour  the  necessity  may  be  upon  you 
unprepared.  Please  communicate  confidentially  with  the 
loyal  and  honest  members  of  both  Houses,  and  have  action,  — 
immediate  action. 

On  the  22d  of  January  a  bill  was  approved  by  the 
President  authorizing  the  appointment  of  two  additional 
Assistant  Secretaries  of  War,  and  on  the  23d,  upon  Mr. 
Stanton's  request,  the  President  nominated  to  the  Sen- 
ate, for  these  positions,  John  Tucker  and  Peter  H. 
Watson.  Thomas  A.  Scott,  of  Pennsylvania,  was 
Assistant  Secretary  of  War  when  Mr.  Stanton  entered 
upon  the  administration  of  the  War  Department.  He 
was  succeeded  by  Christopher  P.  Wolcott,of  Ohio,  who 
was  appointed  July  1,  1862,  and  served  until  January 
1,  1863.  Charles  A.  Dana,  of  New  York,  was  ap- 
pointed Assistant  Secretary  March  1,  1864,  and  con- 
tinued in  office  until  July  31, 1865.  Thomas  T.  Eckert 
was  appointed  Assistant  Secretary  July  27, 1866.  The 
War  Department  records  do  not  show  his  term  of 
service. 

The  new  Secretary  speedily  reorganized  the  War 
Office.  He  marked  out  the  work  he  wanted  done,  and 
informed  himself  as  to  the  capacity  of  the  clerical  force 
provided  by  law  for  doing  it.     He  asked  Congress  for 


WORK  IN  THE  DEPARTMENT  257 

the  additional  clerks  and  messengers  needed,  and  they 
were  promptly  granted  him.  He  systematized  the 
work,  and  every  man  knew  what  was  required  of  him, 
and  knew  that  the  head  of  the  department  would  know 
if  it  was  not  done. 

On  the  22d  the  House  adopted  a  resolution  request- 
ing the  Secretary  of  War  to  inform  that  body  as  soon 
as  practicable  whether  and  in  what  time  sufficient  mili- 
tary protection  could  be  extended  to  the  line  of  the 
Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad,  to  enable  the  company  to 
reopen  and  operate  said  road. 


CHAPTER  XXXV 

Army  Contracts  dealt  with.  —  An  Order  made  to  investigate  them 
and  terminate  Fraudulent  Ones.  —  Order  taking  Possession  of 
all  Railroads  for  Military  Purposes. 

The  vast  expenditure  of  money  involved  in  the  re- 
cruiting, arming  and  equipping,  transporting  and  sup- 
plying of  a  great  army  was,  in  the  nature  of  things,  a 
temptation  to  the  cupidity  which  exhibited  itself  under 
every  garb  in  which  it  could  secure  deahngs  with  the 
government.  Stanton  had  in  words  of  burning  wrath 
denounced  the  "  ravenous  crew  "  who  early  in  the  sum- 
mer of  1861  were  "  pillaging  the  government  and  the 
soldiers  on  every  side"  and  "using  the  treasury  of  the 
nation  as  a  fund  to  be  divided  among  themselves." 
His  predecessor  had  been  compelled  by  the  emergency 
which  then  presented  itseK  to  enter  into  heavy  con- 
tracts with  whomsoever  could  execute  them,  and  he  was 
at  the  mercy  not  only  of  them,  but  of  newly  appointed 
of&cers  in  various  parts  of  the  country,  who  received 
and  receipted  for  the  vast  amount  of  material  thus  con- 
tracted for.  It  is  little  to  be  wondered  at  that  the 
government  was  robbed  in  many  of  these  transactions. 
Shortly  after  Mr.  Stanton  came  into  the  "War  Office,  he 
adopted  measures  to  investigate  all  outstanding  con- 
tracts, and  to  terminate  those  in  which  the  contractors 


ARMY  CONTRACTS   DEALT  WITH  259 

had  given  cause  therefor  by  fraud  or  neglect.     On  the 
29th  of  January  he  issued  the  following  order :  — 

The  urgent  necessity  that  required  the  immediate  purchase 
of  arms,  clothing,  and  other  military  supplies  from  foreign 
countries  having  ceased,  it  is, 

Ordered :  — 

1st.  That  no  further  contracts  be  made  by  this  department, 
or  any  bureau  thereof,  for  any  article  of  foreign  manufacture 
that  can  be  produced  or  manufactured  in  the  United  States. 

2d.  All  outstanding  orders,  agencies,  authorities,  or  licenses 
for  the  purchase  of  arms,  clothing,  or  anything  else,  in  foreign 
countries  or  of  foreign  manufacture  for  this  department,  are 
hereby  revoked  and  annulled. 

3d.  All  persons  claiming  to  have  any  contract,  bargain, 
order,  warrant,  license,  or  authority  of  whatsoever  nature, 
from  this  department  or  any  bureau  thereof,  for  furnishing 
arms,  clothing,  equipment,  or  anything  else  to  the  United 
States  are  required  within  fifteen  days  from  this  date  to 
give  written  notice  of  such  contract  and  its  purport,  with  a 
statement  in  writing  of  what  has  been  done  under  it,  and  to 
file  a  copy  thereof  with  the  Secretary  of  "War, 

4th.  All  contracts,  orders,  and  agreements  for  army  sup- 
plies should  be  in  writing,  and  signed  by  the  contracting 
parties,  and  the  original  or  a  copy  thereof  filed  according  to 
paragraph  1049  of  the  regulations  with  the  head  of  the  pro- 
per bureau. 

It  is  seldom  that  any  necessity  can  prevent  a  contract  from 
being  reduced  to  writing,  and  even  when  made  by  telegraph, 
its  terms  can  be  speedily  written  and  signed  ;  and  every  claim 
founded  upon  any  pretended  contract,  bargain,  agreement, 
order,  warrant,  or  license,  now  outstanding,  of  which  notice 
and  a  copy  is  not  filed  in  accordance  with  this  order  within 
the  time  mentioned,  shall  be  deemed  and  held  to  be  prima 
facie  fraudulent  and  void,  and  no  claim  thereon  will  be  al- 


260     STANTON  AS  SECRETAEY  OF  WAR 

lowed  or  paid  by  this  department,  unless  upon  full  and  satis- 
factory proof  of  its  validity. 

Stanton  soon  made  a  violent  personal  enemy  of  every 
dishonest  government  contractor  or  agent  of  whose  bad 
conduct  he  could  gain  any  information. 

On  the  13th  of  March  he  appointed  Joseph  Holt 
and  Robert  Dale  Owen  a  special  commission  to  exam- 
ine and  adjust  all  claims  in  the  War  Department  in 
respect  to  ordnance,  arms,  and  munitions ;  their  deter- 
mination as  to  the  vaHdity  of  contracts,  execution  of 
the  same,  and  payments  due  thereunder,  to  be  final 
and  conclusive  upon  the  department.  All  contracts 
were  to  be  fully  investigated,  and  if  the  commission 
found  that  any  employee  or  agent  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment was  interested  in  any  contract,  or  received  any 
consideration  for  its  procurement,  such  finding  was  to 
be  good  cause  for  adjudging  the  claim  fraudulent. 

On  the  11th  of  February,  Secretary  Stanton  made 
the  following  order,  in  the  name  of  the  President,  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  the  Army  and  Navy.  He  referred 
to  the  President  in  his  military  capacity  when  issuing 
orders  relating  to  military  movements.  This  order  was 
authorized  by  an  act  of  Congress,  already  referred  to, 
approved  January  31,  1862.  It  was  respected  by  all 
the  railroad  companies  during  the  war,  and  they  ren- 
dered at  all  times  willing  service. 

Ordered :  That  D.  C.  McCallum  be  and  is  hereby  ap- 
pointed Military  Director  and  Superintendent  of  Eailroads 
in  the  United  States,  with  authority  to  enter  upon,  take  pos- 
session of,  and  hold  and  use  all  railroads,  engines,  cars,  loco- 
motives, equipments,  appendages,   and   appurtenances   that 


USE  OF  RAILROADS  261 

may  be  required  for  the  transportation  of  troops,  arms,  muni- 
tions, and  military  supplies  of  the  United  States,  and  to  do 
and  perform  all  acts  that  may  be  necessary  or  proper  to  be 
done  for  the  safe  and  speedy  transport  aforesaid. 

By  order  of   the  President,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Army  and  Navy  of  the  United  States. 


CHAPTER  XXXVI 

Order  concerning  Political  Prisoners  and  Military  Arrests.  —  Re- 
lease o£  Prisoners.  —  Further  Extraordinary  Arrests  to  be  made 
by  the  Military  Authorities  only.  —  Mr.  Stanton  defends  Arrests 
otherwise  made  up  to  that  Time. 

The  arrest  and  imprisonment  of  persons  in  civil  life 
by  tlie  sole  authority  of  the  President,  on  charges  of 
disloyal  practices,  had  been  the  subject  of  much 
criticism  before  Mr.  Stanton  came  into  the  Cabinet. 
The  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Seward,  had  been  quoted 
in  the  press  as  referring  to  his  power  to  cause  an  arrest 
by  "tinkling  his  httle  bell,"  and  the  opinion  exten- 
sively prevailed  that  many  arrests  had  been  made  upon 
insufficient  cause. 

There  had  been  much  railing  against  the  govern- 
ment which,  although  offensive,  was  not  really  danger- 
ous, and  the  public  safety  did  not  require,  nor  would 
pubhc  opinion  be  likely  to  sustain,  a  denial  of  the  right 
of  free  speech,  however  unfriendly  to  the  authorities, 
within  the  limits  of  safety.  This  subject  was  one  to 
which  Mr.  Stanton  gave  early  attention.  His  training 
as  a  lawyer  had  bred  in  him  a  repugnance  to  any  inva- 
sion of  personal  liberty  for  which  a  good  reason  did 
not  exist.  Although  the  suspension  of  the  writ  of 
habeas  corpus  dispensed  with  a  judicial  inquiry  in 
many  cases,  he  felt  that  this  in  no  wise  justified  arrests 


CIVIL  AND   MILITARY  ARRESTS  263 

not  required  by  the  public  safety.  But  as,  in  time  of 
war,  it  would  often  happen  that  the  law  as  found  in 
the  statute  was  silent  in  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  he 
found  no  difficulty  in  then  applying  the  military  law. 
In  his  view  a  spy  could  be  made  a  military  prisoner 
while  surreptitiously  gathering  information  in  the  War 
Department,  instead  of  waiting  until  he  had  actually 
lent  aid  or  comfort  to  the  enemy  by  communicating  that 
information.  This  would  be  an  exercise  of  arbitrary 
military  power,  but  if  ordered  on  the  authority  of  the 
President,  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  army,  it  was 
just  as  lawful  as  would  be  the  arrest  by  a  general  in 
the  field  of  a  photographer  caught  in  the  act  of  taking 
views  of  our  defenses  for  the  use  of  the  enemy. 

As  the  head  of  the  army  the  President  could  prevent 
interference  with  military  operations  without  going 
beyond  the  recognized  laws  of  war,  and  in  doing  this 
Mr.  Stanton  believed  that  the  President  should  act 
through  the  War  Department,  and  in  his  capacity  as 
the  military  chief ;  he  therefore  favored  a  change  in 
the  existing  methods.  The  State  Department  could  no 
longer  order  arrests.  This  power  must  be  exercised 
under  the  military  authority  alone. 

It  was  a  delicate  and  difficult  matter  to  proclaim  this 
change  without  admitting  any  error  in  what  had  been 
done  before ;  but  not  only  was  this  accomplished,  but 
the  order  by  which  it  was  done  contained  so  powerful 
a  statement  of  the  evils  which  had  beset  the  country, 
and  so  clear  a  showing  of  the  immediate  necessity 
which  had  compelled  the  adoption  of  extraordinary 
measures,  that  it  was  a  complete  vindication  and  was 


264  STANTON  AS   SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

well  received  by  the  country.  As  Mr.  Stanton's  own 
words  and  official  letters  are  of  far  greater  interest  than 
anything  that  can  be  substituted  for  them,  and  as  they 
are  always  so  brief  as  to  render  further  condensation 
impracticable,  this  order  is  here  given  entire :  — 

War  Department,  Washington  City, 
February  14,  1862. 

The  breaking  out  of  a  formidable  insurrection,  based  on  a 
conflict  of  political  ideas,  being  an  event  without  a  precedent 
in  the  United  States,  was  necessarily  attended  by  a  great 
confusion  and  perplexity  of  the  public  mind.  Disloyalty, 
before  unsuspected,  suddenly  became  bold,  and  treason 
astonished  the  world  by  bringing  at  once  into  the  field  mili- 
tary forces  superior  in  number  to  the  standing  army  of  the 
United  States. 

Every  department  of  the  government  was  paralyzed  by 
treason.  Defection  appeared  in  the  Senate,  in  the  House  of 
Representatives,  in  the  Cabinet,  in  the  federal  courts ;  minis- 
ters and  consuls  returned  from  foreign  countries  to  enter  the 
insurrectionary  councils  of  land  and  naval  forces  ;  command- 
ing and  other  officers  of  the  army  and  in  the  navy  betrayed 
the  councils  or  betrayed  their  posts  for  commands  in  the 
insurgent  forces.  Treason  was  flagrant  in  the  revenue  and 
in  the  post-office  service,  as  well  as  in  the  territorial  govern- 
ments and  the  Indian  reserves. 

Not  only  judges,  governors,  legislators,  and  ministerial  offi- 
cers in  the  States,  but  even  whole  States  rushed  one  after  the 
other  with  apparent  unanimity  into  rebellion.  The  capital 
was  besieged  and  its  connection  with  all  the  States  cut  off. 

Even  in  the  portions  of  the  country  which  were  most  loyal 
political  combinations  and  secret  societies  were  formed  fur- 
thering the  work  of  disunion,  while  from  motives  of  dis- 
loyalty or  cupidity,  or  from  excited  passions  or  perverted 
sympathies,  individuals  were  found  furnishing  men,  money. 


CIVIL  AND  MILITARY  ARRESTS  265 

and  materials  of  war  and  supplies  to  the  insurgents'  military 
and  naval  forces.  Armies,  ships,  fortifications,  navy  yards, 
arsenals,  military  posts,  and  garrisons,  one  after  another,  were 
betrayed  or  abandoned  to  the  insurgents. 

Congress  had  not  anticipated  and  so  had  not  provided  for 
the  emergency.  The  municipal  authorities  were  powerless 
and  inactive.  The  judicial  machinery  seemed  as  if  it  had 
been  designed  not  to  sustain  the  government,  but  to  embar- 
rass and  betray  it. 

Foreign  intervention  openly  invited,  and  industriously 
instigated  by  the  abettors  of  the  insurrection,  became  immi- 
nent, and  has  only  been  prevented  by  the  practice  of  strict 
and  impartial  justice,  with  the  most  perfect  moderation  in 
our  intercourse  with  nations. 

The  public  mind  was  alarmed  and  apprehensive,  though 
fortunately  not  distracted  or  disheartened.  It  seemed  to  be 
doubtful  whether  the  federal  government,  which  one  year 
before  had  been  thought  a  model  worthy  of  universal 
acceptance,  had  indeed  the  ability  to  defend  or  maintain 
itself. 

Some  reverses,  which  perhaps  were  unavoidable,  suffered 
by  newly  levied  and  inefficient  forces,  discouraged  the  loyal, 
and  gave  new  hope  to  the  insurgents.  Voluntary  enlistments 
seemed  about  to  cease,  and  desertions  commenced.  Parties 
specidated  upon  the  question  whether  conscription  had  not 
become  necessary  to  fill  up  the  armies  of  the  United  States. 

In  this  emergency  the  President  felt  it  his  duty  to  employ 
with  energy  the  extraordinary  powers  which  the  Constitution 
confides  to  him  in  cases  of  insurrection.  He  called  into  the 
field  such  military  and  naval  forces,  authorized  by  the  exist- 
ing laws,  as  seemed  necessary.  He  directed  measures  to 
prevent  the  use  of  the  post-office  for  treasonable  corre- 
spondence. He  subjected  passengers  to  and  from  foreign 
countries  to  new  passport  regulations,  and  he  instituted  a 
blockade,  suspended  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  in  various 


266     STA>TOX  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

places,  and  caused  persons  who  were  represented  to  him  as 
bemsr  about  to  engage  in  disloyal  and  treasonable  practices  to 
be  arrested  by  special  civil  as  well  as  military  agencies,  and 
detained  in  military  custody  when  necessary  to  prevent  them 
and  deter  others  from  such  practices.  Examinations  of  such 
cases  were  instituted,  and  some  of  the  persons  so  arrested 
have  been  discharged,  from  time  to  time,  under  circumstances 
or  upon  conditions  compatible,  as  was  thought,  with  the  pub- 
lic safety.  Meantime  a  favorable  change  of  public  opinion 
has  occui'red.  The  line  between  loyalty  and  disloyalty  is 
plainly  defined,  the  whole  structure  of  the  government  is 
fii"m  and  stable  ;  apprehension  of  public  danger  and  facilities 
for  treasonable  practices  have  diminished  with  the  passions 
which  prompted  heedless  persons  to  adopt  them.  The  insur- 
rection is  believed  to  have  culminated  and  to  be  declining. 

The  President,  in  view  of  these  facts  and  anxious  to  return 
to  a  formal  course  of  the  administration,  as  far  as  regard  for 
the  public  welfare  will  allow,  directs  that  all  political  prison- 
ers or  state  prisoners  now  held  in  military  custody  be  released 
on  their  subscribing  to  a  parole  engaging  them  to  render  no 
aid  or  comfort  to  the  enemies  in  hostility  to  the  United. 
States. 

The  Secretary  of  TTar  will,  however,  in  his  discretion. 
exempt  from  the  effect  of  this  order  any  prisoners  detained 
as  spies  in  the  service  of  the  insurgents,  or  others,  whose 
release  at  the  present  moment  may  be  deemed  incompatible 
with  the  public  safety. 

To  all  persons  who  shall  be  so  released,  who  shaU  keep 
their  parole,  the  President  grants  an  amnesty  for  any  past 
offense  of  treason  or  disloyalty  which  they  have  committed. 

Extraordinary  arrests  will  hereafter  be  made  under  the 
direction  of  the  military  authorities  alone. 

Bv  order  of  the  President. 


RELEASE  OF  POLITICAL  PRISONERS  267 

Unable  to  give  his  attention  to  state  prisoners  then 
in  custody,  Mr.  Stanton,  on  the  27th  of  February, 
appointed  John  A.  Dix,  then  in  command  at  Baltimore, 
and  Hon.  Edwards  Pierrepont  of  New  York,  commis- 
sioners to  examine,  hear,  and  determine  all  such  cases 
ex  jKU'tej  at  such  times  and  places  as  in  their  discretion 
they  might  appoint,  and  make  full  report  to  the  War 
Department.  They  were  to  ascertain  and  recommend 
what  prisoners  should  be  exempted  by  the  Secretary  of 
"War  from  the  operation  of  the  general  order  of  release, 
because  of  their  character  as  spies  or  because  of  other 
offenses  against  military  law. 

The  foregoing  is  not  produced  for  the  purpose  of 
making  any  claim  that  Mr.  Stanton  was  tender  in  his 
treatment  of  sympathizers  with  or  abettors  of  treason ; 
on  the  contrary,  his  grasp  on  those  of  them  who  were 
dangerous  was  unrelenting ;  but  it  shows  that  he  had 
the  wisdom  to  draw  the  power  from  the  right  source 
and  to  use  it  in  the  right  direction. 


CHAPTER  XXXVII 

Colonel  Thomas  A.  Scott's  Mission  to  the  West.  —  Halleck  and  Buell. 
—  Grant  escapes  from  Halleck  and  takes  Forts  Henry  and  Don- 
elson.  —  Halleck  demands  his  Reward  for  it.  —  Nashville  evacu- 
ated. 

In  January  Mr.  Stanton  dispatched  Assistant  Secre- 
tary Thomas  A.  Scott  to  the  West  with  comprehensive 
instructions  which  called  for  reports  of  the  number  and 
location  of  troops  raised,  the  progress  of  enlistment  and 
organization  in  each  State ;  what  partially  enlisted  regi- 
ments could  be  consolidated,  the  amount  of  government 
property  in  the  several  arsenals,  and  in  the  great  depots 
for  commissary  stores  and  quartermasters'  supplies;  and 
also  as  to  what  arrangement  could  be  made  for  the 
transportation  of  troops  to  the  West,  to  strengthen 
Generals  Halleck  and  Buell,  commanding  respectively 
the  departments  of  Missouri  and  Kentucky. 

Colonel  Scott  moved  rapidly  to  Pittsburg,  Columbus, 
Detroit,  Indianapolis,  Louisville,  St.  Louis,  Cairo,  and 
Paducah,  reporting  from  each  place  full  and  correct 
information  from  official  sources  concerning  the  several 
objects  of  his  mission,  and  communicating  his  views  as 
to  the  situation  and  future  possibilities.  He  placed  the 
Secretary  of  War  in  possession  of  all  the  information 
he  would  himself  have  gained  in  a  tour  of  inspection. 
The  celerity  of  his  movements,  the  thoroughness  of  his 


i 


HALLECK  AND  BUELL  269 


work,  the  mass  of  information  he  gathered,  and  the 
valuable  suggestions  he  made  were  such  as  might  have 
been  looked  for  from  such  a  man.^ 

From  Pittsburg  he  reported,  February  2,  that  the 
whole  work  for  the  Mississippi  flotilla,  mortars,  mortar 
boats,  and  shells,  would  be  ready  and  shipped  within 
twenty-one  days  from  that  date. 

Mr.  Stanton  knew  nothing  of  pauses  in  his  work,  nor 
of  any  other  limitation  than  the  capacity  of  all  available 
instrumentahties.  His  plans  were  not  pigeon-holed  to 
be  executed  at  a  remote  date.  Their  execution  was 
commenced  instantly  upon  being  decided  on,  and  those 
to  whom  the  work  was  intrusted  had  to  move  along 
with  it  at  his  pace  or  give  way  to  others  who  would. 

When  McClellan  became  general-in-chief,  November 
1,  1861,  he  sent  General  Halleck  to  Missouri  to  reheve 
General  Fremont,  commanding  that  department,  and 
General  Buell  to  Louisville,  to  relieve  General  Sherman, 
at  the  latter' s  own  request,  in  the  command  of  the 
Department  of  Kentucky.  Halleck  was  ordered  to 
fortify  and  "  concentrate  his  troops  for  such  ulterior 
operations  as  might  prove  necessary."  Buell  was  to 
remain  on  the  defensive  until  he  could  throw  the  mass 
of  his  troops  by  rapid  marches  into  the  mountainous 
region  of  East  Tennessee,  —  a  task  pronounced  by  him  to 
be  impossible  in  the  winter  season.  These  orders  were, 
therefore,  equivalent  to  providing  that  nothing  be  done 
until  spring. 

^  His  great  capacity  for  the  organization  and  promotion  of  business  on 
a  large  scale  was  subsequently  illustrated  by  his  notable  career  as  the 
president  and  controlling  head  of  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  Company. 


270  STANTON  AS   SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

February  1,  1862,  General  Buell  wrote  from  his 
headquarters   at   Louisville   to    General   McClellan   as  J 

follows  :  —  " 

While  you  were  sick,  by  direction  of  the  President  I  pro- 
posed to  Halleck  some  concert  of  action  between  us.  He 
answered,  "  I  can  do  nothing.  Name  a  day  for  a  demonstra- 
tion." Night  before  last,  January  30,  I  received  a  dispatch 
from  him,  saying :  "  I  have  ordered  an  advance  at  Fort  Henry 
and  Dovei',  which  will  be  made  immediately."  I  protest 
against  such  prompt  proceedings ;  as  though  I  had  nothing  to 
do  but  command  and  commence  firing  as  soon  as  he  starts  off. 
However,  he  telegraphs  me  to-night  that  cooperation  is  not 
essential  now. 

Halleck' s  order  for  an  advance  had  been  extorted 
from  him  by  General  Grant,  then  in  command  at  Cairo, 
and  Flag-Officer  Foote,  of  the  navy.  Grant  says  early 
in  January  he  was  reluctantly  given  leave  by  Halleck 
to  visit  him  at  his  headquarters  in  St.  Louis,  to  lay 
before  him  a  plan  of  a  campaign  up  the  Tennessee 
River,  and  the  capture  of  Fort  Henry,  which,  if  success- 
ful, would  compel  the  enemy  to  entirely  evacuate  Ken- 
tucky. Halleck  cut  him  off  without  allowing  him  to 
finish  his  proposition,  and  he  returned  to  Cairo  very 
much  crestfallen.  All  military  authorities  seem  to  have 
concurred  at  that  time  in  a  proper  estimate  of  the 
Tennessee  River  as  a  line  of  operations,  but  Grant  was 
the  only  one  who  proposed  to  go  on  and  attempt  what 
all  agreed  ought  to  be  done.  McClellan,  Halleck,  and 
Buell  were  for  action  in  the  future.  Grant  believed  in 
the  present.  He  was  not  to  be  easily  dissuaded  from  a 
purpose,  and  on  the  28th  of  January,  backed  up  by  a 


GRANT  TAKES  FORT  HENRY       271 

similar  dispatch  from  Flag-Officer  Foote,  he  telegraphed 
to  Halleck :  "  If  permitted,  I  could  take  and  hold  Fort 
Henry  on  the  Tennessee." 

On  the  29th  he  wrote  more  fully  to  the  same  effect, 
and  on  the  1st  of  February  he  received  instructions 
which  "  permitted  "  him  to  take  the  fort.  It  was  taken 
on  the  6th. 

It  was  on  this  very  day  that  Assistant  Secretary  Scott 
reached  General  Buell's  headquarters  at  Louisville. 
The  General  made  a  strong  impression  on  Scott,  and 
expressed  to  him  his  opinion  that  with  from  30,000  to 
50,000  men  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  General 
Halleck  and  he  could  take  a  position  between  the  Ten- 
nessee and  the  Cumberland  rivers,  break  the  rebel  line, 
defeat  the  separate  wings  in  detail,  and  soon  secure 
Nashville.  All  this  Scott  reported  to  Stanton  on  the 
same  day,  with  the  assurance  that  if  he  could  be  al- 
lowed ten  days  to  arrange  for  the  transportation,  he 
could  then  be  ready  to  transport  the 'desired  reinforce- 
ments from  the  East.  On  the  14th,  he  forwarded  let- 
ters from  General  Halleck  containing  the  same  sugges- 
tions. 

Halleck,  like  Buell,  wanted  heavy  reinforcements 
from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  but  even  with  them  he 
did  not  propose  to  advance  on  Nashville  before  April. 
He  was  impatient  to  have  troops  taken  from  Buell  and 
from  the  East  to  enlarge  his  command,  but  they  were 
not  to  be  used  by  him  until  two  months  later.  On 
February  6,  the  day  Fort  Henry  surrendered,  and  be- 
fore he  had  learned  of  the  event,  Halleck  wrote  to 
General  S.  R.  Curtis:   "I  know  what  a  winter  cam- 


272  STANTON  AS   SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

paign  would  be,  but  the  administration  have  ^  on  to 
Richmond '  fever/  and  we  must  go  ahead." 

On  the  following  day,  Halleek  telegraphed  to  Gen- 
eral McClellan:  "Fort  Henry  is  ours,"  and  accepted 
congratulations  without  even  referring  to  Grant. 

The  enthusiastic  Secretary  of  War,  elated  by  the 
event,  and  not  doubting  that  it  was  due  to  General 
Halleek,  telegraphed  him  on  the  8th,  as  follows :  — 

Your  energy  and  ability  I'eceive  the  strongest  commenda- 
tion of  this  department.  You  have  my  perfect  confidence, 
and  you  may  rely  upon  my  utmost  support  in  your  undertak- 
ings. The  pressure  of  my  engagements  has  prevented  me 
from  writing  you,  but  I  will  do  so  fully  in  a  day  or  two. 

On  the  15th,  an  order  was  issued  by  the  Secretaries 
of  War  and  of  the  Navy,  in  the  name  of  the  President, 
as  commander-in-chief,  to  Brigadier-General  Grant  and 
Flag-Officer  Foote,  and  the  forces  under  their  command, 
returning  thanks  for  their  gallant  achievements  in  the 
capture  of  Fort  Henry. 

Halleek  greatly  deprecated  any  interference  by  the 
government  with  the  plans  of  generals,  even  though 
that  interference  only  took  the  form  of  insisting  that 
after  being  provided  with  all  the  necessary  men  and 
means,  they  should  have  some  plans  and  execute  them. 
To  General  McClellan  he  wrote,  January  20,  that  he 
took  it  for  granted  that  what  had  been  done  up  to  that 
time  had  been  the  "  result  of  political  policies  rather 
than  military  strategy,"  and  that  the  want  of  success 
was  "  attributable  to  the  politicians  rather   than   the 

^  Referring  to  the  clamor  of  "  On  to  Richmond  "  which  preceded  the 
first  battle  of  Bull  Run. 


GRANT  MOVES  UPON  FORT  DONELSON   273 

generals."  "  I  am  aware,"  he  continues,  "  that  you, 
general,  are  in  no  way  responsible  for  this,  these  move- 
ments having  been  governed  by  political  expediency, 
and  in  many  cases  directed  by  politicians,  in  order  to 
subserve  particular  interests;  but  is  it  not  possible  with 
the  new  Secretary  of  War  to  introduce  a  different  pol- 
icy, and  to  make  our  future  movements  in  accordance 
with  military  principles?  " 

This  was  a  strong  appeal  to  Stanton,  who  was  sure 
to  see  the  letter,  that  his  influence  should  be  exerted  to 
allow  the  great  military  strategists  to  continue  doing 
nothing,  without  being  disturbed  by  the  clamor  of 
meddlesome  politicians  like  the  President  and  his  Cabi- 
net and  the  leaders  in  Congress. 

McClellan,  Halleck,  and  Buell,  at  their  comfortable 
offices  in  Washington,  St.  Louis,  and  Louisville,  doubt- 
less had  great  plans,  but  were  never  ready  to  execute 
them.  They  all  had  what  Mr.  Lincoln,  in  McClellan's 
case,  so  aptly  termed  "  the  slows."  They  always 
wanted  more  men,  and  more  time  for  equipping  them. 
The  idea  of  actually  starting  out  for  a  fight  with  the 
force  they  had  at  any  given  time  seemed  to  them  mere 
rashness.  To  explain  the  effect  the  occupation  of  Nash- 
ville would  have  upon  the  rebel  forces  in  Kentucky 
and  Tennessee  was  as  far  as  they  had  then  cared  to 
go.  It  was  reserved  for  Grant  to  show  them  that  at 
some  time  doing  as  well  as  thinking  was  necessary,  and 
he  appears  finally  to  have  actually  worried  Halleck  into 
allowdng  him  to  take  Fort  Henry.  That  being  accom- 
plished, he  wrote  to  Halleck  that  he  would  then  move 
upon  Fort  Donelson. 


274     STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

To  this  the  latter  gave  no  response,  although  he  in- 
formed Buell  on  the  next  day  (7th)  that  Grant  would 
march  against  Donelson  on  the  8th. 

On  the  14th,  while  investing  Donelson,  Grant  received 
an  order  from  Halleck,  dated  the  10th,  ordering  him  to 
devote  himself  to  fortifying  Fort  Henry. 

On  the  16th,  two  days  after  Halleck  had  offered, 
through  Assistant  Secretary  Scott,  to  move  up  the  Ten- 
nessee River  if  given  60,000  new  troops.  Grant,  without 
orders  from  Halleck,  the  commander  of  the  department, 
and  without  either  approval  or  disapproval,  but  not 
without  notice  to  him  of  his  intention,  had,  after  three 
days'  fighting,  demanded  and  received  the  "  uncondi- 
tional surrender  "  of  Fort  Donelson. 

Halleck  had  energetically  reinforced  Grant  during 
these  rapid  movements,  but  evidently  more  with  a  view 
of  saving  him  from  destruction  than  in  the  hope  of  any 
decisive  results.  He  and  Buell  firmly  believed  that  the 
United  States  forces  of  the  West  were  too  weak  for  any 
important  movement  until  strengthened  by  an  addition 
of  50,000  from  the  East.  Grant's  celerity  served  in 
lieu  of  the  coveted  reinforcements.  Had  the  campaign 
up  the  Tennessee  River  awaited  the  transportation  of 
50,000  men  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  the  enemy 
would  have  sent  still  greater  reinforcements  to  Fort 
Donelson,  which  was  the  centre  of  the  rebel  line,  stretch- 
ing from  BowHng  Green  to  Columbus.^ 

^  "  I  was  very  impatient  to  get  at  Fort  Donelson  because  I  knew  the 
importance  of  the  place  to  the  enemy,  and  supposed  he  would  reinforce 
it  rapidly.  I  felt  that  15,000  on  the  8th  would  be  more  effective  than 
50,000  a  month  later."     Grant's  Memoirs,  vol.  i.  p.  298. 


HALLECK  DEMANDS  HIS  REWARD  275 

The  advance  was  made  with  15,000  men,  increased 
by  reinforcements  to  27,000.  The  enemy  had  within 
their  intrenchments  21,000  men,  of  whom  2000  were 
killed,  4000   escaped,  and  15,000  were  taken  prisoners. 

On  the  16th  Halleck  wi-ote  to  McClellan  that  Buell 
ought  not  to  move  towards  Nashville,  but  should  aid 
Grant  in  taking  and  holding  Fort  Donelson  and  Clarks- 
ville.  He  added  :  "  Unless  we  can  take  Fort  Donelson 
very  soon  we  shall  have  the  whole  force  of  the  enemy 
on  us.  Fort  Donelson  is  the  turning  point  of  the  war, 
and  we  must  take  it  at  whatever  sacrifice." 

On  the  same  day  Grant  telegraphed  him  that  Fort 
Donelson  was  taken,  but  to  this  he  never  made  reply. 
Although  all  the  world  rang  with  Grant's  praises  the 
next  day,  he  tells  us  in  his  "  Memoirs "  ^  that  he  re- 
ceived nothing  direct  which  indicated  that  HaUeck 
knew  Donelson  was  taken. 

The  latter  did  not  fail  to  appropriate  the  achievement 
to  himself,  as  appears  by  the  following  dispatch  from 
him  to  General  McClellan,  dated  St.  Louis,  February 
17:  — 

Make  Brigadiers  Grant  and  Pope  Major-Gen  erals  of  Vol- 
unteers, and  give  me  command  in  the  West.  I  ask  this  in 
return  for  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson. 

On  the  same  day,  he  energetically  renewed  his  impor- 
tunities to  Assistant  Secretary  Scott,  and  persuaded  him 
to  write  Stanton  an  urgent  letter  asking  that  Buell's 
department  be  added  to  his  own  :  he  to  take  the  field 
in  person,  and  to  move  up  the  Cumberland  and  Ten- 
»  Vol.  i.  p.  324. 


276     STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

nessee  rivers.  With  50,000  well  disciplined  troops  from 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  added  to  their  combined 
forces,  he  said  he  felt  confident  that  Nashville  could  be 
taken.  This  was  deemed  so  urgent  that  Scott's  letter 
was  sent  by  a  special  messenger  to  the  War  Department. 

The  rebel  defense  of  Nashville  was  made  and  lost  at 
Fort  Donelson  on  the  16th,  and  Nashville  was  evacu- 
ated without  a  struggle  as  soon  as  Buell  had  time  to 
make  his  unimpeded  progress  to  the  place,  where  he 
arrived  on  the  24th. 

This  must  have  been  a  great  surprise  to  Halleck,  for 
he  had  written  to  McClellan  on  the  15th  :  "  I  have  no 
definite  plans  beyond  the  taking  of  Donelson  and  Clarks- 
ville."  Thus  we  have  his  own  word  for  it  that  he  was 
as  innocent  of  the  occupation  of  Nashville  as  he  had 
been  of  the  capture  of  Fort  Donelson. 


CHAPTER   XXXVm 

Correspondence  between  Secretary  Stanton  and  Assistant  Secretary 
Scott.  —  Stanton's  Ideas  of  what  War  should  be.  —  His  Intentions 
towards  Halleck  and  Buell.  —  Comments  on  this  and  Reference 
to  Critics.  —  Grant  promoted  to  Major-Generalship  on  Recom- 
mendation made  by  Stanton  on  the  Morning  following  the 
Capture  of  Fort  Donelson. 

Scott's  special  messenger  arrived  at  Washington  in 
due  time  with  his  letters  for  Mr.  Stanton,  who  replied 
as  follows :  — 

Some  features  of  the  proposed  military  reorganization  I 
approve  ;  others  I  do  not.  As  soon  as  General  Buell  fights  a 
battle,  or  makes  any  decisive  movement  with  the  large  force 
under  his  command,  I  will  be  glad  to  recommend,  him  for 
major-general.  But  as  he  communicates  nothing  to  the 
department,  nor  even  acknowledges  communications  made  to 
him  by  me,  the  department  knows  nothing  of  his  operations, 
except  what  appears  from  the  newspapers.  The  activity  of 
General  Halleck  leads  me  to  think  that  the  Western  operations 
may  very  wisely  be  placed  under  his  command  if  he  will  take 
the  field  in  person.  I  am  very  much  inclined  to  prefer  field 
work  rather  than  office  work  for  successful  military  opera- 
tions. The  general  who  stands  upon  the  field  of  battle  and 
heads  his  forces  in  person  is  the  one  who  is  most  likely  to 
win  the  victory.  The  general  commanding  proposes  himself 
to  do  this  at  the  proper  time.  I  am  inclined,  therefore,  to 
reorganize  by  placing  the  whole  Western  operations  under 
General  Halleck,  and  give  him  such  force  as  may  be  desired. 


278  STANTON  AS   SECRETARY   OF  WAR 

In  respect  to  General  Hitchcock,  I  have  no  doubt,  from  what  I 
can  learn  of  him,  that  Missouri  may  be  properly  intrusted  to 
his  command.  General  McClellan  did  not  approve  his  appoint- 
ment, but  as  it  was  requested  by  General  Halleck  and  strongly 
recommended  by  General  Scott,  I  resolved  to  make  it.  The 
extent  of  his  command  I  would  be  disposed  to  leave  to  the 
judgment  of  General  HaUeck.  General  Hunter's  command, 
also,  I  think  may  remain  the  same  as  heretofore.  The  trouble 
between  him  and  Lane  seems  to  have  subsided  in  a  great 
measure. 

In  respect  to  the  details  of  proposed  military  operations  to 
follow  the  new  organization,  it  is  needless  for  me  to  say  any- 
thing, because  they  must  depend  upon  the  exigencies  of  the 
hour,  and  the  general  in  command  would  change  or  modify 
them  according  to  circumstances  ;  the  great  purpose  being  to 
pursue  and  destroy  the  rebels  wherever  they  can  be  found ;  to 
capture  their  cities  and  strong  places ;  drive  them  from  every 
State,  and  restore  the  authority  of  the  government.  I  would 
leave  the  method  of  accomplishing  that  purpose  to  the  gener- 
als operating  in  the  field ;  undertaking  to  supply  every  want, 
so  far  as  might  be  done  by  the  whole  power  of  the  country, 
and  rejoicing  to  reward  alacrity  and  success  with  every  honor 
at  the  disposal  of  the  government. 

These  are  the  general  views  I  now  entertain  on  the  subject 
of  your  letter,  and  will  confer  with  the  President  as  soon  as 
his  domestic  calamity  will  permit. 

I  think  it  is  important  that  you  should  remain  in  the  West, 
visiting  Cairo,  Paducah,  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  St.  Louis, 
and  all  the  other  places  held  by  our  forces  on  the  Western 
rivers. 

The  officers  in  command  do  not  seem  to  be  aware  that  it  is 
their  duty  to  address  the  department,  through  the  adjutant- 
general,  so  that  the  Secretary  is  informed  only  of  what  General 
McClellan  communicates.  In  this  way  their  wants  and  merits 
may  by  accident  sometimes  fail  to  reach  me.     I  shall  expect 


HIS   IDEAS   OF  AVHAT  WAR  SHOULD   BE      279 

from  you  full  reports  of  everything  coneerniDg  military  oper- 
ations at  every  point  you  visit.  Your  diligence  and  atten- 
tion is  fully  appreciated,  and  I  shall  be  glad  to  carry  out  any 
suggestions  that  may  occur  to  you  for  the  good  of  the  service. 

Secretary  Stanton  has  been  accused  of  interfering 
with  military  operations  in  the  field,  and  of  exhibiting-  a 
dictatorial  spirit  towards  the  generals  in  the  army.  The 
record  does  not  sustain  the  charg-e.  No  greneral  who 
wanted  to  fight  the  enemy  ever  found  himself  embar- 
rassed with  advice  from  Stanton  as  to  the  best  way 
to  fight.  He  interfered  with  military  slothfulness,  in- 
difference, and  insubordination,  which  it  was  his  sworn 
duty  to  do,  and  a  duty  in  which  his  patriotism  would 
not  allow  him  to  fail ;  but  the  language  and  the  spirit 
of  the  above  letter  written  by  him,  evidently  to  be 
shown  to  both  Halleck  and  Buell,  attest  his  sincere  pur- 
pose to  urge  military  leaders  to  activity,  and  then  to 
give  them  the  fullest  support  in  whatever  plans  they 
might  adopt.  Buell  must  fight  a  battle  or  make  some 
decisive  movement  if  he  expected  promotion.  The 
original  draft  of  Stanton's  letter  read  that  "  the  depart- 
ment knows  nothing  of  his  operations  except  that  he 
appears  from  the  newspapers  to  be  quietly  enjoying 
himself  in  Louisville."  This  he  modified  to  read  as 
above  quoted. 

If  Halleck  would  take  the  field  in  person,  which,  up 
to  that  time,  he  had  not  done,  he  favored  giving  him 
command  of  the  military  operations  of  the  West. 

For  generals  who  preferred  their  offices  to  the  field 
he  had  no  liking.  "  The  general  who  stands  upon 
the  field  of  battle  and  heads  his  forces  in  person  is  most 


280     STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

likely  to  win  the  victory."  Then,  lest  this  might  be 
construed  into  a  thrust  at  General  McClellan  (who  had 
as  yet  remained  at  his  desk  when  not  on  parade  in  the 
saddle),  and  thereby  diminish  the  respect  for  him  which 
the  service  required,  he  interlined  the  words,  "  The 
general  commanding  proposes  himself  to  do  this  at  the 
proper  time." 

Stanton  did  not  make  any  mistake  in  placing  the 
credit  for  the  capture  of  Fort  Donelson.  That  was  not 
due  to  Halleck's  activity.  The  "  unconditional  surren- 
der "  took  place  February  16.  On  the  next  morning, 
without  hearing  from  Halleck,  he  addressed  to  the 
President  the  following  recommendation  :  — 

I  have  the  honor  to  propose  for  your  approbation  the  fol- 
lowing-named person  for  appointment  in  the  volunteer  force 
now  in  the  service  of  the  United  States. 

Brigadier-General  U.  S.  Grant  of  the  United  States  Volun- 
teers to  be  Major-General  of  Volunteers,  for  gallant  and 
meritorious  conduct  in  the  capture  of  Fort  Donelson,  to  date 
from  February  16,  1862. 

The  President  made  the  nomination  the  same  day, 
and  it  was  placed  before  the  Senate  at  its  next  executive 
session  on  the  19th.  On  motion  of  Senator  Zachary 
Chandler  the  nomination  was,  by  unanimous  consent, 
immediately  confirmed  without  the  usual  reference  to  a 
committee. 

That  portion  of  Mr.  Stanton's  letter  in  which  he 
states  the  great  purpose  of  all  military  operations  —  "  to 
pursue  and  destroy  the  rebels  wherever  they  can  be 
found ;  to  capture  their  cities  and  strong  places,  drive 
them  from  every  State,  and  restore  the  authority  of  the 


STANTON  AND  HIS   CRITICS  281 

government,"  and  his  assurance  that  "  he  would  leave 
the  method  of  accomplishing  that  purpose  to  the  gen- 
erals operating  in  the  field  "  (this  originally  read  "  to 
the  generals  in  command"),  the  government  furnishing 
amjjle  su})plies,  and  rewarding  success  with  high  honors 
—  shows  his  conception  of  the  relative  duties  of  the 
government  and  the  army,  and  of  the  AVar  Department 
and  the  generals  in  the  held. 

The  critics  of  Mr.  Stanton  will  search  in  vain  for  any 
departure  by  him,  during  the  war,  from  the  general 
spirit  of  the  above  letter  written  one  month  after  he 
took  office. 

General  Grant,  in  his  testimony  before  the  Committee 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  May  18,  1865,  after  the 
war  had  ended,  testified  as  follows  :  — 

Beinjr  asked :  "  In  what  manner  has  Mr.  Stanton,  Sec- 
retary  of  War,  performed  his  duties  in  the  supply  of  the 
armies,  and  the  support  of  military  operations  under  your 
charge  ?  " 

He  replied :  "  Admirably,  I  think.  There  has  been  no 
complaint  in  that  respect,  —  that  is,  no  general  complaint. 
So  far  as  he  is  concerned,  I  think  there  has  been  no  ground 
for  complaint,  in  that  respect." 

Question :  "  Has  there  ever  been  any  misunderstanding 
with  regard  to  the  conduct  of  the  war  in  any  particular 
between  you  and  the  Secretary  since  you  have  been  in  com- 
mand ?  " 

Answer :  "  Never  any  expressed  to  me.  I  have  never  had 
any  reason  to  believe  that  any  fault  was  found  with  anything 
I  had  done,  so  far  as  the  Secretary  of  War  and  myself  are 
concerned.  He  has  never  interfered  with  my  duties  ;  never 
thrown  any  obstacle  in  the  way  of  supplies  I  have  called  for. 


282  STANTON  AS   SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

He  has  never  dictated  a  course  of  campaign  to  me,  and  never 
inquired  what  I  was  going  to  do.  He  has  always  seemed  sat- 
isfied with  what  I  have  done,  and  has  heartily  cooperated  with 
me."  1 

^  Report  of  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War. 


i 


CHAPTER   XXXIX 

Horace  Greeley  on  Stanton. — The  Latter  disclaims  Credit  not  his 
due  in  a  Letter  to  the  "  Tribune."  —  Comments  on  this  Letter  by- 
Lewis  Cass. 

The  capture  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson  in  Ten- 
nessee, and  of  Roanoke  Island  on  the  coast  of  North 
CaroUna,  caused  great  rejoicing  throughout  the  country. 
The  people  had  been  so  long  accustomed  to  reading  in 
the  daily  papers  what  Halleck  and  Buell  would  do  in 
the  West  and  what  McClellan  would  do  in  the  East, 
and  then  to  finding  that  nobody  did  anything  but  frame 
new  excuses  for  delay,  that  they  were  greatly  elated  with 
the  reports  of  these  brilliant  enterprises.  Secretary 
Stanton  gave  due  credit,  by  a  published  bulletin,  to 
General  Grant  and  Flag-Officer  Foote,  and  to  General 
Burnside  and  Commodore  Goldsborough,  and  the  brave 
men  under  them,  for  these  achievements. 

The  presence  of  Mr.  Stanton  in  the  administration 
had  manifestly  given  a  new  impetus  to  the  progress  of 
affairs.  He  had  imparted  to  it  some  of  his  own  intense 
energy  and  aggressiveness.  The  President's  order  for 
a  general  advance  on  the  22d  of  February  was  felt  to 
be  as  much  that  of  his  new  Secretary  of  War  as  his  own, 
and  these  victories  following  close  upon  it,  in  advance 
of  the  day  named,  were  very  naturally  connected  with 
it  in  the  public  mind.     They  seemed  to  prove  that  we 


284     STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

had  some  generals  who  not  only  needed  no  urging,  but 
"who  only  wanted  permission  to  do  battle,  and  soldiers 
who  were  as  ready  to  fight  as  their  commanders  were 
to  call  on  them.  In  the  exultation  of  the  hour,  Horace 
Greeley  published  the  following  editorial  in  the  New 
York  "  Tribune  "  of  February  18  :  — 

EDWIN  M.  STANTON. 
"While  every  honest  heart  rises  in  gratitude  to  God  for  the 
victories  which  afford  so  glorious  a  guaranty  of  the  national 
salvation,  let  it  not  be  forgotten  that  it  is  to  Edwin  M.  Stan- 
ton, more  than  to  any  other  individual,  that  these  auspicious 
events  are  now  due.  Our  generals  in  the  field  have  done 
their  duty  with  energy  and  courage ;  our  officers,  and  with 
them  the  noble  democracy  of  the  ranks,  have  proved  them- 
selves worthy  sons  of  the  Kepublic ;  but  it  is  by  the  impas- 
sioned soul,  the  sleepless  will,  and  the  great  practical  talents 
of  the  Secretary  of  War  that  the  vast  power  of  the  United 
States  has  now  been  hurled  upon  their  treacherous  and  pei'- 
jured  enemies  to  crush  them  to  powder.  Let  no  man  imagine 
that  we  exalt  this  great  statesman  above  his  deserts,  or  that 
we  would  detract  an  iota  from  that  share  of  glory  which  in 
this  momentous  crisis  belongs  to  every  faithful  participator 
in  the  events  of  the  war.  But  we  cannot  overlook  the  fact 
that,  whereas  the  other  day  all  was  doubt,  distrust,  and  un- 
certainty ;  the  nation  despairing  almost  of  its  own  restoration 
to  life  ;  Congress  the  scene  of  bitter  imputations  and  unsatis- 
factory apologies ;  the  army  sluggish,  discontented,  and  decay- 
ing, and  the  abyss  of  ruin  and  disgrace  yawning  to  swallow 
us ;  now  all  is  inspiration,  movement,  victory,  and  confidence. 
We  seem  to  have  passed  into  another  state  of  existence,  to 
live  with  distinct  purposes,  and  to  feel  the  certainty  of  their 
realization.  In  one  word,  the  nation  is  saved ;  and  while 
with  ungrudging  hands  we  heap  garlands  upon  all  defenders, 


\^James  Buchatian  to  Mr.  Stanton,  February  2J,  1S62} 


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DISCLAIMS   CREDIT   NOT   HIS   DUE  285 

let  a  special  tribute  of  affectionate  admiration  be  paid  to  the 
minister  who  organized  the  victory  which  they  have  won. 

These  were  dangerous  claims  to  assert  in  behalf  of 
any  man,  even  if  they  could  be  maintained,  and  were 
hkely  to  impair  the  usefulness  of  Mr.  Stanton,  by  excit- 
ing displeasure  in  the  minds  of  military  men  w  ith  whom 
the  interests  of  the  country  required  him  to  be  on  the 
best  of  terms.  Whatever  he  had  contributed  towards 
energizing  the  administration  of  affairs,  civil  and  mili- 
tary, he  had  not  given  direction  to  any  military  opera- 
tions, and  he  was  not  the  man  to  assent,  by  his  silence, 
to  any  unfounded  claim  in  his  behalf.  He  therefore 
addressed  the  following  letter,  February  19,  to  the 
editor  of  the  "  Tribune,"  which  was,  of  course,  pubhshed 
in  that  paper  and  copied  in  nearly  all  the  ncAvsjoapers  of 
the  country. 

To  THE  Editor  of  the  New  York  "  Tribune  :  " 

Sir,  —  I  cannot  suffer  undue  merit  to  be  ascribed  to  my 
official  action.  The  glory  of  our  recent  victories  belongs  to 
the  gallant  soldiers  and  officers  that  fought  the  battles.  No 
share  of  it  belongs  to  me. 

Much  has  recently  been  said  of  military  combinations  and 
"organizing  victory."  I  hear  such  phrases  with  apprehen- 
sion. They  commenced  in  infidel  France  with  the  Italian 
campaign,  and  resulted  in  Waterloo.  Who  can  organize  vic- 
tory ?  Who  combine  the  elements  of  success  on  the  battle- 
field ?  We  owe  our  recent  victories  to  the  spirit  of  the  Lord, 
that  moved  our  soldiers  to  rush  into  battle,  and  filled  the 
hearts  of  our  enemies  with  terror  and  dismay.  The  inspira- 
tion that  conquered  in  battle  was  in  the  hearts  of  the  soldiers, 
and  from  on  high  ;  and  wherever  there  is  the  same  inspiration, 
there  will  be  the  same  results.     Patriotic  spirit  with  resolute 


286     STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

courage  in  officers  and  men  is  a  military  combination  that 
never  failed. 

We  may  well  rejoice  at  the  recent  victories,  for  they  teach 
that  battles  are  to  be  won  now,  and  by  us,  in  the  same  and 
only  manner  that  they  were  ever  won  by  any  people,  since 
the  days  of  Joshua,  —  by  boldly  pursuing  and  striking  the 
foe.  What,  under  the  blessing  of  Providence,  I  conceive  to 
be  the  true  organization  of  victory  and  military  combination 
to  end  this  war  was  declared  in  a  few  words  by  General 
Grant's  message  to  General  Buckner,  —  "I  propose  to  move 
immediately  upon  your  works." 

This  was  in  his  best  vein.  It  breathed  devotion  to 
the  country,  gratitude  to  the  soldiers,  trust  in  God,  and 
an  abiding  faith  in  hard  knocks.  The  religious  element 
had  a  large  place  in  his  character,  and  in  his  appeal  to 
the  God  of  battles  he  was  greatly  in  earnest. 

The  following  letter  written  to  Mr.  Stanton  at  this 
time  by  Mr.  Cass,  the  venerable  statesman  who  was  at 
the  head  of  Mr.  Buchanan's  Cabinet  until  driven  out  by 
the  approaching  storm  in  which  he  could  see  only  ship- 
wreck, here  appears  for  the  first  time,  and  shows  that 
the  country  contained  no  more  patriotic  war  Democrat 
than  Lewis  D.  Cass.  The  allusion  to  idling  and  incom- 
petent generals  is  particularly  severe. 

I  have  read  your  admirable  letter  to  the  New  York  "  Trib- 
une "  with  the  greatest  pleasure.  I  congratulate,  not  you,  but 
this  country  upon  this  exposition  of  your  sentiments.  Nothing 
could  be  in  better  taste  ;  nothing  sounder  in  principle.  I  was 
glad  when  I  heard  that  you  were  called  to  take  charge  of  the 
War  Department,  at  this  crisis  of  our  affairs,  but  I  am  now 
still  more  rejoiced  that  you  are  there.  You  have  a  noble  ex- 
ample before  you  of  the  effect  which  the  firm  course  of  a 


COMMENTS  BY  LEWIS  CASS  287 

single  man  may  produce,  in  the  history  of  the  elder  Pitt,  and 
you  are  following  in  the  same  path,  and  I  trust  with  the  same 
results.  I  concur  with  you  cordially  in  your  view  for  the 
necessity  of  prompt,  energetic  action.  We  want  dashing, 
energetic  officers  at  the  head  of  aU  our  separate  detachments, 
who  will  lead  the  way  to  success,  and  wlieu  this  is  obtained, 
will  follow  the  enemy  without  giving  him  a  moment's  rest. 
We  have  been  lamentably  deficient  in  this  respect.  Marshal 
Saxe  well  said  that  the  whole  secret  of  war  was  in  the  lejrs. 
We  seem  to  have  thought  that  the  secret  was  not  in  using  the 
legs,  but  in  sitting  still.  My  heart  has  been  in  the  suppres- 
sion of  this  rebellion,  and  perhaps  my  imijatience  has  influ- 
enced my  judgment,  but  for  my  soul  I  have  not  been  able  to 
conceive  why  the  immense  force  in  and  about  Washington  has 
been  inactive  for  some  months,  while  the  enemy  has  been 
encamped  almost  within  view  of  the  capital.  Pardon  the 
suggestion,  but  it  appears  to  me,  the  moment  a  commanding 
officer  proves  his  incompetency,  either  by  want  of  courage,  of 
conduct,  or  of  enterprise,  he  should  be  superseded  without  a 
moment's  hesitation.  And  this  should  be  done  as  often  as  the 
occasion  demands,  till  our  troops  find  themselves  led  by  officers 
possessing  their  confidence,  and  proving  their  claims  to  it  by 
conducting  them  to  victory.  No  feeling  for  an  incompetent 
officer  should  save  him  for  a  moment.  Our  country  has  too 
much  at  stake  in  the  present  struggle  for  the  Constitution  to 
suffer  its  interests  to  be  sacrificed  to  consideration  for  indi- 
viduals. When  we  commenced  this  contest,  we  had  very  few 
military  men  known  to  the  country  by  their  experience.  We 
had  to  depend  on  the  course  of  events  to  make  known  the  ca- 
pacity and  pretensions  of  the  men  charged  with  high  military 
responsibility.  It  necessarily  follows  that  in  such  a  trial  there 
must  be  many  unfit  for  the  stations.  These  should  at  once  be 
dropped  and  those  who  pass  the  ordeal  retained  and  employed. 
May  God  prosper  your  efforts,  and  crown  them  with  success. 


CHAPTER  XL 

A  Fleet  of  Steam  Rams  for  Operations  on  the  Mississippi  River.  — 
Constructed  under  Stanton's  Orders  by  Charles  Ellet,  Jr. 

The  possession  of  the  Mississippi  River  was  second 
to  no  object  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war.  Indeed, 
by  some  of  our  military  leaders  it  was  deemed  of  the 
first  importance.  It  would  sunder  the  Confederacy  and 
cut  off  from  the  East  the  great  source  of  supphes  in 
the  Southwest.  We  have  seen  how  anxious  Mr.  Stan- 
ton was  to  respond  to  the  demands  of  Halleck  and 
Buell  for  reinforcements  from  the  East,  supposed  to 
be  necessary  for  operations  on  the  Cumberland  and 
Tennessee  rivers  and  the  upper  Mississippi.  The  im- 
portant part  taken  by  the  gunboats  on  the  Tennessee 
proved  their  great  value,  and  directed  the  attention  of 
the  administration  to  what  might  be  done  with  their 
cooperation  on  a  larger  scale  on  the  Mississippi  River. 
At  a  meeting  of  his  Council  of  the  bureau  officers  of 
the  War  Department,  March  14,  Mr.  Stanton  discussed 
this  subject  with  them  at  length.  At  another  meeting 
on  the  20th  Charles  Ellet,  Jr.,  was  present,  upon  Secre- 
tary Stanton's  invitation,  and  stated  to  the  board  what 
he  saw  at  Fortress  Monroe,  from  whence  he  had  just 
returned. 

Mr.  Ellet  was  a  civil  engineer  of  considerable  reputa- 
tion.    The  sinking  of  the  Arctic,  one  of  the  Colhns 


VALUE  OF   STEAM   RAMS  289 

line  of  Atlantic  steamers,  by  being  run  clown  by  a  ves- 
sel of  similar  tonnage  in  1854,  had  impressed  him  with 
the  feasibility  of  so  constructing  steam  vessels  as  to 
make  them  capable  of  receiving  severe  shocks  with 
impunity,  while  acting  as  rams.  That  is  to  say,  by 
streno^theuino;  the  hulls  of  the  vessels  and  constructing: 
heavy  prows  they  could  fight  the  enemy  by  their 
momentum.  Having  freely  published  his  views  as 
early  as  1855  in  a  pamphlet  which  attracted  much 
attention,  he  apprehended  danger  from  the  adoption  of 
his  plans  by  the  Confederates,  and  early  warned  the 
government  of  this  danger,  calling  special  attention  to 
the  United  States  frigate  Merrimac,  captured  by  the 
Confederates  in  the  Norfolk  navy  yard,  and  which  it 
was  known  they  were  fitting  up  as  a  ram.  On  the  6th 
of  February  he  pubHshed  some  \'iews  on  the  subject,  in 
which  he  stated  that  the  rebels  then  had  five  steam 
rams  nearly  ready  for  use,  —  two  on  the  lower  Missis- 
sippi, two  at  Mobile,  and  the  Merrimac  at  Norfolk.  He 
said  if  the  Merrimac  was  permitted  to  escape  from  the 
Elizabeth  River  she  would  commit  great  depredations 
on  our  vessels  in  Hampton  Roads  and  might  pass  out 
to  sea  and  be  a  terrible  scourge  to  our  commerce,  as 
well  as  a  dangerous  visitor  to  our  blockading  squadrons. 
Four  weeks  later  the  Merrimac  fulfilled  the  first  part  of 
this  prediction  by  the  destruction  of  the  Cumberland 
and  Congress,  with  many  lives,  although  she  found 
herself  overmatched  the  next  day  by  the  Monitor.  Her 
exploit  sufficiently  demonstrated  the  damage  that  could 
be  inflicted  by  a  powerful  steam  ram.  Her  withdrawal 
for  repairs  abated  but  did  not  remove  the  anxiety  of 


290     STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

the  government  caused  by  her  proven  capacity  for  great 
harm.  Mr.  Ellet's  opinion  of  her  and  of  her  diminu- 
tive rival,  the  Monitor,  became  a  matter  of  interest. 
He  reported  to  Mr.  Stanton,  at  the  meeting  of  the 
Council  on  the  20th,  that  Commodore  Goldsborough 
and  other  naval  officers  at  Hampton  seemed  to  have 
become  converts  to  the  capabihty  of  steam  rams,  and  to 
have  concluded  that  almost  any  swift-going  steamer 
that  could,  with  safety  to  herself,  hit  the  Merrimac 
would  send  her  to  the  bottom.  Following  is  a  condensed 
summary  of  the  proceedings  of  the  Council  on  this  sub- 
ject, on  the  20th  and  26th  of  March,  made  from  the 
official  stenographic  minutes  :  — 

After  Mr.  Ellet  had  retired  from  the  room,  General  Meigs 
suggested  that  he  might  be  usefully  employed  by  the  govern- 
ment in  gunboat  construction  in  the  West. 

The  Secretary :  Perhaps  he  would  be  as  good  a  man  as  we 
could  get  for  that  purpose.  He  has  more  ingenuity,  more 
personal  courage,  and  more  enterprise  than  anybody  else  I 
have  ever  seen.  .  .  .  He  is  a  clear,  forcible,  controversial 
writer.  He  can  beat  anybody  at  figures.  He  would  cipher 
anybody  to  death.  If  I  had  a  proposition  that  I  desired  to 
work  out  to  some  definite  result,  I  do  not  know  of  any  one  to 
whom  I  would  intrust  it  so  soon  as  Ellet.  His  fancy  and 
will  are  predominant  points,  and  once  having  taken  a  notion 
he  will  not  allow  it  to  be  questioned.^ 

Secretary  Stanton  stated  that  he  had  had  a  conversation 
with  Mr.  Fox,  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  who  proposed 
that  the  Navy  Department  should  undertake  the  construction 

1  Mr.  Ellet  had  Secretary  Stantou's  entire  confidence  as  a  noble,  reso- 
lute, and  honest  man,  and,  as  we  shall  soon  see,  subsequently  rendered 
valuable  and  distinguished  services  to  the  government. 


GUNBOATS   FOR  WESTERN  RIVERS  291 

of  the  sea-going  gunboats,  and  tliat  the  War  Department 
should  undertake  the  building  of  the  gunboats  for  the  AVest- 
ern  rivers. 

General  Meigs  stated  that  the  proposition  would  do  very 
well,  but  the  appropriation  for  fifteen  millions  for  ironclad 
gunboats  was  to  be  expended  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  in 
accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  law. 

The  Secretary :  That  is  so ;  but  I  do  not  think  there  will 
be  any  difficulty  in  obtaining  an  appropriation  for  army  gun- 
boats, because  Congress  believes  that  you  and  I  are  honest. 

At  the  meeting  of  March  26  the  Secretary  stated  that  he 
had  received  a  dispatch  from  General  Ilalleck  the  previous 
evening  to  the  effect  that  he  had  been  furnished  with  infor- 
mation which  made  him  anxious  in  regard  to  ironclad  boats 
now  being  built  at  New  Orleans,  to  be  sent  up  the  river  for 
the  pui'pose  of  interfering  with  our  flotilla.  He  inquired  if 
any  gentleman  had  anything  to  propose  respecting  the  proper 
way  to  meet  these  boats  now  in  course  of  preparation  by  the 
rebels. 

General  Meigs:  Does  Halleck  say  that  the  rebels  have 
ironclad  boats  ? 

The  Secretary  read  the  dispatch  stating  that  pretended 
Union  men  from  New  Orleans  represent  that  the  rebels  are 
building  one  or  more  river  boats  at  that  place,  clad  with  rail- 
road iron  like  the  Merrimac. 

The  Secretary  said  that  the  construction  of  a  river  ISlonitor 
would  not  meet  the  case,  but  rams  might  be  built  to  answer 
the  purpose.  It  would  take  too  much  time  to  construct  a 
boat  like  the  ISlonitor,  while  a  ram  could  be  made  ready  in 
twenty  days,  or  even  a  half  a  dozen  of  them  could  be  pre- 
pared in  that  time. 

General  ISIeigs :  One  of  the  steamboats  that  we  already 
have  could  in  a  short  time  be  altered  in  the  bow  so  as  to  act 
as  a  ram.  That  would  be  the  quickest  way  of  meeting  the 
difficulty. 


292     STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

The  Secretary :  I  propose  this  day  to  send  Mr.  EUet  to 
the  West  as  the  engineer  of  this  department  to  construct,  as 
speedily  as  possible,  one  or  more  rams  at  Pittsburg,  Cincin- 
nati, and  New  Albany.  Is  there  any  better  person  to  whom 
I  could  commit  that  duty  ? 

General  Meigs :  I  do  not  believe  there  is. 

General  Thomas  :  He  has  genius  and  skill,  and  I  presume 
can  carry  out  the  plan  as  soon  as  anybody. 

General  Totten :  Has  he  any  particular  plan  ? 

The  Secretary :  Yes ;  the  plan  is  to  take  the  largest  and 
most  powerful  river  boats,  remove  the  upper  works,  fill  the 
bows  with  timber,  and  furnish  such  protection  as  can  be 
afforded.  Each  boat  will  require  a  crew  of  five  men  and  a 
person  to  command.     Mr.  EUet  is  himself  willing  to  risk  it. 

Colonel  Taylor :  I  think  I  would  give  him  an  opportunity, 
and  promptly,  too. 

The  Secretary :  I  shall  allow  him  to  commence  one  boat  at 
Pittsburg,  one  at  Cincinnati,  and  one  at  New  Albany,  so  that 
they  may  all  be  progressing  at  once. 

General  Meigs :  I  do  not  think  you  can  do  better.  You 
could  not  add  much  to  the  ironclad  boats  we  already  have. 
They  now  draw  more  water  than  it  was  intended  they  should 
draw. 

The  Secretary :  We  do  not  want  to  wait  for  iron  armor. 
Ellet  calculates  upon  destroying  a  boat  right  off  by  running 
into  her. 

Now,  Mr.  Quartermaster-General,  I  like  everything  done 
systematically  and  in  order.  I  want  a  quartermaster  at  each 
one  of  those  places  to  make  all  contracts,  to  superintend  all 
disbursements,  to  present  and  vouch  for  all  accounts,  etc.  It 
cannot  be  done  by  the  quartermasters  at  these  points  because 
they  already  have  as  much  business  as  they  can  attend  to. 
Besides,  I  would  rather  keep  the  construction  of  these  boats 
separate  from  other  matters.  Are  there  any  unemployed 
quartermasters  that  can  be  detailed  for  that  duty  ? 


HIS  PLAN  FOR  STEAM  RAMS  293 

General  Meigs :  I  do  not  think  that  there  is  any  one 
available.  I  wish  you  would  appoint  somebody  fit  for  the 
place. 

The  Secretary :  I  will  appoint  fifty  quartermasters  if  you 
will  name  men  who  are  fit  for  the  position. 

General  Meigs  :  That  would  be  hard  to  do. 

The  Secretary :  I  propose  to  get  men  who  are  fit.  I  pro- 
pose to  address  a  telegraphic  dispatch  to  the  Board  of  Trade 
in  each  city,  asking  them  to  appoint  three  of  their  most  judi- 
cious members  to  act  as  an  advisory  committee  of  this  depart- 
ment, and  that  one  of  their  number  shall  accept  temporarily 
the  post  of  quartermaster,  receive  a  commission  as  such  from 
the  United  States,  render  his  accounts,  and  surrender  his 
commission  just  as  soon  as  this  business  is  completed,  they  to 
select  the  man.  I  appeal  simply  to  their  patriotic  motives. 
Can  any  gentleman  suggest  a  better  plan? 

Colonel  Taylor :  I  cannot ;  that  you  have  suggested  is  per- 
haps the  only  one. 

General  Meigs  :  The  person  selected  should  be  a  good  man, 
who  knows  the  resources  of  the  place  and  the  people. 

The  Secretary  then  read  the  telegram  which  he  proposed 
to  address  to  the  boards  of  trade  at  Pittsburg,  Cincinnati, 
and  New  Albany. 

General  Totten :  Do  you  make  Ellet  directly  accountable 
to  you  ? 

The  Secretary :  I  make  him  directly  accountable  to  me. 

General  Totten  :    To  whom  are  the   boats  to  be  turned 


over 


9 


The  Secretary :  To  the  quartermaster. 

General  Totten :  My  inquiry  turns  upon  a  point  of  his 
personal  character.  He  will  be  lord  over  all,  unless  you 
make  his  path  and  wall  him  in. 

The  Secretary :  He  will  be  accountable  to  me. 

General  Totten :  Is  he  to  be  subordinate  to  the  command- 
ing officer  ?     What  I  fear  is  that  he  will  not  be  tractable. 


294  STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

The  Secretary :  Then  I  will  dismiss  him.  The  building  of 
the  boats  is  all  that  I  propose  that  he  shall  do.  The  boards 
of  trade  can  select  good  river  men  to  be  captains.  After 
their  construction  the  boats  will  be  placed  under  the  com- 
mand of  the  military  officer  in  charge  of  the  operations  there. 
Ellet  can  go  on  any  one  of  them  if  he  chooses. 

General  Totten :  That,  I  think,  will  be  ample  security. 

The  Secretary :  I  do  not  propose  to  erect  him  into  a  mili- 
tary power. 

General  Totten  :  It  seems  to  me  that  your  proposition  is 
the  proper  one  for  security  against  these  rebel  boats. 

General  Thomas :  It  is  the  only  one  when  the  question  of 
time  is  taken  into  consideration. 

The  Secretary  :  I  have  told  Ellet  to  construct  these  boats 
in  twenty  days. 

General  Meigs  :  You  can  alter  one  sooner  than  that. 

The  Secretary  :  That  is  the  maximum. 

After  some  discussion  the  Secretary  fixed  Mr.  EUet's  pay 
at  ten  dollars  per  day,  with  mileage  at  ten  cents  per  mile. 
He  then  read  to  the  board  his  letter  of  instructions  to  him. 

On  the  next  day  he  gave  Ellet  the  following  order :  — 

Sir,  —  You  will  please  proceed  immediately  to  Pittsburg, 
Cincinnati,  and  New  Albany  and  take  measures  to  provide 
steam  rams  for  defense  against  ironclad  vessels  on  the  West- 
ern waters.  Instructions  will  be  forwarded  you  by  mail  to 
Pittsburg,  in  conformity  with  which  you  will  guide  your 
proceedings,  and  from  time  to  time  receive  such  other  instruc- 
tions as  may  be  required.  All  contracts  and  purchases  wiU 
be  made  by  a  special  quartermaster,  to  be  appointed  to  act 
with  you,  and  all  expenditures  will  be  made  by  him  and 
under  his  direction.  You  will  be  compensated  for  your  ser- 
vice at  the  rate  of  pay  allowed  by  law  for  similar  services,  to 
wit,  ten  dollars  per  day  and  mileage  at  the  rate  of  ten  cents 
per  mile. 


STEA5I  RAMS  BUILT  BY  CHARLES   ELLET    295 

On  the  following  day  Mr.  Stanton  telegraphed  him 
at  Pittsburg  :  — 

Unless  for  imperative  reasons,  do  not  confine  your  work  to 
one  locality.  Give  a  portion  to  Cinciuuati  and  New  Albany, 
so  as  to  avoid  the  imputation  of  local  favoritism,  and  also  to 
bring  out  the  whole  mechanical  energy  of  the  Ohio  Valley. 
Proceed  as  speedily  as  you  can  to  Cincinnati.  The  Board  of 
Trade  there  are  ready  to  act  energetically  with  you.  Confer 
with  Mr.  Butler,  the  president  of  the  board  at  Cincinnati, 
with  whom  I  am  in  communication.     Report  daily  to  me. 

On  the  29th  IMr.  Stanton  sent  the  following  to 
Major-General  Halleck  at  St.  Louis  :  — 

Steam  rams  are  rapidly  being  prepared  under  the  direction 
of  Engineer  Ellet  at  Pittsburg,  and  he  proceeds  immediately 
to  Cincinnati  to  fit  up  some  there.  They  are  the  most  power- 
ful steamboats,  with  upper  cabins  removed,  bows  filled  in 
with  heavy  timber.  It  is  not  proposed  to  wait  for  putting 
on  iron.  This  is  the  mode  in  which  the  Merrimac  will  be 
met.  Can  you  not  have  something  of  the  kind  speedily  pre- 
pared at  St.  Louis  also  ? 

On  the  same  day  Mr.  Ellet  telegraphed  to  Mr.  Stan- 
ton that  the  enemy  had  "  eleven  gunboats  below  Island 
No.  10,  and  others  fitted  up  as  rams  ascending  the 
Mississippi."     He  recited  his  plan  of  work  in  detail. 

Mr.  Stanton  replied  :  — 

Yours  received.  Direct  quartermaster  to  supply  whatever 
you  need.  Spare  nothing  to  accomplish  your  object  at  the 
speediest  moment,  for  time  is  precious. 

On  the  31st  Mr.  Stanton  telegraphed  him  :  — 

Your  letter  just  received.  Your  plan  is  approved.  I  do 
not  mean  to  impose  any  improper  limit,  but  wish  the  work 


296  STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

not  confined  to  one  locality,  but  distributed,  so  as  to  get  the 
utmost  possible  vigor,  and  therefore  recommend  immediate 
inspection  at  Cincinnati  and  New  Albany,  where  an  immense 
amount  of  mechanical  industry  may  work  at  the  same  time 
with  the  force  at  Pittsburg.  You  need  not  consider  yourself 
restricted  to  one  more  boat  at  Pittsburg,  but  I  wish  to  know 
by  telegraph  what  extent  is  proposed  beyond  that,  before 
contracts  are  made.  The  crew  is  of  great  importance.  I 
will  give  honorable  reward  and  also  prize  money  for  success- 
ful courage  in  large  and  liberal  manner. 

April  19  EUet  wrote  that  three  gunboats  at  Pitts- 
burg and  one,  and  possibly  two,  at  Cincinnati  would 
be  ready  as  soon  as  they  could  be  manned.    He  said  :  — 

What  we  do  with  these  rams  will  probably  be  accomplished 
within  a  month  after  striking  the  first  boat.  Success  requires 
that  the  steamers  should  be  run  below  the  batteries,  after 
which  they  will  be  unable  to  return,  and  compelled  to  go 
down  the  Mississippi  or  be  sunk  or  taken.  I  think  if  I  can 
get  the  boats  safely  below  Memphis  I  can  command  the  river. 

He  wrote  full  details  of  his  requirements  for  the 
expedition. 


CHAPTER   XLI 

The  Capture  of  Memphis. 

The  energetic  measures  of  Mr.  Stanton  for  the  con- 
struction of  steam  rams  for  operations  on  the  Missis- 
sippi resulted  in  the  completion  of  the  fleet  about  the 
middle  of  May.  On  the  5th  of  June  it  moved  down 
the  river  to  Memphis.  On  the  following  day  the 
memorable  engagement  took  place,  which  was  mainly 
a  battle  between  the  federal  ram  fleet  and  that  of 
the  enemy,  and  which  resulted  in  the  capture  of 
Memphis.  The  following  is  from  the  report  of  Colonel 
Ellet,  who  commanded  the  federal  rams  constructed 
under  his  direction  :  — 

Eebel  gunboats  made  a  stand  early  this  morning  opposite 
Memphis,  and  opened  a  vigorous  fire  upon  our  gunboats, 
which  was  returned  with  equal  spirit.  I  ordered  the  Queen, 
my  flagship,  to  pass  between  the  gunboats,  and  run  down 
ahead  of  them  upon  the  two  rams  of  the  enemy,  which  first 
boldly  stood  their  groimd.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Ellet,  in  the 
Monarch,  of  which  Captain  Dryden  was  first  master,  followed 
gallantly.  The  rebel  rams  endeavored  to  back  dowii  stream, 
and  then  to  turn  and  run,  but  the  movement  was  fatal  to 
them.  The  Queen  struck  one  of  them  fairly,  and  for  a  few 
minutes  was  fast  to  the  wreck.  After  separating,  the  rebel 
steamer  sank.  My  steamer,  the  Queen,  was  then  herself 
struck  by  another  rebel  steamer  and  disabled,  but,  though 
damaged,  can  be  saved.      A  pistol-shot  wound  in   the  leg 


298     STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

deprived  me  of  the  power  to  witness  the  remainder  of  the 
fight.  The  Monarch  also  passed  ahead  of  our  gunboats,  and 
went  most  gallantly  into  the  action.  She  first  struck  the 
rebel  boat  that  struck  my  flagship,  and  sunk  the  rebel.  She 
was  then  struck  by  one  of  the  rebel  rams,  but  not  injured. 
She  was  then  pushed  on  and  struck  the  Beauregard  and  burst 
open  her  side.  Simultaneously  the  Beauregard  was  struck 
in  the  boiler  by  a  shot  from  one  of  our  gunboats.  The  Mon- 
arch then  pushed  at  the  gunboat  Little  Rebel,  —  the  rebel 
flagship,  —  and  having  little  headway,  pushed  her  before  her, 
the  rebel  commodore  and  crew  escaping.  The  Monarch  then 
finding  the  Beauregard  sinking,  took  her  in  tow  until  she 
sank  in  shallow  water.  Then,  in  compliance  with  the  request 
of  Commodore  Davis,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Ellet  dispatched 
the  Monarch  and  the  Switzerland  in  pursuit  of  one  remaining 
gunboat  and  some  transports  which  had  escaped.  The  gun- 
boats and  two  of  my  rams  have  gone  below.  I  cannot  too 
much  praise  the  conduct  of  the  pilots  and  engineers  and  mili- 
tary guard  of  the  Monarch  and  Queen,  the  brave  conduct  of 
Captain  Dryden,  or  the  heroic  bearing  of  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Ellet.  I  will  name  all  parties  to  you  in  special  report.  I  am 
myself  the  only  person  in  my  fleet  who  was  disabled.  .  .  . 

It  is  proper  and  due  to  the  brave  men  on  the  Queen  and 
the  Monarch  to  say  to  you  briefly  that  two  of  the  rebel  steam- 
ers were  sunk  outright  and  immediately  by  the  shock  of  my 
two  rams ;  one  with  a  large  amount  of  cotton,  etc.,  on  board, 
was  disabled  by  accidental  collision  with  the  Queen,  and 
secured  by  her  crew.  After  I  was  personally  disabled,  an- 
other, which  was  also  hit  by  a  shot  from  the  gunboats,  was 
sunk  by  the  Monarch  and  towed  to  shoal  water  by  that  boat. 
Still  another,  also  injured  by  the  fire  of  our  gunboats,  was 
pushed  into  shore  and  secured  by  the  Monarch.  Of  the  gun- 
boats I  can  only  say  that  they  bore  themselves  as  our  navy 
always  does,  —  bravely  and  well. 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  MEMPHIS  299 

Mr.  Stanton  responded  to  him  as  follows,  June  9 :  — 

The  news  of  your  glorious  achieveiuent  at  Memphis  reached 
here  last  evening,  and  our  joy  was  ouly  dampened  by  your 
personal  injury.  You  will  accept  for  yourself,  and  return  to 
your  officers,  engineers,  pilots,  soldiers,  and  boatmen,  the 
cordial  thanks  of  this  deiJartment  for  the  galhiutry,  courage, 
and  skill  manifested  on  that  occasion.  When  your  official 
report  is  received  official  recognition  will  be  made  of  their 
respective  merits.  I  went  in  the  evening  to  your  house,  and, 
as  carefully  as  I  could,  communicated  to  Mrs.  Ellet  your 
injury.  She  was  of  coiu-se  deeply  affected,  but  bore  the 
information  with  as  much  spirit  and  courage  as  could  be  ex- 
pected. It  is  her  design  to  proceed  immediately  to  join  you. 
I  have  furnished  her  with  a  pass  and  free  passage,  and  she 
will  be  accompanied  by  your  daughter.  I  hoi)e  you  will  keep 
me  advised  of  your  state  of  health  and  everything  you  want. 
To  my  official  thanks,  I  beg  to  add  my  personal  regards. 

The  brave  Ellet  died  from  the  effects  of  his  wounds  on 
the  21st  of  the  same  month,  just  as  the  vessel  which  was 
conveying  him  to  Cairo  touched  the  wharf  at  that  place. 

The  capture  of  Memphis  was  a  strange  episode, 
being:  the  result  of  the  zeal  and  euerjrv  of  two  civilians. 
Stanton's  confidence  in  Ellet  and  the  latter's  confidence 
in  himself  resulted  in  the  rapid  creation  of  a  fleet  of 
rams  over  which  their  constructor  was  given  command. 
The  gunboats  participated  in  the  engagement,  and 
Ellet  gave  them  full  credit,  but  the  victory  was  due  to 
the  rams.  The  engagement  was  watched  from  the 
levee  at  Memphis  by  the  Confederate  general,  M.  Jeff 
Thompson,  who  in  his  report  to  General  Beauregard 
said  :  "  The  enemy's  rams  did  most  of  the  execution, 
and  were  handled  more  adroitly  than  oui-s." 


CHAPTER   XLII 

Halleck  in  the  West.  —  His  Importunity  for  an  Enlarged  Command. 
—  His  Ludicrous  Pretensions.  —  His  Injustice  to  Grant  undone 
by  an  Inquiry  from  the  War  Department.  —  He  is  given  Supreme 
Command  in  the  West.  —  He  then  restores  Grant  to  his  Com- 
mand.—  Tlie  Battle  of  Shiloh  fought  while  Halleck  is  still  at  St. 
Louis.  —  He  then  takes  the  Field  and  resumes  Persecution  of 
Grant.  —  Halleck's  Advance  on  Corinth  by  Parallels.  —  Finds  it 
evacuated. 

The  eagerness  of  General  Halleck  to  have  entire 
command  in  the  West  as  his  reward  for  permitting 
General  Grant  to  capture  Fort  Henry,  and  for  not  pre- 
venting him  from  capturing  Fort  Donelson,  has  already 
been  noted  in  his  telegram  to  that  effect,  of  February 
17,  to  General  McClellan. 

On  the  20th,  he  again  telegraphed  McClellan  as  fol- 
lows :  — 

I  must  have  command  in  the  armies  of  the  West.  Hesita- 
tion and  delay  are  losing  us  the  golden  opportunity.  Lay 
this  before  the  President  and  Secretary  of  War.  May  I 
assume  command  ?     Answer  quickly. 

To  this  McClellan  replied,  February  21:  — 

Buell  at  Bowling  Green  knows  more  of  the  state  of  affairs 
than  you  at  St.  Louis.  Until  I  hear  from  him,  I  cannot  see 
the  necessity  of  giving  you  entire  command.  I  expect  to  hear 
from  Buell  in  a  few  minutes.  I  do  not  yet  see  that  Buell 
cannot  control  his  own  line.  I  shall  not  lay  your  case  before 
the  Secretary  until  I  hear  definitely  from  Buell. 


HALLECK  IN  THE  WEST  301 

On  the  21st,  Mr.  Stanton  telegraphed  to  Halleck  at 
St.  Louis :  — 

Your  plan  of  organization  has  been  transmitted  to  me  by 
Mr.  Scott,  and  strikes  me  as  very  bright.  On  account  of 
domestic  affliction  in  the  President's  family,  I  have  not  yet 
been  able  to  submit  it  to  him. 

On  the  22d,  Mr.  Stanton  telegraphed  Halleck  that, 
after  full  consideration,  the  President  did  not  think  any 
change  in  the  organization  of  the  army  or  military 
departments  advisable. 

Halleck  replied,  on  the  2-lth,  to  Secretary  Stanton :  — 

If  it  is  thought  that  the  present  arrangement  is  best  for 
the  pubhc  service,  I  have  nothing  to  say.  I  have  done  my 
duty  in  making  the  suggestions,  and  leave  it  to  my  superiors 
to  adopt  or  reject  them. 

While  Grant  had  been  hard  at  work,  achieving  grand 
results  in  Tennessee  all  through  February,  he  made 
daily  reports  to  Halleck  at  St.  Louis.  Unfortunately 
his  dispatches  for  a  portion  of  the  time,  as  well  as 
dispatches  from  Halleck  to  him,  failed  to  reach  their 
destination.  One  reason  was  the  desertion  of  a  tele- 
graph operator  to  the  enemy.  Among  these  dispatches 
were  inquiries  made  by  General  McClellan  as  to  the 
number  of  troops  in  his  command.  A  question  as  to 
the  reason  for  this  irregularity  in  the  receiving  of 
reports  would  have  shown  General  Halleck,  what  he 
afterwards  found  to  be  the  case,  that  General  Grant 
was  entirely  blameless,  having  faithfully  performed  his 
duty.  Instead  of  pursuing  that  course,  he  accused 
General  Grant,  in  a  dispatch  to  General  McClellan  of 


302     STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

March  2,  of  neglect  and  inefficiency.  This  brought 
from  the  latter  on  the  next  day  a  dispatch  authorizing 
the  arrest  of  Grant,  at  Halleck's  discretion.  On  the 
4th,  Halleck  reinforced  his  first  assault,  telegraphing 
McClellan  that  a  rumor  had  reached  him  to  the  effect 
that  Grant  had  been  addicting  himself  to  drunkenness, 
"  which,"  he  said,  "  if  true,  would  of  course  account 
for  his  bad  conduct."  He  said  he  did  not  deem  it 
necessary  to  arrest  him  just  then,  but  he  had  given  his 
command  over  to  General  C.  F.  Smith,  who  would 
probably  restore  order  and  discipline.^ 

The  hero  of  the  first  great  Union  victory  of  the  war 
was  thus  put  in  disgrace  without  cause  or  inquiry,  and 
thereby  removed  from  the  possibility  of  being  made 
commander  of  the  Western  armies,  over  the  head  of  his 
senior,  who  had,  up  to  that  time,  remained  at  his  com- 
fortable desk  in  St.  Louis.  Fort  Henry,  Fort  Donelson, 
and  Nashville  had  all  been  taken,  as  already  shown, 
not  only  without  Halleck's  orders,  but  against  his 
judgment.  This  was  not  known,  however,  at  Wash- 
ington, where  the  activity  in  his  department,  so  loudly 
proclaimed  by  himself,  was  naturally  credited  in  great 
part  to  his  energy  and  generalship. 

While  General  McClellan  was  in  command  of  all  the 
armies,  he  maintained  two  distinct  organizations,  —  one 
as  general  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  the  other 
as  general-in-chief .     He  had  separate  headquarters,  and 

*  lu  his  Memoirs  General  Grant  thus  alludes  to  this  period  :  — 
"Thus,  in  less  than  two  weeks  after  the  victory  of  Fort  Donelson,  the 
two  leading  generals  in  the  war  were  in  correspondence  as  to  what  dispo- 
sition should  be  made  of  me,  and  in  less  than  three  weeks  I  was  virtually 
under  arrest  and  without  a  command." 


HALLECK'S  INJUSTICE  TO  GRANT  303 

a  staff  for  each.  His  headquarters  as  general-in-ehief 
were  in  the  War  Departmeut,  the  records  being  kept 
by  the  adjutant-general  of  the  army.  His  headquarters 
as  general  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  were  in  another 
part  of  the  city,  and  the  records  were  in  charge  of  the 
adjutant-general  of  that  army. 

In  a  letter  to  General  Grant  ^  he  explains  that  in  this 
latter  headquarters  he  kept  the  chief  telegraph  office, 
and  the  record  of  "all  telegraphic  dispatches  of  any 
importance."  Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  the  telegraphic 
records  of  his  transactions  as  general-in-chief  were  not 
kept  in  his  headquarters,  as  such,  at  the  War  Depart- 
ment, but  in  the  minor  establishment. 

In  March,  1862,  Secretary  Stanton  caused  all  records 
which  related  to  the  general  command  of  the  army  to 
be  consolidated  in  the  office  of  the  adjutant-general  in 
the  War  Department,  where  they  naturally  belonged. 
This  brought  to  light  much  information  which  was  new 
to  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War.  Among 
these  discoveries  were  the  dispatches  from  Halleck  to 
McClellan  of  March  2  and  4,  so  damaging  to  Grant. 
Similar  charges  had  appeared  in  the  press,  but  this 
evidently  was  the  first  knowledge  the  War  Department 
had  that  they  had  been  made  by  General  Halleck.  The 
following  was  addressed  to  the  latter  by  Adjutant- 
General  Thomas,  March  10  :  — 

Sir,  —  It  has  been  reported  that  soon  after  the  battle  of 
Fort  Donelson  General  Grant  left  his  command  without 
leave. 

By  direction  of  the  President,  the  Secretary  of  War  desires 

1  Ovon  Story,  page  220. 


304     STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

you  to  ascertain  and  report  whether  General  Grant  left  his 
command  at  any  time  without  proper  authority,  and  if  so,  for 
how  long. 

Whether  he  has  made  to  you  proper  reports  and  returns  of 
his  force. 

Whether  he  has  committed  any  acts  which  were  unauthor- 
ized, or  not  in  accordance  with  military  subordination  or  pro- 
priety, and  if  so,  what. 

The  order  of  March  11,  which  retired  McClellan  as 
general-in-chief,  assigned  Halleck  to  the  command  of 
all  the  armies  in  the  West.  The  President  and  his 
Secretary  of  War  knew  only  of  results  in  that  region, 
and  not  of  the  contrivances  by  which  General  Halleck's 
agency  in  them  was  magnified.  When,  therefore,  the 
question  came  to  be  decided,  of  the  chief  command  in 
the  West,  it  was  given  to  him.  He  was  entitled  to  it 
by  rank ;  he  had  in  of&cial  dispatches  made  Grant  to 
appear  wholly  unfit  and  unworthy ;  and  no  one  else 
could  claim  any  advantage  over  him  in  the  way  of 
achievements. 

Having  thus  secured  the  object  of  his  present  ambi- 
tion, and  having  no  justification  whatever  for  the  great 
wrong  he  had  done  General  Grant,  he  attempted  none, 
but  first  restored  him  to  command,  and  then  wrote  to 
the  adjutant-general,  March  15,  as  follows,  in  reply  to 
Stanton's  inquiry :  — 

In  accordance  with  your  instructions  of  the  10th  inst.,  I 
report  that  General  Grant  and  several  officers  of  high  rank 
in  his  command,  immediately  after  the  battle  of  Fort  Donel- 
son,  went  to  Nashville  without  my  authority  or  knowledge. 
I  am   satisfied,  however,  from   investigation,   that   General 


HALLECK  RESTORES  GRANT  TO  COMMAND    305 

Grant  did  this  from  good  intentions,  and  from  a  desire  to 
subserve  the  public  interests.  Not  being  advised  of  General 
Buell's  movements,  and  learning  that  General  B.  had  ordered 
Smith's  division  of  his  (Grant's)  command  to  Nashville,  he 
deemed  it  his  duty  to  go  there  in  person.  During  the  absence 
of  General  Grant  and  a  part  of  his  general  officers,  numerous 
irregularities  are  said  to  have  occurred  at  Fort  Donelson. 
These  were  in  violation  of  the  orders  issued  by  General  Grant 
before  his  departure,  and  probably  under  the  circumstances 
were  unavoidable. 

General  Grant  has  made  the  proper  explanations,  and  has 
been  directed  to  resume  his  command  in  the  field.  As  he 
acted  from  a  praiseworthy,  although  mistaken  zeal,  for  the 
public  service,  in  going  to  Nashville  and  leaving  his  com- 
mand, I  respectfully  recommend  that  no  further  notice  be 
taken  of  it. 

There  never  has  been  any  want  of  military  subordination 
on  the  part  of  General  Grant,  and  his  failure  to  make  returns 
of  his  forces  has  been  explained  as  resulting  partly  from  the 
failure  of  colonels  of  regiments  to  report  to  him  on  arrival, 
and  partly  from  an  interruption  of  telegraphic  communica- 
tion.    All  these  irregularities  have  now  been  remedied. 

It  was  not  until  the  17th  of  March  that  Grant  re- 
ceived from  Halleck  copies  o£  this  correspondence; 
"  but,"  he  remarks,  "  he  did  not  inform  me  that  it  was 
his  own  reports  that  created  all  this  trouble.  In  conse- 
quence I  felt  very  grateful  to  him,  and  supposed  that 
it  was  his  interposition  that  had  set  me  right  with 
the  government." 

Halleck  had  donB  Grant  all  the  harm  he  could  possi- 
bly do  him  —  had  degraded  him  from  command  without 
the  slightest  inquiry,  before  or  afterwards,  as  to  the  jus- 
tice of  his  course.     There  seems  to  be  no  reason  to 


306     STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

suppose  that  lie  ever  would  have  retracted  his  unsup- 
ported charges,  had  he  not  been  compelled  by  the 
questions  of  his  superiors  to  admit  that  there  was  no 
fact  on  which  to  sustain  them. 

General  Halleck  continued  his  office  at  St.  Louis  for 
about  a  month  after  he  had  been  given  command  of  all 
the  Western  armies.  Meanwhile  they  accomplished  a 
great  deal.  Pope's  operations  on  the  Mississippi  River 
at  New  Madrid  and  Island  No.  10,  aided  by  the  gun- 
boats of  the  navy,  under  Commodore  Foote,  resulted  in 
the  capture  of  7000  prisoners  and  an  immense  amount 
of  munitions  of  war. 

The  main  operations  in  the  department,  however, 
■were  those  conducted  by  Grant,  who,  after  resuming 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  on  the  17th  of 
March,  proceeded  to  Savannah  on  the  Tennessee  River, 
to  which  point,  and  places  beyond,  his  troops  had  been 
advanced.  He  at  once  moved  all  of  his  forces  to  Pitts- 
burg Landing,  which  is  within  twenty-two  miles  of 
Corinth,  Mississippi,  at  which  latter  place  the  enemy, 
under  General  A.  S.  Johnston,  was  fortifying  and  mass- 
ing an  army  —  the  first  stand  he  had  made  since  his 
retreat  from  Nashville.  Grant  was  not  strong  enough 
to  attack  the  intrenched  forces  of  Johnston  until  rein- 
forced by  Buell,  who  was  marching  to  his  aid  from 
Nashville.  Aware  of  this  situation,  and  eager  to  recover 
the  prestige  he  had  lost  by  his  failures  in  Tennessee, 
Johnston  decided,  against  the  protest  of  Beauregard,  to 
move  at  once  upon  Grant,  and  give  him  battle  at  Pitts- 
burg Landing.  Then,  after  the  victory  he  anticipated, 
he  would  fall   upon  Buell  before  the  latter  reached 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH  307 

Grant.  He  made  the  attack  near  Pittsburg  Landing  at 
eight  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  Gth  of  April,  and 
the  battle  raged  fiercely  until  night  compelled  its  ces- 
sation. Both  forces  sulfered  greatly,  —  the  Confederate 
losses  including  the  commanding  general,  Albert  Sidney 
Johnston,  —  and  in  the  ranks  of  both  there  had  been 
great  panic  among  some  of  the  raw  recruits.  The  Union 
forces  had  been  driven  back  to  the  river,  where,  with 
aid  from  the  gunboats,  they  repelled  the  last  desperate 
assaults  of  the  enemy  on  that  day,  and  remained  on  the 
portion  of  the  field  thus  held  by  them.  In  this  fierce 
conflict.  Grant  had  been  ably  supported  by  Sherman, 
McClernand,  Prentiss,  Hurlbut,  and  W.  H.  L.  Wallace. 
Buell  arrived  with  a  division  of  his  army  too  late  to  take 
part  on  the  Gth.  General  Lew  Wallace  with  5000  men 
also  failed  to  arrive  in  time  to  do  any  good  on  the  Gth, 
owing  to  a  misunderstandmg  as  to  the  route  by  which 
he  was  to  march. 

Grant  commenced  the  fighting  soon  after  daybreak 
on  the  next  morning  (7th),  and,  reinforced  by  Buell  and 
Wallace,  fought  and  won  the  battle  of  Shiloh.  Beau- 
resrard  succeeded  Johnston  in  command  of  the  rebels. 
"The  enemy  was  driven  back  all  day,"  says  Grant,  "as 
we  had  been  the  day  before,  until  finally  they  beat  a 
precipitate  retreat." 

Grant  says  that  not  more  than  25,000  Union  troops 
were  in  line  on  the  first  day,  while  the  enemy,  according 
to  Beauregard,  were  40,000  strong.     Grant  says  :  — 

Shiloh  was  the  severest  battle  fought  in  the  West,  and  but 
a  few  in  the  East  equaled  it  for  hard,  determined  flighting. 
.  .  .  Our  loss  in  the  two  days'  fighting  was  1754  killed,  8408 


308     STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

wounded,  and  2885  missing.  Beauregard  reported  a  total 
loss  of  10,677,  of  whom  1728  were  killed,  8012  wounded,  and 
957  missing.  This  estimate  must  be  incorrect.  We  buried 
by  actual  count  more  of  the  enemy's  dead  in  front  of  the  ranks 
of  McClernand  and  Sherman  than  here  reported,  and  4000 
was  the  estimate  of  the  burial  parties  for  the  whole  field. 

Grant  wrote  at  once  to  Halleck  informing  bim  of  this 
great  battle  and  its  results.  Halleck  gave  bim  no  re- 
cognition, and  made  no  mention  of  bim  to  the  govern- 
ment at  Washington ;  but  on  the  8tb  be  telegrapbed 
from  bis  office  in  St.  Louis  to  Assistant  Secretary  Scott 
at  New  Madrid  of  a  "  severe  battle  and  splendid  victory 
at  Pittsburg  Landing."  To  tbe  Secretary  of  War  on 
tbe  same  day  be  telegrapbed  :  — 

The  enemy  attacked  our  works  at  Pittsburg  Landing, 
Tennessee,  yesterday,  and  were  repulsed  with  heavy  loss.  No 
details  given. 

Three  days  later,  April  11,  be  made  bis  appearance 
at  Pittsburg  Landing,  and  assumed  command  on  tbe 
field.  He  ignored  General  Grant,  wbo  was  next  to  him 
in  command,  not  even  permitting  bim  to  see  tbe  reports 
of  General  Buell  of  bis  share  in  the  battle.  On  the 
13th  he  telegraphed  to  Mr.  Stanton  that  General  Sher- 
man saved  the  fortune  of  the  day  on  the  6th,  and  re- 
quested that  he  be  made  a  major-general.^ 

It  is  strange  that  General  Grant,  who  commanded  aU 
the  forces  in  this  great  battle,  did  not  seem  to  General 

1  General  Sherman's  services  on  that  occasion  were  fully  recognized  by 
General  Grant.  He  says  in  his  Memoirs  that  any  casualty  to  Sherman 
that  would  have  taken  him  from  the  field  that  day  would  have  been  a  sad 
one  for  the  troops  engaged  at  Shiloh. 


GRANT  IGNORED  AND  SLANDERED     309 

Halleck   worthy   of    mention.      Ten   days   afterwards 
Stanton  telegi-aphed  Halleck  :  — 

The  President  desires  to  know  why  you  have  not  made 
official  report  to  this  department  respecting  the  late  battle  at 
Pittsburg  Landing,  and  whether  any  neglect  or  misconduct  of 
General  Grant  or  any  other  officer  contributed  to  the  sad 
casualties  that  befell  our  forces  on  Sunday. 

This  inquiry  was  made  because  the  most  malicious 
slanders  had  been  circulated  against  Grant,  charging 
that  the  enemy  had  fallen  upon  him  in  the  early  morn- 
ing of  the  first  day  while  he  was  drunk,  and  that  he 
was  at  fault  in  having  been  surprised.  Subsequent 
investigations  proved  that  these  were  falsehoods  out 
of  whole  cloth,  instigated  by  malicious  persons  who 
were  desperately  resolved  to  destroy  Grant  in  the  face 
of  successes  which  have  contributed  largely  to  his  im- 
mortal renown.  Halleck  made  the  following  reply  to 
Mr.  Stanton's  inquiry  :  — 

The  sad  casualties  of  Sunday,  the  6  th,  were  due  in  part  to 
the  bad  conduct  of  officers,  who  were  utterly  unfit  for  their 
places,  and  in  part  to  the  bravery  and  enterprise  of  the  enemy. 
I  prefer  to  express  no  opinion  in  regard  to  the  misconduct  of 
individuals  until  I  receive  the  reports  of  commanders  of  divi- 
sions. A  great  battle  cannot  be  fought,  or  a  victory  won, 
without  many  casualties.  In  this  instance  the  enemy  suffered 
more  than  we  did. 

This  was  not  responsive  to  Mr.  Stanton's  inquiry. 
Halleck  had  been  on  the  ground  thirteen  days,  and 
could  not  have  failed  by  that  time  to  know  that  Grant 
had  neither  by  neglect  nor  misconduct  fallen  short  of 
his  duty.    His  refusal  to  express  an  opinion  in  regard  to 


310  STANTON  AS  SECRETAKY  OF  WAR 

the  misconduct  of  individuals  may  not  have  been  in- 
tended as  a  reference  to  General  Grant,  but  as  that 
officer's  name  alone  had  been  mentioned  by  Mr.  Stan- 
ton, the  failure  to  at  once  exonerate  him  was  a  suppres- 
sion of  the  truth,  of  which  no  soldier  should  have  been 
guilty.  On  the  2d  of  May  Halleck  telegraphed  Stan- 
ton :  — 

The  newspaper  accounts  that  our  divisions  were  surprised 
were  utterly  false.  Every  division  had  notice  of  the  enemy's 
approach  hours  before  the  battle  commenced. 

By  Halleck's  order,  Pope's  command  of  30,000  had 
joined  him  on  the  21st  of  April,  and  on  the  30th  the 
grand  army  «commenced  its  advance  from  Shiloh  upon 
Corinth,  digging  intrenchments  and  creeping  along  be- 
hind them,  consuming  the  month  of  May  in  moving 
twenty  miles.  Corinth  was  evacuated  on  the  29th, 
without  the  knowledge  of  General  Halleck,  who,  on  the 
following  day,  announced  in  orders  that  an  attack  by  the 
enemy  was  expected  that  morning.  The  month  was 
thus  consumed  in  marching  against  a  stronghold  to  find 
it  evacuated,  and  everything  destroyed  or  carried  away 
except  a  few  Quaker  guns,  made  of  wooden  logs,  as  was 
the  case  at  Manassas. 

From  the  13th  of  April  up  to  this  time  Grant  had 
been  so  persecuted  by  Halleck  that  he  had  repeatedly 
asked  to  be  relieved  from  duty  under  him.  He  finally 
obtained  permission  to  leave  the  department,  but  as  he 
was  about  to  start.  General  Sherman  discovered  it  and 
persuaded  him  to  remain.  He  was  permitted,  however, 
to  remove  his  headquarters  to  Memphis  on  the  21st  of 
June. 


HALLECK  AND  GRANT  311 

The  object  in  dwelling  at  some  lenp^tli  on  these  events 
is  to  show  why  a  theoretical  man  like  Ilalleck  was  in 
1862  twice  given  the  preference  by  Lincoln  and  Stanton 
over  a  real  soldier  like  Grant,  who  by  grand  achieve- 
ments had  proven  himself  so  much  better  fitted  to 
command.  It  cannot  be  known  who  orisfinated  the 
calumnies  which  filled  the  public  press  against  Grant 
immediately  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  any  more  than 
those  which  were  circulated  immediately  after  the  battle 
of  Fort  Donelson ;  but  it  was  the  duty  of  the  depart- 
ment commander,  in  each  case,  to  have  immediately 
satisfied  himself  of  the  truth  or  falsity  of  the  accusa- 
tions, and  then,  if  true,  to  have  freed  the  service  of  so 
bad  a  man ;  and,  if  false,  to  let  the  country  have  the 
benefit  of  the  best  services  of  its  first  successful  general. 

Stanton  had  no  patience  with  any  officer  who  was 
neglectful,  insubordinate,  or  demoralized  by  bad  habits. 
When  such  things  were  charged  against  Grant,  and  in- 
dorsed by  Halleck  in  some  cases,  and  in  others  assented 
to  by  his  silence  or  by  innuendo,  he  had  to  accept  them 
as  true  for  the  time  being.  As  seen  above.  General 
Halleck  was  himself  taken  to  task  by  Stanton  for  having 
failed  to  make  an  official  report  of  the  battle  of  Pitts- 
burg Landing  for  two  weeks  after  it  had  been  fought. 
He  apparently  thought  that  Halleck  was  diffident  about 
communicating  to  him  unpleasant  facts  concerning 
Grant's  conduct.  This  view  was  naturally  strengthened 
by  Halleck's  reply,  begging  to  be  relieved  from  saying 
anything  on  that  subject  until  he  obtained  further  in- 
formation. 

One  of  the  greatest  reinforcements  the  rebels  had  at 


312     STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

any  time  during  the  war  was  tlie  effort  —  successful  for 
a  time  —  to  deceive  the  government  as  to  Grant's 
services,  capability,  and  reliability.  Whoever  may  have 
been  most  responsible  for  this,  its  beneficiary  in  the 
way  of  recognition  and  rank  was  General  Henry  W. 
Halleck. 


CHAPTER  XLIII 

General  Butler's  New  Orleans  Expedition.  —  Cooperation  of  Naval 
Fleet  under  Admiral  Farragut.  —  Grand  Naval  Exploit  and  Cap- 
ture of  the  City.  —  Occupation  and  JMilitary  Government  by  Gen- 
eral Butler. 

At  the  time  of  Mr.  Stanton's  appointment  as  Secre- 
tary of  War,  General  Benjamin  F.  Butler  was  in  com- 
mand of  the  Department  of  New  England,  with  head- 
quarters at  Boston,  and  engaged,  by  the  authority  of 
the  President,  in  raising  troops  for  a  descent  upon  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico,  with  the  capture  and  occupation  of 
New  Orleans,  by  cooperation  of  the  navy,  as  the  object. 
A  portion  of  his  command  had  been  in  occupation  of 
Ship  Island,  Mississippi,  since  the  3d  of  December,  1861. 

General  McClellan  had  looked  with  disfavor  upon 
General  Butler  and  his  expedition.  Could  he  have  con- 
trolled, there  would  have  been  no  movement  upon  New 
Orleans.  He  did  what  he  could  to  thwart  it.  The 
threatened  rupture  with  England,  because  of  the  cap- 
ture of  Mason  and  Slidell  from  the  British  mail  steamer 
Trent,  arrested  the  movement  of  troops  by  sea  until 
that  matter  was  settled.  This  brought  it  down  to  early 
in  January.  On  the  13th  of  that  month.  General 
McClellan  ordered  that  on  the  arrival  of  the  steamer 
Constitution  from  Boston,  with  troops  of  Butler's  com- 
mand, she  should  be  sent,  with  the  troops  on  board,  to 
Port  Royal,  South  Carolina,  to  reinforce  General  T.  W. 
Sherman  at  that  point.  The  intention  of  this  order 
was  evidently  to  break  up  the  New  Orleans  expedition. 


314  STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

General  Butler  had  to  contend  not  only  with  McClel- 
lan's  do-nothing  policy,  but  with  fierce  political  oj)po- 
sition  at  home.  Combative  in  the  highest  degree,  he 
had  not  only  been  politically  opposed  to  the  great  body 
of  the  people  of  Massachusetts,  but  he  had  made  his 
opposition  as  offensive  as  possible  at  all  times.  There 
is  no  doubt  that  Governor  Andrew  greatly  distrusted 
him,  as  many  Democratic  leaders  in  other  sections  were 
distrusted.  There  was  no  actual  ground  for  such  dis- 
trust in  his  case.  Butler  had  all  his  life  been  on  the 
side  of  law  and  order,  and  was  as  greatly  incensed  at 
resistance  to  the  authority  of  the  United  States  from 
one  quarter  as  from  another.  Mr.  Lincoln  wisely  trusted 
him ;  but  this  would  avail  little  if  his  troops  were  to  be 
taken  from  him  by  General  McClellan,  and  sent  to 
South  Carolina. 

The  appointment  of  Mr.  Stanton  came  in  the  nick  of 
time  to  save  the  New  Orleans  expedition.  Nominated 
on  January  the  13th,  and  commissioned  on  the  15  th, 
the  remainder  of  the  week  was  occupied  in  his  personal 
affairs,  and  in  conferences  with  Union  leaders.  On 
Sunday  morning,  the  19th,  he  entertained  General  But- 
ler at  breakfast,  when  a  long  consultation  ensued  on 
the  subject  so  near  to  Butler's  heart.  A  memorandum 
of  what  occurred  at  this  conference  covers  a  dozen 
written  pages,  in  General  Butler's  handwriting,  and 
gives  an  account  of  the  number  and  location  of  all  the 
New  England  troops  raised  by  him.  The  entire  num- 
ber was  16,075.  He  had  complete  arrangements  for 
transportation  and  supplies. 

The  two  old  Democrats  understood  each  other  per- 


BUTLER'S  NEW  ORLEANS  EXPEDITION       315 

fectly.  Deserted  by  their  Southern  political  associates, 
for  whose  legal  property  rights  in  slaves  they  had 
stoutly  contended  until  the  flag  was  assailed,  each  knew 
that  the  other  would  devote  himself  to  the  maintenance 
of  the  government  against  rebel  assaults. 

Mr.  Stanton  entered  upon  his  duties  on  the  next 
day,  —  January  20,  1862,  —  and  on  the  22d  General 
McClellan  countermanded  his  order  of  the  13th,  that 
the  troops  of  the  Constitution  should  be  sent  to  Port 
Royal,  South  Carolina.  On  the  24th,  Secretary  Stanton 
made  a  formal  order  that  General  McClellan  report 
without  delay  his  opinion  whether  the  expedition  pro- 
posed by  General  Butler  should  be  carried  out,  and  if 
so  in  what  manner.  General  McClellan  replied  with  a 
recommendation  that  the  troops  raised  by  General  But- 
ler, and  not  assigned,  be  held  in  reserve,  "  ready  to 
support  and  reinforce  in  any  quarter  where  they  may 
be  required,  and  which  can  only  be  determined  by  cir- 
cumstances in  the  course  of  active  operations ;  "  and,  in 
conclusion,  he  said  it  was  clear  to  his  mind  that  "  what 
was  known  as  General  Butler's  expedition  ought  to  be 
suspended." 

Secretary  Stanton  had  not  limited  himself  to  infor- 
mation from  one  side  only.  On  the  same  day  of  his 
order  to  General  McClellan  for  a  report  he  called  upon 
General  Butler  for  information  of  the  condition  of  his 
expedition  :  its  cost  to  date  and  its  probable  necessities. 
To  this  General  Butler  responded  in  detail  on  February 
6,  and  on  the  same  day  wrote  to  General  McClellan  of 
the  departure  of  troops  for  the  Gulf,  of  the  near  readi- 
ness of  others,  and  asking  for  certain  necessary  orders. 


316  STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

Mr.  Stanton  having  disregarded  the  recommendation 
of  General  McClellan,  —  that  this  important  expedition 
be  abandoned,  —  General  Butler's  preparations  had 
been  energetically  carried  forward.  Early  in  February, 
having  embarked  his  2000  remaining  troops  from  Bos- 
ton for  Fortress  Monroe  en  route  for  the  Gulf,  he  went 
to  Washington  for  orders.  These  were  made  out  by 
General  McClellan,  after  a  consultation  with  Butler, 
but  were  not  issued.  Chafing  under  the  delay,  Butler 
reported  in  writing  to  the  Secretary  of  War  on  the 
12th  of  February,  that  he  had  as  yet  no  written  instruc- 
tions in  regard  to  the  details  of  the  expedition,  —  a 
memorandum  of  which  he  had  before  given  the  com- 
manding general,  —  and,  with  characteristic  adroitness, 
he  added  :  "  I  presume  in  the  press  of  more  important 
matters  these  details  may  have  been  overlooked.  Fear- 
ing, however,  that  the  memorandum  may  be  mislaid, 
and  in  order  to  refer  to  it,  a  duplicate  is  sent  herewith." 

This  was  referred  to  General  McClellan  on  the  17th, 
and  his  immediate  attention  requested  by  the  Secretary 
of  War  to  General  Butler's  expedition,  and  to  the 
instructions  to  be  given  him  if  he  was  to  command  it. 

As  General  McClellan  did  not  act  on  this  at  once. 
General  Butler  conceived  of  a  plan  for  applying  a  spur 
to  him.  He  had,  on  the  12th,  testified  before  the  Com- 
mittee on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  and  had  given  his 
opinion  in  writing  that  the  rebel  strength  in  front  of 
Washington  did  not  exceed  65,000.  He  fortified  this 
opinion  with  ofiicial  reports  of  the  enemy,  which  made 
it  nearly  a  demonstration.  Being  questioned  by  the 
President  on  the  21st,  he  had  repeated  this  statement. 


BUTLER  AND  McCLELLAN  317 

Being  asked  by  the  President  i£  he  would  be  willing  to 
cross  the  Potomac  and  make  an  attack  if  he  had  100,000 
effective  troops,  he  had  promptly  replied  in  the  affirma- 
tive, saying,  however,  that  he  only  wished  to  be  off  to 
New  Orleans.  The  President  asked  him  to  call  again 
on  the  23d. 

Butler  learned  that  McClellan  had  issued  an  order  to 
disembark  his  troops  at  Fortress  Monroe  and  send  them 
to  Baltimore.  He  at  once  set  inquiries  on  foot  which 
disclosed  the  singular  fact  that  this  order  had  not 
reached  General  Wool  at  Fortress  Monroe,  but  had,  on 
its  way,  lodged  in  the  coat  pocket  of  a  staff  officer  of 
General  Dix  at  Baltimore,  and  been  by  him  forgotten. 
Improving  the  opportunity  afforded  by  this  delay.  Gen- 
eral Butler  went  to  General  McClellan  on  the  21st,  and 
asked  him  to  revoke  the  order.  "  Why  are  you  so 
anxious  about  this  expedition?"  asked  General  McClel- 
lan. "Because,"  said  Butler,  "I  think  I  can  do  a  great 
deal  of  good  for  the  country.  Besides,  I  want  to  get 
away  from  Washington.  I  am  sick  of  the  intrigues  and 
cross-purposes  that  I  find  here.  Mr.  Lincoln  and  Mr. 
Stanton  seem  to  me  to  be  about  the  only  persons  who 
are  in  dead  earnest  for  a  vigorous  prosecution  of  the 
war." ' 

He  then  informed  McClellan  of  his  conversation  with 
the  President,  including  the  latter's  inquiry  as  to 
whether  he  would  be  willing  to  lead  100,000  effective 
troops  in  an  attack  upon  the  enemy  then  besieging  the 
capital.  He  gave  the  conversation  a  turn  that  was 
calculated  to  suggest  that  it  might  be  dangerous  to 

1  Butler's  Book,  page  334. 


318     STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

McClellan  to  have  a  major-general  around  Washing- 
ton, without  a  command  and  ready  to  fight,  and  then 
asked  whether  his  next  call  should  be  before  or  after 
his  call  on  the  President  on  the  23d.  "  Better  come 
before,"  replied  McClellan.  He  did  so  on  the  morning 
of  the  23d.  McClellan  no  longer  delayed  compliance 
with  Stanton's  order,  but,  on  the  same  day,  created  a 
Department  of  the  Gulf,  assigned  General  Butler  to  the 
command,  and  gave  him  instructions  to  cooperate  with 
the  navy  in  the  attack  upon  New  Orleans. 

General  Butler  did  not  lag.  Receiving  his  instruc- 
tions on  the  23d  of  February,  he  was  on  his  way  to 
Fortress  Monroe  the  next  day,  and  on  the  25th  sailed 
with  1600  men  for  Ship  Island,  Miss.,  where  he  arrived 
late  in  March.  He  had  previously  sent  8000  men  to 
that  place. 

Rear-Admiral  Farragut  had  sailed  from  Fortress 
Monroe  on  the  3d  of  February,  arriving  at  Ship  Island 
on  the  20th.  He  was  under  orders  to  there  collect  such 
vessels  as  could  be  spared  from  the  blockade,  and  — 
when  joined  by  a  fleet  of  mortar-boats  under  Com- 
mander D.  D.  Porter,  who  was  to  report  to  him  —  to 
reduce  the  defenses  on  the  Mississippi  River  below  New 
Orleans ;  then  to  take  that  city  and  hoist  the  United 
States  flag  on  government  buildings,  and  to  hold  it 
until  troops  could  arrive  for  its  permanent  occupation. 

The  forces  he  collected  for  these  operations  were 
eight  sloops  of  war  and  ten  gunboats,  twenty  mortar- 
boats  and  other  vessels  large  and  small,  aggregating 
forty-six  in  all,  with  three  hundred  guns  and  mortars. 
None  of  these  were  ironclad. 


CAPTURE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS  319 

The  obstacles  to  be  overcome  were  the  two  strong 
forts,  Jackson  and  St.  PhiHp,  mounting  12G  guns, — 
many  of  largest  calibre ;  a  stout  chain  cable  stretched 
across  the  river  (700  yards)  supported  by  a  raft  of  logs 
and  eight  hulks  of  vessels ;  numerous  earthworks,  well 
armed,  between  New  Orleans  and  the  forts,  and  a  naval 
force  consisting  of  thirteen  gunboats,  the  ironclad  bat- 
tery Louisiana,  and  the  ironclad  ram  Manassas. 

On  the  18th  of  April  the  bombardment  of  the  forts 
commenced,  which  continued  for  six  days  without  redu- 
cins:  or  silencino;  them. 

On  the  23d,  the  sixth  day,  orders  were  issued  by 
Admiral  Farragut  to  the  fleet,  to  prepare  for  passing 
the  forts.  At  two  on  the  morning  of  the  24th,  the 
whole  squadron  moved  up  the  river  in  two  columns. 
Every  precaution  had  been  taken  to  make  each  vessel 
as  near  invulnerable  as  possible.  The  forts  were  at 
once  fiercely  attacked,  and  returned  a  hot  fire.  The 
fight  lasted  two  hours,  within  which  time  the  two  forts 
had  been  passed,  and  the  whole  rebel  fleet  captured  or 
destroyed.  Farragut  arrived  with  his  fleet  in  front  of 
New  Orleans  at  one  o'clock  of  the  25th. 

On  the  1st  of  May  General  Butler  took  possession 
of  the  city,  disembarking  such  of  his  troops  as  had 
arrived  at  sundown  of  that  day. 

On  the  10th  of  June  Secretary  Stanton  wrote  to 
Butler : '  — 

No  event  during  the  war  has  exercised  an  influence  upon 
the  public  mind  so  powerful  as  the  capture  and  occupation  of 
New  Orleans.    To  you  and  to  the  gallant  officers  and  soldiers 
^  Butler's  Book,  page  471. 


320     STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

under  your  command  the  department  tenders  cordial  thanks. 
Your  vigorous  and  able  administration  of  the  government  of 
that  city  also  receives  warm  commendation.  .  .  .  With  admi- 
ration for  your  achievement  and  the  utmost  confidence  in 
your  continued  success,  I  remain,  etc. 

A  day  or  two  before  General  Butler  took  possession 
of  New  Orleans,  the  United  States  flag,  which  Admiral 
Farragut  had  caused  to  be  raised  on  the  United  States 
Mint,  was  torn  down,  dragged  through  the  streets,  and 
then  torn  in  pieces  and  the  fragments  distributed 
among  the  crowd  as  trophies  to  be  worn  in  the  button- 
holes of  their  coats.  The  man  who  had  torn  down  the 
flag  was  named  Mumford.  He  was  made  an  example 
of  to  convince  those  around  him  that  the  government 
of  the  United  States  would  compel  respect  for  its 
authority  and  its  flag.  He  was  tried  for  treason  before 
a  military  commission,  convicted,  and  on  the  7th  of 
June  was  executed  at  the  United  States  Mint  on  the 
spot  where  he  had  committed  the  offense. 

General  Butler  reported  this  execution  with  various 
other  matters  to  Secretary  Stanton  in  a  dispatch  dated 
June  10.  On  the  23d  of  the  same  month,  in  a  reply 
to  this  dispatch.  Secretary  Stanton  said  :  — 

You  have  been  troubled  with  no  specific  instructions  from 
this  department  because  of  the  confidence  in  your  ability  to 
meet  the  exigencies  of  your  command  better  upon  your  own 
judgment  than  upon  instructions  from  Washington.  ...  It 
will  give  me  pleasure  to  hear  from  you  often,  and  you  may 
count  with  confidence  upon  the  utmost  aid  of  this  depart- 
ment. 


CHAPTER   XLIV 

Operations  on  the  Mississippi  River.  —  First  Movements  on  Vicks- 
burg  by  Farragut  and  Butler. 

When  Butler  established  order  in  New  Orleans  in 
April  he  considered  his  mission  only  begun.  The 
opening  of  the  Mississippi  River  was  of  the  highest 
importance.  The  seizure  and  occupation  of  New  Or- 
leans was  of  course  a  great  step  in  that  direction. 
The  operations  of  General  Pope  on  that  river,  culmi- 
nating vrith.  the  capture  of  Island  No.  10  with  7000 
prisoners  of  war,  were,  for  no  known  reason,  brought 
to  an  untimely  close  by  an  order  from  General  Halleck 
late  in  April,  that  the  expedition  should  be  abandoned, 
and  Pope  and  his  forces  join  the  main  army  in  its 
advance  upon  Corinth. 

On  the  first  day  of  June,  General  Butler  wrote  to  Mr. 
Stanton  that  he  had  proposed  to  cooperate  with  Ad- 
miral Farragut  in  a  movement  upon  Vicksburg.  He 
wrote  that  he  would  send  one  half  of  his  entire  force 
on  the  expedition.  On  the  10th  of  June,  he  wrote  of 
the  progress  of  this  expedition.  On  the  28th  of  June, 
Farragut  wrote  to  Halleck  that  he  had  passed  the  bat- 
teries and  was  then  above  Vicksburg  with  the  greatest 
part  of  his  fleet.  He  said  that  the  force  which  General 
Butler  had  given  him,  under  Brigadier-General  Wil- 
liams, was  too  small  to  attempt  to  land  on  the  Vicks- 


322  STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

burg  side.  He  said  :  "  My  orders,  general,  are  to  clear 
the  river.  This  I  find  impossible  without  your  assist- 
ance. Can  you  aid  me  in  this  matter  to  carry  out  the 
peremptory  order  of  the  President?  I  am  satisfied 
that  you  will  act  for  the  best  advantage  of  the  govern- 
ment in  this  matter,  and  shall,  therefore,  wait  with 
great  anxiety  your  reply." 

This  should  have  been  a  sufficiently  strong  appeal  to 
General  Halleck,  who,  with  the  grand  army  of  the 
West,  was  lying  idle  at  Corinth ;  but  it  was  not  the 
only  one.  Upon  receipt  of  Butler's  letter  of  the  10th, 
Stanton  replied  on  the  23d  :  — 

Your  suggestion  in  regard  to  Vicksburg  is  one  of  great 
importance,  apparently  easy  of  execution,  and  would  be  pro- 
ductive of  very  important  results.  If  your  force  is  strong 
enough,  or  if  General  Halleck  would  cooperate  with  you, 
there  could  be  no  doubt  of  success.  The  possession  of  New 
Orleans,  and  clearing  the  rebels  from  the  Mississippi  so  as 
to  open  trade  and  commerce  through  that  channel  with  the 
Gulf,  has  always  aj)peared  to  be  among  the  chief  points  of 
this  war.  You  have  successfully  accomplished  one,  and  I 
hope  the  other  will  not  be  long  in  the  accomplishment. 

On  the  same  day  he  telegraphed  to  General  Hal- 
leck :  — 

If  you  have  not  already  given  your  attention  to  the  practi- 
cability of  making  a  cut-off  in  the  rear  of  Vicksburg,  I  beg 
to  direct  your  attention  to  that  point.  It  has  been  repre- 
sented to  the  department  to  be  an  undertaking  of  easy  accom- 
plishment, especially  under  the  protection  of  gunboats.  A 
dispatch  to-day  received  from  General  Butler  speaks  of  it  as 
a  project  contemplated  by  him,  but  he  may  not  have  a  force 
to  spare. 


FIRST  MOVEMENTS   ON    VICKSBURG  323 

To  this  General  Halleck  replied  July  1 :  — 

Your  telegram  of  the  23cl  received.  Five  days  en  route. 
It  is  impossible  to  send  to  Vickshurg  at  present ;  but  I  will 
give  the  matter  my  full  attention  as  soon  as  circumstances 
will  permit. 

Two  days  later  Halleck  wrote  to  Admiral  Farragut : 

The  scattered  and  weakened  condition  of  my  forces  ren- 
ders it  impossible  for  me  at  the  present  moment  to  detach 
any  to  cooperate  with  you  on  Vicksburg.^  Probably  I  shall 
be  able  to  do  so  when  I  can  get  my  troops  more  concentrated. 
This  may  delay  the  clearing  of  the  river,  but  its  accomplish- 
ment will  be  sure  in  a  few  weeks.  Allow  me  to  congratulate 
you  on  your  great  success. 

On  the  14th  of  July  Secretary  Stanton  telegraphed 
Halleck :  "  The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  desires  to  know 
whether  you  have  or  intend  to  have  any  land  force  to 
cooperate  in  the  operations  at  Vicksburg.  Please  in- 
form me  immediately,  inasmuch  as  orders  he  intends  to 
give  will  depend  upon  your  answer." 

To  which  Halleck  replied  on  the  15th  :  "  I  cannot 
at  present  give  Commodore  Farragut  any  aid  against 
Vicksburs".  I  am  seudinjr  reinforcements  to  General 
Curtis  in  Arkansas,  and  to  General  Buell  in  Tennessee 
and  Kentucky." 

Thus  despite  the  hearty  coiiperation  between  Ad- 
miral Farragut  and  General  Butler,  and  the  earnest 
endeavors  of  Secretary  Stanton  to  add  the  one  thing 
needful,  namely,  the  cooperation  of  Halleck,  the  move- 
ment against  Vicksburg  had  to  be  abandoned. 

1  He  had  himself  scattered  his  forces  to  no  purpose.  —  Grant's  Me- 
moirs, vol.  i.  p.  382. 


324     STANTON  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

Concerning  the  situation  at  that  time,  General  Grant 
says :  ^  — 

New  Orleans  and  Baton  Rouge  had  fallen  into  the  posses- 
sion of  the  national  forces,  so  that  now  the  Confederates  at 
the  West  were  narrowed  down  for  all  communication  with 
Richmond  to  the  single  line  of  road  running  east  from 
Vicksburg.  To  dispossess  them  of  this,  therefore,  became  a 
matter  of  the  first  importance.  The  possession  of  the  Missis- 
sippi by  us  from  Memphis  to  Baton  Rouge  was  also  a  most 
important  object.  It  would  be  equal  to  the  amputation  of  a 
limb  in  its  weakening  effects  upon  the  enemy. 

As  to  the  ability  of  Halleck  to  render  aid  for  this 
immensely  important  movement  we  also  have  General 
Grant's  testimony.     He  says  :  ^  — 

After  the  capture  of  Corinth,  a  movable  force  of  80,000 
men,  besides  enough  to  hold  all  the  territory  acquired,  could 
have  been  set  in  motion  for  the  accomplishment  of  any  great 
plan  for  the  suppression  of  the  rebellion.  In  addition  to 
this,  fresh  troops  were  being  raised  to  swell  the  effective 
force.  But  the  work  of  depletion  commenced.  Buell  with 
the  Army  of  the  Ohio  was  sent  East,  following  the  line  of 
the  Memphis  and  Charleston  road.  This  he  was  ordered  to 
repair  as  he  advanced  —  only  to  have  it  destroyed  by  smaU 
guerrilla  bands  or  other  troops  as  soon  as  he  was  out  of  the 
way.  If  he  had  been  sent  directly  to  Chattanooga  as  rapidly 
as  he  could  march,  leaving  two  or  three  divisions  along  the 
line  of  the  railroad  from  Nashville  forward,  he  could  have 
arrived  with  but  little  fighting,  and  would  have  saved  much 
of  the  loss  of  life  which  was  afterwards  incurred  in  gaining 
Chattanooga.  Bragg  would  not  then  have  had  time  to  raise 
an  army  and  contest  the  possession  of  Middle  and  East  Ten- 
nessee and  Kentucky ;  the  battles  of  Stone  River  and  Chick- 
1  Memoirs,  vol.  i.  p.  382.  «  i^id,^  page  383. 


HALLECK'S  FAILURE  TO  COOPERATE        325 

amauga  would  not  necessarily  have  been  fought ;  Burnside 
would  not  have  been  besieged  in  Knoxville  without  the  power 
of  helping  himself  or  escaping ;  the  battle  of  Chattanooga 
would  not  have  been  fought.  These  are  the  negative  advan- 
tages, if  the  term  negative  is  applicable,  which  would  prob- 
ably have  residted  from  prompt  movements  after  Corinth 
fell  into  the  possession  of  the  national  forces.  The  positive 
results  might  have  been  a  bloodless  advance  to  Atlanta,  to 
Vicksburg,  or  to  any  other  desired  point  south  of  Corinth  in 
the  interior  of  Mississippi. 

When  we  consider  the  vast  expenditure  of  lives, 
time,  and  money  made  during  the  ensuing  year  to  se- 
cure the  capture  of  Vicksburg,  and  when  we  consider 
that  the  whole  year  could  probably  have  been  saved, 
and  the  position  taken  in  July,  1862,  instead  of  July, 
1863,  if  Halleck  would  but  have  extended  his  hand  to- 
wards Farragut,  his  failure  to  do  so  seems  unaccount- 
able and  unpardonable. 


PART  V 

McCLELLAN'S     PENINSULAR     CAMPAIGN    AND    HIS 
PRELIMINARY  MOVEMENTS 


CHAPTER   XLV 

Lincoln  and  McClellan.  —  The  Relations  between  them.  —  Reluc- 
tance of  the  President  to  force  an  Issue  with  his  General-in- 
Chief.  —  Stanton's  Hopes  of  McClellan.  —  Elation  of  the  Latter 
attributable  to  Exaggerated  Importance  given  to  his  Operations  in 
West  Virginia.  —  Brief  Review  of  that  Campaign.  —  Stanton's 
Influence  made  Manifest.  —  Lincoln  asserts  his  Authority  as 
Commander-in-Chief.  —  He  orders  a  Movement  of  the  Land  and 
Naval  Forces. 

President  Lincoln  was  not  wanting  in  a  correct 
estimate  o£  the  power  vested  in  him  by  the  Constitu- 
tion and  the  laws,  nor  was  he  wanting  in  will  or  in 
dignity  of  character  to  assert  his  authority  when  it  was 
directly  questioned.  But  he  found  it  difficult  to  deal 
with  the  indirect  insubordination  which  ignored  or 
neglected  his  orders,  and  which  baffled  his  purposes  by 
groundless  excuses  and  unnecessary  delays.  He  sought 
to  persuade  without  commanding,  and  for  a  time  car- 
ried this  to  the  verge  of  an  abdication  of  authority. 
He  had  placed  the  destinies  of  the  country  in  the  hands 
of  a  young  man  who  had  never  fought  a  battle,  and 
who,  at  the  time  of  Mr.  Stanton's  appointment,  gave 


I 


LINCOLN  AND  McCLELLAN  327 

little  promise  of  any  intention  ever  to  fig-lit  one.  He 
believed  that  the  army  should  move,  but  still  left 
General  MeClellan  to  decide  when  it  should  move. 
Foreign  intervention  was  imminent,  and  even  the  war 
spirit  in  the  North  might  not  be  proof  against  hope 
too  long-  deferred.  But  yet  the  young  general,  while 
giving  out  indications  at  various  times  of  an  intended 
early  advance,  was  never  ready.  Mr.  Lincoln  saw  that 
MeClellan  was  wanting  either  in  capacity  or  earnest- 
ness, but  he  was  not  willing  to  say  so  harsh  a  thing. 
He  had  not  the  fortitude  to  endure  the  wound  to  his 
own  feelings  which  would  be  caused  by  so  wounding 
those  of  another. 

Stanton  was  emotional  and  sympathetic  too,  but  he 
had  no  tenderness  for  indifference  or  insubordination. 
He  could,  if  it  became  necessary,  bluntl}'^  tell  his  friend 
MeClellan  that  he  did  not  believe  his  excuses  for  delay 
had  sufficient  grounds.  In  short,  he  coidd  perform 
any  imperative  duty,  however  disagreeable.  He  recog- 
nized no  limit  upon  executive  power  in  the  execution  of 
the  laws  and  the  defense  of  the  Constitution.  Equally 
sure  was  he  that  there  was  no  other  restraint  upon 
the  President's  powers  as  the  supreme  military  com- 
mander than  were  to  be  found  in  the  Articles  of  War 
and  the  Usages  of  Nations. 

Stanton  hoped  MeClellan  would  feel  confident  of 
support  from  him,  and  would  be  ready  to  act  when  the 
President  ceased  to  leave  it  at  his  discretion  whether  he 
should  move  or  not.  He  seemed  to  take  it  for  granted 
that,  in  the  natural  course  of  events,  the  head  of  the 
government  would  see  that  some  fighting  was  done. 


328        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

He  thought  when  the  President  asserted  his  authority, 
it  would  be  obeyed.  He  took  office  with  the  intention 
of  urging  that  course  upon  Mr.  Lincoln,  and  of  sup- 
porting him  in  it.  He  did  not  argue  that,  because  the 
President  has  the  constitutional  power  to  take  the  field 
in  person,  plan  campaigns,  and  compel  their  execution 
by  generals  of  his  own  selection,  a  President  without  a 
military  training  should  therefore  actually  direct  the 
marches  and  field  tactics  of  the  army  in  a  campaign. 
But  he  scouted  the  idea  that  the  commander-in-chief 
should  be  subordinate  to  a  general  of  his  own  appoint- 
ment, and  meekly  await  the  latter's  permission  that  the 
army  do  something. 

McClellan  declares  in  his  "  Own  Story  "  that  he  had 
smooth  sailing  with  the  administration  until  shortly 
before  Stanton  became  Secretary  of  War,  when  difficul- 
ties commenced,  which  culminated  soon  after  his  ap- 
pointment. 

Mr.  Lincoln  had  temporized  with  McClellan  in  the 
exercise  of  that  large  charity  which  hopeth  all  things, 
believeth  all  things,  and  endureth  all  things.  He  had 
urged  him  to  do  something,  but  he  defended  him  when 
others  complained  of  his  inactivity.  Mr.  Stanton's 
entrance  into  the  War  Department  was  quickly  fol- 
lowed by  more  urgent  demands  for  action.  At  that 
time  the  lower  Potomac  was  blockaded,  the  Baltimore 
and  Ohio  Railroad  obstructed,  and  the  capital  besieged, 
while  180,000  troops  were  idling  in  camp.  In  the 
West  the  rebels  had  been  aggressive,  and  although 
they  had  not  had  their  own  way  in  Missouri  and  Ken- 
tucky, no  general  plan  of  campaign  was  yet  visible. 


HIS  OPERATIONS  IN   WEST  VIRGINIA        329 

From  the  time  of  his  arrival  in  Waslnnsfton  in 
July,  1861,  McClellan  had  reveled  in  an  atmosphere 
of  adulation,  and  enjoyed  a  reputation  he  seemed  leluc- 
tant  to  risk  in  any  serious  engagement  with  the  enemy. 
That  reputation  he  had  easily  gained  in  Western  Vir- 
ginia by  sounding  proclamations  following  unimportant 
events,  in  which,  as  is  shown  by  his  own  reports,  he 
had  cut  but  little  figure. 

The  events  of  his  so-called  West  Virginia  campaign 
in  1861  are  summarized  in  his  final  report  of  August 
4,  1863,  as  "  the  successful  affairs  of  Philippi,  Rich 
Mountain,  Carrick's  Ford,"  etc.  These  can  be  briefly 
described,  and  the  story  is  instructive. 

The  papers  accompanying  his  report  show  that  the 
"  successful  affair  of  Philippi,"  Virginia,  was  the  dislodg- 
ment,  without  further  pursuit,  of  2000  rebels  at  that 
place  June  3.  The  only  accident  on  the  Union  side 
was  the  woundinof  of  one  officer.  General  McClellan 
received  the  report  of  this  "  successful  affair "  at  his 
office  in  Cincinnati,  Ohio.  He  had  not  then  taken  the 
field,  and  did  not  until  seventeen  days  later. 

On  the  20th  of  June  he  left  Ohio  and  crossed  over 
into  Virginia.  On  his  way,  before  he  had  crossed  the 
Ohio  River,  and  when  he  certainly  had  performed  no 
military  exploits,  he  was  made  the  object  of  an  amount 
of  adulation  well  calculated  to  turn  the  head  of  any 
man  not  insensible  to  applause.  That  it  exhilarated 
him  greatly  is  evidenced  by  a  letter  to  his  wife,  written 
at  Marietta,  Ohio,  June  21,  in  which  he  said  :  — 

At  every  station  in  Ohio  where  we  stopped,  crowds  had 
stopped  to  see  the  "young  general,"  gray-headed  old  men 


330        McCLELLAN'S   PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

and  women,  motliers  holding  up  their  children  to  take  my 
hand,  girls,  boys,  all  sorts,  cheering  and  crying :  "  God  bless 
you."  I  never  went  through  such  a  scene  in  my  life,  and 
never  expect  to  go  through  such  another  one.  You  would 
have  been  surprised  at  the  excitement.  At  Chillicothe  the 
ladies  had  prepared  a  dinner,  and  I  had  to  be  trotted  through. 
They  gave  me  about  twenty  beautiful  bouquets,  and  almost 
killed  me  with  kindness.  The  trouble  will  be  to  fulfill  their 
expectations  —  they  seem  to  be  so  high.  I  could  hear  them 
say :  "  He  is  our  own  general."  "  Look  at  him  ;  how  young 
he  is."  "  He  will  thrash  them."  "  He  will  do,"  etc.,  etc.,  ad 
mfinituni} 

Thus  was  his  fame  assured  before  he  commenced  his 
service. 

On  the  23d  of  June  he  wrote  to  his  wife  from  Graf- 
ton, Va. :  — 

Everything  here  needs  the  hand  of  the  master,  and  is  get- 
ting it  fast. 

On  the  25th,  with  no  enemy  molesting  or  in  sight, 
he  issued  a  proclamation  at  Grafton  to  "  the  soldiers 
of  the  Army  of  the  West,"  exhorting  them  to  good 
behavior,  and  concluding  in  these  words :  — 

Soldiers  !  I  have  heard  that  there  was  danger  here.  I  am 
come  to  place  myself  at  your  head  and  share  it  with  you.  I 
fear  now  but  one  thing  —  that  you  will  not  find  foemen 
worthy  of  your  steel.     I  know  that  I  can  rely  upon  you. 

After  remaining  at  this  place  for  a  week  longer  in 
perfect  quiet  and  safety,  he  moved  eastward. 

The  battle  of  Rich  Mountain,  on  July  11,  was 
planned  and  fought  by  General  Rosecrans.  General 
McClellan  was  to  have  supported  him,  but  he  did  not 

^  Otun  Story,  page  57. 


HIS   OPERATIONS  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA         331 

do  so.  In  bis  official  report  he  admits  that  he  knew 
nothing  of  the  battle  until  the  day  after  it  had  been 
won,  when  he  learned,  while  placing  artillery  where  he 
could  command  the  enemy's  works,  that  they  had  fled. 
The  rebel  loss  was  20  killed  and  50  wounded,  with 
many  prisoners,  and  a  considerable  amount  of  mu- 
nitions. The  Federal  loss  was  11  killed  and  35 
wounded. 

The  third  and  last  event  of  the  campaign  deemed 
worthy  of  mention  by  General  McClellan  occurred 
when  some  retreatins:  rebels  made  a  stand  at  Carrick's 
Ford,  where  a  lively  action  occurred,  resulting  in  their 
beino^  driven  out  with  a  loss  of  20  killed  and  52 
taken  prisoners.  The  Federal  loss  was  2  killed  and  7 
wounded. 

On  the  16th  of  July  General  McClellan  signalized 
these  inconsiderable  events  by  another  highly  inflated 
proclamation  to  the  "  soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the 
West,"  commencing  as  follows  :  — 

I  am  more  than  satisfied  with  you.  You  have  annihilated 
two  armies,  commanded  by  educated  and  experienced  soldiers, 
intrenched  in  mountain  fastnesses,  and  fortified  at  their 
leisure. 

These  movements  in  Western  Virginia  had  been 
given  great  prominence  in  the  journals  of  the  day,  the 
columns  of  which  teemed  with  exasfo-erated  accounts  of 
the  movements  of  troops,  and  the  intentions  and  most 
inconsequential  words  and  utterances  of  their  com- 
mander, to  whom  the  title  "  Young  Napoleon  "  had 
abeady  been  given. 


332        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

Such  was  the  process  by  which  a  popular  idol  was 
created.  It  illustrates  the  fact  that  the  popular  demand 
for  a  hero  to  worship  is  as  certain  to  be  supplied  as  the 
demand  for  a  victim  to  be  sacrificed,  and  the  hero  may 
be  as  innocent  as  the  victim  of  any  act  justifying  the 
selection. 

But  in  January,  1862,  when  Mr.  Stanton  entered 
the  War  Department,  the  time  to  try  the  stuff  of  which 
this  particular  hero  was  made  was  fast  approaching. 
McClellan  says  in  his  final  report :  — 

About  the  middle  of  January,  upon  recovering  from  a 
severe  illness,  I  found  that  excessive  anxiety  for  an  immedi- 
ate move  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  taken  possession 
of  the  minds  of  the  administration.  A  change  had  been 
made  in  the  War  Department,  and  I  was  soon  urged  by  the 
Secretary,  Mr.  Stanton,  to  take  immediate  steps  to  secure  the 
re-opening  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad,  and  to  free 
the  banks  of  the  lower  Potomac  of  the  rebel  batteries  which 
annoyed  passing  vessels. 

This  strongly  increased  desire  of  the  administration 
to  have  something  done  was  evidence  to  McClellan's 
mind  that  a  conspiracy  existed  against  him.  Through- 
out his  military  career,  he  always  appeared  to  act  upon 
the  idea  that  those  who  desired  him  to  fight  were  plot- 
ting his  downfall. 

Stanton  undoubtedly  expected  to  bring  about  a 
radical  change  in  the  military  situation,  partly  by 
inducing  the  President  to  exercise  his  authority  as 
McClellan's  military  superior,  and  partly  by  his  own 
thoroughness  in  supplying  the  army  with  everything 
necessary  to  put  it   in  good  fighting  condition.     He 


LINCOLN  ASSERTS  HIS  AUTHORITY  333 

soon  found  that  McClellan  was  as  stubborn  against  his 
persuasions  as  lie  had  been  against  those  of  Mr.  Lin- 
coln. Then  commenced  the  long  struggle  between  the 
government  and  General  McClellan,  which,  at  its  height, 
threatened  the  integrity  both  of  the  government  and  of 
the  army. 

As  mere  suggestions  and  exhortations  to  McClellan 
to  take  some  steps  towards  raising  the  siege  of  the 
capital  produced  no  effect,  the  President  issued  the  fol- 
lowing order  :  — 

Executive  Mansion,  Washington,  D.  C, 
January  li7,  18G2. 

Presidents  General  War  Order^  No.  1. 

Ordered:  That  the  22d  day  of  February,  1862,  be  the 
day  for  a  general  movement  of  the  land  and  naval  forces  of 
the  United  States  against  the  insurgent  forces.  That  espe- 
cially the  army  at  and  about  Fortress  Monroe,  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  the  Army  of  "Western  Virginia,  the  army  near 
Munfordville,  Kentucky,  the  army  and  flotilla  near  Cairo, 
and  a  naval  force  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  be  ready  to  move 
on  that  day. 

That  all  other  forces,  both  land  and  naval,  with  their 
respective  commanders,  obey  existing  orders  for  the  time,  and 
be  ready  to  obey  additional  orders  when  duly  given. 

That  the  heads  of  departments,  and  especially  the  Secre- 
taries of  War  and  of  the  Navy,  with  all  their  subordinates, 
and  the  general-in-chief,  with  all  other  commanders  and 
subordinates  of  land  and  naval  forces,  will,  severally,  be  hekl 
to  their  strict  and  full  responsibilities  for  the  prompt  execu- 
tion of  this  order. 

A.  Lincoln. 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  this  new  departure  of  the 
President,  asserting  his  authority  and  commanding  that 


334        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

something  be  done,  was  hastened  by  the  presence  of 
Mr.  Stanton  in  his  Cabinet,  and  was  the  precipitation 
by  him  of  an  issue  between  General  McClellan  and  the 
government  as  to  which  should  determine  the  policy 
of  the  war.  It  was  Mr.  Lincoln's  first  exercise  of  his 
authority  as  commander-in-chief. 

The  idea  that  the  government  was  to  be  silent  and 
passive  in  the  midst  of  the  great  and  vital  events  then 
transpiring,  and  to  abdicate  its  authority  over  military 
operations,  could  not  be  tolerated  by  Mr.  Stanton.  Such 
a  subversion  of  the  Constitution  he  would  resist  at 
every  step  of  the  way.  No  general  had  any  authority 
except  that  conferred  upon  him  by  law.  The  same 
law,  in  terms,  made  him  the  military  subordinate  of 
the  President.  The  latter,  although  the  constitutional 
head  of  the  army,  was  also  subject  to  appropriate  laws 
of  Congress,  directing  how  his  power  and  authority 
should  be  carried  into  effect.  To  the  people,  the  final 
source  of  all  governmental  power.  Congress  must  ac- 
count at  stated  times,  and  the  certainty  of  this  ac- 
countability brought  the  people  near  to  the  administra- 
tion of  affairs. 

Such  was  the  line  in  which  Mr.  Stanton's  legal  train- 
ing and  true  Democratic  instincts  compelled  him  to 
think,  and  this  it  was  that  made  him  proof  throughout 
against  the  assumption  so  common  among  purely  mili- 
tary men,  that  the  government  had  nothing  to  do  about 
the  war  but  to  furnish  the  supplies. 

He  did  not  favor  the  substitution  of  civilians  for 
trained  soldiers  in  the  direction  of  military  operations, 


STANTON'S  INFLUENCE   MANIFESTED  335 

but  he  held  the  army  and  its  generals  to  be  subordinate 
in  war,  as  in  peace,  to  the  government  of  the  people, 
speaking  through  laws  enacted  by  their  representatives, 
and  through  the  President  duly  chosen  to  execute 
them. 


CHAPTER  XL VI 

McClellan  proposes  a  Peninsular  Campaign.  —  Mr.  Lincoln  opposes 
it,  and  orders  a  Different  Movement.  —  The  Question  left  un- 
settled untU  Obstructions  are  removed  from  the  Lower  Potomac 
and  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad.  —  Blunders  at  Harper's 
Ferry  compel  an  Abandonment  of  an  Important  Movement.  — 
An  Order  to  attack  Rebel  Batteries  on  the  Potomac  revoked, 
because  of  an  Opinion  of  the  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Army,  Five 
Months  before  the  Order  was  made.  —  General  Lander's  Brilliant 
and  Successful  Exploit.  —  Rashness  on  his  Part  feared  by  the 
General-in-Chief.  —  Stanton's  Contrary  Opinion. 

During  Mr.  Stanton's  first  week  in  the  War  Depart- 
ment General  McClellan  had  laid  before  him  orally 
his  opinion  as  to  the  part  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
should  execute,  in  a  general  plan  of  operations  of  all 
the  armies.  This  was  to  transport  that  army  down  the 
Potomac  and  lower  Chesapeake,  and  advance  upon  the 
rebel  capital  from  that  direction.  The  Secretary  in- 
structed him  to  develop  his  plans  to  the  President,  which 
he  did.  They  were  disapproved,  and,  on  the  31st  day 
of  January,  the  President  issued  his  order,  "  that  all  the 
disposable  forces  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  after 
safely  providing  for  the  defense  of  Washington,  be 
formed  into  an  expedition  for  the  immediate  object  of 
seizing  and  occupying  a  point  upon  the  railroad,  south- 
westward  of  what  is  known  as  Manassas  Junction,  all 
details  to  be  in  the  discretion  of  the  general-in-chief, 
and  the  expedition  to  move  before  or  on  the  22d  day 
of  February  next." 


LINCOLN  OPPOSES   McCLELLAN'S   PLAN        337 

This  order  was  never  revoked  and  never  obeyed. 
General  McClellan  asked  leave  to  submit  his  views  as 
to  the  two  opposing  plans.  These  must  have  been  pre- 
sented fully  aheady,  in  the  long  conferences  whicli  had 
been  held  with  him  by  the  President  and  the  SecreUiry. 
Nevertheless,  he  was  gi'anted  the  desired  permission,  and 
on  the  3d  of  February,  he  submitted  a  long  paj)er  in 
which  he  gave  his  reasons  in  support  of  his  own  plan  as 
against  the  plan  of  Mr.  Lincoln.  Mr,  Lincoln  at  the 
same  time  addressed  him  the  following  letter :  — 

Executive  Mansion, 
Washington,  February  3,  1862. 
Major-General  McClellan  : 

My  dear  Sir,  —  You  and  I  have  distinct  and  diiferent 
plans  for  a  movement  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  —  Yours 
to  be  down  the  Chesapeake,  up  the  Rappahannock  to  Urbana, 
and  across  land  to  the  terminus  of  the  railroad  on  the  York 
River.  —  Mine  to  move  directly  to  a  point  on  the  railroad 
southwest  of  Manassas. 

If  you  will  give  me  satisfactory  answers  to  the  following 
questions,  I  shall  glatUy  yield  my  plan  to  yours. 

1st.  Does  not  your  plan  involve  a  greatly  larger  expen- 
diture of  time  and  money  than  mine? 

2d.  Wherein  is  a  victory  more  certain  by  your  plan  than 
mine? 

3d.  Wherein  is  a  victory  more  valuahle  by  your  i)lan 
than  mine? 

4th.  In  fact,  would  it  not  be  less  valuable  in  this,  tliat  it 
would  break  no  great  line  of  tlie  enemies'  communications, 
while  mine  would? 

6th.  In  case  of  disaster,  would  not  a  safe  retreat  be  more 
difficult  by  your  plan  than  by  mine  ? 

Yours  truly,  A.  Lincoln. 


338        McCLELLAN'S   PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

In  McClellan's  "views"  he  named  the  total  force 
necessary  for  his  plans  to  be  from  110,000  to  140,000. 
He  informs  us  in  his  final  report  that  "  this  letter  must 
have  produced  some  effect  upon  the  mind  of  the  Presi- 
dent, since  the  execution  of  his  order  was  not  required, 
although  it  was  not  revoked  as  formally  as  it  had  been 
issued."  That  is  to  say,  it  was  treated  by  him  as  re- 
voked, because  it  was  not  imperatively  enforced. 

But  while  Mr.  Lincoln  deemed  it  unwise  either  to 
select  a  new  commander  or  to  insist  upon  forcing  an 
unwilling  general  to  the  execution  of  a  plan  he  did  not 
approve,  neither  would  he  be  forced  into  acquiescence 
with  the  general's  plan  until  he  had  incorporated  in  it 
certain  conditions,  looking  to  the  defense  of  Washing- 
ton, nor  till  the  siege  of  the  capital  was  raised  by  the 
removal  of  obstructions  from  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio 
Railroad,  and  from  the  lower  Potomac  River. 

We  have  McClellan's  authority,  already  quoted,  for 
stating  that  immediately  upon  coming  into  office,  Mr. 
Stanton  had  vigorously  urged  him  to  take  immediate 
steps  to  secure  these  latter  objects.  In  compliance  with 
his  demands,  General  Hooker  was  for  some  time  under 
orders  to  prepare  for  crossing  the  lower  Potomac,  and  to 
be  in  readiness  for  an  assault  upon  the  rebel  batteries. 

It  became  known  to  the  government  that  the  pro- 
longed siege  of  the  capital  was  being  regarded  both  at 
home  and  abroad  as  a  fact  of  much  significance,  and 
greatly  to  the  advantage  of  the  rebel  cause.  This  meant 
a  great  deal  when  it  is  considered  that  the  nation's 
power  to  negotiate  loans  with  which  to  carry  on  the  war 
depended  wholly  upon  the  world's  opinion  of  the  ulti- 
mate success  of  the  Federal  arms. 


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THE  BLOCKADE  OF  THE  POTOSIAC  339 

On  the  9th  of  February,  a  sub-committee  was  aj>- 
poiuted  by  the  Committee  of  Conj^ress  on  the  CoiKhu-t 
of  the  War,  to  wait  upon  the  Secretary  of  War  at  once 
for  the  purpose  of  enjoining-  upon  his  consick'ration  the 
necessity  of  immediately  raising  the  blockade  of  the 
Potomac.  In  their  report  to  the  general  committee,  the 
sub-committee  said  that  tliey  had  waited  upon  the  Sec- 
retary and  had  conveyed  the  message  sent  by  them,  "to 
•which,"  says  their  report,  "the  Secretary  replied  that 
the  committee  could  not  feel  more  keenly  upon  this 
subject  than  he  did.  That  he  did  not  go  to  his  bed  at 
nioht  without  his  cheek  burnin<r  with  shame  at  this  dis- 
grace  upon  the  nation.  That  the  sultject  had  received 
his  earnest  consideration  since  he  had  been  in  the  War 
Department,  but  as  yet  he  had  not  been  able  to  accom- 
plish his  wish  in  that  respect,  as  he  was  not  the  head, 
and  could  not  control  the  matter.  The  Secretary  said 
that  General  McClellan  was  then  in  the  building  and  he 
would  brinof  him  into  the  room.'* 

The  report  continues  as  follows :  — 

Whereupon  the  Secretary  left  the  room  and  shortly  re- 
turned, bringing  with  him  General  McClellan,  to  whom  he 
stated  the  object  of  our  visit. 

At  the  request  of  the  Secretary,  the  chairman  then  repeated 
to  General  McClellan  what  he  had  already  stated  to  the  Sec- 
retary in  reference  to  the  necessity  of  raising  the  blockade  of 
the  Potomac,  the  rebuilding  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Kail- 
road,  etc. 

General  ISIcClellan  stated  that  the  subject  had  been  con- 
sidered by  him;  that  he  had  just  been  seeing  what  could  be 
done,  and  in  a  short  time  expected  to  be  able  to  inform  us 
what  steps  woidd  be  taken.     When  asked  how  soon  something 


340        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

could  be  done,  he  replied  that  it  was  not  a  question  of  weeks, 
but  of  days.  .  .  . 

Mr.  Johnson  stated  that  the  interview  with  the  Secretary 
had  been  a  very  satisfactory  one ;  that  the  Secretary  listened 
attentively  to  all  the  chairman  said,  and  although  the  chair- 
man sometimes  made  his  statements  to  General  McClellan  in 
pretty  strong  and  emphatic  language,  the  Secretary  indorsed 
every  statement  he  had  uttered.  The  Secretary  feels  as 
strongly  upon  this  subject  as  this  committee  does.^ 

This  report  was  made  by  Andrew  Johnson,  then  a 
senator  from  Tennessee,  and  afterwards  President  of 
the  United  States. 

On  the  day  following  these  assurances  by  General 
McClellan,  General  Hooker  expressed,  in  an  official  letter 
to  him,  an  entire  readiness  and  an  earnest  desire  to  be 
allowed  to  make  the  assault  on  the  rebel  batteries  on 
the  lower  Potomac,  and  thus  concluded  his  communica- 
tion:— 

The  free  navigation  of  the  river  will  give  us  an  immense 
advantage  over  the  rebels,  particularly  so  long  as  the  roads 
remain  in  their  present  condition,  and  the  destruction  of  the 
batteries  will  in  no  way  expose  the  future  intentions  of  the 
major-general  in  the  conduct  of  the  war. 

The  response  to  this  communication  came  just  one 
week  afterwards  in  the  form  of  the  following  telegram 
from  General  McClellan  to  General  Marcy,  his  chief  of 
staff,  dated  at  Sandy  Hook,  near  Harper's  Ferry :  — 

Revoke  Hooker's  authority  in  accordance  with  Barnard's 
opinion  immediately .^  On  my  return  we  will  take  the  other 
plan  and  j)ush  it  vigorously. 

1  Report  of  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War. 

^  General  Barnard's  opinion,  here  referred  to,  was  five  months  old,  and 


BLUNDERS  AT  HARPER'S  FERRY      341 

No  other  plan  was  taken,  and,  as  a  consequence,  there 
■was  no  pushing  it,  either  vigorously  or  otherwise.  The 
rebels  evacuated  their  Potomac  batteries  at  their  own 
will  and  pleasure  ten  days  later,  when,  unmolested  and 
without  the  knowledge  of  McClellan,  they  also  evacuated 
Manassas  and  Winchester. 

General  McClellan's  reluctance  to  drive  the  rebels 
back  from  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad,  in  the 
vicinity  of  Harper's  Ferry,  was  equally  persistent  with 
his  reluctance  to  drive  them  from  the  lower  Potomac. 

On  the  14th  of  February,  General  Lander,  pushing 
his  way  eastward  on  the  line  of  the  railroad,  fought  a 
spirited  engagement  at  Bloomery  Gap,  killed  13  rebels 
and  took  65  prisoners,  17  being  commissioned  officers, 
his  loss  being  only  2  men.  He  led  the  charge  in  per- 
son, surprising  the  enemy  after  marching  two  thousand 
men  thirty  miles,  and  crossing  them  over  a  bridge  con- 
structed of  wagons,  under  his  directions,  in  four  hours, 
in  the  dead  of  night. 

General  Lander  was  at  that  time  so  broken  down  in 
health  that  he  closed  the  report  of  his  engagement  with 
an  earnest  appeal  to  be  relieved.^ 

The  only  recognition  by  General  McClellan  of  this 
brilliant  action  was  a  letter  the  next  day  from  his  aide- 
de-camp.  Colonel  Hardie,  to  General  Lander  concerning 
his  movements,  instructing  him  that  he  must  incur  no 
desperate  risks,  and  hazard  no  uncertainty  of  results. 

was,  of  course,  perfectly  well  known  to  General  McClellan  when  he  gave 
General  Hooker  the  order  he  now  revoked. 

'  He  was  not  relieved,  and  continued  in  the  active  service  of  his  coun- 
try until  within  two  days  of  his  death,  which  occurred  on  the  second  day 
of  March. 


342        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

"  The  general's  designs,"  wrote  Colonel  Hardie,  "  are 
not  such  as  to  include  any  unnecessary  hazard  at  this 
moment." 

The  President  and  Secretary  Stanton  did  not  share 
General  McClellan's  fear  that  General  Lander  would 
fight  rashly,  and  without  sufficient  prospect  of  success, 
and,  on  the  17th  of  February,  the  Secretary  issued  the 
following  war  bulletin  :  — 

To  Brigadier-General  F.  W.  Lander:  — 

The  President  directs  me  to  say  that  he  has  observed,  with 
pleasure,  the  activity  and  enterprise  manifested  by  yourself 
and  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  your  command.  You  have 
shown  how  much  may  be  done  in  the  worst  weather,  and  the 
worst  roads  by  a  spirited  officer,  at  the  head  of  a  small  force 
of  brave  men,  unwilling  to  waste  life  in  camp,  when  the  ene- 
mies of  their  country  are  within  reach.  Your  brilliant  success 
is  a  happy  presage  of  what  may  be  expected  when  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  shall  be  led  in  the  field  by  their  gallant  general. 

The  dubious  compliment  contained  in  the  concluding 
words  of  this  order  may  have  spurred  the  "  gallant 
general"  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  at  least  a 
semblance  of  activity,  for  he  says,  in  his  final  report, 
that,  about  the  20th  of  February,  1862,  additional 
measures  were  taken  to  secure  the  reopening  of  the 
Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  which,  for  some  unknown 
reason,  he  had  not  until  then  felt  prepared  to  attempt. 
At  last,  on  the  26th,  at  10.20  p.  m.,  General  McClellan 
telegraphed  Stanton  that  "  a  bridge  had  been  splendidly 
thrown  "  across  the  river  at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  that 
8500  infantry,  eighteen  guns,  and  two  squadrons  of 
cavalry  had  been  crossed  to  the  Virginia  side,  and  were 


LANDER'S   BRILLIANT  EXPLOIT  343 

"ready  to  resist  an  attack."  "Loudon  and  Bolivar 
Heights,  as  well  as  Maryland  Heights,  have  been  occu- 
pied by  our  men.  The  canal-boat  bridge  will  be  at- 
tempted to-morrow."  The  troops  were  "  in  a  mood  to 
fight  anything." 

At  one  o'clock  the  next  day  all  was  changed.  He 
telegraphed  his  chief  of  staff  at  Washington  not  to 
send  any  more  troops  until  further  orders.  To  Secre- 
tary Stanton  he  telegraphed  :  — 

The  lift-locks  are  too  small  to  permit  the  canal -boats  to 
enter  the  river,  so  that  it  is  impossible  to  construct  a  perma- 
nent bridge,  as  I  intended.  I  shall  probably  be  obliged  to 
fall  back  upon  the  safe  and  old  plan  of  merely  covering  the 
rebuilding  of  the  railroad.  This  will  be  done  at  once,  but 
will  be  tedious.  I  cannot,  as  things  now  are,  be  sure  of  my 
supplies  for  the  force  necessary  to  seize  Winchester,  which  is 
probably  reinforced  from  Manassas. 

It  was  a  mortifying  fact  that  an  important  military 
movement,  dependent  upon  the  passing  of  canal-boats 
through  a  lift-lock,  had,  at  an  advanced  stage,  failed 
because  the  boats  were  then  discovered  for  the  first  time 
to  be  too  large  for  the  lock !  The  explanation  of  the 
general  was  that  the  lock  was  too  small  for  the  boats, 
which  could  not  well  be  disputed.  He  said  :  "  The  lock 
was  built  for  a  narrower  class  of  boats."  ^ 

Having  thus  marched  up  the  hill  and  down  again, 
General  McClellan  returned  to  Washington  on  the  26th, 
and,  according  to  his  account,  "  commenced  jjreparations 
for  destroying  the  batteries  on  the  lower  Potomac," 
which  enterprise  he  had  suspended  the  day  before,  by 

'  War  Records,  Series  I.  vol.  v.  p.  49,  General  McClellan's  Report. 


344        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

the  telegram  already  quoted.  He  continued  commen- 
cing these  preparations  until  the  9th  of  March,  —  a 
period  of  eleven  days,  —  when  he  was  relieved  from  the 
necessity  of  completing  them  by  information,  received 
on  that  day,  that  the  rebels  had  stolen  away  unobserved 
from  the  batteries  which  he  was  still  commencing  to 
prepare  to  attack. 


CHAPTER  XL VII 

A  Council  of  War.  —  McClellan's  Plan  submitted  and  adopted.  — 
The  Council  summoned  to  the  Wliite  House.  —  The  Plan  laid 
before  the  President.  —  The  Council  questioned  by  Secretary 
Stanton.  —  The  President  accepts  the  Plan  with  Certain  Modi- 
fications. 

PREsroENT  Lincoln  speedily  brought  matters  to  a 
head.  He  made  it  plain  to  General  McClellan  that  he 
■would  tolerate  no  further  procrastination.  He  requu-ed 
the  general  to  convene  a  council  of  war,  and  to  submit 
to  that  council  immediately  a  plan  for  a  campaign.  So 
intolerable  had  the  situation  become  that  it  is  probable 
McClellan  could  not  have  remained  in  command  had  he 
not  at  once  yielded  obedience  to  his  superior.  His 
order  for  the  council  was  issued  on  the  night  of  the 
7th  of  March,  and  the  council  was  to  convene  at  ten 
o'clock  on  the  following  day.  The  generals  summoned 
were  aU  division  commanders  except  Naglee.  He  was 
present,  as  he  says,  by  the  order  of  General  McClellan 
to  represent  General  Hooker,  who  was  then  at  too  great 
a  distance  from  headquarters  to  be  summoned.  Fol- 
lowing is  an  extract  from  the  minutes  of  the  meeting, 
General  Naglee  acting  as  recorder  :  — 

Council  organized. 

General  Sumner  called  to  the  chair. 

Present :  McDowell,  Heintzelman,  Keyes,  Franklin,  Fitz 


346        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

John  Porter,  Sumner,  McCall,  Andrew  Porter,  W.  F,  Smith, 
Barnard,  Blenker,  and  Naglee. 

First  Proposition.  —  Is  it  not  advisable  as  a  preliminary 
to  offensive  operations  that  the  base  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  be  changed  from  the  one  it  now  has,  in  front  of  the 
capital,  to  another  one  further  south,  in  the  lower  Chesapeake, 
the  army  to  move  by  water  to  its  position  ?  The  means  of 
doing  so  if  ready  at  Annapolis  for  the  first  half  in  all  of 
next  week.  Some  means  of  water  transportation  to  serve  for 
the  second  half. 

Vote  upon  First  Proposition.  —  Yeas  :  Naglee,  Smith, 
Blenker,  McCall,  Franklin,  Fitz  John  Porter,  Andrew  Porter, 
and  Keyes. 

Nays :  Barnard,  Heiutzelman,  McDowell,  and  Sumner. 

Yeas:  8.     Nays:  4. 

Several  minor  incidental  questions  were  discussed. 

After  the  council  had  been  in  session  three  hours 
they  were  summoned  to  appear  before  the  President  at 
the  Executive  Mansion.  General  Naglee,  in  a  letter  to 
Hon.  W.  D.  Kelly,  of  Pennsylvania,  dated  September 
27,  1864,  states  that  the  President  informed  the  coun- 
cil that  he  "  was  quite  unwell  and  exceedingly  nervous ; 
that  the  pressure  had  been  intense  against  General 
McClellan."     Naglee  writes  as  follows :  — 

I  informed  him  that  as  recorder  of  the  council  of  war 
which  had  held  its  session  by  order  of  General  McClellan,  I 
would  advise  him  of  the  result  of  its  proceedings,  and  then 
read  them  to  him.  "  What,"  said  he,  "  have  the  council 
decided  by  a  vote  of  eight  to  four  —  two  to  one  —  in  favor 
of  the  peninsular  campaign  ?  "  He  then  asked  many  ques- 
tions in  regard  to  the  same  until  Mr.  Stanton  came  in,  and  I 
proposed  to  read  the  proceedings  to  him.  He  replied  :  "  Give 
me  the  papers  ;  I  '11  read  them  myself."     And  after  reading 


THE  PLAN  LAID  BEFORE  THE  PRESIDENT    347 

them  over  aud  prej)aring  his  notes,  he,  as  you  say,  put  them 
(the  council)  through  the  strict  course  of  examination  to 
which  you  refer. 

General  Nag-lee  states  that  this  examination  lasted 
four  or  live  hours.  It  was  understood  by  the  latter  as 
indicating  the  opposition  of  Stanton  to  the  decision  of 
the  council  of  war. 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  proceedings  at  the  Execu- 
tive Mansion  the  President  requested  the  attendance  of 
all  the  officers  of  the  council  at  the  same  place  on  the 
following  morning  at  ten  o'clock.  They  appeared  at 
that  time  and  were  informed  that  the  President  had 
determined  to  acquiesce  in  the  decision  of  the  council, 
and  to  permit  General  McClellan  to  inaugurate  the 
peninsular  campaign,  subject,  however,  to  the  restric- 
tions which  will  be  given  in  the  next  chapter. 

The  following  statement  by  the  Hon.  W.  D.  Kelly, 
for  many  years  a  leader  in  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives, is  most  interesting  in  this  connection  :  — 

In  the  consideration  of  this  matter  between  the  President 
and  the  Secretary  of  War  the  President  said  to  the  Secre- 
tary :  "  "We  can  do  nothing  else  than  adopt  this  plan  and 
discard  all  others ;  with  eight  out  of  twelve  division  com- 
manders approving  it  we  can't  reject  it  and  adopt  another 
without  assuming  all  the  responsibility  in  case  of  the  failure 
of  the  one  we  adopt."  The  Secretary  said  that,  while  agree- 
ing with  the  President  in  his  conclusion,  he  dissented  from 
his  arithmetic,  adding  that  the  generals  who  dissented  from 
the  proposed  plan  of  campaign  were  independent  of  the 
influence  of  the  commanding  general,  while  all  the  rest  owed 
their  positions  to  him  and  were  especially  under  his  influence, 
so  that  instead  of  eight  to  four  there  was  but  one  against 


348        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CMIPAIGN 

four.  "  You,"  he  continued,  "  as  a  lawyer,  in  estimating  the 
vahie  of  testimony,  look  not  only  to  the  words  of  the  witness, 
but  to  his  manner  and  all  the  surrounding  circumstances  of 
bias,  interest,  or  influence  that  may  affect  his  opinions.  Now, 
who  are  the  eight  generals  upon  whose  votes  you  are  going  to 
adopt  the  proposed  plan  of  campaign  ?  All  made  so  since 
General  McClellan  assumed  command,  and  upon  his  recom- 
mendation, influenced  by  his  views,  and  subservient  to  his 
wishes,  while  the  other  four  are  beyond  these  influences,  so 
that  in  fact  you  have  in  this  decision  only  the  operation  of 
one  man's  mind." 

The  Secretary  of  War  told  me  the  President  seemed  much 
struck  with  this  view  of  the  case,  and  after  considering  some 
time  said :  "I  admit  the  full  force  of  your  objection,  but- 
what  can  we  do  ?  We  are  civilians  —  we  should  be  justly 
held  accountable  for  any  disasters  if  we  set  up  our  opinions 
against  those  of  experienced  military  men  in  the  practical 
management  of  a  campaign  —  we  must  submit  to  the  action 
of  a  majority  of  the  council,  and  the  campaign  will  have  to 
go  on  as  decided  upon  by  that  majority."  ^ 

In  1864,  while  the  anti-war  party  was  laboring  to  make 
General  McClellan  President,  General  Henry  M.  Naglee 
addressed  a  letter  to  Congressman  Kelly  in  response  to 
references  by  Judge  Kelly  to  McClellan 's  peninsular 
campaign.  Kelly  sent  Secretary  Stanton  a  copy  of 
Naglee's  letter,  and  in  reply  Stanton  made  the  follow- 
ing statement  concerning  the  council  of  war  and  its 
several  meetings  :  — 

He  speaks  of  three  meetings,  —  one  at  McClellan's  head- 
quarters in  the  forenoon,  of  which,  at  that  time,  I  had  no 
knowledge ;  one  at  the  White  House  the  afternoon  of  the 

1  Questions  of  the  Day,  No.  29,  "  Lincoln  and  Stanton,"  by  William 
D.  Kelly,  M.  C,  pages  33  and  34. 


THE   PRESIDENT  ACCEPTS  THE   PLAN        349 

same  clay,  at  which  I  was  called  hy  the  President,  and  one 
the  next  morning  at  the  President's,  when  he  informed  the 
generals  that  he  had  ordered  the  army  corps  to  be  reformed. 
The  only  facts  material  in  respect  to  any  or  all  of  these 
meetings  are :  — 

First.  That  McClellan,  on  that  day,  having  had  command 
of  the  army  for  eight  months,  disclosed  for  the  first  time  to 
his  generals  any  plan  of  movement,  and  that  this  was  done 
and  they  committed  to  its  support  before  their  meeting  with 
the  President  and  before  any  opportimity  had  been  afforded 
them  for  hearing  his  inquiries. 

Second.  That  the  President,  finding  a  majority,  including 
Naglee  and  Blenker,  committed  to  the  plan,  yielded  his 
objection,  although  he  was  supported  by  Barnard,  Sumner, 
Heintzelman,  and  McDowell. 

Third.  That  McClellan,  against  the  unanimous  opinion  of 
his  generals,  opposed  the  organization  of  his  army  into  corps, 
but  the  President  decided  with  the  generals  against  McClel- 
lan on  this  point. 


CHAPTER   XLVm 

The  Peninsular  Campaign.  —  Conditions  imposed  by  the  President. 
—  Evacuation  of  Manassas.  —  The  Rebels  in  a  Panic  when 
deemed  most  Formidable  by  McClellan.  —  Advance  of  the 
Army  on  the  Deserted  Field. 

On  the  8th  of  March  the  President  ordered  the  for- 
mation of  that  portion  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
destined  for  active  operation  into  four  army  corps,  to 
be  commanded  according  to  seniority  of  rank,  namely, 
by  Generals  McDowell,  Sumner,  Heintzelman,  and 
Keyes.  He  directed  that  the  order  be  executed  with 
such  promptness  and  dispatch  as  not  to  delay  the  com- 
mencement of  operations  already  directed  to  be  under- 
taken by  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

On  the  same  day  he  issued  his  order  making  the  fol- 
lowing positive  conditions  to  the  proposed  change  of 
base  from  Washington  to  the  lower  Chesapeake  for  the 
inauguration  of  the  peninsular  campaign  :  — 

1st.  To  leave  in  and  about  Washington  such  a  force 
as  in  the  opinion  of  the  general-in-chief  and  corps  com- 
manders would  leave  that  city  entirely  secure. 

2d.  Not  more  than  two  corps  should  move  to  the 
new  base,  until  the  navigation  of  the  Potomac  should 
be  entirely  unobstructed. 

3d.  That  any  movement  to  be  made  by  the  penin- 
sular route  must  be  commenced  by  the  18th  of  March. 


THE  PRESIDENT'S   CONDITIONS  351 

General  Banks  was  assigfned  to  the  command  of  the 
5th  corps,  to  operate  on  the  defensive  near  Washington. 

This  order  greatly  disturbed  McClellan.  Three  of 
the  corps  commanders  had  opposed  his  peninsular  cam- 
paign, and  the  other,  Keyes,  had  favored  it  only  on 
condition  of  first  driving  the  rebel  batteries  from  the 
Potomac. 

These  commanders  had  not  been  selected  to  com- 
mand the  corps  because  of  their  opinions,  but  because 
they  were  entitled  to  command  by  seniority  in  rank,  — 
that  is  to  say,  the  ranking  generals  were  opposed  to 
McClellan's  plans. 

The  conditions  imposed  on  his  peninsular  campaign 
were  most  reasonable.  They  were  simply  that  Wash- 
ington must  not  be  given  over  to  the  enemy,  and  that 
the  new  expedition  should  "  begin  to  move  "  within  ten 
days. 

The  President's  order  that  the  general-in-chief 
should  be  responsible  that  the  movement  shoidd  begin 
as  early  as  March  18  obviously  meant  that  he  should 
not  continue  to  retard  it  beyond  that  day.  The  Secre- 
tary of  War  was  to  be  responsible  for  the  transporta- 
tion. All  General  McClellan  had  to  do,  as  he  well 
knew,  was  to  get  ready  for  the  embarkation. 

The  situation  on  the  morning  of  the  9th  of  March 
was  as  follows  :  — 

1.  Banks's  division  was  on  the  Virginia  side  of  the 
Potomac,  near  Harper's  Ferry,  occupying  Charlestown, 
and  without  orders  from  the  commanding  general,  but 
would  "  gradually  press  upon  Winchester,"  then  held 
by  the  enemy. 


352        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAE  CAMPAIGN 

2.  The  main  army  was  still  "  commencing  prepara- 
tions "  to  move  against  the  batteries  on  the  lower  Po- 
tomac. 

3.  The  roads  to  Manassas  were  said  to  be  "  impass- 
able." General  Johnston  was  there  with  an  army, 
thought  by  McClellan  to  be  vastly  superior  to  his  own. 

4.  The  rebel  ram,  the  Merrimac,  had  made  her  ap- 
pearance at  Hampton  Roads  and  destroyed  several 
vessels. 

The  same  day  saw  great  changes  :  — 

First,  the  news  of  the  morning  that  the  rebel  ram, 
the  Merrimac,  had  been  doing  great  havoc  at  Hampton 
Roads  the  day  before,  was  followed  by  the  news  of  the 
afternoon  that  she  had  been  vanquished  by  the  Moni- 
tor and  retired  to  Norfolk. 

Second,  came  the  information  that  the  rebel  batteries 
on  the  Potomac  had  been  abandoned,  and. 

Third,  the  evening  brought  the  startling  intelligence 
that  the  enemy  had  entirely  evacuated  their  fortified 
position  at  Manassas. 

The  Confederate  correspondence  up  to  that  time  in 
the  "  War  Records  "  shows  that  in  February  the  Con- 
federate government  was  exceedingly  anxious  for  the 
safety  of  Johnston's  army  at  Manassas,  and  great  fears 
were  entertained  that  McClellan  would  attack  before  it 
could  get  out  of  the  way.  As  early  as  February  16 
General  Johnston  wrote  Jefferson  Davis  from  his  head- 
quarters at  Centreville :  "  We  cannot  retreat  from  this 
point  without  heavy  loss." 

February  19  Jefferson  Davis  wrote  to  General  John- 
ston :  "  I  am  very  anxious  to  see  you.     Events  have 


EVACUATION   OF  MANASSAS  353 

cast  on  our  arms  and  on  our  liopes  the  gloomiest  shad- 
ows, and  at  such  a  time  we  must  show  undoubted 
energy  and  resokition,"  ^ 

The  events  he  referred  to  were  the  Federal  victories 
in  the  West.  Fort  Henry  had  been  captured  on  the 
6th,  and  Fort  Donelson  on  the  16th. 

Soon  after  this  the  dispatches  of  General  Johnston 
to  Davis  indicate  that  great  impatience  was  being 
shown  by  the  latter  to  have  the  Confederates  safely 
away  from  Manassas.  February  22  he  says :  "  The 
enemy  may  not  allow  much  time  for  a  change  of  posi- 
tion." 

On  the  23d  he  wrote :  "  In  the  present  condition  of 
the  country,  the  orders  you  have  given  me  cannot  be 
executed  promptly,  if  at  all." 

On  the  25th  he  wrote :  "  The  accumulation  of  sub- 
sistence stores  at  Manassas  is  now  a  great  evil.  .  .  . 
Much  of  both  kinds  of  property  must  be  sacrificed  in 
our  contemplated  movement." 

Jefferson  Davis  wrote  General  Johnston  February 
28  :  "  The  heavy  guns  at  Manassas  and  Evansport, 
needed  elsewhere,  and  reported  to  be  useless  in  their 
present  position,  would  necessarily  be  abandoned  in 
any  hasty  retreat.  I  regret  that  you  find  it  impossible 
to  move  them.  With  your  present  force,  you  cannot 
secure  your  communication  from  the  enemy,  and  may, 
at  any  time  when  he  can  pass  to  your  rear,  be  com- 
pelled to  retreat  at  the  sacrifice  of  your  siege -guns, 
and  army  stores,  and  without  any  preparation  on  a  sec- 
ond line  to  receive  your  army  as  it  retired." 

^   War  Records,  Series  I.  vol.  v.  p.  1077. 


354        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

In  the  same  letter  Davis  said :  "  Recent  disasters 
have  depressed  the  weak  and  are  depriving  us  of  the 
aid  of  the  wavering.  Traitors  show  the  tendencies 
heretofore  concealed,  and  the  selfish  grow  clamorous 
for  local  and  personal  interests." 

On  the  same  day  Johnston  wrote  to  General  Whit- 
ing :  ^'  Publish  nothing  about  the  move  until  we  are  all 
ready.     We  may  need  to  start  before  we  are  ready." 

Jackson  wrote  Johnston,  March  3,  as  to  the  best  way 
to  escape  from  Winchester.  He  expected  an  attack ; 
but,  under  McClellan's  directions.  Banks  kept  at  a  re- 
spectful distance  from  that  place  until  it  was  evacuated 
some  days  later. 

March  3  Johnston  wrote  Davis :  "  The  removal  of 
pubhc  property  goes  on  with  painful  slowness,  because 
sufficient  numbers  of  cars  and  engines  cannot  be  had. 
It  is  evident  that  a  large  quantity  of  it  must  be  sacri- 
ficed or  your  instructions  not  observed." 

March  6  he  wrote  Whiting :  "  I  have  fixed  upon 
Saturday  morning,  the  8th,  for  the  move.  Mention  it 
to  no  one  until  necessary." 

March  13  he  wrote  Whiting :  "  We  were  detained 
at  Manassas  until  Sunday  evening  late,  the  9th." 

In  a  letter  to  General  Holmes,  commanding  at  Fred- 
ericksburg, March  16,  Johnston  expressed  his  uncer- 
tainty as  to  what  route  of  approach  to  Richmond 
McClellan  would  adopt,  adding  :  "  His  land  transporta- 
tion would  be  shortened  by  coming  up  the  Rappahan- 
nock, though  the  route  from  the  Potomac  through 
Fredericksburg  offers  other  advantages.  I  do  not 
think  his  advance  from  Dumfries  can  be  immediate, 


THE  REBELS   IN  A   PANIC  355 

from  what  I  learn  of  the  condition  of  the  roads,  ])ut 
that  he  will  advance  upon  our  line  as  soon  as  possible 
I  have  no  doubt." 

Not  a  word  here  of  any  knowledge  up  to  the  IGtli  of 
March,  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  of  the  contemplated 
movement  by  the  peninsida.  This  evidence  utterly 
dispels  the  idea  entertained  and  expressed  by  McClellan 
that  the  evacuation  of  Manassas  took  place  March  9, 
because  his  plan  for  the  peninsular  campaign  had  then 
become  known  to  the  enemy. 

The  brilliant  successes  in  the  West  at  Fort  Henry 
and  Fort  Donelson,  culminating  in  the  occupation  of 
Nash^*ille  February  25,  had  created  a  panic  throughout 
the  Confederacy,  and  that  panic  evidently  had  com- 
plete possession  of  Jefferson  Davis.  For  two  weeks 
following,  as  shown  by  the  above  correspondence,  he 
was  tugging  as  desperately  at  Johnston  to  get  him  to 
retreat  as  Lincoln  and  Stanton  were  at  McClellan  to 
get  him  to  advance.  The  evidence  is  conclusive  that  if 
McClellan  had  attacked  Johnston  at  any  time  after  the 
16th  of  February  he  could  have  inflicted  great  harm 
upon  the  rebel  cause. 

Upon  learning  of  Johnston's  retreat  McClellan  at 
once  displayed  the  greatest  activity.  The  roads  to 
Manassas  were  no  longer  "impassable."  With  a  celerity 
theretofore  unknown  to  him  he  left  his  office  in  Wash- 
ington that  very  evening,  crossed  the  Potomac,  issued 
an  order  for  the  advance  of  the  whole  army  upon  the 
deserted  fortifications  at  Centreville  and  Manassas,  and 
then  telegraphed  Secretary  Stanton  that  he  could  not 
make  the  advance  the  next  day  unless  the  President's 


356        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

orders  for  the  formation  of  army  corps  should  be  sus- 
pended.    To  this  Mr.  Stanton  replied  :  — 

I  think  it  is  the  duty  of  every  officer  to  obey  the  Presi- 
dent's orders,  nor  can  I  see  any  reason  why  you  should  not 
obey  them  in  the  present  instance.  I  must,  therefore,  decline 
to  suspend  them. 

McClellan  responded  at  one  a.  m.  on  the  10th,  that  he 
had  been  misunderstood;  that  he  simply  meant  that 
under  the  present  aspect  of  affairs  he  could  not  imme- 
diately carry  out  the  President's  orders  as  to  the  forma- 
tion of  army  corps.  He  regarded  it  as  a  military 
necessity  that  the  advance  should  move  to  the  front  at 
once  without  waiting  for  the  formation  of  army  corps. 
If  desired,  he  would  at  once  countermand  all  orders  for 
an  advance  until  the  formation  of  the  army  corps  could 
be  completed. 

To  this  Mr.  Stanton  replied  as  follows  :  — 

General,  —  I  do  not  understand  the  President's  order  as 
restraining  you  from  any  military  movement  by  divisions  or 
otherwise  that  circumstances,  in  your  judgment,  may  render 
expedient,  and  I  certainly  do  not  wish  to  delay  or  change  any 
movement  you  have  made  or  desire  to  make.  I  only  wish  to 
avoid  giving  my  sanction  to  a  suspension  of  policy  which  the 
President  has  ordered  to  be  pursued.  But  if  you  think  the 
terms  of  the  order  as  it  stands  would  operate  to  retard  or 
in  any  way  restrain  movements  that  circumstances  require  to 
be  made  before  the  army  corps  are  formed,  I  will  assume 
the  responsibility  of  suspending  the  order  for  that  purpose, 
and  authorize  you  to  make  any  movement  by  divisions  or 
otherwise,  according  to  your  own  judgment,  without  stopping 
to  form  the  army  corps. 


ADVANCE  OF  THE   ARMY  357 

My  desire  is  that  you  should  exercise  every  power  that  you 
think  present  circumstances  require  to  be  exercised,  without 
delay,  but  I  want  that  you  and  I  shall  not  seem  to  be  desir- 
ous of  opposing  an  order  of  the  President  without  necessity. 
I  say,  therefore,  move  just  as  you  tliink  best  now,  and  lot  the 
other  matter  stand  until  it  can  be  done  without  impeding 
movements. 

At  2.50  A.  M.  McClellan  acknowledged  receipt  of 
the  above,  and  stated  that  the  troops  were  in  motion. 
He  said :  "  I  thank  you  for  your  dispatch.  It  relieves 
me  very  much,  and  you  will  be  convinced  that  I  have 
not  asked  too  much  of  you." 

It  being  then  2.50  in  the  morning  it  is  not  clear 
in  what  dii-ection  the  troops  were  moving.  The  mys- 
tery is  not  lessened  by  his  dispatch  seventeen  hours 
later,  —  8.20  p.  m.  of  the  same  day,  —  saying  that  he 
"  had  given  the  necessary  orders  for  the  movement  and 
would  soon  start  for  Washington,  simply  to  spend  the 
nigfht." 

The  next  day  (11th)  he  moved  his  headquarters  to 
Fairfax  Court  House. 

The  general  had  the  grand  army  on  the  march,  and 
yet  as  secure  and  as  free  from  all  danger  of  rashly 
engaging  the  enemy  as  if  it  had  been  in  camp.  He 
was  not  marshaHng  his  men  the  way  they  were  to  go, 
for  they  were  to  go  down  the  Potomac  and  the  Chesa- 
peake. He  was  only  taking  them  out  for  exercise.  He 
naively  informs  us  that  "  the  retirement  of  the  enemy 
and  the  occupation  of  the  abandoned  positions  which 
necessarily  followed  presented  an  opportunity  for  the 
troops  to  gain  some  experience  on  the  march  and  the 


358        McCLELLAN'S   PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

bivouac,  preparatory  to  the  campaign,  and  to  get  rid  of 
the  superfluous  baggage  and  other  impedimenta  which 
accumulates  so  easily  around  an  army  encamped  for  a 
long  time  in  one  locahty."  And  again,  "  It  offered  a 
good  intermediate  step  between  the  quiet  and  compara- 
tive comfort  of  the  camps  around  Washington  and  the 
rigors  of  active  operations,  besides  accomplishing  the 
important  object  of  determining  the  positions,  and  per- 
haps the  future  defenses,  of  the  enemy,  with  the  possi- 
bility of  being  able  to  harass  their  rear." 

He  telegraphed  to  Stanton  on  the  11th,  from  his 
headquarters  at  Fairfax  Court  House,  that  he  had  just 
returned  from  a  ride  of  over  forty  miles.  The  "  im- 
passable roads  "  had  evidently  greatly  improved.  He 
inspected  the  evacuated  positions  of  the  enemy,  and  was 
satisfied  that  he  had  fallen  behind  the  Rapidan.  He 
would  have  Banks  hold  Manassas  while  he  himself 
would  throw  all  the  available  forces  upon  the  penin- 
sula, the  line  agreed  on  the  previous  week.  The  Moni- 
tor's victory,  he  thought,  justified  the  movement  of 
troops  to  Fortress  Monroe.  He  had  telegraphed  to 
have  transports  brought  to  Washington.  He  thought 
circumstances  might  keep  him  where  he  was  some  little 
time  longer.     He  was  still  there  three  days  later. 

On  the  same  night,  the  11th,  after  telegraphing  to 
the  Secretary,  he  wrote  to  his  wife  as  follows  :  — 

I  regret  that  the  rascals  are  after  me  again.  I  have  been 
foolisk  enough  to  hope  that  when  I  went  into  the  field  they 
would  give  me  some  rest.  Perhaps  I  should  not  have  ex- 
pected it.  If  I  can  get  out  of  this  scrape  you  will  never  get 
me  in  the  power  of  such  a  set  again.    The  idea  of  persecuting 


ON  THE  DESERTED  FIELD  359 

a  man  behind  his  back.  I  suppose  they  are  now  relieved 
from  the  pressure  of  their  fears  by  the  retreat  of  the  enemy 
and  that  they  will  increase  in  violence.  Well,  enough  of 
that.  It  is  bad  enough  for  me  to  be  bothered  in  that  way 
without  annoying  you  with  it. 

The  "  rascals  "  were  probably  those  who  were  cruel 
enouoh  to  ridicule  his  takiug:  the  field  ^vitli  so  much 
energy  after  he  knew  it  had  been  deserted  by  the 
enemy. 


CHAPTER  XLIX 

McClellan  relieved  of  General  Command,  and  assigned  to  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  only.  —  His  Plan  demanded  by  Stanton.  —  Vague 
Response.  —  Ordered  to  move  by  Some  Route  at  once.  —  The 
Transportation  of  the  Army  and  its  Supplies  to  Fortress  Monroe. 

The  withdrawal  of  the  rebel  array  from  Manassas 
without  the  knowledge  of  General  McClellan  gave  a 
rude  shock  to  the  confidence  of  his  admirers,  and  con- 
firmed the  unfavorable  criticisms  of  others.  The  Presi- 
dent had  pleaded  in  vain  with  him  to  intimate  some 
plan  of  campaign,  and  had  at  last  imperatively  ordered 
him  to  move  on  the  22d  of  February.  Sullen  and 
insubordinate,  he  had  ignored  the  order,  and  finally 
extorted  from  the  President  an  unwilling  consent  to  a 
plan  of  campaign  which  the  judgment  of  the  latter, 
sustained  by  the  generals  first  in  rank,  strongly  con- 
demned, —  a  plan  which  had  not  occurred  to  General 
McClellan,  as  he  himself  admits,  until  more  than  five 
months  after  he  took  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac* 

When  he  had  thus  carried  his  point,  he  showed  as 
little  Inclination  as  before  to  take  the  initiative.  At 
last,  when  he  was  giving  his  army  its  first  exercise,  by 

1  McClellan  fixes  "the  beginning  of  December,  1861,"  as  the  time 
when  he  conceived  the  idea  of  the  peninsular  campaign.  Own  Story, 
page  202. 


RELIEVED  OF   GENERAL  COMMAND  361 

a  long,  fruitless,  and  meaningless  march  over  muddy 
roads  to  the  deserted  and  desolate  camps  from  which 
he  knew  the  enemy  had  retired  the  day  before,  tlie 
President  relieved  him  of  the  command  of  "  the  Armies 
of  the  United  States,"  and  assigned  him  to  the  com- 
mand of  "  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  "  only.  Following 
is  this  order  :  — 

President's  War  Order,  No.  3. 

Executive  Mansion,  Washington, 
March  11,  1862. 

General  McClellan  having  personally  taken  the  field  at 
the  head  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  until  otherwise  ordered 
he  is  relieved  from  the  command  of  the  other  military  depart- 
ments, he  retaining  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac. 

Ordered  further,  that  the  departments  now  under  the 
respective  commands  of  Generals  Halleck  and  Hunter,  to- 
gether with  so  much  of  that  under  General  Buell  as  lies  west 
of  a  north  and  south  line  indefinitely  drawn  through  Knox- 
ville,  Tennessee,  to  be  consolidated  and  designated  the  Depart- 
ment of  the  Mississippi ;  and  that,  until  otherwise  ordered, 
Major-General  Halleck  have  command  of  said  department. 

Ordered,  also ;  that  the  country  west  of  the  Department 
of  the  Potomac  and  east  of  the  Department  of  the  Missis- 
sippi be  a  military  department,  to  be  called  the  INIountain 
Department,  and  that  the  same  be  commanded  by  INIajor- 
General  Fremont. 

T/iat  all  the  commanders  of  departments,  after  the  receipt 
of  this  order  by  them,  respectively  report  severally  and 
directly  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  that  prompt,  full,  and 
frequent  reports  wiU  be  expected  of  all  and  each  of  them. 

A.  Lincoln. 

In  a  letter  to  the  President  the  next  day,  General 


362        McCLELLAN'S   PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

McClellan  accepted  the  change  without  any  show  of 
displeasure,  and  summoned  his  corps  commanders  to 
discuss  the  President's  order  of  the  8th,  presenting  the 
conditions  precedent  to  the  embarkation  of  troops  for 
the  peninsular  campaign.  This  council  announced  it 
as  their  opinion  that  the  enemy  having  retreated  from 
Manassas  to  Gordonsville,  the  operations  to  be  carried 
on  would  be  best  undertaken  from  Old  Point  Com- 
fort, provided  the  rebel  vessel,  the  Merrimac,  could  be 
neutrahzed,  transportation  provided,  naval  cooperation 
secured,  and  Washington  left  secure.  If  these  condi- 
tions could  not  be  fulfilled,  they  ought  to  advance  by 
land  against  the  enemy  behind  the  Rappahannock  at 
the  earliest  possible  moment. 

This  was  at  once  forwarded  to  Washington  by  the 
hand  of  General  McDowell.  As  it  favored  the  penin- 
sular route  only  on  conditions  that  could  not  all  be  at 
once  fulfilled,  and  favored  the  land  route  as  an  alterna- 
tive, and  as  it  bore  no  words  of  approval  from  General 
McClellan,  it  committed  him  to  nothing.  Its  indefi- 
niteness  drew  from  Secretary  Stanton  the  following 
inquiry,  dated  March  13  :  — 

General  McDowell  has  arrived  here  and  presented  a  paper 
purporting  to  be  the  opinion  of  generals  commanding  army 
corps,  but  it  contains  nothing  indicating  that  it  is  your  plan. 
The  department  has  nothing  to  show  what  is  your  plan  of 
operations.  Will  you  be  pleased  to  state  what  plans  of  oper- 
ations you  propose  to  execute  under  the  present  circum- 
stances ?  Please  state  at  what  time  this  dispatch  is  received 
by  you,  and  at  what  hour  your  answer  is  made  to  it.  This 
rule  had  better  be  observed  in  all  our  telegraphic  correspond- 
ence.    This  dispatch  is  transmitted  at  5.20  p.  m. 


ORDERED  TO  MOVE  AT  ONCE       363 

This  appears  to  have  been  satisfactorily  answered, 
for  on  the  same  day  the  following-  directions  were  sent 
to  McClellan  by  Secretary  Stanton  :  — 

The  President,  having  reviewed  the  plan  of  operations 
agreed  upon  by  yourself  and  the  commanders  of  army  corps, 
makes  no  objection  to  the  same,  and  gives  the  following  direc- 
tions as  to  its  execution  :  — 

1.  Leave  such  forces  at  Manassas  Junction  as  shall  make 
it  entirely  certain  that  the  enemy  shall  not  repossess  himself 
of  that  position  and  line  of  communication. 

2.  Leave  Washington  entirely  secure. 

3.  Move  the  remainder  of  the  forces  down  the  Potomac, 
choosing  a  new  base  at  Fort  Monroe,  or  anywhere  between 
here  and  there,  or  at  all  events,  move  such  remainder  of  the 
army  at  once  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy  by  some  route. 

This  settled  the  responsibility.  McClellan  was  given 
full  authority  to  choose  by  what  route  he  would  move ; 
but  move  at  once  he  must  "  by  some  route  "  in  pursuit 
of  the  fleeing  enemy. 

Now  that  the  army  seemed  about  to  engage  in  the 
serious  work  for  which  it  had  been  recruited  and  or- 
ganized the  Secretary  took  occasion,  in  the  folloTsdng 
telegram  dated  March  13,  to  assure  the  general  of  his 
cordial  cooperation :  — 

General  Patrick  was  nominated  upon  your  request  several 
days  ago.  I  took  the  nomination  myself  to  the  President 
and  saw  it  signed  by  him,  and  will  go  to  the  Senate  to-mor- 
row to  urge  its  confirmation.  Any  others  you  may  designate 
will  receive  a  like  attention.  Nothing  you  will  ask  of  this 
department  will  be  spared  to  aid  you  in  every  particular. 

It  is  very  evident  from  this,  that  however  impatient 
the  President  and  Secretary  of  War  had  been  with  Gen- 


364        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

eral  McClellan,  while  waiting  for  him  to  overcome  the 
evil  spirit  of  procrastination  by  which  he  seemed  to  be 
bound  down,  they  were  not  then  distrustful  of  his  good 
intentions  or  of  his  patriotism,  nor  doubtful  of  his  abil- 
ity to  do  execution  with  his  forces  when  once  in  motion. 
They  had  quite  as  much  responsibility  as  he  had  for 
any  failure  of  the  campaign,  and  they  knew  nothing  of 
the  monstrous  defects  in  his  character,  or  of  the  danger- 
ous condition  of  his  mind  towards  them  at  that  time. 
These  never  fully  came  to  light  until  the  publication, 
after  his  death,  of  his  memoirs  and  private  correspond- 
ence, under  the  title  of  his  "  Own  Story."  They 
will  be  referred  to  hereafter. 

He  had  from  the  start  an  evident  aversion  to  actual 
hostilities,  which  may  have  grown  out  of  a  reluctance 
to  risk  in  battle  a  reputation  which  came  to  him  with- 
out achievement,  and  which  could  be  maintained  only 
until  a  failure.  There  is  nothing  more  certain  than 
that  he  refrained  from  moving  until  he  could  no  longer 
have  done  so  and  remain  in  command.  He  took  the 
field  under  compulsion,  because  the  enemy  had  volun- 
tarily raised  the  siege  of  his  army,  and  he  could 
not  remain  idle  in  camp.  Even  then  he  never  took 
the  offensive,  and  when  attacked  left  the  fighting  to 
the  sole  direction  of  his  corps  commanders. 

Durmg  the  preceding  fortnight  John  Tucker,  As- 
sistant Secretary  of  War,  had  collected  the  transports 
for  moving  the  army  and  its  supplies  down  the  Potomac 
and  Chesapeake  to  Fortress  Monroe.  On  the  17th  of 
March  the  work  commenced,  and  in  nineteen  days, 
April  5,  he  had  transported  from  Perryville,  Alexandria, 


TRANSPORTATION   OF  THE  ARMY  365 

and  Washington  121,500  men,  14,592  animals,  1150 
wagons,  4A  batteries,  and  7-1  ambulances,  besides  pon- 
toon bridges,  telegraph  materials,  and  all  the  equipage 
required  by  this  vast  army.  This  work  requii-ed  the 
employment  of  113  steamers,  188  schooners,  and  88 
barges. 


CHAPTER   L 

Stanton's  New  Duties.  —  Daily  Meetings  of  his  Bureau  Officers 
as  a  Board  of  Administration.  —  Its  First  Meeting.  —  How  to 
neutralize  the  Merrimac. 

The  President's  order  displacing  McClellan  as  gen- 
eral-in-chief,  and  providing  that  department  command- 
ers report  directly  to  the  War  Department,  devolved 
new  work  upon  Mr.  Stanton,  who  entered  upon  it  with 
alacrity. 

For  the  purpose  of  increasing  the  efficiency  of  his 
department,  he  summoned  the  heads  of  bureaus  for 
daily  conferences,  both  for  information  and  advice. 
He  caused  the  reports  of  these  proceedings  for  a  time 
to  be  taken  down.  The  following  extracts  from  them 
cannot  fail  to  interest  the  reader :  — 

War  Department,  March  13,  1862. 

In  pursuance  of  orders,  the  following-named  officers  of  the 
Army  of  the  United  States  assembled  at  the  War  Depart- 
ment this  day  at  twelve  o'clock,  namely :  — 

Brigadier-General  Lorenzo  Thomas,  Adjutant-General. 

Brigadier-General  M.  C.  Meigs,  Quartermaster-General. 

Brigadier-General  James  W.  Ripley,  Chief  of  Ordnance. 

Br'vt.  Brigadier-General  James  G.  Totten,  Chief  En- 
gineer. 

Colonel  Joseph  P.  Taylor,  Commissary-General. 

The  Secretary  of  War,  Hon.  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  stated 
that  his  object  in  assembling  the  officers  present  was  to  effect 


STANTON'S  NEW    DUTIES 


367 


an  informal  organization  for  his  own  instruction,  and  in  order 
the  more  effectually  to  bring  to  bear  the  whole  power  of  the 
government  upon  the  operations  of  the  present  war.  To  this 
end  he  desired  that  they  should  meet  at  a  regular  hour  each 
day,  to  consider  such  subjects  as  he  might  desire  to  present 
to  them,  as  well  as  such  suggestions,  as  might  be  submitted, 
in  connection  with  their  several  duties  for  the  good  of  the 
public  service. 

The  Secretary  then  read  the  following  statement  of  the 
numerical  strength  of  the  various  commands  now  operating 
against  the  enemy :  — 


Department  of  New  York  —  a  few  regular  troops 

regiment  of  volunteer  artillery  —  say 
Department  of  the  Potomac     . 
Department  of  Virginia  (at  Fortress  Monroe) 
Expedition  of  Burnside    .... 
Department  of  West  Virginia 
General  Buell's  command 
General  Halleck's  command 
Department  of  Kansas     .... 
Department  of  New  Mexico 
Department  of  Key  West  and  the  Tortugas 
Department  of  Florida  (Fort  Pickens) 
Department  of  the  Pacific 
Expedition  of  General  Sherman    . 
Expedition  of  General  Butler  . 


and  a 


Total 602,987 


1,500 

247,768 

15,000 

10,853 

23,527 

133,864 

158,905 

15,000 

5,790 

5,000 

2,500 

6,353 

16,927 

20,000 


He  thought  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  would  require  very 
little  attention  on  their  part,  inasmuch  as  General  ISIcClellan 
would  probably  inform  the  department  of  everything  that 
might  be  necessary  to  make  his  command  effective,  and  inas- 
much also  as  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  would  not  remain 
long  in  this  vicinity.  .  .  . 

The  board  would  be  called  upon  to  consider  the  best  means 
of  defending  our  harbors  and  coasts  from  engines  of  war  sim- 


368        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

ilar  to  that  wliicli  appeared  near  Fortress  Monroe  on  Sunday- 
last  ;  and  the  first  subject  to  which  he  desired  to  invite  the 
attention  of  the  board  was  the  condition  of  affairs  at  that 
point.^ 

Having  stated  the  object  for  which  he  called  them 
together,  Mr.  Stanton  inquired  if  any  member  of  the 
board  had  any  proposition  to  submit  in  regard  to  af- 
fairs at  Fortress  Monroe. 

General  Totten  complained  of  a  publication  in  the 
newspapers,  purporting  to  be  an  extract  from  a  letter 
written  by  General  Wool,  in  which  he  said  that  "  had 
not  the  steamer  Monitor  arrived,  everything  inside  as 
well  as  outside  of  the  fort  might  have  been  sacrificed." 
He  thought  it  was  a  very  careless  expression,  and  that  it 
excited  public  apprehension  without  any  grounds.  He 
declared  Fortress  Monroe  to  be  as  inaccessible  to  the 
Merrimac  as  it  was  to  the  man  in  the  moon,  and  said  it 
could  not  be  taken  without  a  long  siege,  the  material 
for  which  was  not  within  the  power  of  the  enemy. 

The  Secretary  asked  General  Totten  how  the  fort 
would  be  affected  by  the  Merrimac  should  she  come  up 
and  shell  it.  General  Totten  thought  it  would  not 
impair  the  inherent  strength  of  the  works  at  all.  He 
thought  the  works  on  the  Rip  Raps  could  be  carried 
by  force  on  steamers. 

The  Secretary  then  inquired  if  that  would  be  of 
much  disadvantao^e  to  Fortress  Monroe. 

General  Totten  replied :  It  is  only  about  a  mile  distant, 

^  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  one  of  the  conditions  precedent  to 
the  peninsular  campaign  was  the  neutralization  of  the  rebel  ram,  the 
Merrimac,  then  at  Norfolk. 


BOARD  OF  ADMINISTRATION  369 

and   cannonading    at    that   distance    does    not   amount   to 
much.i 

The  Secretary  then  inquired  of  the  commissary- 
general  how  well  Fortress  Monroe  was  supplied.  He 
replied  that  the  fort  was  victualed  for  about  sixty  days. 
The  Secretary  thought  that  a  very  short  supply.  He 
directed  the  commissary-general  to  report  fully  the 
following  morning,  and  in  the  meantime  to  take  mea- 
sures to  be  in  a  condition  to  put  supplies  into  the  fort 
rapidly,  and  asked  General  Totten  for  what  length  of 
time  the  fort  ought  to  be  supplied  in  view  of  the  exist- 
ing state  of  affairs.  General  Totten  thouoht  it  ought 
to  be  furnished  with  six  months'  supplies. 

It  transpired  during  the  session  that  there  were  but 
two  guns  at  Fortress  Monroe  which  could  inflict  dam- 
age upon  the  Merrimac :  one  a  12-inch  gun  and  the 
other  a  15-incli,  the  latter  not  being  mounted. 

The  Secretary :  Why  cannot  the  15-inch  gun  be  mounted  ? 

General  Totten :  It  cannot  be  put  back  upon  the  carriage. 

The  Secretary :  I  ask  the  advice  of  this  board  whether  I 
shall  give  a  peremptory  order  to  put  the  15-inch  gun  on  the 
carriage  instead  of  the  12-inch  gun.  We  have  ordered  200 
shot  for  the  15-inch. 

General  Ripley:  The  carriage  has  been  under  way  for 
months.  I  have  sent  Captain  Rodman  with  orders  to  work 
night  and  day  upon  it  in  order  that  it  may  be  finished  and 
sent  to  the  fort.  There  are  a  few  shot  for  the  15-inch  gun, 
and  orders  have  been  "-iven  for  shot  both  for  the  12-inch  and 
the  15-incli. 

The  Secretary  then  instructed  General  Ripley  to  inquire 

^  This  was  in  1861,  and  is  suggestive  of  the  progress  since  made  in 
ordnance. 


370        McCLELLAN'S   PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

and  report  speedily  in  respect  to  projectiles  for  these  guns, 
and  it  was 

Ordered :  That  with  the  advice  of  this  board,  there  being 
one  gun  carriage,  and  having  shot  for  the  15-inch  gun,  the 
12-inch  gun  be  dismounted,  and  the  15-inch  gun  substituted 
in  its  stead. 

General  Ripley  said  that  the  carriage  for  the  other 
gun  would  be  ready  in  two  weeks. 

The  Secretary :  This  thing  will  be  over  in  less  than  that.^ 

General  Totten :  I  suggest  extemporizing  a  mounting ; 
making  a  timber  bed  for  it. 

General  Ripley :  I  will  give  instructions  to  Lieutenant 
Baylor  to  do  so  at  once. 

The  Secretary  :  It  would  be  a  wonderful  reproach  to  your 
department,  General  Ripley,  should  the  big  gun  not  be 
mounted  when  needed. 

General  Ripley:  Neither  of  these  guns  is  a  part  of  the 
armament  of  the  fort,  having  been  sent  there  merely  for 
experimental  purposes. 

The  Secretary :  I  do  not  think  the  public  will  make  that 
distinction.  We  have  now  been  engaged  several  months  in 
this  war,  and  yet  the  largest  gun  at  the  fort  is  lying  dis- 
mounted on  the  sand,  and  without  shell. 

General  Ripley  :  But,  Mr.  Stanton,  the  gun  has  never  been 
adopted. 

The  Secretary :  We  have  been  seven  months  in  the  war 
with  the  fort  threatened,  and  that  gun  not  yet  been  adopted 
into  the  service.  .  .  .  Now  how  can  this  gun  be  mounted 
and  made  useful  and  shot  procured  for  it,  as  well  as  powder? 
The  civilized  world  will  execrate  the  man  who  did  not  have 
this  gun  in  fighting  order  ready  for  an  emergency.  I  would 
not  answer  for  the  neck  of  the  man  upon  whom  they  should 
fix  the  responsibility. 

^  He  was  referring  to  the  immediate  necessity  of  protecting  McClel- 
lan's  transports  on  their  way  to  Fortress  Monroe. 


HOW  TO  NEUTRALIZE  THE  MERRIMAC       371 

Then  followed  a  discussion  as  to  the  power  of  the 
Merrimac  to  endanger  Fortress  Monroe. 

General  Totten  thought  she  could  gain  notliin<r  if 
she  made  a  breach  in  the  walls,  because  of  the  protec- 
tion offered  by  the  ditch  and  water  front.  He  pro- 
posed to  mount  the  15-inch  gun  on  the  carriage  at  the 
existing  battery  and  the  12-inch  gun  on  a  temporary 


carriage. 


General  Meigs  felt  certain  that  the  Merrimac  could 
dismount  every  gun  in  time. 

"  If  she  gets  out,"  said  he,  "  there  is  nothing  in  this  coun- 
try that  can  best  her.  It  is  a  disgrace  to  the  country  that 
the  rebels,  without  resources,  have  built  a  vessel  with  which 
we  cannot  cope.  It  was  a  providence  that  the  Monitor  ar- 
rived at  Old  Point  the  day  after  this  disaster.  Yet  the  least 
damage  or  accident  to  the  Monitor  might  disable  her." 

The  Secretary :  What  do  you  propose  as  a  protection 
against  the  Merrimac  ? 

General  Meigs :  What  Commander  Wilkes  proposed  on 
Sunday  last,  —  that  the  Monitor  be  directed  to  sink  coal  ves- 
sels or  anything  else  available  in  the  channel  off  Craney 
Island.  Now  is  the  time  to  shut  her  up  at  Norfolk  while 
she  is  undergoing  repairs. 

The  Secretary :  The  question  is,  How  is  this  channel  to  be 
obstructed,  for  it  is  guarded  by  Sewells  Point  batteries  ? 

General  Meigs  quoted  Captain  Wise  of  the  navy  as 
saying  that  the  deck  of  the  Merrimac  was  as  high  out 
of  the  water  as  the  ceiling  of  the  rooms  in  the  Presi- 
dent's house. 

The  Secretary :  It  seems  now  as  if  the  navy  is  determined 
to  exaggerate  her  as  much  as  they  underrated  her  before. 


372        McCLELLAN'S   PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

Who,  General  Ripley,  is  the  livest  man  you  can  send  to 
mount  the  guns  at  Fort  Monroe  ? 

General  Ripley :  Major  Hagner  would  be  an  excellent 
officer  for  that  duty. 

The  Secretary :  His  health  is  too  bad. 

General  Ripley :  I  do  not  think  we  can  do  any  better  than 
to  leave  the  duty  to  Lieutenant  Baylor,  who  is  an  excellent 
officer. 

The  Secretary :  I  do  not  think  I  would  lose  a  moment  in 
writing  the  order. 

General  Ripley  at  once  wrote  the  order,  and  it  was  dis- 
patched by  telegraph. 

General  Totten  felt  certain  that  the  10-incli  guns  on 
the  ramparts  of  Fortress  Monroe  could  be  relied  on  to 
damage  the  Merrimac,  but  she  was  a  dangerous  enemy, 
and  he  would  shut  her  up  by  all  means. 

The  Secretary :  There  is  no  difference  o£  opinion  about 
that,  but  the  question  is  how  to  do  it.  Can  any  practicable 
mode  be  suggested  ? 

The  following  dispatcli  was  here  read  from  the  As- 
sistant Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  General  McClellan 
concerning  the  ability  of  the  Monitor  to  cope  with  the 
Merrimac. 

The  Monitor  is  more  than  a  match  for  the  Merrimac,  but 
she  might  be  disabled  in  the  next  encounter.  I  cannot  ad- 
vise so  great  a  dependence  upon  her.  .  .  . 

The  Monitor  may,  and  I  think  will,  destroy  the  Merrimac 
in  the  next  fight,  but  this  is  hope  and  not  certainty.  The 
Merrimac  must  dock  for  repairs. 

This  was  in  response  to  an  inquiry  made  by  General 
McClellan  the  day  before  as  to  whether  the  Monitor 


HOW  TO  NEUTRALIZE  THE  MERRIMAC       373 

could  be  relied  on  to  keep  the  Merrimac  in  check,  and 
protect  the  transports  from  her,  so  that  Fortress  Monroe 
could  be  made  the  base  of  operations. 

The  Secretary :  I  now  wish  to  submit  to  the  board  the 
question  whether  they  would  regard  as  expedient  any  military 
expedition  looking  to  the  transportation  of  troops  by  water 
to  Fortress  ^Monroe  before  the  channel  off  Craney  Island  is 
blocked. 

General  Meigs :  "We  would  then  have  Hampton  Roads  full 
of  transports,  and  the  Merrimac  might  come  up  and  destroy 
the  whole  flotilla.  Such  an  expedition  should  not  be  under- 
taken before  the  channel  is  stopped  up. 

The  Secretary :  Is  it  the  opinion  of  this  board  that  the 
army  should  not  be  embarked  here  and  transported  to 
Hampton  Roads  in  tbe  present  state  of  knowledge  respecting 
the  relative  strength  of  the  Merrimac  and  the  Monitor  ? 

To  this  question  each  member  of  the  board  gave  an 
affirmative  answer. 

The  Secretary  then  instructed  the  adjutant-general 
to  inform  the  Navy  Department  that  any  transports  or 
coal  vessels  which  the  War  Department  had  at  Fortress 
Monroe  were  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment, to  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  obstructing  the 
channel  between  Craney  Island  and  Sewells  Point. 

On  the  following  day  (March  14),  the  board  met 
again. 

The  Secretary  remarked  that  Fortress  Monroe,  being 
a  pleasant  place  in  the  summer,  had  become  a  point  of 
resort  for  large  numbers  of  people  from  different  parts 
of  the  country,  and  that  now  many  visitors,  including 
men,  women,  and  children,  were  there,  and  in  view  of 
present  circumstances  he  thought  it  might  be  well  to 


374        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

give  an  order  to  General  Dix  to  grant  no  more  permits 
to  Old  Point,  and  to  instruct  General  Wool  to  cause  all 
persons  not  in  the  service  to  leave  the  place  at  once. 
He  desired  to  know  of  the  board  if  his  action  in  this 
respect,  as  indicated  by  what  he  had  stated,  was  more 
than  circumstances  required. 

The  members  all  expressed  concurrence  in  the  course 
pursued  by  the  Secretary.  He  had  already  made  the 
order. 

The  Secretary :  I  will  state  to  the  board  that  it  is  in  pur- 
suance of  suggestions  made  here  yesterday  that  I  addressed 
a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  informing  him  that  our 
hulks  and  coal  vessels  were  at  his  disposal  to  be  used  in  ob- 
structing the  channel  of  Elizabeth  River.  My  letter  does 
not  seem  to  have  been  received  in  very  good  temper,  for  I 
received  a  communication  in  reply,  stating  that  when  the 
army  should  clear  Sewells  Point  of  the  enemy,  the  navy 
would  be  very  happy  to  do  their  duty  in  sinking  vessels. 
This  I  understand  to  be  a  declaration  that  the  navy  will  do 
nothing  towards  closing  the  channel  while  the  batteries  are 
there. 

He  added :  — 

The  President  sent  for  me.  I  went  and  found  Mr.  Fox 
there.  We  had  a  conference  upon  this  subject,  but  it  led  to 
no  result.  I  consider  it  our  duty  to  give  this  matter  full  at- 
tention, and  to  consider  advice  from  any  one  who  may  be 
able  and  willing  to  give  it,  but  it  is  not  likely  that  our  views 
in  relation  to  this  subject  will  produce  the  least  result. 

General  Meigs  :  Is  Mr.  Welles  to  remain  in  the  Cabinet  ? 

The  Secretary:  That  is  a  question  for  the  President  to 
consider.  He  leans  to  the  judgment  of  Mr.  Fox,  who  seems 
to  think  he  is  in  possession  of  the  entire  amount  of  know- 


HOW  TO  NEUTRALIZE  THE  MERRIMAC        375 

ledge  of  the  naval  world.  Not  being  a  sailor  myself,  I  do 
not  pretend  to  know  anything  about  such  matters. 

General  Meigs :  Why,  this  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  the 
Merrimac  shall  be  allowed  six  months  or  any  length  of  time 
that  may  be  required  to  make  her  sufficiently  strong  to  be 
invincible. 

The  Secretary:  That  is  the  logical  result  of  the  proposi- 
tion. 

General  Meigs :  "We  might  borrow  the  Monitor  to  tow  our 
coal  vessels  up  to  block  the  channel. 

The  Secretary :  The  navy  would  not  lend  her  for  that  pur- 
pose. 


CHAPTER  LI 

The  Peninsiilar  Campaign.  —  McClellan's  Disregard  o£  Orders.  — 
His  Attempt  to  leave  Washington  unprotected.  —  How  this  was 
prevented.  —  McDowell's  Corps  retained.  —  McClellan's  Misrepre- 
sentations. —  He  treated  the  Enforcement  of  Conditions  originally- 
placed  upon  his  Campaign  as  an  Interference. 

McClellan's  final  report  of  the  military  operations 
directed  by  him  was  not  made  until  August  4,  1863, 
nine  months  after  he  had  been  relieved  from  command, 
and  when  he  was  at  his  home  in  New  Jersey,  training 
for  the  candidacy  of  the  anti-war  party  for  the  presi- 
dency in  1864.^  It  evidently  derives  much  of  its  tone 
from  these  conditions. 

The  burden  of  his  story  in  that  report  and  in  his 
book  is  that  when  he  entered  upon  the  peninsular  cam- 
paign, the  President  promised  him  forces  which  were 
never  allowed  to  reach  him.  The  record  flatly  contra- 
dicts this  statement.  In  the  paper  presented  by  him  to 
the  Secretary  of  War,  of  the  date  of  February  3,  and 
given  a  place  in  his  final  report,  he  stated  that  the  total 
force  to  be  required  would  be,  "  according  to  circum- 
stances," from  110,000  to  140,000.  In  that  same  re- 
port, without  questioning  its  correctness,  he  gives  an 
extract  from  the  report  of  Mr.  John  Tucker,  Assistant 
Secretary  of  War,  under  whose  directions  the  troops 

1  This  report  appears  iu  vol.  v.  of  Series  I.  of  the  official  records  of  the 
War  of  the  Rebellion,  at  page  5. 


McCLELLAN'S  MISREPRESENTATIONS  377 

-were  transported  to  Fortress  Monroe,  stating  that  the 
number  so  transported  was  121,500. 

It  thus  appears  from  his  own  oHicial  report  that  he 
commenced  his  peninsukr  campaign  April  5,  18G2, 
•with  1 1,500  more  men  than  the  minimum  proposed  by 
him  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  that  the  number  only 
fell  18,500  short  of  the  maximum  number  proposed  by 
him.  On  the  20th  of  April  —  only  two  weeks  later  — 
he  was  reinforced  by  Franklin's  division  of  12,000  men, 
all  of  whom  remained  idle  for  two  weeks  on  the  trans- 
ports which  brought  them  to  him.  Later  on,  during  the 
months  of  May  and  June,  he  received  reinforcements 
amounting  to  over  27,000  men,  making  an  aggregate 
of  160,500. 

Before  entering  upon  his  campaign,  he  knew  that  it 
would  be  flagrant  insubordination  for  him  to  move  in 
violation  of  either  of  the  following  jjositive  conditions 
under  which  his  operations  were  ordered  :  — 

First :  The  condition  imposed  by  the  President  on 
the  8th  of  March,  that  such  a  force  should  be  left 
in  and  about  Washington,  as,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
general-in-chief  and  of  the  corps  commanders,  should 
leave  that  city  entirely  secure. 

Second :  The  conditions  added  by  the  council  of  corps 
commanders  of  March  13,  and  approved  by  the  Presi- 
dent, that  the  enemy's  vessel,  the  Merrimac,  should 
be  neutralized,  and  that  a  naval  auxiliary  force  could 
be  had  to  aid  in  silencing  the  enemy's  batteries  on  the 
York  River  ;  and,  finally,  the  additional  requirement  by 
the  President,  of  the  same  date,  that  such  a  force  be 
left  at  Manassas  Junction  as  would  make  it  entirely  cer- 


378        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

tain  that  the  enemy  could  not  repossess  himself  of  that 
position  and  line  of  communication. 

These  conditions  were  not  imposed  in  haste  or  in 
reversal  of  any  previous  orders.  They  were  made 
twenty  days  before  General  McClellan  left  Alexandria 
for  Fortress  Monroe,  and  met  with  no  protest  whatever 
from  him  at  that  time.  He  knew  that  without  them 
no  peninsular  campaign  would  have  been  entered  upon. 
How  willfully  he  disregarded  them  will  now  appear. 

He  sailed  for  Fortress  Monroe  on  the  1st  of  April. 
He  gave  the  Secretary  of  War  no  information,  before 
leaving,  as  to  the  number  of  troops  to  be  left  for  the 
defense  of  Washington  and  Manassas ;  but,  from  the 
deck  of  the  steamer  at  Alexandria,  while  waiting  for 
her  to  start,  he  wrote  a  communication  to  the  adjutant- 
general  to  be  laid  before  the  Secretary  of  War  after  he 
had  gone,  informing  him  of  the  force  so  left  behind. 
Upon  receiving  this,  the  Secretary  addressed  the  follow- 
ing inquiry  to  the  officers  named  therein  :  — 

Adjutant-General  Thomas  and  Major-General  Hitch- 
cock: 

Generals,  —  I  beg  leave  to  refer  you  to  the  following 
papers :  — 

1st.  The  President's  War  Order,  No.  3,  dated  March  8, 
1862,  marked  A. 

2d.  The  report  of  a  council  held  at  headquarters,  Fairfax 
Court-House,  March  13,  marked  B. 

3d.  The  President's  instructions  to  General  McClellan, 
March  13,  marked  C. 

4th.  The  report  of  Major-General  McClellan,  dated  on 
board  the  steamer  Commodore,  April  1,  addressed  to  the 
adjutant-general  (D). 


HIS   DISREGARD  OF   ORDERS  379 

5th.  The  report  of  General  Wadsworth  as  to  the  forces  in 
his  command  (E). 

And  upon  examination,  I  desire  you  to  report  to  me  whether 
the  President's  order  and  instructions  have  been  comjjlied 
with  in  respect  to  the  forces  to  be  left  for  the  defense  of 
Washington  and  its  security,  and  at  Manassas,  and,  if  not, 
wherein  those  instructions  have  been  departed  from. 

The  reply  to  this  inquiry,  after  giving  the  number 
and  position  o£  all  the  troops  which  McClellan  proposed 
to  leave  behind  him,  \Yas  as  follows :  — 

In  view  of  the  opinion  expressed  by  the  council  of  the  com- 
manders of  army  corps,  of  the  force  necessary  for  the  defense 
of  the  capital,  though  not  numerically  stated,  and  of  the  force 
represented  by  General  JMcClellan  as  left  for  that  i)urpose, 
we  are  of  opinion  that  the  requirement  of  the  President  — 
that  this  city  shall  be  left  entirely  secure,  not  only  in  the 
opinion  of  the  general-in-chief,  but  that  of  the  commanders 
of  all  the  army  corps  also  —  has  not  been  fully  complied 
with. 

The  garrisons  and  forts  of  Washington,  together,  had 
left  to  them  only  18,000  men.  Generals  Thomas  and 
Hitchcock  stated  30,000  men  to  be  the  number  neces- 
sary to  man  the  forts  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Potomac, 
and  the  corps  commanders  had  fixed  upon  25,000  as 
the  number  necessary  to  occupy  its  left  bank.  The 
President  then  made  the  following  order,  both  the  body 
and  signature  of  which  are  in  his  own  handwriting :  — 

Executive  Mansion,  April  3,  18G2. 
The  Secretary  of  War  will  order  that  one  or  the  otlier  of 
the  corps  of  General  McDowell  or  General  Sumner  remain  in 
front  of  Washington  until  further  orders  from  the  depart- 
ment, to  operate  at  or  in  the  direction  of  Manassas  Junction 


380        McCLELLAN'S   PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

or  otherwise  as  occasion  may  require,  and  that  the  other  corps 

not  so  ordered  to  remain  go  forward  to  General  McClellan  as 

speedily  as  possible.     That  General  McClellan  commence  his 

forward  movements  from  his  new  base  at  once,  and  that  such 

incidental  modifications  as  the  foregoing  may  render  proper 

be  also  made. 

A.  Lincoln. 

Thus  was  McClellan's  reckless  attempt  to  override  the 
President's  order  for  the  protection  of  the  capital 
defeated  by  the  vigilance  of  Secretary  Stanton.  In- 
stead of  relieving  him  from  command  for  this  flagrant 
and  dangerous  act  of  insubordination,  Mr.  Lincoln 
caused  the  following  dispatch  to  be  sent  to  him, 
April  4 :  — 

By  direction  of  the  President,  General  McDowell's  corps 
has  been  detached  from  the  forces  under  your  immediate 
command,  and  the  general  is  ordered  to  report  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  AVar. 

On  the  same  day,  General  McClellan  was  informed  of 
the  creation  of  two  new  departments,  —  one,  the  Depart- 
ment of  the  Shenandoah,  under  General  Banks,  and  the 
other,  the  Department  of  the  Rappahannock,  under 
General  McDowell. 


CHAPTER   LII 

On  the  Peninsula.  —  Stanton  to  McClellan.  —  The  Siege  of  York- 
town. —  Manassas  repeated.  —  rrej)arution8  and  no  Attatk  for 
Thirty  Days. — Yorktown  then  evacuated.  —  Loud  Demand  for 
Trooi)s,  which  were  sent  and  never  used.  —  McCkdlan's  Daily 
Promises  to  Stanton  daily  broken.  —  Said  he  woidd  have  at- 
tacked on  the  6th  of  May  if  the  Enemy  had  not  retreated  on  the 
4th. 

On  April  5  McClellan  was  on  the  peninsula  with 
121,500  men,  independent  of  General  Wool's  command 
of  15,000  at  Fortress  Monroe.  The  first  substantial 
obstacle  to  his  advance  was  Yorktown,  ganisoned,  as  he 
reported,  by  not  less  than  15,000  troops  under  the 
command  of  General  Magruder.  The  enemy  were 
about  15,000  strong  at  Norfolk.  General  McClellan 
assures  us  in  his  report  that  if  he  could  only  have 
had  men  enough,  instead  of  only  121,500,  he  would 
have  driven  the  enemy  into  Richmond,  and  followed 
them  in  "  by  rapid  movements."  Being  deprived  of 
McDowell's  coqis  (which  he  never  had,  nor  had  any 
right  to  expect)  he  was  "  incapable  of  continuing  ojiera- 
tions  which  he  had  begun."  He  was  compelled  to 
adopt  "  another,  a  different,  and  a  less  effective  plan  of 
campaign."  It  "  made  rapid  and  brilliant  operations 
impossible." 

On  the  5tli  General  McClellan  addressed  the  Presi- 
dent, greatly  magnifying  the  force  in  front  of  him,  and 


382        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

expressing  his  deliberate  judgment  that  the  success  of 
the  cause  would  be  imperiled  by  so  greatly  reducing 
his  force  "  when  it  is  actually  under  the  fire  of  the 
enemy. 

He  was  of  the  opinion  that  he  would  have  to  fight 
all  the  available  force  of  the  enemy  not  far  from  the 
position  he  then  occupied.  He  begged  not  to  be 
forced  to  do  so  with  diminished  numbers,  and  earnestly 
urged  the  President  to  reconsider  his  order  "  detach- 
ing "  General  McDowell's  corps  from  his  command. 

McClellan's  dispatches  are  so  contradictory  that  it  is 
impossible  for  all  of  them  to  be  true.  If  the  Presi- 
dent had  neglected  to  protect  Washington,  as  McClel- 
lan  had  done,  and  had  made  no  order  concerning 
McDowell's  corps,  by  no  possibility  could  that  force 
have  been  with  McClellan  at  that  time.  His  own 
arrangements  did  not  call  for  them  to  be  there  so  soon. 
How,  then,  was  his  force  reduced  "  while  under  the 
fire  of  the  enemy  "  by  the  detachment  of  a  corjjs  which 
had  never  been  nearer  to  him  than  Alexandria  ?  With 
the  Confederates  everywhere  panic-stricken  by  Union 
successes  in  the  West,  McClellan,  with  121,500  men, 
pretended  to  be  disheartened  because  he  was  not  allowed 
to  usurp  the  authority  of  the  President  and  abolish 
the  conditions  under  which  the  campaign  had  been 
authorized. 

^  The  casual  reading  of  this  would  justify  the  inference  that  the  main 
body  of  his  army  was,  at  that  moment,  engaged  in  a  great  battle  in  which 
he  was  overmatched,  and  that  its  success  had,  therefore,  been  imperiled 
by  withholding  from  it  McDowell's  corps.  The  fact  was  that  a  recon- 
noitring party  had  been  fired  upon  by  two  guns.  (See  dispatch  of 
General  Keyes,  War  Records,  Series  I.  vol.  ii.  part  iii.  p.  70,) 


STANTON  TO  McCLELLAN  383 

On  the  6tli  Mr.  Stanton  made  the  following  ex- 
planation to  General  McClellan  of  the  reasons  why 
McDowell's  corps  had  not  been  allowed  to  join  his 
forces. 

Your  instructions  to  McDowell  did  not  appear  to  contem- 
plate the  removal  of  his  force  until  some  time  this  week. 
The  enemy  were  reported  to  he  still  in  force  at  Gordonsville 
and  Fredericksburg  and  threatening  Winchester  and  the  Bal- 
timore and  Ohio  Kailroad.  The  force  under  Banks  and 
Wadsworth  was  deemed  by  experienced  military  men  inade- 
quate to  protect  Winchester  and  the  railroad,  and  was  much 
less  than  had  been  fixed  by  your  corps  commanders  as  neces- 
sarj'-  to  secure  Washington.  It  was  thought  best,  therefore, 
to  detach  either  McDowell  or  Sumner,  and  as  a  part  of  Sum- 
ner's corps  was  already  with  you  it  was  concluded  to  retain 
McDowell.  Your  advance  on  Yorktown  gratified  me  very 
much,  and  I  hope  you  will  press  forward  and  carry  the 
enemy's  works  and  soon  be  at  Richmond. 

The  order  organizing  the  new  departments  will  not  in  any 
degree  affect  your  control  over  the  supplies,  transportation, 
and  materials  that  have  been  left  behind  you,  or  that  you 
may  at  any  time  require.  The  whole  force  and  material  of 
the  government  will  be  as  fully  and  speedily  under  your  com- 
mand as  heretofore,  or  as  if  the  new  departments  had  not 
been  created. 

On  the  same  day  McClellan  telegraphed  that  he 
"  would  attack  Yorktown,  but  that  it  might  be  a  slow 
process."  And  again  :  "  The  affair  will  be  protracted 
in  consequence  of  the  diminution  of  my  forces." 

Mr.  Stanton  then  addressed  the  following  telesrram 
to  General  Wool  at  Fortress  Monroe  :  "  Please  let  me 
know  fully  the  state  of  affairs  towards  Yorktown,  and 


384        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

whether  it  is  necessary  to  send  more  than  Sumner's 
corps,  which  is  on  the  way  down  ?  " 

As  General  McClellan  was  virtually  threatening  to 
abandon  the  campaign  unless  he  could  have  his  way,  it 
was  most  natural  that  the  government  should  desire  the 
opinion  of  an  old  and  capable  general  as  to  whether 
his  affected  panic  was  based  on  sufficient  cause.  In 
reply  to  Mr.  Stanton's  inquiry  General  Wool  said  :  — 

From  a  conversation  with  General  McClellan  I  am  induced 
to  believe  that  with  General  Sumner's  corps  he  must  have 
over  100,000  men,  with  a  large  force  of  artillery.  He 
informs  me  that  the  enemy  has  in  and  about  Yorktown 
30,000  men.  If  the  enemy  is  not  stronger  I  should  think  he 
had  sufficient  force  to  overcome  it.  He  complains,  however, 
of  taking  from  him  45,000  men  under  McDowell,  which,  he 
says,  compels  him  to  change  his  plans  of  operation.  What 
these  plans  are  he  has  not  informed  me. 

On  the  same  day  General  McClellan  wrote  General 
Wool  that  General  Joseph  Johnston  had,  according  to 
information  received  from  prisoners,  arrived  in  York- 
town  with  heavy  reinforcements,  that  the  troops  of 
Manassas  were  coming  in,  and  the  rebels  intended 
fighting  their  first  battle  at  Yorktown.  Being  on  the 
York  Kiver  he  began  to  express  great  anxiety  to  get 
over  to  the  James.  He  wished  the  Merrimac  would 
come  out  so  that  he  could  "  get  our  gunboats  up  the 
James  Kiver."  He  declared  that  he  had  but  68,000 
men  for  duty,  although  the  day  before  he  had  100,000. 
What  became  of  the  remaining  32,000  has  never  been 
ascertained.  Two  days  before,  according  to  his  report, 
he  had  121,000. 


THE  SIEGE   OF  YORKTOWN  385 

In  his  dispatches  and  letters  he  constantly  com- 
plained that  50,000  men  had  heen  taken  from  him 
since  he  commenced  operations.  This  made  it  appear 
as  thonjrh  50,000  men  had  been  withdrawn  from  the 
peninsula.  So  frequently  does  he  repeat  this  unfounded 
statement  that  it  is  necessary  to  explain  often  that  not 
a  single  man  was  ever  withdrawn  from  the  peninsula 
from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  his  campaign.  He 
retained  his  original  121,500  men  and  had  39,441 
added  to  them.  The  men  to  whom  he  refers  as  having 
been  withdrawn  from  his  command  were  the  force  that 
he  was  ordered  to  leave  in  Washington  for  its  defense ; 
and  because  he  was  not  allowed  to  take  them  away  in 
violation  of  the  President's  order  he  charged  that  they 
had  been  withdrawn  from  his  support. 

It  is  evident  that  the  retention  of  McDowell's  corps 
in  northern  Yiro-inia  was  made  to  serve  McClellan 
throuohout  as  an  excuse  for  the  non-action  which  was 
either  his  policy  or  a  constitutional  defect.  His  dis- 
patches to  the  War  Department  now  alternated  between 
explanations  why  nothing  was  done  and  calls  for  more 
troops.  The  siege  of  Yorktown  was  to  be  the  work  of 
"  the  next  thirty  days."  April  9  the  weather  was  so 
execrable ;  the  roads  were  terrible  ;  siege-guns  could 
not  be  landed  because  of  the  washout,  but  "would  lose 
no  time  in  placing  our  heavy  guns,"  and  would  assault 
at  the  earliest  practicable  moment.  On  the  10th 
Franklin's  and  McCall's  divisions  were  wanted.  The 
fate  of  the  cause  depended  upon  having  Franklin's 
division  at  any  rate. 

His  point  of  attack,  he  stated,  was  determined,  and 


386        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

he  was  at  that  moment  engaged  in  fixing  the  position 
of  the  batteries.  Under  the  President's  direction  Stan- 
ton immediately  ordered  Franklin's  division  sent  to 
him,  and  telegraphed  him  April  11 :  — 

Frankhn's  division  is  marching  towards  Alexandria  to 
embark.  McCall's  will  be  sent  if  the  safety  of  this  city  will 
permit.  Inform  me  where  you  want  Franklin  to  land.  He 
will  embark  to-morrow  and  as  quickly  as  possible. 

On  the  11th  he  assured  Secretary  Stanton  that  good 
progress  in  landing  heavy  guns  and  supplies  would  be 
made  on  the  day  following. 

Much  of  his  time  was  devoted  to  addressing  com- 
munications to  President  Lincoln  and  Secretary  Stanton 
Fewailing  his  condition,  speculating  on  the  probabilities 
as  to  how  much  stronger  the  enemy  were  than  his  own 
forces,  agreeing  to  do  the  best  he  could  without  any 
support  from  the  government,  and  deprecating  the 
failure  to  send  him  more  troops.  Mr.  Lincoln  wrote 
him  on  the  9th  of  April :  — 

There  is  a  curious  mystery  about  the  number  of  troops  now 
with  you.  When  I  telegraphed  you  on  the  6th,  saying  that 
you  had  over  100,000  with  you,  I  had  just  obtained  from  the 
Secretary  of  War  a  statement,  taken,  as  he  said,  from  your 
own  reports,  making  108,000  then  with  you  and  on  the  road 
to  you.  You  now  say  that  you  will  have  but  85,000  when  all 
on  the  road  to  you  shall  have  reached  you.  How  can  the 
discrepancy  of  23,000  be  accounted  for  ? 

The  President  then  urged  him  to  strike  a  blow, 
warning  him  that  the  enemy  were  gaining  faster  by 
fortifications  and  reinforcements  than  he  could  by 
reinforcements  alone.     He  concluded :  — 


THE  SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWN  387 

You  will  do  me  the  justice  to  remember  I  always  insisted 
that  going  down  the  bay  in  search  of  a  field,  instead  of  fight- 
ing at  or  near  Manassas,  was  only  shifting  and  not  surmount- 
ing a  difficulty;  that  we  have  just  the  same  enemy,  with  the 
same  or  equal  intrenchments  at  either  place.  The  country 
will  not  fail  to  note,  is  now  noting,  that  the  persistent  hesita- 
tion to  move  upon  an  intrenched  enemy  is  but  the  story  of 
Manassas  repeated.  I  beg  to  assure  you  that  I  have  never 
written  or  spoken  to  you  in  a  kindlier  spirit  than  now,  nor 
with  a  fuller  purpose  to  sustain  you,  so  far  as  in  my  most 
anxious  judgment  I  consistently  can  ;  but  you  must  act. 

April  12  McClellan  telegraphed  Stanton  :  — 

I  thank  you  most  sincerely  for  the  reinforcements  sent  me, 
Franklin  will  attack  on  the  other  side.  The  moment  I  hear 
from  him  I  will  state  a  point  of  rendezvous.  I  am  confident 
as  to  results  now. 

On  the  13th  McClellan  telegraphed  Stanton  :  — 

We  shall  soon  be  at  them,  and  I  am  sure  of  the  result. 

His  force  at  that  time,  as  certified  by  himself  and  on 
record  in  the  adjutant-general's  office,  was,  aggregate 
present  for  duty,  100,970.^ 

On  the  14th  he  assured  Secretary  Stanton  that  he 
■was  getting  up  the  heavy  guns,  mortars,  and  ammuni- 
tion quite  rapidly.  On  the  next  day  he  hoped  "  to 
make  good  progress." 

On  the  16th  he  telegraphed  as  follows  :  — 

General  Sumner  has  just  handsomely  silenced  the  fire  of 
the  so-called  one-gun  battery,  and  forced  the  enemy  to  suspend 
work.     Mott's  battery  behaved  splendidly. 

To  which  Mr.  Stanton  replied  :  — 

*  War  Records,  Series  I.  vol.  ii.  part  iii.  p.  97. 


388        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

Good  for  tlie  first  lick.  Hurrah  for  Mott  and  the  one-gun 
battery.  Let  us  have  Yorktown,  with  Magruder  and  his 
gaug,  before  the  first  of  May,  and  the  job  will  be  over.  I 
have  seen  General  Ripley  about  the  shells. 

April  18  McClellan  hoped  to  have  twelve  heavy  guns 
in  battery  by  daybreak,  five  more  the  next  night,  and 
twenty-one  more  the  next  night.  Then  they  would 
commence  the  first  parallel,  etc.  Mr.  Stanton  asked 
him  on  that  day  whether  the  indications  did  not  show 
that  the  enemy  were  inclined  to  take  the  offensive.  He 
replied  that  he  could  not  hope  for  such  good  fortune  ; 
that  he  was  perfectly  prepared  for  any  attack  the 
enemy  might  make.  On  the  same  day  he  called  for 
another  200-pound  Parrott  gun. 

On  the  20th  of  April  Franklin's  di^asion  of  12,000 
men  arrived  at  the  headquarters  near  Yorktown,  but 
remained  on  board  the  transport  vessels  which  brought 
them  until  the  3d  of  May !  They  seemed  to  be 
needed  only  pre^aous  to  their  arrival. 

On  the  25th  of  April  Assistant  Secretary  Watson 
wrote  to  McClellan  and  inclosed  to  him  a  paper  written 
by  a  person  of  high  character.^  It  was  to  the  effect 
that  the  writer  believed  the  enemy  would  make  no  stand 
at  Yorktown,  but  would  be  more  likely  to  concentrate 
for  an  attack  upon  jMcDowell  at  Fredericksburg,  and  that 
preparatory  to  this  he  would  draw  off  the  main  body  of 
the  troops  from  Yorktown,  leaving  only  enough  to 
menace  McClellan  and  keep  his  forces  unoccupied. 

April  26  McClellan  informed  Stanton  that  the  first 
parallel  was  completed !  also  that  it  would  be  nearly 
finished  by  daylight ! 

1  Probably  General  Scott. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWN  389 

Here  is  his  telegram  :  — 

I  am  glad  to  write  that  the  first  parallel  now  extends  to 
York  River,  being  now  complete.  The  most  exposed  portion 
was  commenced  to-night  by  the  regulars.  They  are  now  well 
under  cover  and  the  parallel  will  be  nearly  finished  by  day- 
light. Everything  quiet  to-night.  No  firing  on  either  side 
that  amounts  to  anything. 

On  the  27th  he  said  that  the  first  parallel  was 
"  essentially  finished." 

On  the  28th  he  was  making  good  progress.  Mortar 
batteries  were  progressing  and  would  soon  be  ready  to 
open.  He  would  be  glad  to  have  the  thirty  Parrotts 
in  the  works  around  Washington  at  once.  Was  "  very 
short  of  that  excellent  gun." 

Referring  to  this  demand  the  President  sent  the  fol- 
lowing :  — 

Your  call  for  Parrott  guns  from  Washington  alarms  me, 
chiefly  because  it  argues  indefinite  procrastination.  Is 
nothing  to  be  done  ? 

April  30  he  reported  that  he  had  opened  upon  York- 
town  wharf  with  battery  No.  1,  and  driven  off  all  their 
schooners.  On  that  day  he  reported  that  he  had 
present  with  him  for  duty  112,392  men.  This  is  from 
the  records  in  the  adjutant-general's  office. 

May  1  he  telegraphed  Secretary  Stanton  :  — 

The  time  for  opening  fire  is  now  rapidly  approaching. 

On  the  2d  he  telegraphed  Stanton  :  — 

You  have  not  much  longer  to  wait. 

On  the  3d  he  telegraphed  the  Secretary  that  the 
enemy  was  unusually  quiet  the  previous  night  and  that 


390        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

morning.  That  most  satisfactory  progress  was  being 
made  in  arming  the  batteries. 

At  noon  on  the  4th  Secretary  Stanton  received  a 
dispatch  from  McClellan,  saying  :  "  Yorktown  is  in  our 
possession."  In  fact,  it  had  been  evacuated  the  night 
before  without  his  knowledge.  McClellan  reported 
that  he  had  a  force  of  his  cavalry  in  pursuit  of  the 
enemy,  supported  by  infantry.  Secretary  Stanton  tele- 
graphed :  — 

Accept  my  cordial  congratulations  upon  the  success  at 
Yorktown.  I  am  rejoiced  to  hear  that  your  forces  are  in 
active  pursuit.  Please  furnish  me  with  details  as  far  as  they 
are  required.     I  hope  soon  to  hail  your  arrival  at  Richmond. 

McClellan  thus  summarizes  this  grand  military  ex- 
ploit —  the  siege  of  Yorktown  :  ^  — 

As  the  siege  progressed  it  was  with  great  difficulty  that  the 
rifle  pits  on  the  road  could  be  excavated  and  held,  so  little 
covering  could  be  made  against  the  hot  fire  of  the  enemy's 
artillery  and  infantry.  Their  guns  continued  firing  up  to  a 
late  hour  on  the  night  of  the  3d  of  May.  Our  batteries 
would  have  been  ready  to  open  on  the  6th  of  May  at  least, 
but  on  the  morning  of  the  4th  it  was  discovered  that  the 
enemy  had  already  been  compelled  to  evacuate  his  position 
during  the  night,  leaving  behind  him  all  of  his  heavy  guns 
uninjured  and  a  large  amount  of  munitions  and  supplies. 

Manassas  had  been  repeated  as  President  Lincoln 
predicted. 

The  gigantic  preparations  which  McClellan  had  made 
for  the  firing  which  never  opened  included  the  con- 
struction of  sixteen  batteries,  their  full  armament  being 
114  heavy  guns  and  mortars.  Never  was  there  a  more 
lame  and  impotent  conclusion. 

^  War  Records,  Series  I.  vol.  xi.  part  i.  p.  18. 


CHAPTER   Lin 

The  Battle  of  "Williamsburg.  —  McClellan  says  Battle  was  an  Acci- 
dent due  to  Rapidity  of  Pursuit  of  the  Enemy  ordered  by  him.  — 
How  he  saved  the  Day  by  Two  Orders,  neither  of  which  he  says 
was  executed. 

After  the  evacuation  of  Yorktown,  General  McClel- 
lan ordered  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy  towards  Williams- 
burg under  two  separate  and  conflicting  commands. 
General  Sumner,  in  his  official  report,  states  that  he 
received  an  order  from  General  McClellan  to  take  com- 
mand of  the  troops  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy.  General 
Heintzelman,  in  his  report,  states  that  his  instructions 
directed  him  to  take  "  control  of  the  entire  movement." 

The  enemy  made  a  stand  at  AVilliamsburg,  and  on 
Monday,  May  5,  a  severe  battle  took  place,  resulting 
in  a  Union  victory  with  a  loss  of  450  killed  and  1400 
wounded.*  General  McClellan  himself,  as  he  says  in 
his  report,  "  remained  at  Yorktown,  pushing  General 
FrankUn  and  his  troops  "  up  the  York  River  to  West 
Point.     To  his  wife  he  wrote,  May  6  :  — 

Unfortunately  I  did  not  go  with  the  advance  myself,  being 
obliged  to  remain  to  get  Franklin  and  Sedgwick  started  up 
the  river  for  West  Point. 

It  certainly  was  unfortunate  that  these  able  generals 

1  In  his  Own  Story, -page  322,  General  McClellan  says:  "The  battle 
of  Williamsburg  was  an  accident  brought  about  by  the  rapid  pursuit  of 
our  troops."  lie  ordered  the  pursuit  ;  strange  that  its  success  in  over- 
taking the  enemy  should  have  been  regarded  by  him  as  "  an  accident." 


392        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

could  not,  with  tlie  aid  o£  their  quartermasters,  embark 
a  division  of  troops,  without  the  personal  supervision  of 
General  MeClellan. 

He  was  summoned  to  the  field  by  the  news  that 
things  were  going  badly,  and  arrived  at  five  o'clock. 
His  official  report  shows  that  he  produced  no  effect 
whatever  upon  the  battle.  He  states  that  he  ordered 
General  Smith  and  General  Naglee  to  the  support  of 
Hancock's  command,  but  that  before  they  could  reach 
the  field,  although  they  moved  with  great  rapidity,  the 
latter  had  been  confronted  by  a  superior  force,  which 
he  routed  and  dispersed. 

MeClellan  says :  — 

I  then  directed  our  centre  to  advance  to  the  further  edge 
of  the  woods,  and  attempted  to  open  direct  communication  with 
General  Heintzelman,  hut  was  prevented  by  the  marshy  state 
of  the  ground  in  the  direction  In  which  the  attempt  was 
made. 

This,  as  appears  by  his  report,  was  the  extent  of  his 
participation  in  the  battle.  Hancock  got  along  with- 
out him,  and  he  failed  to  reach  Heintzelman.  He 
says  :  "  Night  put  an  end  to  all  operations  here." 

Thus  we  have  his  own  testimony  that  no  order  of  his 
was  made  in  time  for  execution  at  the  battle  of  Wil- 
liamsburg. This  did  not  prevent  him  from  telegraph- 
ing the  Secretary  of  War  that  but  for  him  the  army 
would  have  been  routed  through  the  incompetency  of 
his  corps  commanders. 

Had  I  been  one  half  hour  later  on  the  field  on  the  5th,  we 
would  have  been  routed  and  would  have  lost  everything. 

To  his  wife  he  wrote  from  Williamsburg  on  the  6th : 


THE  BATTLE  OF  WILLIAMSBURG  393 

As  soon  as  I  came  upon  the  field,  the  men  clieered  like 
fiends,  and  I  saw  at  once  that  I  could  save  the  day. 

On  the  8th  he  wrote  her  :  — 

It  would  have  heeu  easy  for  me  to  have  sacrificed  10,000 
lives  in  taking  Yorktown,  and  I  presume  the  world  would 
have  thought  it  more  hrilliant.  I  am  content  with  what  I 
have  done.  The  battle  of  "Williamsburg  was  more  bloody. 
Had  I  reached  the  field  three  hours  earlier,  I  could  have 
gained  greater  results,  and  have  saved  1000  lives  [I]  It  is 
perhaps  well  as  it  is,  for  officers  and  men  feel  that  I  saved 
the  day. 

A  thousand  lives  would  have  been  a  large  price  to 
pay  for  establishing  the  belief  that  he  had  "  saved  the 
day  "  when  his  official  report  demonstrates  that  he  had 
not  even  contributed  to  that  result.  But  fortunately 
only  450  of  our  men  were  killed  at  Williamsburg. 

In  a  familiar  letter  to  General  Burnside,  dated  May 
21,  he  says :  — 

We  came  near  being  badly  beaten  at  Williamsburg.  I 
arrived  on  the  field  at  five  p.  m.,  and  found  that  all  thought 
we  were  whipped  and  in  for  a  disaster.  You  would  have 
been  glad  to  see,  old  fellow,  how  the  men  cheered  and  bright- 
ened up  when  they  saw  me.  In  five  minutes  after  I  reached 
the  ground,  a  possible  defeat  was  changed  into  victory. 

The  messasre  from  Williamsburof  to  General  McClel- 
Ian  at  Yorktown,  which  called  him  to  the  field,  was 
carried  by  Governor  Sprague  in  an  hour  and  a  half.  It 
was  four  hours  from  that  time  before  General  McClel- 
lan  appeared  on  the  field.  He  seemed  offended  at 
being  called  upon  at  all,  for  Governor  Sprague  testified 
that  when   he   stated  to  him   the  condition  of  affairs, 


394        McCLELLAN'S   PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

General  McClellan  remarked  to  him  that  "  he  supposed 
those  in  front  could  attend  to  that  little  affair."  ^ 

At  ten  o'clock  that  evening  McClellan  telegraphed  to 
Stanton,  as  usual,  that  Johnston  was  in  front  of  him 
in  strong  force  —  probably  a  great  deal  stronger  than 
his  own  —  and  very  strongly  intrenched.  He  learned 
from  prisoners  that  the  enemy  intended  disputing  every 
step  to  Richmond.  He  would  run  the  risk  of  at  least 
holding  them  in  check  where  they  were,  while  he 
resumed  the  original  position.  He  stated  that  his  force 
was  undoubtedly  considerably  inferior  to  that  of  the 
rebels,  who  still  fought  well ;  but  he  would  do  all  he 
could  with  the  force  at  his  disposal.  Four  hours  later, 
that  is,  at  three  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  6th  of 
May,  the  rebels  evacuated  Williamsburg,  as  they  had 
Yorktown  and  Manassas,  in  a  state  of  great  demoraliza- 
tion. 

On  the  9th  of  May,  four  days  after  the  battle  of 
Williamsburg,  McClellan  telegraphed  to  the  Secretary  of 
War,  then  with  the  President  at  Fortress  Monroe :  — 

Notwithstanding  my  positive  orders,  I  was  informed  of 
nothing  that  had  occurred,  and  I  went  on  the  field  of  battle 
myself  upon  official  information  that  my  presence  was  needed 
to  avoid  defeat. 

I  found  there  the  utmost  confusion  and  incompetency ;  the 
utmost  discouragement  on  the  part  of  the  men.  At  least  a 
thousand  lives  were  really  sacrificed  by  the  organization  into 
corps.2 

^  Testimony  of  Governor  Sprague  in  the  Report  of  the  Committee  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War,  part  i.  p.  569. 

*  He  still  adhered  to  the  story  of  the  loss  of  a  thousand  lives,  when 
only  450  lives  were  lost  to  the  Union  army  as  shown  by  the  record. 


THE  ARMY  CORPS   ORGANIZATION  395 

He  wished  to  return  to  the  organization  by  divisions, 
or  else  to  be  authorized  "  to  reheve  from  duty  with  this 
army,  commanders  of  corps  or  divisions  who  find  them- 
selves incompetent."  This  was  a  fresh  manifestation 
of  the  hostility  to  Generals  Sumner,  Heintzelman,  and 
Keyes,  shown  when  the  President  had  overruled  him  in 
March  by  organizing  the  army  into  corps,  and  giving 
the  command  of  them  to  those  generals  who  were 
entitled  to  it  by  rank. 

To  this  dispatch  the  following  reply  was  sent  on  the 
same  day  by  Mr.  Stanton  :  — 

The  President  is  unwilling  to  have  the  army  corps  organ- 
ization broken  up ;  but  also  unwilling  that  the  commanding 
general  shall  be  trammeled  and  embarrassed  in  actual  skir- 
mishing collision  with  the  enemy,  and  on  the  eve  of  an  ex- 
pected great  battle.  You,  therefore,  may  temporarily  sus- 
pend that  organization  in  the  army  now  under  your  immediate 
command,  and  adopt  any  you  see  fit  until  further  orders.  He 
also  writes  you  privately. 

The  letter  of  the  President  to  General  McClellan, 
referred  to  in  the  above,  is  as  follows :  — 

Dear  Sir,  —  I  have  just  assisted  the  Secretary  of  War  in 
framing  the  part  of  a  dispatch  to  you  relating  to  army  corps, 
which  dispatch,  of  course,  will  have  reached  you  long  before 
this  will. 

I  wish  to  say  a  few  words  to  you  privately  on  this  subject, 
I  ordered  the  army  corps  organization  not  only  on  the  unani- 
mous opinion  of  the  twelve  generals  whom  you  had  selected 
and  assigned  as  generals  of  divisions,  but  also  on  the  unani- 
mous opinion  of  every  military  man  I  could  get  an  opinion 
from,  and  every  modern  military  book,  yourself  only  excepted. 
Of  course,  I  did  not  on  my  own  judgment  pretend  to  under- 


396        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

stand  the  subject.  I  now  think  it  indispensable  for  you  to 
know  how  your  struggle  against  it  is  received  in  quarters 
which  we  cannot  entirely  disregard.  It  is  looked  upon  as 
merely  an  effort  to  pamper  one  or  two  pets  and  to  persecute 
and  degrade  their  supposed  rivals.  I  have  no  word  from 
Sumner,  Heintzelman,  or  Keyes.  The  commanders  of  these 
corps  are,  of  course,  the  three  highest  officers  with  you,  but  I 
am  constantly  told  that  you  have  no  consultation  or  commu- 
nication with  them ;  that  you  consult  and  communicate  with 
nobody  but  General  Fitz  John  Porter,  and  perhaps  General 
Franklin.  I  do  not  say  that  these  complaints  are  true  or 
just ;  but  at  all  events  it  is  proper  you  should  know  of  their 
existence.  Do  the  commanders  of  corps  disobey  your  orders 
in  anything? 

When  you  relieved  General  Hamilton  of  his  command  the 
other  day,  you  thereby  lost  the  confidence  of  at  least  one  of 
your  best  friends  in  the  Senate.  And  here  let  me  say,  not  as 
applicable  to  you  personally,  that  senators  and  representa- 
tives speak  of  me  in  their  places  as  they  please,  without  ques- 
tion, and  that  officers  of  the  army  must  cease  addressing 
insulting  letters  to  them  for  taking  no  greater  liberty  with 
them. 

But  to  return :  are  you  strong  enough  —  are  you  strong 
enough  even  with  my  help  —  to  set  your  foot  upon  the  necks 
of  Sumner,  Heintzelman,  and  Keyes  all  at  once  ?  This  is  a 
practical  and  very  serious  question  for  you. 

The  success  of  your  army  and  the  cause  of  the  country  are 
the  same,  and  of  course  I  only  desire  the  good  of  the  cause. 

A  little  later  the  President  authorized  the  formation 
of  two  additional  provisional  army  corps,  to  be  com- 
manded by  Generals  Porter  and  Franklin.  They  were 
numbered  the  5th  and  6th.  The  order  announcing 
this  was  promulgated  by  General  McClellan  May  18. 


A  LETTER  FROM  THE  PRESIDENT     397 

The  President  and  his  Secretary  of  War  cannot  be 
said  to  have  been  wantino-  in  forbearance  towards  the 
general,  who,  like  a  spoiled  child,  was  nevertheless  just 
as  determined  in  his  hostility  after  being  indulged  as 
when  opposed.  When  an  order  was  distasteful  to  him, 
the  only  attention  paid  to  it  by  him  was  to  persistently 
demand  its  revocation  or  modification.  The  sfovern- 
ment  had  to  compromise  with  him  and  make  corps 
commanders  of  his  two  favorites  before  he  would  even 
seem  to  tolerate  their  seniors,  already  under  his  com- 
mand. Even  then  he  made  no  show  of  being  recon- 
ciled to  the  latter. 


CHAPTER  LIV 

The  Fall  of  Norfolk  and  the  Destruction  of  the  Merrimac.  —  The 
James  River  then  opened  to  McClellan. 

On  the  day  of  the  evacuation  of  Yorktown,  Mr. 
Stanton  sent  the  following  to  General  Wool,  at  Fortress 
Monroe :  — 

The  President  desires  to  know  whether  your  force  is  in  con- 
dition for  a  sudden  movement,  if  one  should  be  ordered  under 
your  command.     Please  have  it  in  readiness. 

On  the  6th  the  President  and  Secretaries  Stanton  and 
Chase  were  at  Fortress  Monroe,  as  appeared  by  the  fol- 
lowing dispatch  from  Stanton  to  McClellan  :  — 

The  President  with  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  reached 
here  a  few  moments  ago,  having  left  Washington  last  evening, 
and  we  are  rejoiced  to  learn  of  the  success  of  your  recent 
operations.  I  find  here  a  copy  of  your  dispatch  of  this  day's 
date,  and  in  answer  to  inquiry  state  that  you  are  authorized 
to  inscribe  the  names  of  battles  upon  regimental  banners  at 
your  discretion.  We  shall  remain  here  a  day  or  two,  and 
will  be  glad  to  confer  with  you  to-morrow  and  render  you  any 
assistance. 

May  7  Mr.  Stanton  sent  the  following  to  General 
McClellan :  — 

Your  dispatch  received,  and  I  am  rejoiced  at  the  success  of 
your  operations.  An  expedition  under  Captain  Rodgers  will 
under  express  orders  be  sent  up  the  James  River  to-night, 


t 
^ 


Lj 


^ 


1^ 


4 


) 


.4 


THE  MOVEMENT  UPON  NORFOLK  399 

consisting  of  the  Galena  and  two  gunboats  for  the  purpose  of 
cooperating  with  you.  They  start  as  soon  as  pilots  can  be 
found.  Wednesday  midnight.  Is  there  anything  else  you 
want? 

And  on  the  8th  Mr.  Stanton  telegraphed  General 
McCleUau:  — 

Commander  Rodgers  with  three  gunboats  started  this  morn- 
ing up  the  James  River.  If  you  can  aid  them  any  way  with 
supplies  in  case  they  run  short,  it  may  be  well  to  be  in  condi- 
tion to  do  so.  A  rebel  tug-boat  from  Norfolk  came  over  and 
surrendered  to  us  this  morning.  They  report  that  for  three 
days  Norfolk  was  being  evacuated,  the  Navy  Yard  being  dis- 
mantled, the  troops  going  some  to  Richmond  and  others 
north  to  join  Jackson.  The  Yorktown,  Jamestown,  and  two 
other  rebel  gunboats  are  up  the  James  River,  and  the  Merri- 
mac  will  probably  try  to  get  up  to-day. 

An  attack  on  Sewells  Point  batteries  will  be  made  to-day 
by  Commodore  Goldsborough  and  General  Wool. 

Report  anything  you  need. 

The  deserters  say  there  is  great  consternation  in  Richmond 
and  Norfolk.  The  machinery  of  the  Navy  Yard  and  all  the 
cotton,  tobacco,  and  oil  are  being  shipped  to  Weldon  and 
Raleigh. 

On  the  8th  Mr.  Stanton  sent  to  Washington  the  fol- 
lowing account  of  the  naval  expedition  up  the  James 
River,  and  of  the  movement  upon  Norfolk  :  — 

An  attack  on  Sewells  Point  will  be  made  to-day.  Com- 
mander Rodgers  with  three  gunboats  moved  this  morning  up 
the  James  River  toward  Richmond.  We  shall  advance  di- 
rectly on  Norfolk.  Cannonading  up  the  James  River  can  be 
distinctly  heard  at  this  moment,  supposed  to  be  our  gunboats 
attacking  the  Yorktown  and  Jamestown  that  went  up  two 


400        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

nights  ago.     Report  says  that  all  the  tobacco,  oil,  and  cotton 
are  being  removed  from  Norfolk.     Things  are  moving  now. 

And  later  in  the  day  the  following :  — 

The  President  is  at  this  moment  (two  o'clock  P.  m.)  at  Fort 
Wool  witnessing  our  gunboats  —  three  of  them  besides  the 
Monitor  and  Stevens  —  shelling  the  rebel  batteries  at  Se wells 
Point.  At  the  same  time,  heavy  firing  up  the  James  River 
indicates  that  Rodgers  and  Morris  are  fighting  the  Jamestown 
and  Yorktown  up  the  James  River.  The  boom  of  heavy 
cannonading  strikes  the  ear  every  minute.  The  Sawyer  gun 
in  Fort  Wool  has  silenced  one  battery  on  Sewells  Point. 
The  James  rifle  mounted  on  Fort  Wool  also  does  good  work. 
It  was  a  beautiful  sight  to  witness  the  boats  moving  on 
Sewells  Point,  and  one  after  the  other  opening  fire  and  blaz- 
ing away  every  minute.  The  troops  will  be  ready  in  an  hour 
to  move.  The  ships  engaged  are  the  Dacotah,  the  Savannah, 
and  the  San  Jacinto,  the  Monitor  and  the  Stevens.  The 
Merrimac  has  not  made  her  appearance,  but  is  expected  in 
the  field  every  minute.  A  rebel  tug  came  over  this  morning, 
and  the  deserters  said  that  the  Merrimac  was  at  Norfolk  when 
they  left. 

The  naval  attack  on  the  batteries  at  Sewells  Point 
was  followed  by  the  landing  of  troops  in  that  vicinity 
by  General  Wool,  during  the  night  of  the  9th. 

Mr.  Stanton  telegraphed  to  Washington  from  Fortress 
Monroe  May  10  :  — 

The  troops  were  landed  last  night,  and  are  on  the  advance 
to  Norfolk.  Nothing  for  the  last  twenty-four  hours  from 
Rodgers's  expedition.  Nothing  of  any  interest  from  the  army. 
Your  telegram  received.     We  shall  wait  the  result  on  Norfolk. 

Later  on  the  same  day,  Mr.  Stanton  telegraphed 
General  McClellan :  — 


DESTRUCTION  OF  THE   MERRIMAC  401 

Norfolk  and  Portsmouth  surrendered  to  General  Wool  at 
five  o'clock  this  afternoon  without  a  battle.  General  linger 
withdrew  his  force.  General  Viele  is  in  possession  with  five 
thousand  troops.  The  city  was  not  burned.  The  smoke  and 
fires  which  have  been  visible  for  some  hours  in  that  direction 
arose  from  other  causes.  General  Wool  and  Secretary  Chase, 
who  accompanied  him  from  Norfolk,  have  returned  here. 

On  the  11th  Mr.  Stanton  sent  the  following  to  P.  H. 
Watson :  — 

The  Merrimac  was  blown  up  by  the  rebels  at  two  minutes 
before  five  o'clock  this  morning.  She  was  set  fire  to  about 
three  o'clock,  and  the  explosion  took  place  at  the  time  stated. 
It  is  said  to  have  been  a  grand  sight  by  those  who  saw  it. 
The  Monitor,  Stevens,  and  the  gunboats  have  gone  up  towards 
Norfolk. 

General  McClellan  had  telegraphed  to  Secretary  Stan- 
ton on  the  10th  :  — 

Should  Norfolk  be  taken  and  the  Merrimac  destroyed,  I 
can  change  my  line  to  the  James  River  and  dispense  with 
the  railroad. 

At  nine  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  11th,  McClellan 
sent  the  following  from  his  camp,  nineteen  miles  from 
Williamsburg :  — 

I  congratulate  you  from  the  bottom  of  my  heart  upon  the 
destruction  of  the  Merrimac.  I  would  now  most  earnestly 
urge  that  our  gunboats  and  the  ironclad  boats  be  sent  as  far 
as  possible  up  the  James  River  without  delay.  This  will 
enable  me  to  make  our  movements  much  more  decisive. 

On  the  same  day,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  ordered 
Commodore  Goldsborough  to  push  all  the  boats  he 
could  spare  up  the  James  River,  even  to  Richmond, 


402        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CA^IPAIGN 

unless  otherwise  ordered  by  the  President.  The  fol- 
lowing dispatch  from  Stanton  to  McClellan  the  same 
day  shows  that  the  latter  did  not  lack  the  support  of 
the  navy,  if  he  felt  disposed  to  change  his  base  to  the 
James  Eiver :  — 

We  are  on  board  the  steamer  homeward  bomid,  having 
just  returned  from  Norfolk.  The  order  to  send  the  Monitor, 
Stevens,  and  one  or  two  other  boats  up  the  James  River  has 
been  given  and  will  be  executed  immediately,  as  I  am  assured 
by  riag-Officer  Goldsborough. 


CHAPTER   LV 

McClellan's  Snail  Pace  on  the  Peninsula.  —  His  Failure  to  take  the 
Line  of  the  James  River  on  two  Favorable  Occasions.  —  Then 
attributes  Failure  of  his  Campaign  to  not  having  taken  it.  —  His 
Correspondence,  exposing  Glaring  Inconsistency,  and  refuting 
many  Statements  in  his  Book. 

The  Merrimac  had  been  a  formidable  menace  to  all 
operations  in  the  lower  Chesapeake  from  the  time  of 
her  appearance  in  Hampton  Roads  on  the  8th  of  March. 
Although  she  had  been  so  damaged  by  the  Monitor  that 
on  the  following  day  she  had  been  compelled  to  go 
into  dock  at  Norfolk  for  repairs,  the  fact  of  her  ex- 
istence had  operated  as  an  efficient  blockade  of  the 
James  River.  By  her  destruction  on  the  11th  of  May 
that  blockade  had  been  raised. 

General  McClellan's  dispatch  to  Stanton  on  the  day 
before  was  expressive  of  elation  at  the  movement  on 
Norfolk,  and  of  his  apparent  eagerness  to  make  the 
James  River  the  base  of  his  operations  in  the  event  of 
its  success.  He  said  it  would  enable  him  to  dispense 
with  the  railroad  running  from  the  head  of  York  River 
to  Richmond.  On  the  11th  he  congratulated  Stanton 
from  the  bottom  of  his  heart  on  the  destruction  of 
the  Merrimac,  and  earnestly  urged  that  gunboats  and 
ironclads  be  sent  up  the  James  River  without  delay, 
saying  this  would  enable  him  to  make  much  more 
decisive  movements. 


404        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

His  wishes  were  immediately  complied  with,  and  a 
messao-e  so  informing  him  was  received  by  him  from 
Mr.  Stanton  on  the  same  day.  All  this  clearly  appears 
from  the  dispatches  quoted  in  the  preceding  chapter. 

No  impediment  remained  to  prevent  the  adoption  of 
the  James  River  as  his  base.  His  own  judgment  had 
the  approval  of  the  Secretaries  of  War  and  of  the  Navy. 
Being  thus  left  perfectly  free  on  the  11th  of  May  to 
adopt  either  the  James  or  the  York  River,  he  deHber- 
ately  adopted  the  latter !  From  the  hour  that  gun- 
boats and  ironclads  were  ordered  up  the  James  River,  at 
his  request,  by  Admiral  Goldsborough,  he  moved  stead- 
ily in  the  other  direction.  Although  according  to  his 
"  Own  Story  "  "  the  roads  were  so  bad,  narrow,  and  un- 
frequent  as  to  render  the  movement  of  large  masses 
very  slow  and  difficult,  —  so  much  so  that  in  the  move- 
ment to  White  House  on  the  15th  and  16th  it  required 
forty-eight  hours  to  move  two  divisions  and  their  two 
trains  five  miles,"  ^  he  nevertheless  moved  his  army  to 
the  last-named  locality,  and  there  established  his  head- 
quarters on  the  16th. 

In  his  book  he  thus  states  the  advantages  of  the 
James  River  as  a  base  :  — 

With  the  aid  of  the  gunboats  and  water  transportation,  I 
am  sure  that  I  could  have  occupied  Petersburg  and  placed 
the  army  between  that  place  and  Richmond,  so  that  the 
enemy  would  have  been  obliged  to  abandon  the  capital  or  to 
come  out  and  attack  in  a  position  of  my  own  choosing.^ 

As  to  the  line  of  the  York  and  Pamunkey,  here  is 
his  statement  as  to  its  fatal  disadvantages  :  — 

1  Own  Story,  page  341.  a  jj^^^  page  343. 


FAILURE  TO  USE  THE  JAMES   RIVER        405 

As  it  was  impossible  to  get  at  Richmond,  and  the  enemy's 
army  covering  it,  without  crossing  the  Chickaliominy,  I  was 
obliged  to  divide  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  into  two  parts 
separated  by  that  stream. 

And  yet  he  deliberately  adopted  this  line  without  any 
suggestion  from  Washington,  or  from  any  source  what- 
ever, after  the  James  River  had  been  opened  to  him  at 
his  own  request.  If  he  had  approached  Richmond  by 
the  James,  he  says  he  would  have  "  avoided  the  delays 
and  losses  incurred  in  bridging  the  Chickahominy,  and 
could  have  had  the  army  united  in  one  body,  instead 
of  being  necessarily  divided  by  that  stream."  ^ 

If  these  were  indeed  his  opinions  at  the  time  —  as  in 
his  book  he  would  have  it  appear  —  what  defense  can 
be  made  for  the  perversity  with  which  he  first  doomed 
his  army  to  contend  for  forty  days  with  the  deadly 
vapors  of  the  Chickahominy  swamps,  and  then  to  the 
seven  days  of  merely  defensive  fighting,  initiated  by 
the  enemy,  and  the  seven  nights'  flight  to  Harrison's 
Landing^  on  the  James  ? 

His  own  defense  is^  that  his  movements  from  the 
11th  of  May  to  the  16th,  when  he  voluntarily  estab- 
lished his  headquarters  at  White  House  on  the  Pamun- 
key  River,  were  compelled  by  an  order  of  the  President, 
made  two  days  after  the  last-named  date.^ 

"  This  order,"  he  says,  "  rendered  it  impossible  for 
me  to  use  the  James  River  as  a  line  of  operations; 
forced  me  to  establish  our  depots  on  the  Pamunkey, 

1  Own  Story,  page  346.  '^  Ihid. 

«  The  President's  order,  as  will  presently  be  shown,  did  not  direct  the 
adoption  of  any  base  of  operations,  but  merely  dealt  with  the  line  already 
adopted  by  McClellan. 


406        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

and  to  approach  Richmond  from  the  north.  Herein 
lay  the  failure  of  the  campaign." 

It  would  be  difficult  for  any  man  to  crowd  the  same 
amount  of  self-stultification  into  the  same  space.  Let 
us  recapitulate :  As  we  have  seen,  he  was,  at  the  very 
time  of  receiving  that  order,  on  the  18th  of  May,  — 
and  had  been  for  two  days,  —  already  estabHshed  on 
the  Pamunkey,  of  his  own  free  choice. 

He  had  told  Stanton  on  the  10th,  that  if  the  Merri- 
mac  were  destroyed,  he  could  change  his  line  to  the 
James  River,  and  "dispense  with  the  raiboad  from 
Richmond  to  West  Point."  When  this  event  happened, 
he  had  asked  for  gunboats  to  be  sent  up  the  James 
River  to  enable  him  to  make  these  "decisive  move- 
ments." His  request  had  been  complied  with,  and  at 
Stanton's  solicitation  Admiral  Goldsborough  had  been 
ordered  to  send  the  gunboats  up  on  the  same  day, 
and  he  had  been  so  informed.  Thus  the  initiative  for 
the  adoption  of  the  James  River  as  a  base  had  actually 
been  taken  on  the  11th  of  May  by  Stanton,  who  could 
not  then  have  doubted  that  it  would  be  followed  up  by 
General  McClellan  ;  but  instead  of  so  doing,  without 
even  a  suggestion  from  any  source,  the  latter  had,  on 
the  18th,  been  moving  his  troops  up  the  Pamunkey 
River  and  away  from  the  James  River  for  the  seven 
days  immediately  following  the  opening  of  the  latter  to 
his  use. 

During  that  week  he  had  been  wildly  calling  for 
reinforcements.  To  the  President  he  declared  that 
the  enemy  had  double  the  number  of  his  troops, 
besides  having   the  advantage   of   intrenchments.     In 


GLARING  INCONSISTENCY  407 

the  same  dispatch  he  said  it  was  entirely  possible  that 
the  rebels  might  abandon  Richmond,  but  that  if  they 
did,  he  wanted  to  be  in  a  condition  to  press  them  when 
they  should  make  a  stand  west  or  south  of  that  place. 
Even  if  more  troops  were  not  needed,  "  it  would,"  he 
said,  "  have  the  best  moral  effect  for  us  to  display  an 
imposing  force  in  the  capital  of  the  rebel  govern- 
ment." ^ 

Monday,  the  12th,  he  wrote  to  his  wife :  — 

I  think  one  more  battle  here  will  finish  the  work.  I  expect 
a  great  one,  but  feel  that  confidence  in  my  men  and  that  trust 
in  God,  which  makes  me  very  sanguine  as  to  the  result. 

My  government,  alas,  it  is  not  gi^ang  me  any  aid,  but  I 
will  do  the  best  I  can  with  what  I  have,  and  trust  to  God's 
mercy  and  the  courage  of  my  men  for  the  result. 

On  the  15th  he  wrote  :  — 

I  don't  know  yet  what  to  make  of  the  rebels.  I  do  not  see 
how  they  can  possibly  abandon  Virginia  and  Richmond  with- 
out a  battle,  nor  do  I  understand  why  they  abandoned  and 
destroyed  Norfolk  and  the  Merrimac,  unless  they  also  intend 
to  abandon  all  of  Virginia.  There  is  a  puzzle  somewhere 
which  will  soon  be  solved. 

On  the  17th  he  wrote  :  — 

It  is  very  difficult  to  divine  whether  secesh  will  fight  a 
great  battle  in  front  of  Richmond  or  not.  I  still  think  they 
ought  to,  but  there  are  some  circumstances  which  look  some- 
what as  if  they  would  evacuate. 

That  he  could  thus  imagine  it  possible  for  the  enemy 
to  run  away  from  intrenched  positions,  and  give  up  their 

1  Own  Story,  page  343.  Dispatch  to  the  President,  May  14,  War 
Records,  vol.  xi.  part  i.  p.  26. 


408        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

capital,  if,  as  he  declared,  they  had  twice  his  number, 
indicates  that  his  mental  processes  were  outside  of  any 
other  human  experience. 

While  General  McClellan's  disordered  imagination 
pictured  to  him  an  enemy  in  front  twice  the  number  of 
his  own  force,  the  Confederate  government  was  actually 
making  preparations  for  the  evacuation  of  Richmond,  if 
it  shoidd  become  a  necessity,  —  a  danger  which  to  them 
seemed  imminent  for  the  two  weeks  following  the  battle 
of  Williamsburg.  This  fact  is  fully  established  by  the 
following  extracts  from  the  Confederate  correspondence 
in  the  "War  Records."  The  Confederate  Secretary  of 
War  wrote  from  Richmond  to  the  President  of  the 
Richmond,  Fredericksburg,  and  Petersburg  Railroad 
Company,  May  9,  1862,  as  follows :  — 

The  government  desires,  in  the  event  of  the  occupation  of 
this  city  by  the  enemy,  that  all  of  your  rolhng  stock  and 
materials  necessary  for  the  operation  of  the  road  should  be 
sent  South.  You  will  therefore  prepare  it  for  removal,  and 
should  the  danger  become  imminent,  you  will  remove  it  with- 
out waiting  for  further  instructions. 

To  the  Confederate  adjutant  -  general  he  wrote 
May  10:  — 

Have  such  of  your  records  and  papers  as  ought  to  be  pre- 
served, and  are  not  required  for  constant  reference,  packed 
in  boxes  for  removal  and  marked  so  as  to  designate  the  bureau 
to  which  they  belong.  Books  and  papers  necessary  for  con- 
stant reference  may  be  kept  in  the  presses,  but  boxes  must  be 
prepared  for  them.  This  is  only  intended  as  a  prudent  step, 
and  is  not  caused  by  any  bad  news  from  the  army.  There  is 
no  need,  therefore,  for  any  panic  in  the  city,  and  it  should  be 


i 


THE  ENEMY   DEMORALIZED  409 

prevented  by  the  assurance  that  we  have  every  reason  to  think 
that  the  city  can  be  successfully  defended. 

The  following,  dated  May  10,  from  General  D.  H. 
Hill  to  the  rebel  Secretiiry  of  War  shows  the  demoral- 
ized condition  of  the  enemy  at  that  time  :  — 

It  is  with  deep  mortification  that  I  report  that  several 
thousand  soldiers  and  many  individuals  with  commissions 
have  fled  to  Richmond  on  pretext  of  sickness.  They  have 
even  thrown  away  their  arms  that  their  flight  might  not  be 
impeded.  Cannot  these  miserable  wretches  be  arrested  and 
returned  to  their  regiments,  where  they  can  have  their  heads 
shaved  and  be  drummed  out  of  the  service  ? 

May  13  General  Lee  wrote  to  General  Joseph  John- 
ston as  follows :  — 

I  have  received  your  letter  of  to-day  by  Major  Cole  in 
reference  to  the  supply  of  provisions  for  your  army,  in  the 
event  of  Richmond  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

Then  follows  a  statement  of  the  formation  of  supply 
depots  at  Danville,  Charlotte,  Atlanta,  Gordonsville, 
Charlottesville,  and  Lynchburg. 

On  the  17th  of  May  Jefferson  Davis  wrote  to  General 
Johnston  as  follows  :  — 

There  is  much  manifestation  of  a  determination  that  the 
ancient  and  honored  capital  of  Virginia,  now  the  seat  of  the 
Confederate  government,  shall  not  fall  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy.     Many  say  rather  let  it  be  a  heap  of  rubbish. 

On  the  21st  of  May,  in  response  to  a  call  made  upon 
him  by  General  Lee  at  the  request  of  Jefferson  Davis, 
General  Johnston  reported  the  strength  of  the  army 
under  his  command  near  Richmond  to  be  53,688. 


410        McCLELLAN'S   PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

The  strength  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  on  the 
20th  of  May,  as  officially  reported  by  General  McClellan, 
was  128,864,  of  which  he  reported  that  there  were 
present  for  duty  and  equipped  107,088. 

The  President  and  his  Secretary  of  War  could  not 
fail  to  see  from  McClellan's  wild  and  incoherent  lan- 
guage that  he  intended  to  do  nothing,  and  that  he 
intended  to  place  the  blame  for  inaction  upon  the  gov- 
ernment, for  not  sending  him  the  troops  then  guarding 
the  capital.  Indeed,  at  this  time,  every  newspaper  that 
was  unfriendly  to  the  national  cause  was  loudly  making 
that  very  charge  against  the  administration.  These 
publications  were  read  in  Richmond,  and  could  have  no 
other  effect  than  to  satisfy  the  Confederate  authorities 
that  McClellan  contemplated  no  offensive  movement. 

Following  is  Stanton's  dispatch  of  the  18th  of  May 
to  McClellan,  which  the  latter  said  had  alone  controlled 
his  ^9re?j20z«s  action  from  the  11th  to  the  16th  of  that 
month  in  selecting  his  base  of  operations:  — 

General,  —  Your  dispatch  to  the  President  asking  rein- 
forcements has  been  received  and  carefully  considered. 

The  President  is  not  willing  to  uncover  the  capital  entirely ; 
and  it  is  believed  that  even  if  this  were  prudent,  it  would 
require  more  time  to  effect  that  junction  between  your  army 
and  that  of  the  Rappahannock  by  way  of  the  Potomac  and 
the  York  River  than  by  a  land  route.  In  order,  therefore,  to 
increase  the  force  of  the  land  attack  upon  Richmond  at  the 
earliest  moment.  General  McDowell  has  been  ordered  to  march 
upon  that  city  by  the  shortest  route. 

He  is  ordered,  keeping  himself  always  in  position  to  save 
the  capital  from  all  possible  attack,  so  to  operate,  as  to  put 
his  left  wing  in  communication  with  your  right  wing,  and 


McDowell  ordered  to  mcClellan-s  aid  411 

you  are  instructed  to  cooperate  so  as  to  establish  this  com- 
munication as  soon  as  possible  by  extending  your  right  wing 
to  the  north  of  Richmond. 

It  is  believed  that  this  communication  can  be  safely  es- 
tablished either  north  or  south  of  the  Pamunkey  Eiver. 

In  any  event,  you  will  be  able  to  prevent  the  main  body  of 
the  enemy's  forces  from  leaving  Richmond  and  falling  in 
overwhelming  force  upon  General  McDowell.  He  will  move 
with  between  thirty-five  (35)  and  forty  thousand  men. 

A  copy  of  the  instructions  to  General  McDowell  are  with 
this.  The  specific  task  assigned  to  his  command  has  been  to 
provide  against  any  danger  to  the  capital  of  the  nation. 

At  your  earnest  call  for  reinforcements,  he  is  sent  forward 
to  cooperate  in  the  reduction  of  Richmond,  and  charged,  in 
attempting  this,  not  to  uncover  the  city  of  Washington,  and 
you  will  give  no  order,  either  before  or  after  your  junction, 
which  can  put  him  out  of  position  to  cover  this  city.  You 
and  he  wiU  communicate  with  each  other  by  telegraph  or 
otherwise,  as  frequently  as  may  be  necessary  for  efficient 
cooperation.  When  General  McDowell  is  in  position  on  your 
right,  his  supplies  must  be  drawn  from  West  Point,  and  you 
will  instruct  your  staff  officers  to  be  prepared  to  supply  him 
by  that  route. 

The  President  desires  that  General  McDowell  retain  the 
command  of  the  Department  of  the  Rappahannock,  and  of 
the  forces  with  which  he  moves  forward. 

By  order  of  the  President. 

This  order,  it  should  be  remembered,  was  in  response 
to  McClellan's  vehement  and  repeated  declarations  that 
his  army  was  about  to  be  overwhelmed  by  the  enemy, 
unless  he  could  have  the  aid  of  the  forces  which  were 
absolutely  necessary  for  the  defense  of  Washington. 
He  feared  the  enemy  was  so  weak  that  he  would  abandon 


412        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

Richmond  and  go  South  without  a  fight,  and  yet  so 
strong  that  he  would  crush  the  Union  army.  And  so 
he  stood  still  and  did  nothing. 

McClellan  sent  a  lengthy  dispatch  to  the  President  in 
response  to  this  order,  in  which  he  discussed  water 
transportation,  and  raised  an  issue  as  to  the  relative 
authority  of  McDowell  and  himself  over  the  troops  of 
the  former  when  these  should  arrive.  But  neither  in 
that  nor  in  any  subsequent  one  did  he  make  the  slight- 
est intimation  that  the  order  had  anything  to  do  with 
his  selection,  as  a  line  of  operations,  of  the  York  and 
Pamunkey  rivers  as  against  the  James.  How  could  he 
have  done  so,  when  of  his  own  free  will  he  had  two 
days  before  (16th)  advanced  to  White  House  on  the 
Pamunkey,  and  had  on  the  18th  ordered  an  advance  of 
his  headquarters  with  the  army  corps  five  miles  further 
up  that  river  to  Tunstall's  Station  ?  ^ 

And  yet  more  than  a  year  afterwards,  when  he  had 
been  deprived  of  command,  and  was  at  his  home  in  New 
Jersey,  he  wrote  what  he  called  an  official  report, 
abounding  in  contradictions,  inconsistencies,  and  mis- 
representations, in  which  he  declared  that  this  order  of 
May  18  forced  him  to  adopt  the  line  of  the  York  and 
Pamunkey  and  caused  the  failure  of  his  campaign.  In 
that  report  he  exalted  the  line  of  the  James  River,  to 
which,  as  has  been  here  shown  from  the  record,  he 
promptly  turned  his  back  as  soon  as  it  was  opened  to 
him  on  the  11th  of  May. 

On  this  inexpHcable  course  of  McClellan,  Jefferson 
Davis  says :  — 

^  Own  Story,  page  358. 


HIS  INEXPLICABLE  COURSE  413 

The  considerations  which  induced  General  McClellan  to 
make  his  base  on  the  York  River  had  at  least  partly  ceased 
to  exist.  From  the  corps  for  which  he  had  so  persistently 
applied,  he  had  received  the  di^^sion  which  he  most  valued, 
and  the  destruction  of  the  Virginia  [Merrimac]  had  left  the 
James  River  open  to  his  fleet  and  transports  as  far  up  as 
Drury's  Bluff,  and  the  withdrawal  of  General  Johnston  across 
the  Chickahominy  made  it  quite  practicable  for  him  to  trans- 
fer his  army  to  the  James  River,  the  south  side  of  which  had 
then  but  weak  defenses,  and  thus  by  a  short  march  to  gain 
more  than  all  the  advantages  which  at  a  later  period  of  the 
war  General  Grant  obtained  at  the  sacrifice  of  a  hecatomb  of 
soldiers.^ 

To  his  wife  McClellaii  wrote  at  midnight  May  18 :  — 

Those  hounds  in  Washington  are  after  me  again. 

This  could  only  have  referred  to  the  President  and 
his  Secretary  of  War,  the  immediate  provocation  being 
the  conditions  imposed  upon  McDowell's  advance  to  his 
support,  and  contained  in  Stanton's  dispatch  to  him  of 
that  date,  last  above  cited. 

1  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,  vol.  ii.  p.  105. 


CHAPTER   LVI 

Slanders  of  Stanton  by  the  McClellan  and  Copperhead  Press.  — 
Dh'ectly  based  on  Private  Letters  of  McClellan.  —  The  Latter 
boasts  of  having  insulted  President  Lincoln. 

It  seemed  to  have  become  the  settled  policy  of  Gen- 
eral McClellan  to  act  on  the  defensive  towards  the 
rebels,  and  to  make  offensive  war  only  upon  his  own 
government.  Well  understanding  the  eager  anxiety  of 
the  Union  masses  of  the  people  to  see  him  deliver  his 
j&rst  blow  at  the  rebellion,  but  apparently  determined 
not  to  fight,  he  commenced  the  work  of  misleading  the 
public  mind  into  the  belief  that  the  War  Department 
was  holding  him  in  check,  and  depriving  him  of  forces 
without  which  he  was  hopeless  in  the  presence  of  the 
enemy.  A  review  of  his  newspaper  campaign  against 
Mr.  Stanton  will  be  instructive.  The  editor  of  the 
Baltimore  "  American  "  addressed  Mr.  Stanton  a  letter 
as  early  as  the  9th  of  April,  in  which  he  said :  — 

A  private  note  from  our  correspondent  with  General 
McClellan,  intimate  with  all  leading  officers  of  his  staff, 
says  much  feeling  is  shown  here  in  depriving  McClellan  of 
McDowell's  corps.  Our  military  authorities  have  reliable 
information  that  Magruder's  force  up  to  last  night  was  sixty 
thousancl,^  and  still  being  reinforced.     If  we  should  be  de- 

1  McClellan  himself,  in  his  report  to  Secretary  Stanton,  stated  the 
number  to  be  15,000. 


SLANDERS  OF  STANTON  415 

feated,  through  trickery  of  McDowell,  a  terrible  retribution 
^^'ill  rest  somewhere.  I  send  you  this  as  coming  from  one  in 
a  position  to  know  the  sentiment  of  officers  at  headquarters. 

This  furnishes  a  key  to  the  public  clamor  which  rap- 
idly arose  by  the  aid  of  newspapers  having  correspond- 
ents near  McClellan's  headquarters. 

The  New  York  "Commercial  Advertiser"  of  April 
15  stated,  upon  what  it  deemed  the  "  fullest  author- 
ity," what  General  McClellan's  "  plans  "  were,  and  how 
they  had  been  disarranged  at  Washington,  and  that 
the  success  of  "  his  grand  movement "  had  thus  been 
put  in  peril.  It  was  quite  sure  that  the  rebels  had 
thus  been  enabled  to  concentrate  at  Yorktown  forces 
vastly  superior  to  those  of  the  government.  The  re- 
mainder of  the  article  was  so  evidently  inspired  from 
McClellan's  headquarters  that  it  is  inserted  at  length : 

On  this  whole  subject  we  fear  there  is  room  for  uneasiness, 
and  occasion  for  censure  somewhere.  There  appears  to  be  a 
plot  —  we  fear  indeed  that  it  is  not  in  appearance  only,  but 
that  such  a  combination  exists,  both  here  and  in  Washington 
—  to  prevent  General  McClellan  achieving  the  results  of  his 
masterly  strategy  of  the  fall  and  winter.  On  this  subject 
we  do  not  speak  unadvisedly,  and  we  deem  it  high  time  the 
subject  should  be  ventilated,  and  thoroughly  understood  by 
the  public.  We  do  not  believe  that  the  President  is  in 
sympathy  with  the  conspirators  against  General  McClellan's 
fame  and  success.  From  the  first,  the  chief  magistrate,  who 
is  no  mean  judge  of  men  in  any  relation  of  life,  was  led  to 
give  him  his  confidence,  and  is  now,  we  believe,  further  than 
ever  from  withdrawing  it.  The  same  feeling,  we  understand, 
exists  in  the  Cabinet  generally.  We  fear  it  is  true,  however, 
that  General  McClellan  has  no  very  warm  friend  in  the  Sec- 


416        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

retary  of  War.  We  would  not  for  a  moment  suppose,  how- 
ever, that  that  officer  of  the  government  would  knowingly  do 
the  general  commanding  an  injustice.  Least  of  all  would 
we  suppose  that  the  Secretary  of  War,  in  any  idea  of  hostil- 
ity to  General  McClellan,  would  consent  to  any  such  crip- 
pling of  the  general's  resources  and  movements  as  would  put 
in  peril  his  success  against  the  rebels.  It  is  but  too  true, 
however,  that  McClellan's  enemies  do  not  regard  the  War 
Department  as  a  serious  obstacle  to  their  cherished  purpose 
of  ultimately  forcing  him  from  his  position  as  the  general 
commanding  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

The  conspiracy  against  General  McClellan  is  composed 
mainly  of  civilians,  though  the  names  of  some  military  com- 
manders are  spoken  of  in  connection  with  it.  The  ground 
of  hostility,  we  take  it,  is  twofold,  —  personal  and  political. 
Personal  we  mean  in  this  sense,  that  the  general  stands  in 
the  way  of  partisans  of  other  commanding  officers,  who  would 
even  secure  to  their  favorites  the  honors  of  the  fame  that 
awaits  General  McClellan.  This  motive  for  the  opposition 
to  him  is  not  creditable  to  the  patriotism  of  those  who  are  in- 
fluenced by  it.  The  political  character  of  the  opposition  has 
been  more  than  once  betrayed.  A  certain  school  of  politi- 
cians are  angered  with  him,  and  because  they  foresee  a  pos- 
sibility that  he  may  be  carried  into  the  next  presidency,  by 
the  acclamations  of  an  admiring  and  grateful  people.  That, 
while  General  McClellan  has  acted  on  the  noble  principle  of 
the  Jewish  patriot,  —  "I  am  doing  a  great  work  so  that  I  can- 
not come  down  ;  why  should  the  work  cease  whilst  I  leave  it 
and  come  down  to  you  ?  "  —  he  has  nevertheless  felt  keenly 
this  hostility  is  not  to  be  wondered  at.  Nor  will  the  country 
be  surprised  if  the  interference  with  his  plans  after  he  left 
Washington  proves  to  have  been  the  subject  of  an  earnest 
protest  to  the  War  Department,  with  the  request  that  it  may 
be  filed  there  to  be  seen  by  his  friends,  should  disaster  over- 
take him. 


SLANDERS  OF  STANTON  417 

On  the  17tli  of  April  the  newspapers  published 
rumors  that  Secretary  Stanton  had  resigned  in  conse- 
quence of  differences  of  opinion  between  him  and  the 
President  touching  the  movement  of  troops.  These 
rumors  were  false,  and  were  manufactured  for  the  pur- 
pose of  confusing  the  pubHc  mind  with  a  pretended 
conflict,  with  Lincoln  and  McClellan  on  one  side,  and 
Stanton  on  the  other. 

The  New  York  "  Commercial  Advertiser "  of  the 
17th,  commenting  upon  this  rumored  resignation, 
said :  — 

Tlie  Secretary  of  War  has  certainly  committed  grave  errors 
since  he  took  charge  of  the  department,  and  we  have  reason 
to  believe  that  the  President  is  far  from  satisfied  with  the 
Secretary's  treatment  of  General  McClellan.  It  is  even  said 
that  after  the  general  commanding  went  to  Yorktown,  the 
President  felt  it  to  be  his  duty  to  interfere  peremptorily  for 
his  protection,  and  sent  troops  to  him  that  Stanton  had  with- 
held ;  and  we  believe  that  such  is  a  fact.  There  are  very 
unpleasant  rumors  afloat,  alluded  to  partially  in  our  remarks 
on  Tuesday.  Various  reasons  are  assigned  for  the  behavior 
of  the  Secretary  of  War  to  General  McClellan,  the  most 
common  of  which  is  that  the  Secretary  has  seen  visions  of  a 
AYhite  House  that  will  want  an  occupant  in  1865,  and  that  a 
desire  to  be  that  occupant  has  taken  an  engrossing  possession 
of  his  mind.  The  judgment  being  thus  warped,  jealousy  of 
McClellan  has  followed,  and  is  bearing  some  very  unpleasant 
fruits.  Such  is  the  common  rumor.  Of  its  truth,  we  are 
not  competent  to  judge,  and  therefore  offer  no  opinion.  But 
that,  from  his  first  entrance  upon  office  down  to  the  present 
time,  Mr.  Secretary  Stanton  has  not  given  General  McClellan 
a  cordial  support,  to  say  the  least,  is  very  generally  under- 
stood.    The  evidences  of  this  spirit  are  abundant.     The  let- 


418        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

ter,  addressed  to  the  "  Tribune  "  by  the  Secretary,  in  response 
to  that  journal's  laudation  of  him,  at  General  McClellan's 
expense,  was  a  pitiful  exhibition  of  his  temper.  It  was  fol- 
lowed soon  by  a  covert  sneer  at  the  general  commanding, 
dragged  into  a  letter  of  thanks  to  General  Lander,  and  has 
been  shown  in  other  ways  since.  It  is  said  that  at  least  one 
military  general  whose  obligations  to  General  McClellan 
should  have  taught  him  another  line  of  conduct,  is  more  or 
less  covertly  in  sympathy  with  these  attempts  to  embarrass 
General  McCleUan.  i  .  . 

It  is  reported  that  the  course  pursued  by  the  Secretary 
of  War  to  the  commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had 
become  a  subject  of  grave  cabinet  discussions,  and  that  the 
President  had  "  put  his  foot  down  "  —  which  is  a  way  he 
has,  greatly  to  Mr.  Stanton's  surprise  and  disgust.  It  is  not 
improbable  that  these  reports  have  some  foundation  in  truth. 
It  is  very  certain  that  he  has  no  jealousies  of  McClellan,  and 
that  he  has  much  confidence  in  him,  and  we  are  well  assured 
that  he  wiU,  if  necessary,  very  summarily  dismiss  from  his 
Cabinet  any  man  who  tries  to  thwart,  from  whatever  motive, 
that  enduring  general's  efforts  to  give  a  final  blow  to  the 
rebellion. 

Mr.  Stanton  must  change  either  his  policy  or  his  place. 

The  following  private  letter  to  Stanton,  dated  April 
16,  gives  the  source  of  the  "  fullest  authority  "  of  the 
"  Advertiser "  for  its  article  of  the  15th.  Its  writer, 
Edwards  Pierrepont,  was  a  stanch  patriot  and  an  inti- 
mate friend  of  Stanton's.  He  served  afterwards  as 
Attorney-General  and  minister  to  England  during  the 
presidency  of  General  Grant :  — 

To  an  ordinary  newspaper  article  I  would  not  call  your 
attention.  The  inclosed  from  the  "  Commercial  Advertiser  " 
of  New  York  excites  much  comment.     Eead  it  twice.     Three 


PRETENDED  INTERVIEW   WITH   LINCOLN    419 

days  ago,  a  friend  of  McClellan's  told  me  the  contents  of 
letters  just  received  by  liim  from  the  general.  These  letters 
were  the  basis  of  this  article.  That  General  McClellan  so 
intended,  I  do  not  believe.  That  these  letters  caused  the  arti- 
cle, I  am  (in  my  own  mind)  quite  sure.  The  general  sup- 
poses the  President  is  with  him,  and  his  friends  suppose  that 
in  any  difference  between  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the 
general,  that  the  President  is  secure  for  the  general.  Mc- 
Clellan gave  a  statement  of  a  veiy  peculiar  interview  "  scene  " 
between  the  President  and  himself.  I  shall  give  you  the 
"  affectionate  particulars  "  when  we  meet.  I  think  you  will 
understand  that  meeting  and  the  "  affectionate  scene."  ^ 

^  In  his  Own  Story,  at  page  195,  McClellan  states  that  in  an  interview 
between  the  President  and  himself,  on  the  8th  of  March,  Mr.  Lincoln 
said  that  it  had  been  represented  to  him  that  the  peninsular  campaign 
"  was  conceived  with  the  traitorous  intent  of  removing  its  defenses  from 
Washington,  and  thus  giving  over  to  tlie  enemy  the  capital  and  the  gov- 
ernment, thus  left  defenseless."     McClellan  then  says  :  — 

"  It  is  difficult  to  understand  that  a  man  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  intelligence 
could  give  ear  to  such  abominable  nonsense.  I  was  seated  when  he  said 
this,  concluding  with  the  remark  that  it  did  look  to  him  much  like 
treason.  Upon  this  I  arose,  and  in  a  manner  perhaps  not  altogether 
decorous  towards  the  Chief  Magistrate,  desired  that  he  should  retract 
the  expression,  telling  him  that  I  could  permit  no  one  to  couple  the  word 
treason  with  my  name.  He  was  much  agitated  and  at  once  disclaimed 
any  idea  of  considering  me  a  traitor,  and  said  he  merely  repeated  what 
others  had  said,  and  that  he  did  not  believe  a  word  of  it.  I  suggested 
caution  in  the  use  of  language,  and  again  said  that  I  would  permit  no 
doubt  to  be  thrown  upon  my  intentions  ;  whereupon  he  apologized  and 
disclaimed  any  purpose  of  impugning  my  motives." 

If  McClellan  could  make  the  coterie  around  him  believe  this  prepos- 
terous story,  the  efPect  would  be  to  convince  them  of  his  mastery  over 
Mr.  Lincoln  to  such  an  extent  that  the  latter  could  be  relied  upon  at  any 
time  to  cooperate  with  him  in  any  issue  he  might  choose  to  make  with 
Mr.  Stanton.  The  tale  is  manifestly  a  fabrication  worthy  of  Baron 
Munchausen.  It  is  probable  that  this  pretended  interview  or  "  scene  "  is 
the  one  referred  to  by  McClellan  in  the  letter  received  from  him  in  New 
York,  and  which  inspired  the  Advertiser'' s  attack  on  Secretary  Stanton. 


420        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

Here  is  another  letter  to  Mr.  Stanton  from  the  same 
writer  of  the  following  day :  — 

If  McClellan's  friends  continue  the  attack  on  the  Secretary 
of  War,  a  reply  in  time  may  be  weU.  Of  that  we  shall  see. 
The  charge  is  that  McClellan  went  to  Yorktown  with  the 
promise  from  the  Secretary  of  War  that  he  was  to  have  aU 
needed  troops ;  that  when  he  got  there  you  changed  ;  gave 
McDowell  separate  command ;  would  not  allow  McClellan 
to  have  even  sappers  and  miners  nor  any  force  adequate  to 
the  work  before  him.  The  motive  charged  is  that  you  and 
Chase  and  McDowell  and  Wadsworth  combined  to  have 
McClellan  defeated  in  order :  — 

First :  To  make  you  President  instead  of  McClellan,  who, 
they  say,  is  the  rival  for  that  office. 

Second :  To  give  McDowell  the  office  of  commander-in- 
chief  and  thus  to  aid  Chase. 

Third:  To  gratify  Wadsworth,  who  dislikes  McClellan 
because  the  latter  is  not  an  abolitionist,  and  whose  success 
may  defeat  Wadsworth  in  his  political  aspirations. 

All  these  amiable  and  patriotic  motives  are  very  confidently 
asserted  as  the  cause  of  your  continued  efforts  to  have  your 
country  disgraced  by  the  loss  of  a  battle  before  Yorktown. 
That  you  all  wish  the  battle  lost  is  regarded  as  a  truth  so 
self-evident  by  the  followers  of  McClellan  as  to  need  no 
proof. 

The  activity  is  extraordinary.  Of  the  papers  I  have  sent 
you  specimens  to-day.  This  is  all  got  up  by  letters  from 
Washington.  It  is  boasted  loudly  that  "the  President 
stands  by  his  country  and  protects  his  general-in-chief  from 
those  who  wish  our  brave  troops  to  be  slaughtered  to  gratify 
unholy  and  bloody  ambition." 

If  they  can  get  you  to  resign,  then  all  will  be  as  they  wish. 
This  you  must  not  do.  This  accursed,  absurd  bosh  is  not 
amongst  the  common  people.     It  is  confined  to  the  upper 


ACTIVITY   OF  HIS  POLITICAL  FRIENDS       421 

classes  and  to  the  newspaper  men.  In  short,  it  is  confined 
to  those  who  love  the  South  more  than  the  North,  and  who 
would  pay  homage  to  Jeff  Davis  the  moment  he  entered 
Washington. 

These  attacks  upon  Mr.  Stanton  were  evidently  based 
upon  the  contents  of  McClellau's  private  letters. 

In  its  issue  of  the  18th  of  April  the  "Advertiser" 
explained  that  it  was  McClellau's  desire  to  put  down 
the  rebellion  without  hurting  anybody,  so  that  the 
memory  of  it  "  would  not  rankle  in  the  generations  to 
follow."  His  simple  pui-pose  was  to  "  bag  "  the  rebel 
army,  which  he  had  not  been  able  to  do  because  he 
had  not  been  allowed  to  leave  Washington  undefended. 
It  said :  — 

For  this  conception  alone  General  McClellan,  in  our  judg- 
ment, deserves  the  credit  of  the  millions  of  the  loyal  people 
of  the  United  States.  For  a  young  general,  scarcely  past  the 
enthusiasm  of  youth  and  with  a  reputation  on  the  field  yet 
comparatively  unmade,  to  come  to  such  a  Christian  deter- 
mination, is  one  of  the  sublimest  moral  spectacles  ever  pre- 
sented to  the  world.  Animated  by  such  noble  sentiments 
General  McClellan  will  triumph  over  all  opposition  ;  but  if 
the  interference  with  his  grand  and  comprehensive  plans  fills 
the  North  with  groaning  for  the  slain  before  the  intrench- 
ments  at  Yorktown,  let  the  responsibilities  rest  upon  the  par- 
ties at  Washington,  who,  without  consulting  him,  divided  his 
army  when  he  had  left  the  capital. 

General  McClellan  has  never  stooped  to  complain  of  the 
bitter  assaults  upon  him  and  of  the  dubious  course  pursued 
towards  him  by  the  War  Department.  His  friends,  too,  so 
far  have  contented  themselves  with  defending  him  without 
assailing  others.     But  if  it  is  necessary  in  order  to  sustain 


422        McCLELLAN'S   PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

him  at  this  important  crisis,  they  may  be  tempted  to  carry 
the  war  into  Africa. 

This  ^*  Christian  youth,"  who  so  excited  the  admira- 
tion of  the  writer  of  the  above,  did  not  fill  the  North 
with  groaning  for  any  slain  before  the  intrenchments 
at  Yorktown.  As  a  defense  of  McClellan  "without 
assaiHng  others,"  the  article  is  unapproachable. 

On  the  27th  of  April  the  New  York  "  Herald "  in- 
formed the  public  that  it  had  been  decided  at  a  cabinet 
meeting  that  "  McClellan  and  his  plans  are  no  longer 
to  be  disturbed  by  the  cowardly  abolition  fanatics  who 
have  dogged  him  so  long."  On  the  same  day  the 
New  York  "  Express "  declared  its  suspicion  of  Mr. 
Stanton,  because  he  had  been  indorsed  "  by  such  men 
as  Wendell  Phillips."     It  said  :  — 

The  army  power  of  the  war  administration  has  been  twisted, 
too,  by  somebody  of  late  to  administer  to  and  to  excite  negro 
fanaticism,  and  to  put  passion  in  the  South  rather  than  to 
strengthen  and  develop  the  Union  sentiment. 

Complaints  were  loud  and  continuous  at  this  time  at 
Mr.  Stanton's  censorship  of  the  press.  The  New  York 
"  Advertiser,"  on  April  26,  said  it  was  "  about  on  a 
par  with  the  Egyptian  taskmasters  of  the  Israelites, 
when  required  to  make  their  full  tale  of  bricks  without 
a  supply  of  straw." 

Said  the  New  York  "  World :  "  — 

Not  only  is  the  censorship  useless  for  the  purpose  for  which 
it  was  professedly  instituted,  but  it  is  exercised  in  such  an 
arbitrary  manner  as  to  be  excessively  annoying  and  harassing. 

This  spirit  of  discontent  at  not  being  allowed  to  pub- 


CENSORSHIP  OF  THE  PRESS  423 

lish  all  that  might  be  interesting  very  naturally  made 
a  large  portion  of  the  press  willing  coadjutors  with 
McClellan's  special  organs  and  the  copperhead  volun- 
teers in  his  service.  The  day  before  that  small  por- 
tion of  the  rebel  army  which  had  for  a  month  kept 
McClellan  at  bay  retired  from  Yorktown,  the  New 
York  "World"  said  : — 

But  for  Secretary  Stanton's  interference  with  General 
McClellan's  plans,  Richmond  and  Yorktown  might  this  day 
be  occupied  by  our  troops  and  the  rebel  army  have  been 
bagged  or  routed. 

Even  the  New  York  "  Tribune "  appears  finally  to 
have  been  taken  into  McClellan's  confidence,  for  on 
May  5,  the  day  after  the  evacuation  of  Yorktown,  that 
journal  said  :  — 

It  is  not  improper  now  to  say  that  General  McClellan's 
plan  of  the  campaign  on  the  peninsula  was,  when  he  had 
gotten  before  Yorktown,  to  have  General  McDowell  push 
across  the  head  of  the  peninsula  with  50,000  men  and  cut  off 
the  rebel  retreat  that  has  now  taken  place.^  If  this  plan  had 
been  carried  out,  not  a  regiment  of  all  the  rebel  army  at 
Yorktown  would  have  escaped  ;  but  the  plan  was  changed  at 
Washington  after  General  McClellan  got  before  Yorktown, 
and  changed  without  his  knowledge  or  consent.  His  enemies 
blame  him  now  for  letting  the  enemy  get  away,  the  very 
thing,  above  all  others,  that  McClellan's  plan,  if  followed, 
would  have  prevented. 

The  moment  McClellan  was  ofiicially  informed,  in 

^  McDowell's  best  division  of  12,000  men,  commanded  by  Franklin, 
was  sent  to  McClellan,  and  in  his  dispatch  to  Stanton  of  April  13  he 
declared  that  this  made  him  "confident  as  to  results."  Yet  he  made 
no  use  of  them  until  after  the  evacuation  of  Yorktown,  but  left  them 
on  their  transports  until  that  time. 


424        McCLELLAN'S   PENINSULAR  CAI^IPAIGN 

April,  of  what  he  abeady  well  knew,  that  he  would  not 
be  allowed  to  leave  Washington  defenseless,  in  flagrant 
disobedience  of  the  President's  orders,  he  set  up  a  false 
and  noisy  pretense  that  so  many  troops  had  been  with- 
drawn from  him  that  the  country  must  not  expect  any 
successes  at  his  hands.  This  was  as  loudly  proclaimed 
throughout  the  Confederacy  as  it  was  throughout  the 
North,  and  was  as  encouraging  to  the  enemies  of  the 
Union  in  both  sections  as  it  was  depressing  among  its 
friends. 

There  was  no  time  during  the  siege  of  Yorktown 
that  his  forces  were  not  twice  the  numerical  strength 
of  the  enemy,  nor  any  occasion  when  he  made  use  of  all 
he  had. 


CHAPTER   LVII 

Stanton's  Silence  under  Persecution,  lest  Harm  come  to  the  Country. 
—  His  Reply  in  a  Private  Letter,  never  published  until  Seventeen 
Years  after  his  Death.  —  A  Voice  from  the  Grave. 

Under  all  the  obloquy  that  was  cast  upon  him  during 
that  trying  period,  Mr.  Stanton  remained  absolutely 
silent,  while  McClellan  posed  under  the  fraudulent  guise 
of  the  victim  of  a  conspiracy  of  which  the  former  was 
the  head.  The  country  was  being  told  that  Stanton 
was  afraid  to  allow  McClellan  to  win  a  victory,  lest  it 
might  help  him  to  the  presidency  and  hinder  Stanton. 
The  press  teemed  with  sayings  like  those  in  the  last 
chapter,  in  which  Lincoln  was  pictured  as  trying  to  pre- 
vent Stanton  from  aiding  the  enemy  by  thwarting  the 
briUiant  and  Napoleonic  plans  of  McClellan.  Stanton 
alone  stood  in  the  way  of  McClellan's  arrangements  for 
"  bagging  "  the  entire  rebel  army  without  bloodshed. 

Although  these  falsehoods  were,  "like  a  mountain, 
gross  and  palpable,"  they  were,  nevertheless,  accepted 
by  a  large  portion  of  the  people  as  historical  truths. 
They  are  to  this  day  believed  by  many  who  either  never 
had  the  opportunity  or  have  never  taken  the  trouble  to 
examine  the  records.  They  were  never  pubhcly  noticed 
by  Mr.  Stanton  during  his  lifetime,  but,  as  if  he  had 
spoken  from  the  grave,  his  own  answer  to  them  reached 
the  public  twenty-four  years  after  they  were  uttered,  and 


426        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR   CAMPAIGN 

seventeen  years  after  his  death.  It  came  in  the  form  of 
a  private  letter  written  by  him  on  the  18th  of  May, 
1862,  to  his  old  pastor  and  friend  of  his  youth,  Rev. 
Heman  Dyer, — a  letter  written  under  the  seal  of  con- 
fidence, which  had  been  strictly  observed  for  twenty- 
four  years.  On  the  28th  of  May  and  on  the  4th  of 
June,  1886,  a  member  of  the  House  of  Representatives 
reproduced  in  debate  the  charges  which  McClellan  and 
his  friends  had  made  against  Mr.  Stanton  in  April  and 
May,  1862,  and  thereafter ;  whereupon,  on  the  8th  of 
June,  the  Hon.  W.  D.  Kelly,  a  Representative  from 
Pennsylvania,  responded,  and  in  the  course  of  his  re- 
marks read  the  letter  referred  to,  which  is  as  follows  :  — 

Washington,  May  18, 1862. 

My  deak  Friend,  —  Yours  of  the  16th  is  welcomed  as  an 
evidence  of  the  continued  regard  of  one  whose  esteem  I  have 
always  been  anxious  to  possess.  I  have  been  very  well  aware 
of  the  calumnies  busily  circulated  against  me  in  New  York, 
and  elsewhere,  respecting  my  relations  to  General  McClellan, 
but  am  compelled  from  public  considerations  to  withhold 
the  proofs  that  would  stamp  the  falsehood  of  the  accusa- 
tions and  the  base  motives  of  the  accusers,  who  belong  to  two 
classes :  — 

1st,  Plunderers  who  have  been  driven  from  the  depart- 
ment where  they  were  gorging  millions  ; 

2d,  Scheming  politicians  whose  designs  are  endangered  by 
an  earnest,  resolute,  uncompromising  prosecution  of  this  war 
—  as  a  war  against  rebels  and  traitors. 

A  brief  statement  of  facts,  on  official  record,  which  I  can 
make  to  you  confidentially^  will  be  sufficient  to  satisfy  your- 
self that  your  confidence  in  me  has  not  been  misplaced  :  — 

1st,  When  I  entered  the  Cabinet,  I  was,  and  for  months 


^. 


^ 


V 


^^^, 


A  VOICE  FROM  THE  GRAVE  427 

had  been,  the  sincere  and  devoted  friend  of  General  McClel- 
lan,  and  to  support  him,  and,  so  far  as  I  might,  aid  and  as- 
sist him  in  bringing  the  war  to  a  close,  was  a  chief  induce- 
ment for  me  to  sacrifice  my  personal  happiness  to  a  sense  of 
public  duty.  I  had  studied  him  earnestly  with  an  anxious 
desire  to  discover  the  military  and  patriotic  virtue  that  might 
save  the  country,  and  if  in  any  degi'ce  disappointed,  I  hoped 
on,  and  waited  for  time  to  develop. 

I  went  into  the  Cabinet  about  the  20th  of  January.  On 
the  27th  the  President  made  his  war  order  No.  1,  requiring 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  move.  It  is  not  necessary,  or 
perhaps  proper,  to  state  all  the  causes  that  led  to  that  order, 
but  it  is  enough  to  know  that  the  government  was  on  the  verge 
of  bankruptcy,  and  at  the  rate  of  expenditure,  the  armies  must 
move,  or  the  government  perish.  The  22d  of  February  was 
the  day  fixed  for  movement,  and  when  it  arrived  there  was  no 
more  sign  of  movement  on  the  Potomac  than  there  had  been 
for  three  months  before.  Many,  very  many,  earnest  conver- 
sations I  had  held  with  General  McClellan,  to  impress  him 
with  the  absolute  necessity  of  active  operations,  or  that  the 
government  would  fail  because  of  foreign  intervention  and 
enormous  debt. 

Between  the  22d  of  February  and  the  8th  of  March  the 
President  had  again  interfered,  and  a  movement  on  Win- 
chester and  to  clear  the  blockade  of  the  Potomac  was  pro- 
mised, commenced,  and  abandoned.  The  circumstances  cannot 
at  present  be  revealed. 

On  the  6th  of  March  the  President  again  interfered,  ordered 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  be  organized  into  army  corps, 
and  that  operations  should  commence  immediately. 

Two  lines  of  operations  were  open,  —  1st,  one  moving  di- 
rectly on  the  enemy  by  Manassas  and  forcing  him  back  on 
Richmond,  beating  and  destroying  him  by  superior  force,  and 
all  the  time  keeping  the  capital  secure  by  being  between  it 
and  the  enemy.     This  was  the  plan  favored  by  the  President. 


428        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

2d,  The  other  plan  was  to  transfer  the  troops  by  water  to 
some  point  on  the  lower  Chesapeake,  and  thence  advance  on 
Kichmond.  This  was  General  McClellan's  plan.  The  Presi- 
dent reluctantly  yielded  his  own  views,  although  they  were 
supported  by  some  of  the  best  military  men  in  the  country,  and 
consented  that  the  general  should  pursue  his  own  plan.  But 
by  a  written  order  he  imposed  the  special  condition,  that  the 
army  should  not  be  removed  without  leaving  a  sufficient  force 
in  and  around  Washington  to  make  the  capital  perfectly  se- 
cure against  all  danger,  and  that  the  force  required  should  be 
determined  by  the  judgment  of  all  the  commanders  of  army 
corps. 

In  order  to  enable  General  McClellan  to  devote  his  whole 
energy  to  the  movement  of  his  own  army  (which  was  quite 
enough  to  tax  the  ability  of  the  ablest  commander  in  the 
world),  he  was  relieved  from  the  charge  of  the  other  military 
departments,  it  being  supposed  that  the  respective  commanders 
were  competent  to  direct  the  operations  in  their  own  depart- 
ments. 

To  enable  General  McClellan  to  transport  his  force,  every 
means  and  power  of  the  government  was  placed  at  his  dis- 
posal and  unsparingly  used. 

When  a  large  part  of  his  force  had  been  transferred  to 
Fortress  Monroe,  and  the  whole  of  it  about  to  go  in  a  few 
days,  information  was  given  to  me  by  various  persons,  that 
there  was  great  reason  to  fear  that  no  adequate  force  had  been 
left  to  defend  the  capital  in  case  of  a  sudden  attack ;  that  the 
enemy  might  detach  a  large  force  and  seize  it  at  a  time  when 
it  would  be  impossible  for  General  McClellan  to  render  any 
assistance.  Serious  alarm  was  expressed  by  many  persons, 
and  many  warnings  given  me,  which  I  could  not  neglect.  I 
ordered  a  report  of  the  force  left  to  defend  Washington.  It 
was  reported  by  the  commander  to  be  less  than  twenty  thou- 
sand raw  recruits,  with  not  a  single  organized  brigade !  A 
dash  like  that  made  a  short  time  before  at  Winchester  would 


STANTON'S   SILENCE  UNDER  PERSECUTION    429 

at  any  time  take  the  capital  of  the  nation.  The  report  of  the 
force  left  to  defend  AVashington,  and  the  order  of  the  Presi- 
dent, were  referred  to  Major-General  Hitchcock  and  Adju- 
tant-General Thomas  to  report,  — 

1st,  whether  the  President's  orders  had  been  complied 
with; 

2d,  whether  the  force  left  to  defend  this  city  was  sufficient. 

They  reported  in  the  negative  on  both  points.  These  re- 
ports were  submitted  to  the  President,  who  also  consulted 
General  Totten,  General  Taylor,  General  Meigs,  and  General 
Ripley.  They  agreed  in  opinion  that  the  capital  was  not 
safe.  The  President,  then,  by  written  order,  directed  me  to 
retain  one  of  the  army  corps  for  the  defense  of  Washington, 
either  Sumner's  or  McDowell's.  As  part  of  Sumner's  corps 
had  already  embarked,  I  directed  McDowell  to  remain  with 
his  command,  and  the  reasons  were  approved  by  the  President. 

Down  to  this  period  there  had  never  been  a  shadow  of  dif- 
ference between  General  McClellan  and  myself.  It  is  true 
that  I  thought  his  plan  of  operations  objectionable,  as  the 
most  expensive,  the  most  hazardous,  and  most  protracted  that 
could  have  been  chosen  ;  but  I  was  not  a  military  man,  and 
while  he  was  in  command,  I  would  not  interfere  with  his  plan, 
and  gave  him  every  aid  to  execute  it.  But  when  the  case  had 
assumed  the  form  it  had  done  by  his  disregard  of  the  Presi- 
dent's order,  and  by  leaving  the  capital  exposed  to  seizure  by 
the  enemy,  I  was  bound  to  act,  even  if  I  had  not  been  required 
by  the  specific  written  order  of  the  President.  Will  any  man 
question  that  such  was  my  duty? 

When  this  order  was  communicated  to  General  McClellan, 
it  of  course  provoked  his  wrath,  and  the  wrath  of  his  friends 
was  directed  upon  me,  because  I  was  the  agent  of  its  execu- 
tion. If  the  force  had  gone  forward  as  he  had  designed,  I 
believe  that  Washington  would  this  day  be  in  the  hands  of 
the  rebels. 

Down  to  this  point,  moreover,  there  was  never  the  slightest 


430        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

difference  between  the  President  and  myself.  But  the  en- 
treaties of  General  McClellan  induced  the  President  to  modify 
his  order  to  the  extent  that  Franklin's  division  (being  part  of 
McDowell's  corps  that  had  been  retained)  were  detached  and 
sent  forward  by  boat  to  McClellan. 

This  was  against  my  judgment,  because  I  thought  the  whole 
force  of  McDowell  should  be  kept  together,  and  sent  forward 
by  land  on  the  shortest  route  to  Richmond,  thus  aiding  Mc- 
Clellan, but,  at  the  same  time,  covering  and  protecting  Wash- 
ington by  keeping  between  it  and  the  enemy.  In  this  opinion 
Major-General  Hitchcock,  General  Meigs,  and  Adjutant-Gen- 
eral Thomas  agreed ;  but  the  President  was  so  anxious  that 
General  McClellan  should  have  no  cause  of  complaint  that  he 
ordered  the  force  to  be  sent  by  water,  although  that  route  was 
then  threatened  by  the  Merrimack.  I  yielded  my  opinion  to 
the  President's  order ;  but  between  him  and  me  there  has 
never  been  the  slishtest  shadow  since  I  entered  the  Cabinet. 
And  except  the  retention  of  the  force  under  McDowell  by 
the  President's  order  for  the  reasons  mentioned.  General  Mc- 
Clellan has  never  made  a  request,  or  expressed  a  wish,  that 
has  not  been  promptly  complied  with,  if  in  the  power  of  the 
government. 

To  me  personally  he  has  repeatedly  expressed  his  confidence 
and  his  thanks  in  the  dispatches  sent  me  !  Now  one  word  as 
to  political  motives.  What  motive  can  I  have  to  thwart  Gen- 
eral McClellan  ?  I  am  not  now,  never  have  been,  and  never 
will  be  a  candidate  for  any  office. 

I  hold  my  present  post  at  the  request  of  a  President  who 
knew  me  personally,  but  to  whom  I  had  not  spoken  from  the 
4th  of  March,  1861,  until  the  day  he  handed  me  my  commis- 
sion. I  knew  that  everything  I  cherish  and  hold  dear  would 
be  sacrificed  by  accepting  office.  But  I  thought  I  might  help 
to  save  the  country,  and  for  that  I  was  willing  to  perish.  If 
I  wanted  to  be  a  politician  or  a  candidate  for  any  office,  would 
I  stand  between  the  Treasury  and  the  robbers  that  are  howling 


STANTON'S  SILENCE  UNDER  PERSECUTION    431 

around  me  ?  Would  I  provoke  and  stand  against  the  whole 
newspaper  gang  in  this  country,  of  every  party,  who  to  sell 
news  would  imperil  a  battle  ? 

I  was  never  taken  for  a  fool,  but  there  could  be  no  greater 
madness  than  for  a  man  to  encoxmter  what  I  do  for  anything 
else  than  motives  that  overleap  time  and  look  forward  to 
eternity. 

I  believe  that  God  Almighty  founded  this  government,  and 
for  my  acts  in  the  effort  to  maintain  it,  I  expect  to  stand  before 
Him  in  judgment.  You  will  pardon  this  long  explanation, 
which  has  been  made  to  no  one  else.  It  is  due  to  you,  who 
was  my  friend  when  I  was  a  poor  boy  at  school,  and  had  no 
claim  upon  your  confidence  or  kindness.  It  cannot  be  made 
public  for  obvious  reasons.  General  McClellan  is  at  the  head 
of  our  chief  army,  he  must  have  every  confidence  and  support, 
and  I  am  willing  that  the  whole  world  should  revile  me  rather 
than  to  diminish  one  grain  of  the  strength  needed  to  conquer 
the  rebels.  In  a  struggle  like  this,  justice  or  credit  to  indi- 
viduals is  but  dust  in  the  balance. 

Desiring  no  office  nor  honor,  and  anxious  only  for  the  peace 
and  quiet  of  my  home,  I  suffer  no  inconvenience  beyond  that 
which  arises  from  the  trouble  and  anxiety  suffered  by  worthy 
friends  like  yourself,  who  are  naturally  disturbed  by  the 
clamors  and  calumny  of  those  whose  interest  or  feeling  are 
hostile  to  me. 

The  official  records  will  at  proper  time  fully  prove,  — 

1st,  that  I  have  employed  the  whole  power  of  the  govern- 
ment unsparingly  to  support  General  McClellan's  operations 
in  preference  of  every  other  general. 

2d,  that  I  have  not  interfered  with  or  thwarted  them  in  any 
particular. 

3d,  that  the  force  retained  from  his  expedition  was  not 
needed  and  could  not  have  been  employed  by  him  —  that  it 
was  retained  by  express  orders  of  the  President  upon  military 
investigation  and  upon  the  best  military  advice  in  the  country 


432        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

—  that  its  retention  was  required  to  save  the  capital  from  the 
danger  to  which  it  was  exposed  by  a  disregard  to  the  Presi- 
dent's positive  order  of  the  6th  of  March. 

4th,  that  between  the  President  and  myself  there  has  never 
been  any,  the  slightest,  shadow  of  difference  upon  any  point 
save  the  detachment  of  Franklin's  force,  and  that  was  a  point 
of  no  significance,  but  in  which  I  was  sustained  by  Generals 
Hitchcock,  Meigs,  Thomas,  and  Eipley,  while  the  President 
yielded  only  to  an  anxious  desire  to  avoid  complaint,  declaring 
at  the  same  time  his  belief  that  the  force  was  not  needed  by 
General  McClellan. 

You  will,  of  course,  regard  this  explanation  as  being  in  the 
strictest  confidence,  designed  only  for  your  information  upon 
matters  wherein  you  express  concern  for  me. 

The  confidence  of  yourself,  and  men  like  you,  is  more  than 
a  full  equivalent  for  all  the  railing  that  has  been  or  can  be 
expended  against  me ;  and  in  the  magnitude  of  the  cause  all 
merely  individual  questions  are  swallowed  up. 

I  shall  always  rejoice  to  hear  from  you,  and  am,  as  ever, 

Truly  yours, 

Edwin  M.  Stanton. 

Revd  Heman  Dteb. 


CHAPTER  LVIII 

The  Battle  of  Fair  Oaks.  —  McClellan  divides  his  Army  by  a  River 
rapidly  being  rendered  impassable  by  a  Flood.  —  Two  Corps  are 
saved  by  Sumner's  Energetic  Movement  in  Advance  of  McClel- 
lan's  Order.  —  A  Costly  Victory  thrown  away.  —  Army  ordered 
back  when  within  Four  Miles  of  Richmond. 

It  was  -while  McClellan  was  resting  on  the  Pamunkey 
River,  after  a  march  of  twenty  miles  in  twelve  days 
in  pursuit  of  a  fleeing  enemy,  that  Stanton  wrote  his 
letter  of  May  18,  in  strict  confidence  to  a  friend.  It 
was  on  that  very  day  that  he  wrote  the  order  to  Mc- 
Dowell to  advance  to  the  support  of  McClellan,  and 
wrote  the  latter  accordingly. 

On  the  21st  of  May  McClellan  wrote  to  the  Presi- 
dent, complaining  because  McDowell's  command  was  to 
be,  to  a  certain  extent,  independent  of  him  after  form- 
ing the  junction.  The  President  kindly  replied  to  him 
on  the  21th  that  it  should  be  as  he  desired,  and  that 
he  should  be  in  such  relations  to  McDowell  as  he  had 
himself  defined  in  his  letter  of  the  21st. 

On  the  same  day.  May  24,  the  President  telegraphed 
him  that  the  rebels,  reinforced  from  Richmond,  had 
appeared  in  such  numbers  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley 
that  McDowell  could  not  move  southward  until  the 
dangfer  had  been  averted.  On  the  25th  the  President 
telegraphed  him  that  he  must  either  assume  the  offen- 


434        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

sive,  or  come  in  aid  of  the  defense  of  the  capital.  This 
was  equivalent  to  saying  that  his  force  on  the  penin- 
sula had  not  been  a  sufficient  menace  to  Richmond  to 
occupy  the  attention  of  the  rebel  army  in  that  region, 
and  that  his  inaction  was  endangering  Washington. 
This  was  a  truth  he  could  not  gainsay. 

His  army  was  now  on  the  left  or  north  bank  of  the 
Chickahominy  River.  As  this  stream  soon  became  as 
formidable  an  enemy  to  the  Federal  army  as  were  the 
rebels  themselves,  it  is  interesting  to  know  something 
of  its  power  for  evil.     McClellan  thus  describes  it :  — 

The  Chickahominy  River  rises  some  fifteen  miles  to  the 
north  of  Richmond,  and  unites  with  the  James  about  forty 
miles  below  that  city.  Our  operations  embraced  the  part 
of  the  river  between  Meadow's  and  Bottom's  bridges,  covering 
the  approaches  to  Richmond  from  the  east.  In  this  vicinity 
the  river  in  its  ordinary  stage  is  about  forty  feet  wide,  fringed 
with  a  dense  growth  of  heavy  forest  trees,  and  bordered  by 
low  marshy  bottom  lands,  varying  from  half  a  mile  to  a  mile 
in  width.  Within  the  limits  above  mentioned,  the  firm 
ground  lying  above  high-water  mark  seldom  approaches  the 
river  on  either  bank,  and  no  place  was  found,  within  this  sec- 
tion, where  the  high  ground  came  near  the  stream  on  both 
banks. 

It  was  subject  to  frequent,  sudden,  and  great  variations  in 
the  volume  of  water,  and  a  single  violent  rainstorm  of  brief 
duration  would  cause  a  rise  of  water  which  overflowed  the 
bottom  lands  on  both  sides,  and  for  many  days  made  the 
river  absolutely  impassable  without  bridges.^ 

He  states  that  this  stream,  so  easily  flooded  by  a 
single  rain,  and  so  formidable  an  impediment  when  so 

^  Own  Story,  page  362. 


THE  CHICKAHOMINY   RIVER  435 

flooded,  was  subjected  that  month  to  steady  rains.     He 
says: — 

In  view  of  the  peculiar  character  of  the  Chickahominy, 
and  the  liability  to  sudden  inundations,  it  hecame  necessary 
to  construct  eleven  bridges,  all  long  and  difficult,  with  exten- 
sive log-way  approaches,  and  often  built  under  fire.' 

General  McClellan  minutely  chronicles  the  weather 
in  May  in  his  "  Own  Story."  From  him  we  learn  that 
on  the  14th  and  15th  it  "  rained  hea\'ily  and  continu- 
ously," and  "  somewhat  on  the  IGth."  -  On  the  19th 
the  rain  "recommenced,"^  and  on  the  20th  it  ajrain 
"rained  heavily."'*  "It  rained  heavily"  on  the  22d, 
23d,  21th,  26th,  27th,  28th,  and  29th,  and  "during 
the  day  and  night  of  the  30th  an  unusually  violent 
rainstorm  occurred,  accompanied  by  torrents  of  rain. 
The  vaUey  of  the  Chickahominy  was  flooded  more  than 
ever. 

It  was  in  the  midst  of  this  nearly  continuous  rain- 
storm of  eight  days  that  (on  the  25th)  McClellan  placed 
this  dangerous  stream  between  that  portion  of  his  army 
consisting  of  the  third  and  fourth  corps,  and  the  re- 
mainder, by  ordering  those  corps  to  the  right  bank  of 
the  river. 

He  says  that  "  on  approaching  the  river  on  the  20th 
of  May,  it  was  found  that  all  the  bridges  had  been 
destroyed  by  the  enemy  on  our  approach,  except  that 
of  MechanicsviUe."  ^ 

On  the  24th  the  bridge  at  Mechanics\'ille  was  also 
destroyed.^    He  commenced  bridge-building  on  the  21th, 

I  Own  Story,  page  364.   -  Tbid.,  page  ^41.      »  Ibid.,  page  360. 
*  Ibid.,  page  361.       *  Ibid.,  page  362.     «  Ibid.,  page  363. 


436        MdCLELLAX  S   PE>TS'SrLAR  CAMPAIGN 

one  dtLj  before  he  moTed  two  corps  of  his  army  to 

file  oppoaiB  side  of  die  river  from  the  three  remaining 
eoi|^  The  sevoi  days'  hexwj  rain  ^hich  preceded  the 
SOdi  did  not  appear  to  cause  Geneial  McGleDan  any 
mieasiiiessy  although  he  knew  it  was  sor^  isolating 
two  eocps  of  his  army,  and  placing  tiiem  at  the  mercy 
of  die  lAole  straigth  of  the  enemy.  He  professed  to 
brieve  thk  stroigth  double  that  of  his  own.  It  plainly 
folhiws  that  he  was  wiDing  to  espose  two  corps  to  an 
attaek  from  double  the  strength  of  his  entire  aimj, 
under  conditions  diat,  he  beKeTed,  would  make  repeat 
and  rraof  oreement  alike  impossible. 

RnallT.  when  the  great  storm  of  the  30th  had  come 
and  gCMie,  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks  was  fought  on  the 
Slst  of  May  and  the  Ist  of  June  on  the  Pdchmond 
side  of  the  Ghickahominy,  between  all  the  rebel  forces 
and  thz~  :ii:":i;  inly  of  our  own.  The  two  imperiled 
e(Kp&.  '  by  Generals  Heintzelman  and  Keyes, 

wexe  rtLLx.rv-^  oy  Genial  Sumner^  who,  with  great 
difficulty,  got  his  two  diri&aoiis  aeroes  ihe  isw^,  on  two 
unemnpleted  and  partially  submerged  bridges  at  half 
past  two  of  tiie  first  day.  This  desperate  battle  of  two 
days  resulted  in  a  TietcHy  fc»  the  Federal  army,  but 
it  was  deaiiy  bought.  Hie  losses  on  the  Union  side 
in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing  w^ie  5031.  The  rebd 
kuaes  woe  6064. 

^is  battle  was  not  <me  of  McQellan's  seeking,  but 
was  an  ine¥itaUe  ecMisequaice  of  his  own  disposition 
of  his  fcoees.  Hie  tdk  die  story  very  concisely  him- 
sdf  when  he  says,  after  describing  the  storm  of  the 
30th:  — 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FAIR  OAKS  437 

The  enemy  seized  the  occasion  and  determined  to  attack 
the  part  of  the  army  which  had  crossed  the  Chickahominy, 
when  it  would  be  very  difficult  or  impossible  to  support  it.^ 

And  acrain  :  — 

The  enemy,  perceiving  the  unfavorable  position  in  which 
we  were  placed,  and  the  possibility  of  destroying  that  part  of 
the  army  which  was  apparently  cut  off  from  the  main  body  by 
a  rapidly  rising  stream,  threw  an  overwhelming  force  (grand 
divisions  of  Generals  D.  H.  Hill,  Huger,  Longstreet,  and  G. 
W.  Smith)  upon  the  position  occupied  by  Casey's  division. 

It  is  not  necessary,  therefore,  to  go  outside  of 
McClellan's  "  Own  Story "  to  show  that,  -without  any 
explainable  motive,  he  exposed  two  corps  of  his  army 
to  destruction  with  open  eyes  ;  because  he  sent  them 
south  of  the  Chickahominy  after  three  days'  rain, 
when  the  waters  were  risingr  and  most  of  the  bridojes 
destroyed.  Not  only  so,  but  he  neither  recalled  nor 
reinforced  them,  after  four  more  days  of  continuous 
rains.  When  their  extreme  peril  came,  and  the  firing 
was  heard  at  Federal  headquarters,  we  have  McClellan's 
own  word  for  it  that  he  did  not  order  General  Sumner 
to  move,  but  only  to  "  get  his  command  under  arms,  and 
be  ready  to  move  at  a  moment's  warning." "  Instead 
of  waiting  for  further  orders,  Sumner  at  once  marched 
his  two  divisions  to  the  river,  and  halted  them  at  two 
bridges  he  had  built.  When  the  order  came  to  cross 
the  Chickahominy,  he  was,  therefore,  an  hour  in  ad- 
vance of  his  orders.  He  was  then  only  just  in  time  to 
cross  before  the  bridges  became  impassable.  McClellan 
says:  — 

1  Ovm  Story,  page  365.  »  Ibid.,  page  329. 


438        McCLELLAN'S   PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

On  the  31st,  when  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks  was  commenced, 
we  had  two  of  our  bridges  nearly  completed ;  but  the  rising 
waters  flooded  the  log-way  approaches  and  made  them  almost 
impassable,  so  that  it  was  only  by  the  greatest  efforts  that 
General  Sumner  crossed  his  corps  and  participated  in  that 
hard-fought  engagement.  The  bridges  became  totally  useless 
after  this  corps  had  passed.^ 

It  was  the  presence  of  Sumner's  corps  that  saved  the 
3d  and  4th  corps  from  destruction  on  the  first  day  of 
that  battle.  Porter  and  Franklin  with  their  corps  re- 
mained on  the  north  side  during  the  two  days'  fighting. 
The  rebels  fled  to  their  intrenchments  on  the  second 
day  in  such  disorder  that  some  United  States  officers  of 
high  rank  declared  afterwards  that  our  victorious  troops 
could  easily  have  followed  them  into  Richmond  before 
they  could  have  recovered  themselves.  No  effort,  how- 
ever, was  made  by  McClellan  to  utilize  the  unexpected 
victory,  and  the  treacherous  Chickahominy  continued 
to  flow  between  the  two  wings  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac. 

General  McClellan  then  declared  that  although  three 
fifths  of  his  army  had  routed  the  main  body  of  the 
enemy  at  Fair  Oaks,  he  could  make  no  further  move- 
ments until  he  had  received  large  reinforcements.  Gen- 
erals Heintzelman  and  Sumner  testified  to  the  contrary 
of  this  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
"War,  February  18, 1863.  General  Sumner  being  asked, 
"When  the  enemy  had  retreated  after  the  battle  of 
Fair  Oaks,  what  military  reasons  were  there  for  not 
immediately  following  them  up  to  Richmond  ? "  said  : 

^  Own  Story,  page  384. 


A  COSTLY   VICTORY  THROWN  AWAY        439 

1  know  of  none,  and,  from  information  we  got  afterwards, 
I  do  believe  that  if  the  general  ha<l  crossed  the  C'hickahominy 
with  the  residue  of  the  army,  and  made  a  general  attack  with 
his  whole  force,  we  would  have  carried  Richmond.  .  .  . 

From  information  we  received  afterwards,  the  enemy  were 
very  much  demoralized  by  the  accident  to  thoir  chief  at  that 
time.  There  was  no  other  officer  of  suitable  rank  to  take  com- 
mand there,  and  when  Johnston  was  knocked  from  his  horse 
and  taken  on  a  litter  to  Richmond,  the  rebel  army  became  a 
confused  mob,  and  if  we  had  attacked  with  our  whole  force, 
we  would  have  swept  everything  before  us,  and  I  think  the 
majorit}^  of  the  officers  who  were  there  think  so  now. 

General  Sumner  further  testified  that  General  Mc- 
Clellan  was  not  with  him  in  any  engagement  on  the 
peninsula.^ 

General  Heintzelman,  on  February  17,  testified  as 
follows,  regarding  what  occurred  on  the  day  following 
the  battle :  — 

I  sent  my  troops  forward,  and  they  got  within  about  four 
miles  of  Richmond.  They  sent  back  word  how  far  they  had 
got,  and  I  sent  that  word  to  General  McClellan.  He  ordered 
me  to  stop  and  fall  back  on  the  old  lines.  From  information 
we  got  from  the  rebels,  I  had  no  doubt  we  could  have  gone 
right  into  Richmond. 

Question  :  WTiere  was  General  McClellan  during  this 
battle  ? 

Answer :  He  was  on  the  other  side  of  the  Chickahominy. 
I  received  no  orders  from  him  during  this  battle.^ 

These  were  the  generals  who  fought  the  battle  of 
Fair  Oaks  without  any  directions  from  General  Mc- 
Clellan. 

»  Report  of  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  part  i.  p.  330. 

2  Ibid.,  page  352. 


CHAPTER  LIX 

McClellan   lies   down   on   the   Banks   of    the   Chickahominy   and 
awaits  an  Attack  which  he  says  will  destroy  his  Army. 

Two  days  after  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  General 
McClellan  issued  an  order  to  the  soldiers  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  in  which  he  said :  — 

Soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  —  I  have 
fulfilled  at  least  a  part  of  my  promise  to  you.  You  are  now 
face  to  face  with  the  rebels,  who  are  at  bay  in  front  of  their 
capital.  The  final  and  decisive  battle  is  at  hand.  Unless 
you  belie  your  past  history  the  result  cannot  be  for  a  moment 
doubtful.  If  the  troops  who  labored  so  patiently  and  fought 
so  gallantly  at  Yorktown,  and  so  bravely  won  the  hard  fights 
at  Williamsburg,  West  Point,  Hanover  Court  House,  and 
Fair  Oaks  now  prove  worthy  of  their  antecedents,  the  victory 
is  surely  ours.  The  events  of  every  day  prove  your  supe- 
riority ;  wherever  you  have  met  the  enemy  you  have  beaten 
him ;  wherever  you  have  used  the  bayonet  he  has  given  away 
in  panic  and  disaster.  I  ask  of  you  now  one  last  crowning 
effort.  The  enemy  has  staked  his  all  on  the  issue  of  the 
coming  battle.  Let  us  meet  and  crush  him  here  in  the  very 
centre  of  the  rebellion. 

Soldiers,  I  will  be  with  you  in  this  battle  and  share  its 
dangers  with  you.  Our  confidence  in  each  other  is  now 
founded  upon  the  past.  Let  us  strike  the  blow  which  is  to 
restore  peace  and  union  to  this  distracted  land.  Upon  your 
valor,  discipline,  and  mutual  confidence  that  result  depends.^ 

^  But  no  blow  followed  until  twenty-four  days  later,  and  that  was 
delivered  by  the  enemy  at  Mechanicsville  June  26. 


ON  THE  BANKS   OF  THE  CHICKAHOMINY     441 

To  Secretary  Stanton  he  telegraphed  the  same  day, 
June  2  :  — 

Our  troops  charged  frequently  on  both  days  and  uniforndy 
broke  the  enemy.  The  result  is  that  our  left  is  within  four 
miles  of  Richmond.  I  only  wait  for  the  river  to  fall  to  cross 
with  the  rest  of  the  troops  and  make  a  general  attack. 
Should  I  find  them  holding  firm  in  a  very  strong  position, 
I  may  wait  for  what  troops  I  can  bring  up  from  Fortress 
Monroe ;  but  the  morale  of  my  troops  now  is  such  that  I  can 
venture  much  and  do  not  fear  for  odds  against  me. 

Secretary  Stanton  immediately  replied  :  — 

Your  telegram  has  been  received,  and  we  greatly  rejoice  at 
your  success,  not  only  of  itself,  but  because  of  the  dauntless 
spirit  and  courage  displayed  in  your  troops.  .  .  . 

All  interest  now  centres  in  your  operations  and  full  con- 
fidence is  entertained  of  your  briUiant  and  glorious  success. 

On  the  5th  Mr.  Stanton  telegraphed  him  that  five 
new  regiments  would  be  sent  him  at  once,  and,  on  the 
6th,  that  McCall's  division  would  be  sent  him  from 
Fredericksburg  as  soon  as  transportation  could  be  had. 

On  the  7th  of  June  McClellan  telegraphed  to  Stan- 
ton :  — 

I  shall  be  in  perfect  readiness  to  attack  Richmond  the 
moment  McCall  reaches  here  and  the  ground  will  admit  of 
the  passage  of  artillery. 

On  the  11th  he  telegraphed  Stanton  :  — 

McCall's  troops  have  commenced  arriving  at  White  House. 
I  have  sent  instructions.  Weather  good  to-day.  Glad  to 
hear  of  Commodore  Dupont's  and  Hunter's  progress.  Give 
me  a  little  good  weather,  and  I  shall  have  progress  to  report 
here. 


442        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CA^IPAIGN 
On  the  12th  he  telegraphed  :  — 
Weather  now  good. 

But  still  the  digging  of  intrenchments  went  on, 
behind  which  our  men  were  to  be  protected  from  rebel 
attacks.  The  enemy  was  not  to  be  attacked  —  he  never 
had  been.  So  long  as  he  would  be  quiet  there  would 
be  no  trouble. 

During  all  this  period  of  criminal  blundering  and 
procrastination  no  complaints  reached  McClellan  from 
Washington,  but  instead  words  of  good  cheer  and 
unceasing  efforts  to  strengthen  his  hands.  On  the 
11th  of  June  Secretary  Stanton  telegraphed  him  as 
follows :  — 

Your  dispatch  of  three  thirty  (3.30)  yesterday  has  been 
received.  I  am  fully  impressed  with  the  difficulties  men- 
tioned, and  whicli  no  art  or  skill  can  avoid,  but  only  endure, 
and  am  striving  to  the  utmost  to  render  you  every  aid  in  the 
power  of  the  government.  McCall's  force  was  reported  yes- 
terday as  having  embarked  and  on  its  way  to  join  you.  It  is 
intended  to  send  the  residue  of  McDowell's  force  also  to  join 
you  as  soon  as  possible. 

Fremont  had  a  hard  fight  yesterday  with  Jackson's  force 
at  Union  Church,  eight  miles  from  Harrisonburg.  He  claims 
the  victory,  but  was  pretty  badly  handled.  It  is  clear  that 
a  strong  force  is  operating  with  Jackson  for  the  purpose  of 
detaining  the  forces  here  from  you.  I  am  urging  as  fast  as 
possible  the  new  levies. 

Be  assured,  general,  that  there  never  has  been  a  moment 
when  my  desire  has  been  otherwise  than  to  aid  you  with  my 
whole  heart,  mind,  and  strength,  since  the  hour  we  first  met ; 
and  whatever  others  may  say  for  their  own  purposes,  you 
have  never  had  and  never  can  have  any  one  more  truly  your 


CRIMINAL   PROCRASTINATION  -143 

friend,  or  more  anxious  to  supj)ort  yoii,  or  more  joyiul  at  the 
success  which,  I  have  no  doubt,  will  soon  be  achieved  by 
your  arms. 

On  the  14th  McClellan  telegraphed  Stanton  that  the 
weather  was  favorable ;  that  he  hoped  two  days  more 
would  make  the  ground  practicable ;  that  he  should 
advance  as  soon  as  the  bridges  were  completed  and  the 
ground  fit  for  the  artillery  to  move.  He  incidentally 
remarked  that  he  would  be  glad  to  have  whatever 
troops  could  be  sent  him. 

On  the  15th  he  reported  more  rain,  and  explained 
that  they  "  must  have  a  few  days  of  dry  weather  to 
make  the  ground  firm  enough  to  sustiiin  the  guns 
before  advancing." 

June  18  McClellan  telegraphed  Stanton  that  Jackson 
(then  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley)  was  being  reinforced 
from  Lee's  army  at  Richmond.  This  movement  had 
been  going  on  for  ten  days.  He  thought  the  force 
sent  away  from  Richmond  to  support  Jackson  was  not 
less  than  ten  thousand.  To  this  the  President  replied 
that  the  information  had  been  corroborated  ;  his  dis- 
patch concluded  thus  :  — 

If  this  is  true,  it  is  as  good  as  a  reinforcement  to  you  of  an 
equal  force.  I  could  better  dispose  of  things  if  I  knew  about 
what  day  you  could  attack  Richmond,  and  would  be  glad  to 
be  informed,  if  you  think  you  can  inform  me  with  safety. 

On  the  same  day  McClellan  telegraphed  the  Presi- 
dent as  follows  :  — 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  receipt  of  your  dispatch 
of  to-day.  Our  army  is  well  over  the  Chickahominy,  except 
the  very  considerable  force  necessary  to  protect  our  flanks 


444        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAISIPAIGN 

and  communications.  Our  whole  line  of  pickets  in  front  runs 
within  six  miles  of  Richmond.  The  rebel  line  runs  within 
musket  range  of  ours.  Each  has  heavy  support  at  hand. 
A  general  engagement  may  take  place  at  any  hour.  An 
advance  by  us  involves  a  battle  more  or  less  decisive.  The 
enemy  exhibit  at  every  point  a  readiness  to  meet  us.  They 
certainly  have  great  numbers  and  extensive  works.  If  ten 
thousand  or  fifteen  thousand  men  have  left  Richmond  to 
reinforce  Jackson,  it  illustrates  their  strength  and  confidence.^ 
After  to-morrow  we  shall  fight  the  rebel  army  as  soon  as 
Providence  will  permit.  We  shall  await  only  a  favorable 
condition  of  the  earth  and  sky  and  the  completion  of  some 
necessary  preliminaries. 

The  favorable  conjunction  of  circumstances  described 
in  the  above  never  arrived.  The  completion  of  the 
"  necessary  preliminaries  "  was  never  accomplished. 

McClellan  was  now,  with  the  main  body  of  his  army, 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Chickahominy,  while  his  base 
of  supplies  and  his  "  considerable  force "  guarding 
them  were  on  the  other  side.  This  rear  guard  con- 
sisted of  Fitz  John  Porter's  5th  corps,  to  which  had 
been  added  McCall's  division. 

On  the  23d  McClellan  directed  Porter,  if  attacked,  to 
promptly  and  carefully  state  the  number,  composition, 
and  position  of  the  enemy.  "  The  troops  on  this  side" 
(of  the  Chickahominy),  he  said,  "  will  be  ready  to  sup- 
port you,  or  to  attack  the  enemy  directly  in  their  front. 
If  the  force  attacking  you  is  large,  the  general  would 
prefer  the  latter  course,  counting  on  your  skill  and  the 
admirable  troops  under  your  command  to  hold  their 

^  It  illustrated  rather  their  confidence  in  the  continued  inaction  of  the 
Union  commander. 


HE  AWAITS  AN  ATTACK  445 

own  against  superior  numbers  long  enough  for  him  to 
make  the  decisive  movement  which  will  determine  the 
fate  of  Richmond." 

Although  he  kept  up  some  appearance  of  an  inten- 
tion to  advance  upon  the  defenses  of  Richmond,  he  had 
commenced  preparations  as  early  as  the  18th  of  June 
for  a  chausre  of  base  to  the  James  River.  This  is  made 
apparent  from  the  following  statement  in  his  '^  Own 
Story :  *  — 

In  anticipation  of  a  speedy  advance  upon  Richmond,  to 
provide  for  the  contingency  of  our  communications  with  the 
depot  at  the  White  House  being  severed  by  the  enemy,  and 
at  the  same  time  to  be  prepared  for  a  change  of  the  base 
of  our  operations  to  James  River,  if  circumstances  should 
render  it  advisable,  I  had  made  arrangements  more  than  a 
week  previous  (on  the  18th)  to  have  transports  with  supplies 
of  provisions  and  forage,  under  a  convoy  of  gunboats,  sent 
up  James  River. 

On  the  21:th  he  telegraphed  the  Secretary  of  War  as 
follows  :  — 

A  very  peculiar  case  of  desertion  has  just  occurred  from 
the  enemy.  The  party  states  that  he  left  Jackson,  Whiting, 
and  Ewell  (15  brigades)  at  Gordonsville  on  the  2l8t ;  that 
they  were  moving  to  Frederick's  Hall,  and  that  it  was  in- 
tended to  attack  my  rear  on  the  28th.2 

On  the  25th  he  telegraphed  ^  that  he  had  information 
that  Jackson's  advance  was  near  Hanover  Court  House ; 
that  Beauregard  had  arrived  with  strong  reinforcements 
in  Richmond;  that  he  thought  Jackson  would  attack 
his  right  and  rear;  that  the  rebel  force  was  stated  at 

»  Own  Story,  page  411.  ^  /^/^^  p^ge  390.  8  juj^^  p.^gg  392. 


446        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

200,000  (!) ;  that  he  regretted  his  great  inferiority  in 
numbers,  but  felt  that  he  was  in  no  way  responsible, 
as  he  had  repeatedly  called  for  reinforcements ;  that  he 
would  do  all  a  general  could  do  with  such  a  splendid 
army,  and  that,  if  the  army  was  destroyed,  he  could  at 
least  die  with  it ;  that  if  the  result  of  the  action,  which 
would  probably  occur  on  the  next  day  or  very  soon, 
should  be  disaster,  the  responsibility  could  not  be 
thrown  on  his  shoulders,  but  must  rest  where  it  be- 
longed ;  and  that  he  would  probably  be  attacked  the 
next  day,  and  would  make  preparations  for  a  defense. 
He  concluded  by  saying  that  he  felt  that  there  was 
"  no  use  in  again  asking  for  reinforcements." 

In  all  this  lugubrious  outpouring  he  gives  no  excuse 
for  awaiting  the  attack  of  what  he  said  was  a  superior 
and  an  irresistible  force,  instead  of  withdrawing  his 
army  to  the  James  River  as  he  had  been  contemplating 
for  a  week.  He  was  informed  on  the  24th  that  he 
would  be  attacked  on  the  28th  by  an  overwhelming 
force  of  the  enemy,  reinforced  by  Jackson,  but  he  did 
not  act  upon  the  information.  The  only  step  he  ap- 
pears to  have  taken  was  to  telegraph  the  Secretary  of 
War  an  assurance  that  the  army  would  certainly  be 
destroyed  three  days  later  because  the  government 
willfully  refused  to  sustain  it,  and  that  he  would  await 
the  attack  and  die  with  it. 


CHAPTER   LX 

The  Seven  Days'  Battles. 

McClellan  informs  us^  that  up  to  the  2Gth  of 
June  the  operations  against  Richmond  had  been  con- 
ducted from  the  east  and  northeast,  but  that  "  the  dis- 
sipation then  of  all  hope  of  cooperation  by  land  of 
General  McDowell's  forces "  compelled  an  immediate 
change  of  base  across  the  peninsula. 

From  this  it  might  be  inferred  that  until  the  26th  he 
had  rehed  upon  the  support  of  McDowell's  command. 
But  he  contradicts  this  view.  Referring  to  his  tele- 
gram to  Stanton  of  June  7,  he  says :  — 

As  I  did  not  think  it  probable  that  any  reinforcements 
would  be  sent  me  in  time  for  the  advance  on  Richmond,  I 
stated  in  the  foregoing  dispatch  that  I  should  be  ready  to 
move  when  General  McCall's  division  joined  me.^ 

McCall's  division  of  10,000  men,  taken  from  Mc- 
Dowell's command,  reached  him  on  the  11th,  and  he 
reported  good  weather  for  the  next  four  days ;  but  he 
made  no  advance  on  Richmond. 

If  the  change  of  base  had  been  rendered  necessary 
by  the  failure  to  send  him  all  of  McDowell's  command, 
why  did  he  not  commence  that  movement  as  soon  as  he 
became  satisfied  that  McDowell  was  not  coming?    This, 

^  Oum  Story,  page  411.  2  Ibid.,  page  387. 


448        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

as  above  shown,  would  have  been  as  early  as  the  7th. 
Why  was  McCall's  division  sufficient  to  justify  an  attack 
on  Eichmond  until  it  arrived  on  the  11th,  and  not 
sufficient  after  it  arrived  ? 

On  the  15th  of  June  the  President  wrote  McClellan 
that  he  feared  McDowell  would  be  unable  to  get  to  him 
in  time.  If  the  fact  that  he  could  not  have  McDowell 
with  him  compelled  him,  on  the  26th,  to  change  base  to 
the  James  River,  why  had  not  the  same  fact,  when  thus 
officially  made  known  to  him  on  the  15th,  induced  the 
same  decision  ? 

The  truth  appears  to  be  that  he  never  fully  decided 
when  to  change  base  until  the  morning  after  the  battle 
of  Gaines's  Mill,  the  second  of  the  Seven  Days'  battles, 
which  was  fought  on  the  27th. 

In  General  McClellan's  report  of  the  battle  of 
Mechanicsville,  of  the  26th  of  June,  after  stating  the 
disposition  of  the  right  wing  under  General  Fitz  John 
Porter  (consisting  of  three  divisions  on  the  north  or 
left  bank  of  the  Chickahominy),  he  makes  the  following 
extraordinary  statement :  — 

Such  was  the  state  of  affairs  on  the  morning  of  June  26. 
I  was  by  that  time  satisfied  that  I  had  to  deal  with  at  least 
twice  my  numbers,  but  so  great  was  my  confidence  in  the 
conduct  of  the  officers  and  the  devotion  of  the  men,  that  I 
felt  contented  to  calmly  await  the  bursting  of  the  coming 
storm,  ready  to  profit  by  any  fault  of  the  enemy,  and  sure 
that  I  could  extricate  the  army  from  any  difficulty  in  which 
it  might  become  involved.  No  other  course  was  open  to  me, 
for  my  information  in  regard  to  the  movement  of  the  enemy 
was  too  meagre  to  enable  me  to  take  a  decided  course.^ 
^  War  Records,  vol.  xi.  part  ii.  p.  20. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  MECHANICSVILLE  449 

And  yet,  in  the  beginning  of  this  same  report,  he 
says:  — 

On  the  24th  of  June  I  received  information  that  appeared 
entitled  to  some  credit,  that  Jackson  was  at  Frederick's  Hall 
with  his  entire  force,  consisting  of  his  own  division  with  those 
of  Ewell  and  "Whiting,  and  that  his  intention  was  to  attack 
my  Hank  and  rear,  in  order  to  cut  oft"  our  communications 
with  the  White  House,  and  throw  the  right  wing  of  the  army 
into  the  Chickahorainy.  Fortunately  I  had  a  few  days  before 
proA-ided  against  this  contingency  by  ordering  a  number  of 
transports  to  the  James  River,  loaded  with  commissary,  quar- 
termaster, and  ordnance  supplies,  and,  therefore,  felt  free  to 
watch  the  enemy  closely,  await  events,  and  act  according  to 
circumstances,  feeling  sure  that  if  cut  off  from  the  Pamunkey, 
I  coiUd  gain  the  James  River  for  a  new  base. 

It  will  always  appear  to  the  non-military  mind  that 
he  could  have  gained  the  James  River  for  a  new  base 
easily,  and  without  serious  loss,  if  he  had  started  the 
movement  actively  on  the  24th,  instead  of  "  calmly 
awaiting  the  bursting  of  the  coming  storm  "  on  the 
27th,  which  he  deemed  irresistible,  and  which  raged 
for  a  week,  with  a  loss  to  the  Union  cause  of  9800 
killed  and  wounded,  and  6000  missing. 

At  the  battle  of  Mechanicsville  (or  Beaver  Dam)  on 
the  26th,  Porter  repulsed  the  enemy  repeatedly,  and 
remained  in  full  possession  of  the  field  when  the  battle 
ended  at  nine  o'clock.  He  reported  that  with  5000 
men  he  had  defeated  10,000,  and  had  lost  250  men 
against  a  loss  of  2000  by  the  rebels. 

This  victory  was  most  disastrous  to  the  morale  of  the 
enemy,  and  might  have  been  followed  up  with  great 
effect.     The  Confederate  general,  Longstreet,  declared 


450        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

in  later  years  that  "  next  to  Malvern  Hill,  the  sacrifice 
at  Beaver  Dam  was  unequaled  in  demoralization  during 
the  entire  summer."  ^ 

Late  in  the  evening  after  this  battle  had  been  won, 
Porter  urged  McClellan,  who  had  visited  his  headquar- 
ters, to  make  the  attack  on  Richmond  the  next  day  with 
the  main  army,  assuring  him  that  in  such  an  event  he 
could  with  small  reinforcements  hold  his  ground  on  the 
north  side  of  the  Chickahominy. 

This  would  simply  have  been  carrjdng  into  effect 
McClellan's  assurance  contained  in  his  order  to  Porter 
of  the  23d,  quoted  in  the  preceding  chapter.  McClel- 
lan returned  to  his  own  headquarters,  having  decided 
nothing,  and  given  Porter  no  information  of  his  inten- 
tions. If,  as  in  his  book  he  says  he  did,  he  really 
"  bent  all  his  energies  from  the  evening  of  the  26th  to 
a  change  of  base  to  the  James  River,"  Porter,  who  saw 
him  that  evening,  knew  nothing  of  it.  He  still  had 
only  for  his  guidance  McClellan's  order  of  the  23d, 
namely,  that  if  attacked  he  was  to  hold  his  own,  even 
if  against  superior  numbers,  long  enough  for  McClellan 
to  make  the  decisive  movement  on  the  other  side  of  the 
river,  which  would  determine  the  fate  of  Richmond. 
At  daylight  of  the  27th  Porter  was  ordered  to  a  posi- 
tion near  Gaines's  Mill,  with  no  intimation  that  he  was 
merely  to  cover  a  retreat  of  the  main  army.  His  new 
position  was  still  north  of  the  Chickahominy,  covering 
the  most  important  bridge  across  that  stream. 

McClellan  states  that  he  had  certain  information  on 
the  26th  that  Jackson  was  rapidly  advancing  in  strong 

^  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  vol.  ii.  p.  398. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  GAINES'S  MILL  461 

force  from  Hanover  Court  House,  and  that  his  advance 
guard  had  probably  participated  in  the  battle  of  that 
day.  Thus  informed,  he  allowed  Porter,  with  only 
about  one  fourth  of  the  army,  to  be  overwhelmed  on 
the  27th  by  more  than  three  fourths  of  the  army  of 
Lee.  Having  a  month  before  exposed  three  fifths  of 
his  army  to  destruction,  at  Fair  Oaks,  by  a  force  said 
by  him  to  be  double  that  of  his  entire  army,  so,  at  the 
battle  of  Gaines's  Mill,  he  allowed  Porter,  with  very 
meagre  reinforcements  (his  whole  force  never  exceeding 
30,000  at  any  time  during  the  day),  to  receive  the  shock 
of  all  the  forces  which  the  enemy  chose  to  bring  against 
him  (estimated  at  65,000).^ 

Confederate  accounts  all  agree  that  the  main  body 
of  their  army  fought  the  battle  of  Gaines's  Mill.  The 
main  body  of  the  Union  army  remained  on  the  other 
side  of  the  Chickahominy  River  in  front  of  Richmond, 
neither  reinforcing  Porter  nor  advancing  on  that  place. 
McClellan  utterly  ignored  his  assurance  to  Porter  that 
"  the  troops  on  this  side  will  be  held  ready  either  to 
support  you  directly,  or  to  attack  the  enemy  in  their 
front." 

'  General  Porter  says  :  "  The  forces  in  this  battle  were,  Union,  50  regi- 
ments, 20  batteries  (several  not  engaged)  ;  in  all  about  30,000  fighting 
men  (including  the  reinforcements  received  during  the  day)  ;  Confed- 
erate, 129  regiments,  19  batteries  ;  in  all  about  65,000."  Battles  and 
Leaders,  vol.  ii.  p.  337. 

General  McClellan  estimated  the  Union  forces  engaged  in  the  battle  at 
35,000  and  the  Confederate  forces  at  70,000.  McClellan's  Report,  War 
Records,  vol.  xi.  part  i.  p.  5G. 

McClellan's  official  report  of  June  20  showed  the  number  of  liis  army 
present  and  equipped  to  be  114,691.  The  official  estimate  of  Lee's  forces 
at  that  time  was  80,762. 


452        McCLELLAN'S  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

More  than  80,000  Union  troops  remained  inactive, 
while  30,000  fought  more  than  twice  their  number,  in 
the  most  useless  and  hopeless  battle  ever  recorded  in 
history,  as  it  was  one  of  the  bloodiest  of  the  war  against 
the  rebellion.  The  Union  loss  was  4000  killed  and 
wounded,  and  that  of  the  enemy  about  5000.  General 
McClellan  was  at  no  time  on  the  field,  and  gave  no 
order  during  the  battle. 

Two  battles  having  thus  been  forced  upon  him  by 
the  enemy,  and  the  second  having  been  most  disastrous, 
he  was  finally  able  to  bring  himself  to  a  decision  as  to 
the  course  to  be  pursued.  During  the  night  of  the 
27th  he  summoned  his  corps  commanders,  and  gave 
orders  for  the  retreat  to  the  James  River.  The  surviv- 
ors of  Porter's  5th  corps,  which  had  fought  both 
battles,  retired  safely  across  the  Chickahominy,  burning 
the  bridges  behind  them  and  joining  the  main  army,  as 
they  could  have  done  with  greater  ease  and  entire  safety 
the  day  before,  after  the  battle  of  Mechanicsville. 

Stung  with  mortification,  and  anxious  to  shift  the 
responsibility  of  this  terrible  defeat,  for  which  he  was 
alone  to  blame,  McClellan  on  the  28th  sent  the  follow- 
ing absurd  and  untruthful  dispatch  to  the  Secretary  of 
War:  — 

I  now  know  the  full  history  of  the  day.  On  this  side  of 
the  river  (the  right  bank),  we  repulsed  several  attacks. 
On  the  left  bank  our  men  did  all  that  men  could  do,  —  all 
that  soldiers  could  accomplish,  —  but  they  were  overwhelmed 
by  vastly  superior  numbers,  even  after  I  brought  my  last 
reserves  into  action.  The  loss  on  both  sides  is  terrible.  I 
believe  it  will  prove  to  be  the  most  desperate  battle  of  the 


AN  UNTRUTHFUL   DISPATCH  463 

war.  The  sad  remnants  of  my  men  behave  as  men.  Those 
battalions  who  fought  most  bravely  and  suffered  most  are 
still  in  the  best  order.  My  regulars  were  superb,  and  I  count 
ujK)n  what  are  left  to  turn  another  battle  in  company  with  the 
gallant  comrades  of  the  volunteers. 

Had  I  twenty  or  even  ten  thousand  fresh  troops  to  use 
to-morrow,  I  could  take  Kichmond,  but  I  have  not  a  man  in 
reserve,  and  shall  be  glad  to  cover  my  retreat  and  save  the 
material  and  personnel  of  the  army.  If  we  have  lost  the  day, 
we  have  yet  preserved  our  honor,  and  no  one  need  blush  for 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

I  have  lost  this  battle  because  my  force  was  too  small.  I 
again  repeat  that  I  am  not  responsible  for  this ;  and  I  say  it 
with  the  earnestness  of  a  general  who  feels  in  his  heart  the 
loss  of  every  brave  man  who  has  been  needlessly  sacrificed 
to-day. 

I  still  hope  to  retrieve  our  fortunes,  but  to  do  this  the  gov- 
ernment must  view  this  matter  with  the  same  earnestness  that 
I  do ;  you  must  send  me  very  large  reinforcements,  and  send 
them  at  once.  I  shall  draw  back  to  this  side  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy,  and  think  I  can  withdraw  all  of  our  material.  Please 
understand  that  in  this  battle  we  have  lost  nothing  but  men, 
and  those  the  best  we  have.  In  addition  to  what  I  have  al- 
ready said,  I  only  wish  to  say  to  the  President  that  I  think  he 
is  wrong  in  regarding  me  as  ungenerous  when  I  say  that  my 
force  was  too  small.  I  merely  reiterate  a  truth  which  to-day 
has  been  plainly  proven.  I  should  have  gained  this  battle 
with  ten  thousand  fresh  men.  If  at  this  instant  I  could  dis- 
pose of  ten  thousand  fresh  men,  I  would  gain  a  victory  to- 
morrow. I  know  a  few  thousand  more  men  would  have 
changed  this  battle  from  a  defeat  into  a  victory.  As  it  is, 
the  government  cannot  hold  me  responsible  for  the  result.  I 
feel  too  earnestly  —  I  have  seen  too  many  dead  and  woiuided 
comrades  to  feel  otherwise  than  that  —  the  government  has 


454        McCLELLAN'S   PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 

not  sustained  this  army.     If  you  do  not  do  so  now  the  game 
is  lost.i 

Let  the  dispatch  be  compared  with  the  facts  as  shown 
by  the  record,  and  its  mendacity  becomes  at  once  appar- 
ent. He  did  not  lose  the  battle  because  "  his  force  was 
too  small,"  but  because  he  allowed  65,000  of  the  enemy 
to  be  opposed  by  but  30,000  of  his  own  force  of 
114,000,  while  he  kept  84,000  troops  across  the  Chick- 
ahominy,  and  away  from  the  battle  that  was  raging, 
to  watch  15,000  of  the  enemy  behind  the  defenses  of 
Richmond. 

The  testimony  of  the  corps  commanders  shows  that 

^  The  original  of  this  dispatch  is  not  in  the  files  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment. The  foregoing  copy  will  be  found  in  part  i.  of  the  Report  of  the 
Joint  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  at  page  339.  It  there 
appears  as  having  been  furnished  in  evidence  by  Major-General  E.  A. 
Hitchcock  on  the  21st  of  January,  1863.  He  was  then  on  duty  in  the 
War  Department  and  had  been  during  the  preceding  ten  months.  The 
original  being  lost,  this  copy  would  seem  to  be  authority  for  the  text 
of  that  dispatch  as  it  was  received  at  the  department.  More  than  six 
months  after  the  copy  had  been  furnished  by  General  Hitchcock,  Gen- 
eral McClellan  forwarded  to  the  adjutant-general  from  his  home  in  New 
Jersey  his  final  report  of  all  the  operations  of  the  army  under  his  com- 
mand. It  was  dated  August  4, 1863.  In  that  report  he  inserts  the  above 
dispatch  of  June  28,  but  with  these  alterations  :  — 

The  words,  "  I  should  have  gained  this  battle  with  ten  thousand  fresh 
men,"  are  stricken  out,  and  the  following  words  are  added  :  "  If  I  save 
this  army  now,  I  tell  you  plainly  that  I  owe  no  thanks  to  you  or  to  any 
person  in  Washington.     You  have  done  your  best  to  sacrifice  this  army." 

In  the  absence  of  any  further  proof  on  the  subject,  it  is  fair  to  assume 
that  the  dispatch  as  furnished  by  General  Hitchcock  contains  all  that 
McClellan  sent  to  Secretary  Stanton,  while  the  one  embodied  in  his  re- 
port contains  the  original  draft  which  he  changed  before  sending.  It  is 
not  a  matter  of  vital  importance,  but  it  seems  proper  that  the  record  as 
made  up  by  him  should  be  corrected  to  conform  with  the  record  which 
General  Hitchcock  furnished  from  the  War  Department. 


AN  UNNECESSARY  SACRIFICE   OF  LIFE        455 

each  one  fought  on  his  own  account  in  the  bloody  bat- 
tles Avhich  followed  during  the  retreat  to  the  James 
River,  the  energ-ies  of  the  «»eneral  in  command  bein<r 
devoted  to  selecting  the  line  on  which  our  army  should 
retreat  after  each  day's  fightmg.  There  is  nothing  in 
McClellan's  report  or  those  of  his  subordinates  to  show 
that  the  fate  of  any  battle  was  affected  by  any  order  of 
his.  He  had  been  compelled  to  change  base  in  front 
of  the  enemy,  because  he  had  waited  for  the  enemy  to 
arrive  at  his  front  and  attack  him  instead  of  executing 
such  change  at  the  time  its  necessity  became  known  to 
him  on  the  2J:th  of  June. 

The  valor  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  during  the 
Seven  Days'  battles  made  its  name  immortal  m  the 
annals  of  the  war,  but  the  carnage  of  that  week  was 
an  unnecessary  sacrifice  of  life,  in  a  series  of  battles 
in  each  of  which  our  troops  were  on  the  defensive, 
althouo^h  in  most  of  them  \4ctorious. 

McClellan  says :  — 

The  battles  which  continued  day  aft^r  day  in  the  progi*ess 
of  our  flank  movement  to  the  James,  with  the  exception  of 
the  one  at  Gaines's  Mill,  were  successes  to  our  arms,  and  the 
closing  engagement  at  Malvern  Hill  was  the  most  decisive  of 
aU.i 

Malvern  Hill  might,  indeed,  have  been  most  decisive, 
but  this  decisive  victory  was,  to  McClellan,  only  a  call 
for  his  final  retreat.  The  beaten  and  demoralized 
enemy  were  allowed  to  depart  in  peace,  while  the  vic- 
tors,  under  McClellan's  orders,   fled  from   them   and 

*  Own  Story,  page  423. 


456        McCLELLAN'S   PENINSULAE  CAMPAIGN 

rested  on  the  bank  of  the  James.     Says  General  Mc- 
Clellan  of  this  successful  flight :  — 

So  long  as  life  lasts,  the  survivors  of  those  glorious  days 
will  remember  with  quickened  pulse  the  attitude  of  that  army 
when  it  reached  the  goal  for  which  it  had  striven  with  such 
transcendent  heroism.^ 

Their  heroism  and  sacrifices  were  worthy  of  a  better 
result. 

Exhausted  and  demoralized,  our  forces  reached  Har- 
rison's Landing  on  the  2d  day  of  July.  The  Union 
cause  seemed  well-nigh  lost,  and  the  enemy  were  corre- 
spondingly elated. 

The  Federal  losses  in  the  Seven  Days'  battles  were 
1734  killed,  8062  wounded,  6053  missing,  —  total, 
15,849. 

The  losses  on  the  Confederate  side  were  2823  killed, 
13,703  wounded,  and  3223  missing,  —  total,  19,749.2 

^  Own  Story,  page  439.  ^  Ibid.,  page  440. 


CAMBRIDGE,  MASSACHUSETTS,  U.  S.  A. 

BLECTROTVPED  AND  PRINTED  BY 

H.  O.  HOUGHTON  AND  CO. 


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